The Handbook of Conflict Resolution

Theory and Practice

Second Edition

Morton Deutsch
Peter T. Coleman
Eric C. Marcus
Editors

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More Praise for *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Second Edition*

“Morton Deutsch, Peter Coleman, and Eric Marcus put together a handbook that will be helpful to many. I hope the book will reach well beyond North America to contribute to the growing worldwide interest in the constructive resolution of conflict. This book offers instructive ways to make this commitment a reality.”

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“In the past, I have been saying to all of my students at Kyushu University and the participants in my mediation trainings, ‘If you are serious about mediation, read *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution.*’ Now seeing the updated and enlarged second edition, I would say, ‘Read it, for it will help you become a thoughtful and insightful mediator.’”

—Hisako Kobayashi-Levin, associate professor, Faculty of Law, Kyushu University
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PREFACE

The field of conflict resolution has been developing rapidly. As a consequence, we decided to update and revise the first edition of this handbook. Almost all of the chapters in the first edition have been updated; in some, the revisions have been extensive and in others, only minor changes seemed necessary. Also, we have added new chapters to cover topics that were not covered or needed more coverage than they received in the first edition.

The new chapters have an asterisk next to them in the Contents. They are important, original contributions to the field of conflict resolution by outstanding scholars and practitioners as are the updated chapters from the first edition.

In the Preface to the first edition, we characterized the purpose of the handbook, its organization, professional value, and the handbook’s orientation. All of this is expressed in this modified Preface to the first edition. The modification was made so that the description of the different parts of the book, and the chapters contained in these parts, correspond to the revised, second edition rather than to the first edition.

This book is meant for those who wish to deepen their understanding of the processes involved in conflicts and their knowledge of how to manage them constructively. It provides the theoretical underpinnings that throw light on the fundamental social psychological processes involved in understanding and managing conflicts at all levels: interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, and international.
As an area of scholarship and professional practice, conflict resolution is relatively young, having emerged as a discipline after World War II. Practice and theory have been only loosely linked. This book aims to foster closer connection between the two by demonstrating the relevance of theoretical ideas to practice. Though the link between theory and practice is inherently bidirectional, this handbook primarily emphasizes the path from theory to practice.

The theoretical ideas presented in this book were for the most part not developed specifically in relation to understanding conflict, nor to facilitate professional practice in this area. They have relevance to any area in which it is important to understand the basic processes involved in social interactions of all sorts, in various contexts—at work; in politics, schools, families, clinics, courts, and bedrooms; on highways; and elsewhere. For the purposes of this book, the authors have developed their chapters to bring out the relevance of the theories being discussed to understanding conflict specifically.

When appropriate, chapters contain three sections. The first deals with the theoretical ideas in the substantive area being discussed. The second draws out the implications of these ideas for understanding conflict, and the third is concerned with the implications of these ideas for educating or training people to manage their conflicts more constructively.

The Handbook of Conflict Resolution is divided into sections somewhat arbitrarily, and inevitably there is overlap among them. The introductory chapter gives examples of real conflicts and indicates the kinds of questions one might pose to understand what is going on in the conflicts—questions that are addressed in many of these chapters. The Introduction also has a brief discussion of the orientations of the practitioners on the one hand and the researcher-theorists on the other, to permit some insight into the misunderstandings that often occur between these two groups. It also contains an abbreviated history of the study of conflict, from a social psychological perspective, and indicates the sorts of questions that have been and are being addressed.

Parts One through Four comprise the major portion of the book and present the theoretical ideas that have been developed (mainly in areas of social psychology) that are useful in understanding conflict processes as well as in helping people to learn to manage their conflicts constructively. The authors of the chapters in the first four parts discuss the practical implications of their ideas for conflict as well as the theoretical foundations underlying the implications they draw.

Even apart from their usefulness for conflict, the theoretical ideas should be of value to anyone interested in understanding the nature of basic social psychological processes involved in social interactions of any kind. The table of contents for Parts One through Four indicates to the reader the broad range of theoretical ideas and their implications for conflict that are discussed in this
section. They are grouped, arbitrarily, into interpersonal and intergroup processes, intrapsychic processes, personal difference, and creativity and change. Almost all of the chapters discuss matters that cross such arbitrary boundaries. New chapters (Chapters Seven, Ten, Twelve, Fourteen, and Nineteen) respectively deal with language, emotion, gender, and personal implicit theories as they relate to conflict.

Part Five is concerned with difficult conflicts. Two revised chapters (Twenty-Three and Twenty-Four) are concerned with aggression as violence and intractable conflict, respectively. Three new chapters have been added: Chapter Twenty-Five is focused on moral conflict, Chapter Twenty-Six is concerned with religious issues, and Chapter Twenty-Seven deals with the connections between human rights and conflicts.

Part Six contains three chapters that consider the relation between culture and conflict, each from a somewhat different perspective. Chapters Twenty-Eight and Twenty-Nine (a new chapter) examine some of the common sorts of misunderstanding that can arise when people from varying cultural backgrounds interact and what can be done to help people learn to understand one another's cultural background. Then Chapter Thirty examines an influential theoretical approach to conflict resolution, developed in the United States, to see how it is (or is not) applicable to conflict in the entirely different context of China.

Part Seven is most directly concerned with practice. The first of its chapters presents the Coleman-Raider Model for training in constructive conflict resolution, which has been extensively used by our colleagues in the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution. Chapter Thirty-Two discusses mediation, as well as its values and limitations, from the perspective of someone who is both a highly respected mediator and an outstanding researcher in this area. Chapter Thirty-Three then discusses recently developed methods of managing conflict in large groups by someone who has coauthored the first book in this area and who is a distinguished scholar and practitioner of these methods. Two new chapters have been added to this section. Chapter Thirty-Four is concerned with managing conflict in organizations by a leading scholar/practitioner in this area, and Chapter Thirty-Five presents reflections on practice by one of the most creative practitioners in the field.

Finally, in Part Eight, we look to the future. Chapter Thirty-Six presents a framework for thinking about research on conflict resolution training. As of this writing, there has been little good and systematic research in this area. If the field is to develop and have a bright future, it needs more research. Chapter Thirty-Seven (a new chapter) presents the author's views of the future directions that basic research on conflict and its resolution might well take; the author has been the leading researcher and scholar in this area. The concluding chapter is an overview and commentary on the current state of the field; it
considers issues such as what substantive questions need to be addressed that have not received the attention they warrant—that is, the practice as well as theoretical issues.

The contributors to *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* are an illustrious group of experts in the areas with which their chapters are concerned. We have asked them to write chapters that can be easily understood by readers who are not social scientists but that are also credible to other experts in their areas. Further, we suggested to them that they limit considerably the number of technical references in their chapter but add a short list of Recommended Readings to provide additional sources of information, if they desired to do so. Given the opaqueness of much writing in the social sciences, it is surprising how well the contributors have succeeded in writing clear, informative, interesting, useful, and authoritative chapters.

We believe *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* is accessible and valuable to a wide variety of groups who have an interest in constructive conflict management: to undergraduate and graduate students, as well as their professors, in a number of academic fields such as psychology, education, sociology, political science, business, international relations, law, social work, and health care. It is also of value to practitioners such as conflict resolution trainers and consultants, negotiators, mediators, and those who manage or supervise others. In editing this handbook, we have learned a great deal, so we believe that even those considered “experts” can find much of value in it.

One final word about the handbook’s orientation. This handbook is concerned with finding cooperative, win-win solutions to conflict, no matter how difficult. The “black arts” of conflict (such as violence, coercion, intimidation, deceit, blackmail, and seduction) are not discussed except, if at all, in the context of how to respond to or prevent the use of such tactics by oneself or others. In our view, such tactics are used too often, are commonly destructive and self-defeating, and are less productive in the long run than a constructive approach.

We wish to thank our faculty colleagues who participated in an informal seminar on conflict resolution at Teachers College; the inspiration for this book emerged from the lively discussions in the seminar. We also wish to thank Riva Kantowitz, Kathleen Vaughan, Joanne Lim, Danny Mallonga, Will Concepcion, Kathryn Crawford, Melissa Sweeney, and Naira Musallam, who typed, e-mailed, did editorial work, and provided other invaluable services necessary to produce a completed manuscript.

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Eric C. Marcus
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution
INTRODUCTION

Morton Deutsch

In this introduction, I give some examples of conflicts and indicate the kinds of questions one might pose to understand what is going on in the conflicts—questions that are addressed in many of the following chapters. It also includes a brief discussion of the orientations of both practitioners and researcher-theorists to provide some insight into the misunderstandings that often occur between these two groups. It concludes with an abbreviated history of the study of conflict from a social psychological perspective.

A CONFLICT BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Some time ago, I had the opportunity to do therapeutic work with a professional couple involved in bitter conflicts over issues they considered nonnegotiable. The destructiveness of their way of dealing with their conflicts was reflected in their tendency to escalate a dispute about almost any specific issue (for example, a household chore, the child’s bedtime) into a power struggle in which each spouse felt that his or her self-esteem or core identity was at stake. The destructive process resulted in (as well as from) justified mutual suspicion; correctly perceived mutual hostility; a win-lose orientation to their conflicts; a tendency to act so as to lead the other to respond in a way that would confirm one’s worst suspicion; inability to understand and empathize with the other’s needs and
vulnerabilities; and reluctance—based on stubborn pride, nursed grudges, and fear of humiliation—to initiate or respond to a positive, generous action so as to break out of the escalating vicious cycle in which they were trapped.

Many couples involved in such conflicts do not seek help; they continue to abuse one another, sometimes violently, or they break up. The couple that I worked with sought help for several reasons. On the one hand, their conflicts were becoming physically violent. This frightened them, and it also ran counter to their strongly held intellectual values regarding violence. On the other hand, there were strong constraints making it difficult for them to separate. Their child would suffer; they felt they would be considerably worse off economically; and they had mutually congenial intellectual, aesthetic, sexual, and recreational interests that would be difficult to continue engaging in together if they separated. As is often the case in such matters, it was the woman—being less ashamed to admit the need for help—who took the initiative to seek the assistance of a skilled third party.

The wife, who worked (and preferred to do so), wanted the husband to share equally in the household and child care responsibilities; she considered equality of the genders to be a core personal value. The husband wanted a “traditional marriage” with a conventional division of responsibilities in which he would be the primary income-producing worker outside the home, while his wife would principally do the work related to the household and child care. The husband considered household work and child care inconsistent with his deeply rooted image of adult masculinity. The conflict seemed nonnegotiable to the couple. For the wife, it would mean betrayal of her feminist values to accept her husband’s terms; for him, it would violate his sense of male adult identity to become deeply involved in housework and child care.

Yet this nonnegotiable conflict became negotiable when, with the help of the therapist, the husband and wife were able to listen to and really understand the other’s feelings and how their respective life experiences had led them to the views they each held. Understanding the other’s position fully, and the feelings and experiences behind them, made each person feel less hurt and humiliated by the other’s position and readier to seek solutions that would accommodate the interests of both. They realized that with their joint incomes they could afford to pay for household and child care help that would enable the wife to be considerably less burdened by such responsibilities without increasing the husband’s chores in these areas (though doing so, of course, lessened the amount of money they had available for other purposes).

This solution was not perfect for either partner. Each would have preferred that the other share his or her own view of what a marriage should be like. But their deeper understanding of the other’s position made them feel less humiliated and threatened by it and less defensive toward the other. It also enabled them to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement that lessened tensions,
despite the continuing differences in basic perspective. (See Deutsch, 1988, for further discussion of negotiating the nonnegotiable.)

AN INTERGROUP CONFLICT AT A SCHOOL

A conflict has developed between two groups of teachers at a high school in New York City: the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC) and the newly formed Site-Based Management (SBM) Committee. The SBM committee’s eighteen members consist of the principal, the union chairperson, a representative from the parents’ association, a student, and an elected teacher representative from each academic department. All of the SBM members are European American, with the exception of an African American teacher chosen from the math department.

At the last SBM meeting, the math teacher proposed that an official voting seat be designated for an African American teacher. After much heated discussion, the proposal was voted down. But the problems raised by the proposal did not go away. Much personal bitterness has ensued.

The school has experienced a recent demographic shift from a predominantly white student body to one that is now mainly composed of students of color. This has occurred for two reasons. First, there has been a large influx of students of color from the city-owned housing projects constructed in the district during the past two years. Second, as a result the number of science-oriented students coming from other parts of the city has dropped.

The present student population is approximately 40 percent African American, 30 percent Latino American, 25 percent European American, and 5 percent Asian American. The faculty is 90 percent European American and 10 percent African American. The parents’ association is 100 percent European American.

The Position of the BTC

The BTC believes that the SBM committee needs its input to make the changes needed—specifically, the curriculum is Eurocentric and many school policies are out of touch with the cultural perspective of the current student population. In addition, the caucus is very concerned about an increase in bias-related incidents in the community and wants to initiate antiracism classes at all grade levels.

The members of the BTC believe that even though the majority of the management committee members are sincerely interested in bringing about positive school change and are good, dedicated teachers, they lack personal understanding of the impact of racism on the African American experience. Some even seem to still value the old melting-pot approach to race relations, a position the caucus members believe is naive and dysfunctional when it comes to positive educational change.
The BTC believes that having its representative present as a voting member on the committee will add a needed multicultural and antiracist perspective at this critical time of change. The caucus wants to be part of this change and will not take no for an answer.

The Position of the Euro-American SBM Committee Members

There are many reasons the European Americans voted against an African American seat on the SBM committee, and they deeply resent the implication that they are racists for so doing. First of all, they believe that if any particular black teacher wants a seat, he or she should go through regular democratic procedures and get elected by the respective department. New elections will be held in May.

Second, it would not be fair to give a special seat to the black teachers without opening up other seats for the Latino, Asian, Jewish, Greek, or “you name it” teachers. SBM is about department representation, the members say, not about representation based on race or ethnicity.

Third, designating a seat for Blacks or establishing quotas of any kind based on race would give the appearance of catering to pressure from a special-interest group and be difficult to explain to the rest of the faculty and the parents’ association. They believe that the best direction for the school and society as a whole is a color-blind policy that would assimilate all races and ethnic groups into the great American melting pot. The site-management members sincerely believe that they do not discriminate because of race, and they resent the implication that they are incapable of teaching children of color.

The principal of the school, who is strongly committed to both site-based management and multiculturalism, very much wants this conflict to be resolved constructively. After several months of unproductive discussions between the two groups, during which they become progressively hardened in their respective positions, the principal calls in a mediator (Ellen Raider, the lead author of Chapter Thirty-One) to help the groups resolve their conflict. By various means over a period of time, she—as well as the principal—encourages a civil problem-solving discussion of the issue. Together, the groups brainstorm and come up with twenty-seven ideas for handling the problem. Ultimately, they agree on one solution as being the best, namely, each year the principal will appoint seven faculty members to a multicultural task force that reflects the student composition. Two of the task-force members will also be members of the SBM committee, one to be elected by the task force members and one selected from the ethnic group most heavily represented in the student population.

The solution, though not perfect, is acceptable to both sides and is implemented to the satisfaction of the teachers. It goes on contributing to the reduction of intergroup tensions as well as to the effectiveness of the SBM committee.
THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

As Cairns and Darby (1998) point out, “The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its most basic a struggle between those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland” (p. 754). The roots of the conflict go back centuries to the period when the English colonized the island, occupied 95 percent of the land, and introduced a community of foreigners (mainly Scottish Protestants) in Northern Ireland. They became a majority in this area, in contrast to a Catholic majority in the south of the island.

Cairns and Darby (1998) also state that “years of oppression by the colonists and rebellion by the native Irish culminated in the Treaty of 1921, which partitioned the island into two sections: the six predominantly Protestant counties of the North, which remained an integral part of the United Kingdom, and the twenty-six mainly Catholic counties of the South, which separated from the United Kingdom” (p. 755) and ultimately became known as the Republic of Ireland. Despite the partition, significant violence has occurred periodically in Northern Ireland.

The use of the terms Catholic and Protestant to label the conflicting groups is not meant to indicate that the conflict is primarily a religious one, although that is an element. A small sector of the Protestant population is virulently anti-Catholic and fears for its religious freedom if union occurs with the Irish republic, whose population is 98 percent Catholic. The Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy has heavily influenced the laws of the Republic of Ireland in such matters as divorce and birth control.

Other elements come into play. The Catholics mainly consider themselves to be Irish, while the Protestants prefer to be viewed as British. Economic inequality has been an important factor in fueling the conflict: there has been considerably more unemployment, less education, and poorer housing among the Catholics as compared with the Protestants. The two communities are largely separated psychologically even though they are not always physically separated. Each has developed separate social identities that affect how the members in each community view themselves and the people of the community. The social identities of the two groups have, until recently, been negatively related: a perceived gain for one side is usually associated with a perceived loss for the other.

Although the costs of the intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland have been relatively small compared to ethnic conflicts in areas such as Rwanda, Lebanon, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and Kosovo, they have not been insignificant. Taking into account population size, the deaths due to violence in Northern Ireland are equivalent to 500,000 deaths in the United States. There are not only the direct costs of violence in terms of death and injury (about 3,000 killed and 30,000
injured between 1969 and 1994) but also the indirect, harder-to-measure economic and mental health costs. Some of these costs were borne by England: the economic, psychological, and political toll from seeing some of its soldiers attacked and killed in an attempt to control the violence.

Over the years, various attempts have been made to reduce the explosiveness of the conflict, including efforts by the Northern Ireland government to improve the economic situation of the Catholics, stimulation of intergroup contact under favorable circumstances, conduct of intergroup workshops for influentials in both groups, organization of women’s groups that conducted various demonstrations against violence, integration of some of the Catholic and Protestant schools, recognition and honoring of the cultural traditions of both groups, and so forth. Many of these efforts were sabotaged by extremist groups on both sides. However, cumulatively they began to create the recognition that peaceful relations might be possible and that continued violence would not lead to victory for either side. Most of the ordinary people on both sides became increasingly alienated from the perpetrators of violence.

The conditions for possible successful negotiation of a solution to the conflict were beginning to develop. The heads of three interested and concerned governments—U.S. President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, and Prime Minister Ahern of Ireland—played key roles in getting the leaders of the various factions involved in the conflict to the negotiating table. Appointing former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, a highly respected and influential political figure, as a mediator was an important, positive step. He was acceptable to both sides and was a well-practiced, skilled political mediator.

There have been substantial popular votes in Northern Ireland as well as in Ireland in favor of an agreement negotiated among leaders of the main Protestant and Catholic factions in Northern Ireland that was hoped would end their protracted, sometimes violent conflict. The agreement was developed with the aid of a skillful mediator and with strong pressures from the leaders of the three interested governments in constant telephone contact with the negotiators during the difficult phases of the process. In coming to an agreement, each of the conflicting parties had to modify long-held positions, reduce their aspirations, and act with greater civility toward one another as well as bring the extremists in their groups under control. This was difficult to do. The level of distrust among the conflicting groups is still very high despite the agreement. Its successful implementation over a period of time requires a high level of vigilance among those committed to its successful implementation, to prevent misunderstandings or the actions of extremists from unraveling it. The agreement itself was a creative attempt to respond to the apprehensions as well as interests of the various participants in the conflict. Its achievement was honored in 1998 by the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to John Hume and David Trimble, the leading negotiators for the Catholics and Protestants, respectively.
Professor Ed Cairns, a social psychologist at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland, e-mailed me on November 5, 2005 with his views of what has happened since the agreement. He indicated that the agreement led to the setting up of a regional parliament known as the Northern Ireland Assembly. This made a good start and included ministers from all parties—even those initially opposed to the agreement. However, the Assembly has had a stop-start existence and has been suspended more often than it has been in action. These suspensions came about largely because of Protestant/Unionist perceptions that the IRA was refusing to decommission its weapons as required by the Good Friday Agreement. No weapons were decommissioned until 2001 and the final decommissioning was not announced until 2005. In between, however, there were allegations that the IRA had been involved in espionage, training Colombian guerrillas, and a major bank robbery.

Sinn Fein has also pointed out that Loyalist paramilitaries, which tend to be smaller organizations, have not offered to decommission and are now believed to be involved in racketeering and major crime. Further, although there have been major changes to the policing system, Sinn Fein believed that all the reforms promised in the Agreement have not yet been implemented.

The IRA’s refusal to decommission cost David Trimble (the main Unionist leader at the time of the Agreement and in the Assembly) dearly. He had entered into the government with Sinn Fein—seen by most as the political wing of the IRA. However, Protestants felt that Catholic/Nationalists had most of their demands met—for example, by the release of “political” prisoners and the disbandment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but had given nothing in return. The result was that in the 2003 elections Trimble lost his seat and his party was virtually wiped out, being replaced by the more radical, anti-Agreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by Dr. Ian Paisley. Similarly, Sinn Fein made gains in the 2003 elections replacing the Social Democratic and Labour Party SDLP, (founded by John Hume) as the largest Catholic/Nationalist party.

Generally, these electoral moves have been reflected in social surveys in which a majority of Protestants report that today they would be unlikely to vote again for the Agreement had they the opportunity to do so. Demographic trends also suggest a worsening of intergroup relations indicating that Northern Ireland is entering a period of “benign apartheid” with segregation now worse than it was before the “troubles” began in 1968. Observers are in agreement then that one lesson from Northern Ireland is that a peace agreement does not necessarily lead straight to a post-conflict era but instead may be followed by a post-agreement phase, which may last a considerable period of time.

Despite mostly gloomy news, the original Good Friday Agreement is still in existence, large-scale violence is unknown, and there is general agreement that no appetite exists among politicians, the people, or indeed the (former) terrorists for a return to out-and-out violence.
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT CONFLICT

Conflicts such as these three suggest many questions pertinent to conflicts of all sorts—interpersonal, intergroup, and international. These questions relate to fundamental processes that have been studied extensively by social psychologists. The chapters in this book address many of the fundamental social psychological processes involved in conflict and develop the implications of these processes for understanding conflict and for managing conflicts more effectively.

Here is an outline of some of the processes affecting conflict that are addressed in one or more chapters.

- **Cooperation-competition.** Each of the conflicts I have described had a destructive phase characterized by a win-lose or competitive orientation to the conflict. What determines whether a conflict takes a destructive, win-lose course or a constructive, cooperative, problem-solving one?

- **Social justice.** All of the parties in the three conflicts had initially differing conceptions of what would be a fair resolution. What are the important sources of perceived injustice?

- **Motivation.** What needs do the parties in conflict have? Are their needs the same as their positions? What motives foster conflict, and which are fostered by conflict and tend to perpetuate it? Which facilitate constructive conflict resolution?

- **Trust.** Distrust is common whenever a conflict takes a destructive course. What processes give rise to trust, and which give rise to distrust?

- **Communication.** Faulty communication engenders misunderstanding, which may lead to conflict, and conflict often leads to breakdown of communication. What are the characteristics of effective communication in terms of the communicator and the listener? What can be done to develop such communication?

- **Language.** What role does language usage play in affecting the course of conflict? Do metaphors, images, and words relating to war and competition (for example, battle, struggle, fight, coercion, defeat, enemy, suspicion) dominate the discourse, or does the language use reflect terms related to cooperation and peace (for example, constructive controversy, problem solving, creativity, mutual enlightenment, persuasion, trust)?

- ** Attribution processes.** Our emotional responses toward the actions of another are very much influenced by what intentions we attribute to the other as well as how much responsibility for the actions we attribute to that person. What are the nature and consequences of common errors in attribution?
• *Emotions.* What emotions make a constructive conflict resolution less or more likely? What gives rise to these emotions? How can one control one’s destructive emotions during a conflict?

• *Persuasion.* In most negotiations and conflicts, much of each party’s effort is channeled into attempting to persuade the other of the soundness of the former’s position. What insights into the conditions resulting in effective persuasion have resulted from systematic research of the processes involved in persuasion?

• *Self-control.* Effective goal-directed actions, particularly those that have to be sustained over a period of time, require effective self-control. During the course of conflict, various distractions, unexpected events, and emotions (such as rage, wounded pride, despair, anxiety) may, when uncontrolled, lead one to lose sight of one’s important, enduring needs and goals. Knowing how to keep oneself on course during a conflict is obviously valuable; what help does theory provide?

• *Power.* The distribution of power among parties in conflict and how power is employed strongly influence conflict processes. How do the bases of each party’s power (including economic resources, weapons, information, legitimate authority, effective social organization) determine the type of influence exerted during a conflict?

• *Violence.* When conflict takes a destructive course, it sometimes leads to violence. What factors contribute to violent behavior? What sorts of intervention reduce the likelihood of violence?

• *Judgmental biases.* A host of misunderstandings, misperceptions, and potential biases interfere with the ability to resolve a conflict constructively. What gives rise to misunderstandings and biases, and how can their occurrence be reduced?

• *Personality.* How do unresolved self-conflict and individual personality characteristics affect how conflict is managed? How important is it to know the conflictual styles of various types of people (anxious, obsessive, analytical, and so on)?

• *Development.* What differences typically exist in managing conflict depending on whether it is between children, adolescents, or adults? How does psychological development (such as acquisition of language, increase in physical strength, and decreasing dependence on adults) affect response to conflict?

• *Group problem solving and creativity.* Constructive management of conflict can be viewed as a creative, cooperative problem-solving process in which the conflict is defined as the mutual problem to be solved. What leads to effective group problem solving, and what enables individuals to be creative in their approach to nonroutine problems?
• **Intergroup conflict.** Conflict between groups that differ in ethnicity, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and the like appear to have become prevalent and salient in recent years. How do the processes involved in intergroup conflicts differ from those in interpersonal conflicts?

• **Moral conflict.** Conflict over basic values (for example, “pro-choice” versus “pro-life”), which are often experienced as moral conflict, are often difficult to resolve. Why are they so difficult to resolve and what approaches have been developed to manage such conflicts constructively?

• **Religious conflict.** Despite the fact that the major religions of the world share many values throughout the ages, religious differences have given rise to many destructive conflicts. Why? It is also evident that religious leaders have often been instrumental in preventing deadly conflict. How can leaders of the different religions be encouraged and helped to foster more cooperative relations among the different religions and more constructive conflict resolution within their own communities?

• **Family and gender conflict.** Some of the most destructive interpersonal conflicts occur within families between genders (husband and wife) and between parents and children. What are the conflicts about, why are they so emotionally intense, and how can the participants learn to manage their conflicts constructively?

• **Organizational conflicts.** Most of us spend a considerable portion of our lives in organizations: as students in schools, as workers in economic organizations, as citizens in community organizations, and so on. We experience interpersonal conflicts with peers, subordinates, or superordinates; intergroup conflicts with other groups within our organizations, and interorganizational conflicts with other organizations. How are such conflicts managed constructively?

• **Culture.** How does the culture in which an individual or group is embedded affect how conflicts develop and are managed? What problems are faced by negotiators from diverse cultural backgrounds?

• **Intractable conflicts.** Difficult, long-standing, intractable conflicts occur at all levels—interpersonal, intergroup, and international. When are such conflicts “ripe” for intervention? What methods of intervention are likely to be productive? How can reconciliation and forgiveness be encouraged between historically bitter enemies?

• **Mediation.** Third-party intervention, such as mediation, can sometimes help people resolve their conflicts when they are unable to do so by themselves. When is mediation likely to be effective? What are the processes involved in mediation?
• Managing conflict in large groups. When the conflict occurs among factions within a large group, are there ways of bringing the total group, or its relevant components, together so that the group as a whole can contribute to resolving the conflict?

• Constructive controversy. Conflict can take the form of lively, constructive controversy, which stimulates creativity and richer thought processes; yet differences in belief and opinion often produce quarrels that lead to hardening of positions and breakdown of relations. What leads to lively controversy rather than deadly quarrel?

• Culture and conflict. Is conflict theory, largely developed in Western culture, applicable elsewhere? Can it be usefully applied in China, for example? What modifications, if any, are necessary?

• Teaching the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of constructive conflict. What are the methods employed by some of the most experienced educators (practitioners and trainers to help students acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of constructive conflict resolution?

• Research. The field of conflict resolution is relatively young. There is still much basic research needed to acquire fundamental knowledge about all of the issues mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. What are the most important and urgent questions to investigate? Also, there are many practitioners doing training and intervening in relation to many different kinds of conflicts. There is much need for research that helps us to know what kinds of intervention or training, with what kinds of clients, in what sorts of circumstances, produce what types of effects.

These and other questions relevant to all sorts of conflict are addressed in one or more of the chapters of this handbook—sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly by articulating the fundamental social psychological processes that occur in all sorts of conflict.

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ORIENTATION OF THEORISTS AND PRACTITIONERS

Inevitable differences in the theory and practice orientations can lead to misunderstanding and alienation if these inherent differences are not understood. In many disciplines of the natural as well as social sciences, the “scientist” and the “practitioner” tend to stereotype each other: the scientist viewing the practitioner as “unscientific” and the practitioner considering the scientist to be
“impractical.” In the hope of fostering mutual respect and understanding of each other’s orientation, we contrast several aspects of each orientation.

The Analytical Versus the Synthetic Approach
The practitioner must synthesize the knowledge from many theories and research studies; she must make a collage or mosaic of many theoretical ideas of the kind presented in this book rather than relying on any single one. In contrast, the theorist-researcher generates knowledge by analysis and isolation of the object of inquiry; the focus is often narrowly defined. Breadth of theoretical knowledge is more important for the practitioner than precision, consistency, or elegance, although the opposite is true for the theoretically oriented researcher. Moreover, because there are no well-established procedures for combining theories to fit them to a given practical problem, practitioners must often work intuitively without being able to specify precisely how they are weaving together the theoretical ideas employed. In contrast, the pressure on theorist-researchers is to be explicit and specific about their ideas and procedures.

The Skeptical Versus the Pragmatic
The practitioner is rewarded if what he does “works” even if his practice is not grounded in well-established knowledge. Moreover, he is usually more persuasive and effective if he has a positive, confident attitude about what he is doing and recommending. The scientist, on the other hand, knows very well that the path of progress in science is littered with discarded theories, and honor goes to those who help to determine the well-established ones. Thus, it is no wonder that the professional stance of the theorist-researcher is hesitant, self-critical, and skeptical toward the theory and research that social technologists often use with a confident attitude.

Enduring Versus Useful Truths
The theorist has the (rarely achieved) aim of developing knowledge that is universally true; enduringly valid for different times and places, and relevant for understanding cave people as well as astronauts, aborigines in Kakadu as well as Park Avenue sophisticates. Such theoretical knowledge is usually general and abstract, and developing its implications for specific situations requires considerable additional thought and effort. The scientist is especially interested in developing the surprising and thus interesting implications of a theory because its validity and generality seem enhanced by the ability to predict the unexpected.

In contrast, the practitioner is necessarily concerned with the mundane and practical, namely, with those aspects of a specific situation that can be altered with minimum cost to produce the desired consequence. Her interest is more focused on the here and now, on the concrete aspects of the situation in which she has to work, rather than on the general and abstract. Of course, the practitioner
also seeks to have general knowledge of the kind of situation and type of people with whom her model of intervention is effective, but the focus of attention is on what can be done to produce the desired effects. In practical work, it is more important to know that a child’s ability to learn may be improved more easily and economically by changing motivation rather than by modifying genes, even though the child’s genes may play an important role in determining the ability to learn.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIZING ABOUT CONFLICT

This section of the Introduction is an overview of the progress made during the past one hundred years or so in the social psychological study of conflict. The writings of three intellectual giants—Darwin, Marx, and Freud—dominated the intellectual atmosphere during social psychology’s infancy. These three theorists significantly influenced the writings of the early social psychologists on conflict as well as in many other areas. All three appeared, on a superficial reading, to emphasize the competitive, destructive aspects of conflict.

Darwin stressed “the competitive struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest.” He wrote that “all nature is at war, one organism with another, or with external nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, this may at first be well doubted; but reflection will inevitably prove it is too true” (quoted in Hyman, 1966, p. 29).

Marx emphasized class struggle, and as the struggle proceeds, “the whole society breaks up more and more into two great hostile camps, two great, directly antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat.” He and Engels end their Communist Manifesto with a ringing call to class struggle: “The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite.”

Freud’s view of psychosexual development was largely that of constant struggle between the biologically rooted infantile id and the socially determined, internalized parental surrogate, the superego. As Schachtel (1959) has noted, “The concepts and language used by Freud to describe the great metamorphosis from life in the womb to life in the world abound with images of war, coercion, reluctant compromise, unwelcome necessity, imposed sacrifices, uneasy truce under pressure, enforced detours and roundabout ways to return to the original peaceful state of absence of consciousness and stimulation” (p. 10).

Thus, the intellectual atmosphere prevalent during the period when social psychology began to emerge contributed to viewing conflict from the perspective of “competitive struggle.” Social conditions too—the intense competition among
businesses and among nations, the devastation of World War I, the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the rise of Nazism and other totalitarian systems—reinforced this perspective.

The vulgarization of Darwin’s ideas in the form of “social Darwinism” provided an intellectual rationale for racism, sexism, class superiority, and war. Such ideas as “survival of the fittest,” “hereditary determinism,” and “stages of evolution” were eagerly misapplied to the relations between human social groups—classes and nations, as well as social races—to rationalize imperialist policies. The influence of pseudo-evolutionary thinking was so strong that, as a critic suggested, it gave rise to a new imperialist beatitude: “Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak” (Banton, 1967, p. 48). The rich and powerful were biologically superior; they had achieved their positions as a result of natural selection. It would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the poor and weak.

Social Darwinism and the mode of explaining behavior in terms of innate, evolutionary, derived instincts were in retreat by the mid-1920s. The prestige of the empirical methods in the physical sciences, the point of view of social determinism advanced by Karl Marx and various sociological theorists, and the findings of cultural anthropologists all contributed to their decline. With the waning of the instinctual mode of explaining such conflict phenomena as war, intergroup hostility, and human exploitation, two others have become dominant: the psychological and the social-political-economic.

The psychological mode attempts to explain such phenomena in terms of “what goes on in the minds of men” (Klineberg, 1964) or “tensions that cause war” (Cantril, 1950). In other words, it explains such phenomena in terms of the perceptions, beliefs, values, ideology, motivations, and other psychological states and characteristics that individual men and women have acquired as a result of their experiences and as these characteristics are activated by the particular situation and role in which people are situated. The social-political-economic mode, by contrast, seeks an explanation in terms of such social, economic, and political factors as levels of armament, objective conflicts between economic and political interests, and the like.

Although the two modes of explanation are not mutually exclusive, there is a tendency for partisans of the psychological mode to consider that the causal arrow points from psychological conditions to social-political-economic conditions and for partisans of the latter to believe the reverse is true. In any case, much of the social psychological writing in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s on the topics of war, intergroup conflict, and industrial strife was largely non-empirical, and in one vein or the other. The psychologically trained social psychologist tended to favor the psychological mode; the Marxist-oriented or sociologically trained social psychologist more often favored the other.
The decline of social Darwinism and the instinctivist doctrines was hastened by the development and employment of empirical methods in social psychology. This early empirical orientation to social psychology focused on the socialization of the individual; in part as a reaction to the instinctivist doctrine. It led to a great variety of studies, including a number investigating cooperation and competition. These latter studies are, in my view, the precursors to the empirical, social psychological study of conflict.

Field Theory, Conflict, and Cooperation-Competition

During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, quite independently of the work being conducted in the United States on cooperation-competition, Kurt Lewin and his students were theorizing and conducting research that profoundly affected later work in many areas of social psychology. Lewin's field theory—with its dynamic concepts of tension systems, driving and restraining forces, own and induced forces, valences, levels of aspiration, power fields, interdependence, overlapping situations, and so on—created a new vocabulary for thinking about conflict and cooperation-competition.

As early as 1931, employing his analysis of force fields, Lewin (1931, 1935) presented a penetrating theoretical discussion of three basic types of psychological conflict: approach-approach, in which the individual stands between two positive valences of approximately equal strength; avoidance-avoidance, where the individual stands between two negative valences of approximately equal strength; and approach-avoidance, meaning the individual is exposed to opposing forces deriving from positive and negative valences. Hull (1938) translated Lewin's analysis into the terminology of the goal gradient, and Miller (1937, 1944) elaborated and did research on it. Numerous experimental studies supported the theoretical analysis.

My own initial theorizing on cooperation-competition (Deutsch, 1949b) was influenced by Lewinian thinking on tension systems, which was reflected in a series of brilliant experiments on the recall of interrupted activities (Zeigarnik), the resumption of interrupted activities (Ovsiankina), substitutability (Mahler), and the role of ego in cooperative work (Lewis and Franklin). But even more of my thinking was indebted to the ideas that were in the air at the MIT Research Center for Group Dynamics. Ways of characterizing and explaining group processes and group functioning, employing the language of Lewinian theorizing, were under constant discussion there among the students and faculty. Thus, it was quite natural that when I settled on cooperation-competition as the topic of my doctoral dissertation, I employed the Lewinian dynamic emphasis on goals and how they are interrelated as my key theoretical wedge into this topic.

Even more important, the preoccupation at the MIT center with understanding group processes pressed me to formulate my ideas about cooperation and competition so that they would be relevant to the psychological and interpersonal
processes occurring within and between groups. This pressure forced my theory and research (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b) to go considerably beyond the prior social psychological work on cooperation-competition. My theorizing and research were concerned not only with the individual and group outcomes of cooperation and competition but also with the social psychological processes that would give rise to those outcomes. This work has central relevance to understanding the processes involved in conflict. It is summarized in Chapter One.

**Game Theory and Games**

In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern published their now-classic work, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. Game theory has made a major contribution to the work of social scientists by formulating in mathematical terms the problem of conflict of interest. However, it is neither the mathematics nor the normative prescriptions for minimizing losses when facing an intelligent adversary that have made game theory of considerable value to social psychologists. Rather, it is the core emphasis on the parties in conflict having interdependent interests; their fates are woven together. Although the mathematical and normative development of game theory has been most successful in connection with pure competitive conflict (zero-sum games), game theory also recognizes that cooperative as well as competitive interests may be intertwined in conflict (as in coalition games or non-zero-sum games).

Game theory’s recognition of the intertwining of cooperative and competitive interests in situations of conflict (or, in Schelling’s useful term, the mixed-motive nature of conflict; Schelling, 1960) has had a productive impact on the social psychological study of conflict, theoretically as well as methodologically. Theoretically, at least for me, it helped buttress a viewpoint that I had developed prior to my acquaintance with game theory, namely, that conflicts were typically mixtures of cooperative and competitive processes and that the course of conflict would be determined by the nature of the mixture. This emphasis on the cooperative elements involved in conflict ran counter to what was then the dominant view of conflict as a competitive struggle.

Methodologically, game theory had an impact on an even larger group of psychologists. The mathematical formulations of game theory had the indirect but extremely valuable consequence of laying bare some fascinating paradoxical situations in such a way that they were highly suggestive of experimental work. Game matrices as an experimental device were popular because they facilitated precise definition of the reward structure encountered by the subjects, and hence of the way they depend on one another. Partly stimulated by and partly in reaction to the research using game matrices, other research games for the study of conflict were also developed. Well over one thousand studies based on experimental games had been published by 1985. Much of this research, as is true in other areas of science, was mindless—being done because a convenient
experimental format was readily available. But some of it has, I believe, helped to develop systematic understanding of conflict processes and conflict resolution. Fortunately, in recent years, experimental gaming has been supplemented by other experimental procedures and by field studies that overcome some of the inherent limitations of experimental gaming.

**Themes in Contemporary Social Psychological Research on Conflicts**

Social psychological research and theorizing on conflict during the past forty years have primarily addressed thirteen major questions (see Deutsch, 1990 for more detail about the first five):

1. **What conditions give rise to a constructive or destructive process of conflict resolution?** In terms of bargaining and negotiation, the emphasis here is on determining the circumstances that allow the conflicting parties to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement that maximizes their joint outcomes. In a sense, this first question arises from focusing on the cooperative potential inherent in conflict. In social psychology, this question has been most directly addressed in the work of my students and myself and summarized in my 1973 book, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*. All of the chapters in this handbook are relevant; the chapters focusing on constructive controversy and cooperation-competition are most relevant.

2. **What circumstances, strategies, and tactics lead one party to do better than another in a conflict situation?** The stress here is on how one can wage conflict, or bargain, so as to win or at least do better than one’s adversary. This second question emerges from focusing on the competitive features of a conflict situation. It has been mainly addressed by economists and political scientists (for example, Schelling, 1960). In social psychology, research related to this question focuses on bargaining tactics such as “being ignorant,” “being tough,” “being belligerent,” “the effects of threats,” and how to increase one’s bargaining power. This question is treated only indirectly in this handbook, by inference, because of the book’s emphasis on constructive conflict resolution.

3. **What determines the nature of the agreement between conflicting parties if they are able to reach an agreement?** Here, the concern is with the cognitive and normative factors that lead people to conceive a possible agreement and to perceive it as a salient possibility for reaching a stable agreement—one that each of the conflicting parties sees as “just” under the circumstances. This third question is a recent one and has been addressed under the heading of research on the social psychology
of equity and justice. Chapter Two, on social justice and conflict, is most
directly relevant to this question, but other chapters bear on it as well.

4. How can third parties be used to prevent conflicts from becoming
destructive or to help deadlocked or embittered negotiators move toward
constructive management of their conflicts? This fourth question has
been reflected in studies of mediation and in strategies for de-
escalating conflict. Chapter Thirty-Two, on mediation, pertains most
directly, but all of the chapters have some relevance.

5. How can people be educated to manage their conflicts constructively?
This has been a concern of consultants working with leaders in industry
and government and also with those who have responsibility for
educating children in our schools. All the chapters bear on this
question.

During the past fifteen years, many additional questions have emerged as foci
of work in the field of conflict resolution:

6. How and when should one intervene in prolonged, intractable conflicts?
Much of the literature in conflict resolution has been preventive rather
than remedial in its emphasis. It is concerned with understanding the
conditions that foster productive rather than destructive conflict (as in
question 1) or developing knowledge about the circumstances that
lead to intractable, destructive conflict, in the hope of preventing
such conflict. More recently, the reality that many protracted, destruc-
tive conflicts exist in the world has induced some scholars to focus
their attention on this problem. In this book, the discussions of
intractable conflicts (Chapter Twenty-Four), mediation (Chapter Thirty-
Two), and intergroup conflict (Chapter Eight) are particularly relevant.

7. How are we to understand why ethnic, religious, and identity conflicts
frequently take an intractable, destructive course? With the end of the
Cold War, there appears to be a proliferation of such conflicts. In the
past ten years, interest in such conflicts has been renewed. The chap-
ters most directly pertaining to this question are those dealing with
intergroup and cultural conflict, but almost all are relevant.

8. How applicable in other cultural contexts are the theories related to con-
lict that have largely been developed in the United States and Western
Europe? In recent years, there has been much discussion in the litera-
ture of the differences that exist in how people from varying cultural
backgrounds deal with negotiations and, more generally, manage con-
lict. We have not attempted to summarize the cultural differences that
exist with regard to conflict management. However, in discussing
culture and conflict (Chapters Twenty-Eight and Twenty-Nine), on
applying conflict theory in China, there is discussion of the issue of cross-cultural generalizability.

9. How do we foster reconciliation between parties who have been in a bitter, deadly, destructive conflict? Since the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, there has been considerable interest and some research related to this question. Although no chapter has its sole focus on this topic, various chapters have very relevant discussions—for example, the chapters on justice, trust, change, intractable conflict, and intergroup conflict.

10. How do we help people “negotiate the nonnegotiable,” as in conflicts over identity, basic values, or religious conflict? In its more extreme form, this question can be expressed as, how does one understand and deal with fundamentalism, terrorism, and suicide bombers? While many chapters have relevance to this question (in its less extreme form), the chapters dealing with moral and religious conflicts are focused on this issue (as is the first case in this Introduction).

11. How do we understand the often implicit, theoretical presuppositions and framework about the conflict that affect one’s orientation to and behaviors during conflict? These presuppositions often reflect personality disposition, cultural influences, and life experiences. The chapters on implicit theories and conflict and personality and conflict, and the chapters concerned with culture and conflict, are directly relevant; many other chapters have indirect relevance.

12. How do we identify “ripeness,” “critical moments,” or “turning points” in a conflict? Often, these crucial periods provide an opportunity to change the direction of a conflict from a destructive process to a constructive one. No chapter focuses on this but there are relevant discussions in the chapters dealing with trust, intractable conflict, and mediation.

13. What are the constructive and destructive effects of emotions during conflict? The important role of emotions during conflict has been much neglected until recently. The chapter on emotions and conflict focuses on this question and many other chapters have some relevant discussion.

Although various chapters of this book have direct relevance to the questions listed here, the aim of the Handbook of Conflict Resolution is not to summarize the work done so far in the field of conflict resolution. Rather, its aim is to enrich the field by presenting the theoretical underpinnings that throw light on the fundamental social psychological processes involved in all levels of conflict. None of the theories is adequate to deal by itself with the complexities involved
in any specific conflict or any type of conflict. As indicated earlier in this chap-
ter, each theory is a component of the particular mosaic that needs to be cre-
tated to understand and manage a unique conflict constructively.

References

PART ONE

INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP PROCESSES
Some time ago, in the garden of a friend’s house, my five-year-old son and his chum were struggling over possession of a water hose. (They were in conflict.) Each wanted to use it first to water the garden. (They had a competitive orientation.) Each was trying to tug it away from the other and both were crying. Each was very frustrated, and neither was able to use the hose to sprinkle the flowers as he had desired. After reaching a deadlock in this tug-of-war, they began to punch one another and call each other names. (As a result of their competitive approach, the conflict took a destructive course for both of them—producing frustration, crying, and violence.)

Now imagine a different scenario. The garden consists mainly of two sections, flowers and vegetables. Each kid wants to use the hose first. Let’s suppose they want to resolve their conflict amicably. (They have a cooperative orientation.) One says to the other, “Let’s flip a coin to see who uses the hose first.” (A fair procedure for resolving the conflict is suggested.) The other agrees and suggests that the loser be given the right to select which section of the garden he waters. They both agree to the suggestion. (A cooperative, win-win agreement is reached.) Their agreements are implemented and both kids feel happy and good about one another. (These are common effects of a cooperative or constructive approach to a conflict.)

As this example illustrates, whether the participants in a conflict have a cooperative orientation or a competitive one is decisive in determining its course and outcomes. This chapter is concerned with understanding the processes involved
in cooperation and competition, their effects, and the factors that contribute to
developing a cooperative or competitive relationship. It is important to under-
stand the nature of cooperation and competition because almost all conflicts are
mixed-motive, containing elements of both cooperation and competition.

A THEORY OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

The theory being presented here was initially developed by Morton Deutsch
(1949a, 1949b, 1973, 1985) and much elaborated by David W. Johnson (Johnson
and Johnson, 1989). The Johnsons have provided the most extensive summary
of the theory and the research bearing on it; their 1989 book and 2003 paper
should be consulted for greater detail.

The theory has two basic ideas. One relates to the type of interdependence
among goals of the people involved in a given situation. The other pertains to
the type of action taken by the people involved.

I identify two basic types of goal interdependence: positive (where the goals
are linked in such a way that the amount or probability of a person’s goal attain-
ment is positively correlated with the amount or probability of another obtaining
his goal) and negative (where the goals are linked in such a way that the
amount or probability of goal attainment is negatively correlated with the amount
or probability of the other’s goal attainment). To put it colloquially, if you’re pos-
itively linked with another, then you sink or swim together; with negative link-
age, if the other sinks, you swim, and if the other swims, you sink.

It is well to realize that few situations are “purely” positive or negative. In
most situations, people have a mixture of goals so that it is common for some
of their goals initially to be positive and some negatively interdependent. In this
section, for analytical purposes, I discuss pure situations. In mixed situations,
the relative strengths of the two types of goal interdependency, as well as their
general orientation to one another, largely determine the nature of the conflict
process.

I also characterize two basic types of action by an individual: “effective
actions,” which improve the actor’s chances of obtaining a goal, and
“bungling actions,” which worsen the actor’s chances of obtaining the goal. (For
the purpose of simplicity, I use dichotomies for my basic concepts; the dichoto-
mous types of interdependence and the dichotomous types of actions are, I
assume, polar ends of continua.) I then combine types of interdependence and
types of action to posit how they jointly affect three basic social psychological
processes that are discussed later in this chapter: substitutability, attitudes, and
inducibility.

People’s goals may be linked for various reasons. Thus, positive interdepen-
dence can result from people liking one another, being rewarded in terms of their
joint achievement, needing to share a resource or overcome an obstacle together, holding common membership or identification with a group whose fate is important to them, being unable to achieve their task goals unless they divide up the work, being influenced by personality and cultural orientation, being bound together because they are treated this way by a common enemy or an authority, and so on. Similarly, with regard to negative interdependence, it can result from people disliking one another or from their being rewarded in such a way that the more the other gets of the reward, the less one gets, and so on.

In addition to positive and negative interdependence, it is well to recognize that there can be lack of interdependence, or independence, such that the activities and fate of the people involved do not affect one another, directly or indirectly. If they are completely independent of one another, no conflict arises; the existence of a conflict implies some form of interdependence.

One further point: asymmetries may exist with regard to the degree of interdependence in a relationship; suppose that what you do or what happens to you may have a considerable effect on me, but what I do or what happens to me may have little impact on you. I am more dependent on you than you are on me. In the extreme case, you may be completely independent of me and I may be highly dependent on you. As a consequence of this asymmetry, you have greater power and influence in the relationship than I. This power may be general if the asymmetry exists in many situations, or it may be situation-specific if the asymmetry occurs only in a particular situation. A master has general power over a slave, while an auto mechanic repairing my car’s electrical system has situation-specific power.

The three concepts mentioned previously—substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility—are vital to understanding the social and psychological processes involved in creating the major effects of cooperation and competition. Substitutability (how a person’s actions can satisfy another person’s intentions) is central to the functioning of all social institutions (the family, industry, schools), to the division of labor, and to role specialization. Unless the activities of other people can substitute for yours, you are like a person stranded on a desert island alone: you have to build your own house, find or produce your own food, protect yourself from harmful animals, treat your ailments and illnesses, educate yourself about the nature of your new environment and about how to do all these tasks, and so on, without the help of others. Being alone, you can neither create children nor have a family. Substitutability permits you to accept the activities of others in fulfilling your needs. Negative substitutability involves active rejection and effort to counteract the effects of another’s activities.

Attitudes refer to the predisposition to respond evaluatively, favorably or unfavorably to aspects of one’s environment or self. Through natural selection, evolution has ensured that all living creatures have the capacity to respond positively to stimuli that are beneficial to them and negatively to those that are
harmful. They are attracted to, approach, receive, ingest, like, enhance, and otherwise act positively toward beneficial objects, events, or other creatures; in contrast, they are repelled by harmful objects and circumstances and avoid, eject, attack, dislike, negate, and otherwise act negatively toward them. This inborn tendency to act positively toward the beneficial and negatively toward the harmful is the foundation on which the human potentials for cooperation and love as well as for competition and hate develop. The basic psychological orientation of cooperation implies the positive attitude that “we are for each other,” “we benefit one another”; competition, by contrast, implies the negative attitude that “we are against one another” and, in its extreme form, “you are out to harm me.”

*Inducibility* refers to the readiness to accept another’s influence to do what he or she wants; *negative inducibility* refers to the readiness to reject or obstruct fulfillment of what the other wants. The complement of substitutability is inducibility. You are willing to be helpful to another whose actions are helpful to you, but not to someone whose actions are harmful. In fact, you reject any request to help the other engage in harmful actions and, if possible, obstruct or interfere with these actions if they occur.

### THE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

Thus, the theory predicts that if you are in a positively interdependent relationship with someone who bungles, the bungling is not a substitute for effective actions you intended; thus, the bungling is viewed negatively. In fact, when your net-playing tennis partner in a doubles game allows an easy shot to get past him, you have to extend yourself to prevent being harmed by the error. On the other hand, if your relationship is one of negative interdependence, and the other person bungles (as when your tennis opponent double-faults), your opponent’s bungle substitutes for an effective action on your part, and it is regarded positively or valued. The reverse is true for effective actions. An opponent’s effective actions are not substitutable for yours and are negatively valued; a teammate can induce you to help him or her make an effective action, but you are likely to try to prevent or obstruct a bungling action by your teammate. In contrast, you are willing to help an opponent bungle, but your opponent is not likely to induce you to help him or her make an effective action (which, in effect, harms your chances of obtaining your goal).

The theory of cooperation and competition, then, goes on to make further predictions about different aspects of intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup processes from the predictions about substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility. Thus, assuming that the individual actions in a group are more frequently effective than bungling, among the predictions that follow
from the theory are that cooperative relations (those in which the goals of the parties involved are predominantly positively interdependent), as compared with competitive ones, show more of these positive characteristics:

1. **Effective communication is exhibited.** Ideas are verbalized, and group members are attentive to one another, accepting of the ideas of other members, and influenced by them. They have fewer difficulties in communicating with or understanding others.

2. **Friendliness, helpfulness, and lessened obstructiveness** are expressed in the discussions. Members also are more satisfied with the group and its solutions and favorably impressed by the contributions of the other group members. In addition, members of the cooperative groups rate themselves high in desire to win the respect of their colleagues and in obligation to the other members.

3. **Coordination of effort, division of labor, orientation to task achievement, orderliness in discussion, and high productivity** are manifested in the cooperative groups (if the group task requires effective communication, coordination of effort, division of labor, or sharing of resources).

4. **Feeling of agreement with the ideas of others and a sense of basic similarity in beliefs and values, as well as confidence in one’s own ideas and in the value that other members attach to those ideas,** are obtained in the cooperative groups.

5. **Recognizing and respecting the other by being responsive to the other’s needs.**

6. **Willingness to enhance the other’s power** (for example, the knowledge, skills, resources, and so on) to accomplish the other’s goals increases. As the other’s capabilities are strengthened, you are strengthened; they are of value to you as well as to the other. Similarly, the other is enhanced from your enhancement and benefits from your growing capabilities and power.

7. **Defining conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort** facilitates recognizing the legitimacy of each other’s interests and the necessity to search for a solution responsive to the needs of all. It tends to limit rather than expand the scope of conflicting interests. Attempts to influence the other tend to be confined to processes of persuasion.

In contrast, a competitive process has the opposite effects:

1. Communication is impaired as the conflicting parties seek to gain advantage by misleading the other through use of false promises, ingratiating tactics, and disinformation. It is reduced and seen as futile
as they recognize that they cannot trust one another’s communications to be honest or informative.

2. Obstructiveness and lack of helpfulness lead to mutual negative attitudes and suspicion of one another’s intentions. One’s perceptions of the other tend to focus on the person’s negative qualities and ignore the positive.

3. The parties to the process are unable to divide their work, duplicating one another’s efforts such that they become mirror images; if they do divide the work, they feel the need to check what the other is doing continuously.

4. The repeated experience of disagreement and critical rejection of ideas reduces confidence in oneself as well as the other.

5. The conflicting parties seek to enhance their own power and to reduce the power of the other. Any increase in the power of the other is seen as threatening to oneself.

6. The competitive process stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can be imposed only by one side on the other, which in turn leads to using coercive tactics such as psychological as well as physical threats and violence. It tends to expand the scope of the issues in conflict as each side seeks superiority in power and legitimacy. The conflict becomes a power struggle or a matter of moral principle and is no longer confined to a specific issue at a given time and place. Escalating the conflict increases its motivational significance to the participants and may make a limited defeat less acceptable and more humiliating than a mutual disaster.

As the conflict escalates, it perpetuates itself by such processes as autistic hostility, self-fulfilling prophecies, and unwitting commitments. Autistic hostility involves breaking off contact and communication with the other; the result is that the hostility is perpetuated because one has no opportunity to learn that it may be based on misunderstandings or misjudgments or to learn if the other has changed for the better.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are those wherein you engage in hostile behavior toward another because of a false assumption that the other has done or is preparing to do something harmful to you; your false assumption comes true when it leads you to engage in hostile behavior that then provokes the other to react in a hostile manner to you. The dynamics of an escalating, destructive conflict have the inherent quality of a folie à deux in which the self-fulfilling prophecies of each side mutually reinforce one another. As a result, both sides are right to think that the other is provocative, untrustworthy, and malevolent.
Each side, however, tends to be blind to how it and the other have contributed to this malignant process.

In the case of *unwitting commitments*, during the course of escalating conflict the parties not only overcommit to rigid positions but also may unwittingly commit to negative attitudes and perceptions, beliefs, defenses against the other’s expected attacks, and investments involved in carrying out their conflictual activities. Thus, during an escalated conflict, a person (a group, a nation) may commit to the view that the other is an evil enemy, the belief that the other is out to take advantage of oneself (one’s group, nation), the conviction that one has to be constantly vigilant and ready to defend against the danger the other poses to one’s vital interests, and also invest in the means of defending oneself as well as attacking the other. After a protracted conflict, it is hard to give up a grudge, to disarm without feeling vulnerable, as well as to give up the emotional charge associated with being mobilized and vigilant in relation to the conflict.

As Johnson and Johnson (1989) have detailed, these ideas have given rise to a large number of research studies indicating that a cooperative process (as compared to a competitive one) leads to greater group productivity, more favorable interpersonal relations, better psychological health, and higher self-esteem. Research has also shown that more constructive resolution of conflicts results from cooperative as opposed to competitive processes.

For understanding the nature of the processes involved in conflict, this last research finding is of central theoretical and practical significance. It suggests that constructive processes of conflict resolution are similar to cooperative processes of problem solving, and destructive processes of conflict resolution are similar to competitive processes. Because our prior theoretical and research work gave us considerable knowledge about the nature of the processes involved in cooperation and competition, it is evident that this knowledge provides detailed insight into the nature of the processes entailed in constructive and destructive conflict resolution. This kind of knowledge contributes to understanding what processes are involved in producing good or bad outcomes of conflict. There are many ways of characterizing the outcomes of a conflict: satisfaction-dissatisfaction of the parties, material benefits and costs, improvement or worsening of their relationship, effects on self-esteem and reputation, precedents set, kinds of lessons learned, effects on third parties (such as children of divorcing parents), and so on. Thus, there is reason to believe that a cooperative-constructive process of conflict resolution leads to such good outcomes as mutual benefits and satisfaction, strengthening relationships, positive psychological effects, and so on, while a competitive-destructive process leads to material losses and dissatisfaction, worsening relationships, and negative
psychological effects in at least one party (the loser if it is a win-lose outcome) or both parties (if it is a lose-lose outcome).

CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION

Competition can vary from destructive to constructive: unfair, unregulated competition at the destructive end; fair, regulated competition in between; and constructive competition at the positive end. In constructive competition, the losers as well as the winners gain. Thus, in a tennis match that takes the form of constructive competition, the winner suggests how the loser can improve, offers an opportunity for the loser to learn and practice skills, and makes the match an enjoyable or worthwhile experience for the loser. In constructive competition, winners see to it that losers are better off, or at least not worse off than they were before the competition.

The major difference, for example, between constructive controversy and competitive debate is that in the former, people discuss their differences with the objective of clarifying them and attempting to find a solution that integrates the best thoughts that emerge during the discussion, no matter who articulates them (see Chapter Three for a fuller discussion). There is no winner and no loser; both win if during the controversy each party comes to deeper insights and enriched views of the matter that is initially in controversy. Constructive controversy is a process for constructively coping with the inevitable differences that people bring to cooperative interaction because it uses differences in understanding, perspective, knowledge, and world view as valued resources. By contrast, in competitive contests or debates there is usually a winner and a loser. The party judged to have “the best”—ideas, skills, knowledge, and so on—typically wins, while the other, who is judged to be less good, typically loses. Competition evaluates and ranks people based on their capacity for a particular task, rather than integrating various contributions.

By my emphasis throughout this chapter, I do not mean to suggest that competition produces no benefits. Competition is part of everyday life. Acquiring the skills necessary to compete effectively can be of considerable value. Moreover, competition in a cooperative, playful context can be fun. It enables one to enact and experience, in a nonserious setting, symbolic emotional dramas relating to victory and defeat, life and death, power and helplessness, dominance and submission; these dramas have deep personal and cultural roots. In addition, competition is a useful social mechanism for selecting those who are more able to perform the activities involved in the competition. Further, when no objective, criterion-referenced basis for measurement of performance exists, the relative performance of students affords a crude yardstick. Nevertheless, serious problems are associated with competition when it does not occur in a
cooperative context and if it is not effectively regulated by fair rules. (See Deutsch, 1973, pp. 377–388, for a discussion of regulating competition.)

**INITIATING COOPERATION AND COMPETITION**

If we know that cooperative and competitive processes have important effects on conflict resolution, a question follows: what initiates or gives rise to one or the other process? We did much research (Deutsch, 1973) in an attempt to find the answer. The results of our many studies fell into a pattern I slowly began to grasp. They seemed explainable by an assumption I have immodestly labeled “Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations”:

The characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also tend to elicit that type of social relationship.

Thus, cooperation induces and is induced by perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and de-emphasis of opposed interests, orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences, and so on. Similarly, competition induces and is induced by use of the tactics of coercion, threat, or deception; attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other; poor communication; minimization of the awareness of similarities in values and increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspicious and hostile attitudes; the importance, rigidity, and size of issues in conflict; and so on.

In other words, if one has systematic knowledge of the effects of cooperative and competitive processes, one has systematic knowledge of the conditions that typically give rise to such processes and, by extension, to the conditions that affect whether a conflict takes a constructive or destructive course. My early theory of cooperation and competition is a theory of the effects of cooperative and competitive processes. Hence, from the Crude Law of Social Relations, it follows that this theory brings insight into the conditions that give rise to cooperative and competitive processes.

This law is certainly crude. It expresses surface similarities between effects and causes; the basic relationships are genotypical rather than phenotypical. The surface effects of cooperation and competition are due to the underlying type of interdependence (positive or negative) and type of action (effective or bungling), the basic social psychological processes involved in the theory (substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility), and the cultural or social medium and situational context in which these processes are expressed. Thus, how a positive attitude is expressed in an effective, positively interdependent relationship depends on what is appropriate to the cultural or social medium and situational
context; that is, presumably one would not seek to express it in a way that is humiliating or embarrassing or likely to be experienced negatively by one's partner.

Similarly, the effectiveness of any typical effect of cooperation or competition as an initiating or inducing condition of a cooperative or competitive process is not due to its phenotype but rather to the inferred genotype of the type of interdependence and type of action. Thus, in most social media and social contexts, perceived similarity in basic values is highly suggestive of the possibility of a positive linkage between oneself and the other. However, we are likely to see ourselves as negatively linked in a context that leads each of us to recognize that similarities in values impel seeking something that is in scarce supply and available for only one of us. Also, it is evident that although threats are mostly perceived in a way that suggests a negative linkage, any threat perceived as intended to compel you to do something that is good for you or that you feel you should do is apt to be suggestive of a positive linkage.

Although the law is crude, my impression is that it is reasonably accurate; phenotypes often indicate the underlying genotypes. Moreover, it is a synthesizing principle, which integrates and summarizes a wide range of social psychological phenomena. The typical effects of a given relationship tend to induce that relationship; similarly, it seems that any of the typical effects of a given relationship tend to induce the other typical effects. For example, among the typical effects of a cooperative relationship are positive attitudes, perception of similarities, open communication, and orientation toward mutual enhancement. One can integrate much of the literature on the determinants of positive and negative attitudes in terms of the other associated effects of cooperation and competition. Thus, positive attitudes result from perceptions of similarity, open communication, and so on. Similarly, many of the determinants of effective communication can be linked to the other typical effects of cooperation or competition, such as positive attitudes and power sharing.

**SUMMARY OF THE THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

In brief, the theory equates a constructive process of conflict resolution with an effective cooperative problem-solving process in which the conflict is the mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively. It also equates a destructive process of conflict resolution with a competitive process in which the conflicting parties are involved in a competition or struggle to determine who wins and who loses; often, the outcome of the struggle is a loss for both parties. The theory further indicates that a cooperative-constructive process of conflict resolution is fostered by the typical effects of cooperation. The theory of cooperation and competition outlined in the beginning of this chapter is a well-verified theory of the
effects of cooperation and competition and thus allows insight into what can
give rise to a constructive or destructive process.

The theory cannot serve as a “cookbook” for a practitioner in the field of conflict resolution. It is a general intellectual framework for understanding what goes on in conflicts and how to intervene in them. Additionally, understanding and intervening in a specific conflict requires specific knowledge about the conflicting parties, their social contexts, their aspirations, their conflict orientations, the social norms, and so on.

Cooperation-competition, although of central importance, is only one factor influencing the course of conflict. The other chapters in this volume detail some of the other ingredients affecting conflict: power and influence, group problem solving, social perception and cognition, creativity, intrapsychic conflict, and personality. A practitioner must develop a mosaic of theories relevant to the specific situation of interest, rather than relying on any single one. The symptoms or difficulties in one situation may require emphasis on the theoretical theme related to power; in another, it may require focusing on problem-solving deficiencies.

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT**

Kurt Lewin, a famous psychologist, used to tell his students, of whom I was one, that “there is nothing so practical as a good theory.” To this point, I have presented the basic ideas of a good theory; in what follows, I indicate their usefulness in conflict situations.

**The Importance of a Cooperative Orientation**

The most important implication of cooperation-competition theory is that a cooperative or win-win orientation to resolving a conflict enormously facilitates constructive resolution, while a competitive or win-lose orientation hinders it. It is easier to develop and maintain a win-win attitude if you have social support for it. The social support can come from friends, coworkers, employers, the media, or your community.

To have a win-win attitude in a hostile environment, it is valuable to become part of a network of people or a member of groups with similar orientations that can extend social support to you. It is also helpful to develop the personal strengths and skills that are useful in bucking the tide.

If you are the manager in a system (for example, a principal in a school, a CEO in a company, a parent in a family), it is worthwhile to recognize that basic change in the system involves more than educating students, employees, or
children to have a win-win orientation. It also involves educating yourself and other key people in the system such as supervisors, staff, teachers, and parents so that their actions reflect and support a win-win orientation. Additionally, it often requires fundamental change in the incentive structure so that the rewards, salaries, grades, perks, etc., in the system do not foster a win-lose relationship among the people in it.

Reframing

The second most important implication of the theory has to do with the cooperative process that is involved in constructive conflict resolution. At the heart of this process is reframing the conflict as a mutual problem to be resolved (or solved) through joint cooperative efforts. Reframing helps to develop a cooperative orientation to the conflict even if the goals of the conflicting parties are seen, initially, to be negatively interdependent. A cooperative orientation to what is initially a win-lose conflict leads the parties to search for just procedures to determine who the winner is as well as for helping the loser gain through compensation or other means. Reframing has inherent within it the assumption that whatever resolution is achieved, it is acceptable to each party and considered to be just by both. This assumption is made explicit when one or both parties to a conflict communicate to the other something like, “I won’t be satisfied with any agreement unless you also feel satisfied with it and consider it to be just, and I assume that you feel the same way. Is my assumption correct?”

Thus, consider the school that is developing site-based management (SBM) procedures but faces a conflict (the second opening vignette of the Introduction). One group of teachers, mainly White, insists on having teachers elected to the SBM executive committee from the various academic departments by majority vote. Another group of teachers, the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC), demands that several members of the committee be from minority groups to represent their interests. This conflict can be reformulated as a joint problem: how to develop SBM procedures that empower and are responsive to the interests and needs of faculty, parents, and students from minority groups without abandoning the regular democratic procedures whereby teachers are elected to the SBM committee by their respective departments.

This joint problem is not easy to solve, but similar problems have been faced and resolved in many organizations. There is reason to believe that if the conflicting groups—the SBM committee members elected by their departments and the BTC—define the conflict as a joint problem to be resolved cooperatively, they can come up with a solution that is mutually satisfactory. (See Chapter Two for a discussion of resolving conflicts about what is “just.”)

The Norms of Cooperation

Of course, the parties are more apt to succeed in reframing their conflict into a mutual problem if the participants abide by the norms of cooperative behavior,
even when in conflict, and have the skills that facilitate effective cooperation. The norms of cooperative behavior basically are similar to those for respectful, responsible, honest, empowering, and caring behavior toward friends or fellow group members. Some of these norms, particularly relevant to conflict, are the following:

- Place the disagreements in perspective by identifying common ground and common interests.
- When there is disagreement, address the issues and refrain from making personal attacks.
- When there is disagreement, seek to understand the other’s views from his or her perspective; try to feel what it would be like if you were on the other’s side.
- Build on the ideas of the other, fully acknowledging their value.
- Emphasize the positive in the other and the possibilities of constructive resolution of the conflict. Limit and control expression of your negative feelings so that they are primarily directed at the other’s violation of cooperative norms (if that occurs) or at the other’s defeatism.
- Take responsibility for the harmful consequences—unwitting as well as intended—of what you do and say; seek to undo the harm as well as openly accept responsibility and make sincere apology for it.
- If the other harms you, be willing to forgive if the other accepts responsibility for doing so, sincerely apologizes, and is willing to try to undo it; seek reconciliation rather than nurturing an injury or grudge.
- Be responsive to the other’s legitimate needs.
- Empower the other to contribute effectively to the cooperative effort; solicit the other’s views, listen responsively, share information, and otherwise help the other—when necessary—to be an active, effective participant in the cooperative problem-solving process.
- Be appropriately honest. Being dishonest, attempting to mislead or deceive, is of course a violation of cooperative norms. However, one can be unnecessarily and inappropriately truthful. In most relationships, there is usually some ambivalence, a mixture of positive as well as negative thoughts and feelings about the other and about oneself. Unless the relationship has developed to a very high level of intimacy, communicating every suspicion, doubt, fear, and sense of weakness one has about oneself or the other is apt to be damaging to the relationship—particularly if the communication is blunt, unrationaled, and unmodulated. In effect, one should be open and honest in communication but appropriately so, realistically taking into account the consequences of what one says or does not say and the current state of the relationship.
Throughout conflict, remain a moral person—therefore, a person who is caring and just—and consider the other as a member of one’s moral community—therefore, as a person who is entitled to care and justice.

In the heat of conflict, there is often a tendency to violate the norms of cooperation. For example, you begin to attack the other as a person (“you’re stubborn,” “you’re selfish,” “you’re unreasonable,” “you’re inconsiderate,” “you’re narcissistic,” “you’re paranoid”). Recognize when you start to do this, stop, apologize, and explain what made you angry enough to want to belittle and hurt the other. If the other starts to do this to you, then interrupt, explain why you are interrupting, and try to resume a mutually respectful dialogue. (“You’re calling me names; that’s making me angry and makes me want to retaliate, so pretty soon we’ll be in a name-calling contest and that will get us nowhere. Let’s stick to the issues and be respectful of one another. If you’re angry with me, tell me why. If I’m at fault, I’ll remedy it.”)

It is wise to recognize that you, as well as the other, have hot buttons that, if pressed, are likely to evoke strong emotions. The emotions evoked may be anxiety, anger, rage, fear, depression, withdrawal, and so on. It is important to know your own hot buttons and how you tend to react when they are pressed, so that you can control your reactions in that event. Sometimes you need to take time out to control your emotional reactions and to consider an appropriate response to what elicits them. Similarly, it is valuable to know the other’s hot buttons so as to avoid pressing them and provoking disruptive emotions in the other.

The Values Underlying Constructive Conflict Resolution

The norms of cooperation and constructive conflict resolution reflect some basic values, to which people who are “profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” can adhere (Rawls, 1996, p. xxxix). A reasonable doctrine includes conceptions of the values and norms with regard to conflict that people who adhere to another reasonable doctrine (as well as those who adhere to one’s own) can endorse and be expected to follow during conflict. Thus, pro-life and pro-choice advocates in the abortion conflict may have profoundly differing views, but they are both components of reasonable doctrines if the adherents to each are willing to follow common values in dealing with their conflict about abortion. Among such values are reciprocity, human equality, shared community, fallibility, and nonviolence. A brief discussion of these interrelated values follows.

Reciprocity. This is the value involved in the maxim “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.” My understanding of the maxim as it applies to conflict requires each party to treat the other with the fairness that it would
normatively expect if in the other’s position. It assumes reciprocity from the
other—fairness to and from the other. The fairness in behavior, in process, and
in outcomes expected is normative. As defined by one’s culture, it is how the
conflicting parties should or should not behave toward one another if they are,
at a minimum, to avoid a destructive conflict or, more positively, to promote
constructive management of their conflict. The norms against violence, disre-
spect, deceit, and irresponsibility are widespread standards for avoiding destruc-
tive conflict.

**Human Equality.** This value implies that all human beings are equally entitled
to just and respectful treatment, with consideration for their needs, and enti-
tled to such basic liberties as freedom of conscience, thought, and expression,
as well as freedom from coercion. You are entitled to this from the other, but
the other is entitled to this from you too. Human equality does not imply that
people necessarily have the same status, privileges, power, needs, or wealth. It
does imply that such differences are not the consequence of one’s violation of
the other’s entitlements.

**Shared Community.** Implicit in constructive conflict resolution is mutual recog-
nition of being part of a broader community that members wish to preserve, a
community sharing some key values and norms; such recognition occurs despite
important differences between oneself and the other.

**Fallibility.** The sources of disagreement between reasonable people are mani-
fold. Disagreements may arise from such sources as the nature of the evidence,
the weight to be given to types of evidence, and the vagueness of the moral or
other concepts involved, as well as from differences in basic values or world-
views. Reasonable people understand that their own judgment as well as the
judgment of others may be fallible.

**Nonviolence.** This value implies that coercive tactics are not employed by you
or the other to obtain agreement or consent. Such tactics include physical or
psychological violence (for example, humiliation), destruction of property
or other valued goods, harm to one’s life chances (a potential career), harm to
one’s loved ones, and so on.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGING CONFLICT**

In prior sections, discussion focused on the attitudes, norms, and values that
foster cooperation. These are necessary but not in themselves sufficient. Knowl-
edge and skills are also important in promoting constructive resolution of a
conflict. This is the thesis underlying the book. Knowledge of the theory presented earlier in this chapter offers a useful framework for organizing one’s thinking about the social psychological consequences of cooperation and competition as well as the conditions that lead to one rather than the other. It is a way of orienting oneself to situations not previously encountered. Along with the other theories discussed in this book, it enlarges one’s knowledge of the range of conditions to be considered as one wishes to develop and maintain a constructive, cooperative process of conflict resolution and to prevent developing a destructive process.

Skills are also vitally important if one wishes to develop and implement successfully an effective, cooperative problem-solving process. There has not been much systematic discussion of the skills involved in constructive solutions to conflict. There are, I believe, three main kinds useful to the participants in a conflict as well as to third parties (such as mediators, conciliators, counselors, or therapists) who are called on to provide assistance to conflicting parties. For convenience, I label them rapport-building skills, cooperative conflict resolution skills, and group process and decision-making skills.

First, there are the skills involved in establishing effective working relationships with each of the conflicting parties and between the conflicting parties if you are the mediator or with the other if you are a participant. Some of the components of this broad category include such skills as breaking the ice; reducing fears, tensions, and suspicion; overcoming resistance to negotiation; establishing a framework for civil discourse and interaction; and fostering realistic hope and optimism. Thus, before negotiations begin between two individuals or groups perceiving each other as adversaries, it is often useful to have informal social gatherings or meetings in which the adversaries can get to know one another as human beings who share some similar interests and values. Skill in breaking the ice and creating a safe, friendly atmosphere for interaction between the adversaries is helpful in developing the prenegotiation experiences likely to lead to effective negotiations about the issues in dispute.

A second, related set of skills concerns developing and maintaining a cooperative conflict resolution process among the parties throughout their conflict. These are the skills that are usually emphasized in practicum courses or workshops on conflict resolution. They include identifying the type of conflict in which you are involved; reframing the issues so the conflict is perceived as a mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively; active listening and responsive communication; distinguishing between needs and positions; recognizing and acknowledging the other’s needs as well as your own; encouraging, supporting, and enhancing the other; taking the perspective of the other; identifying shared interests and other similarities in values, experiences, and so on; being alert to cultural differences and the possibilities of misunderstanding arising from them; controlling anger; dealing with difficult conflicts and difficult people; being
sensitive to the other’s anxieties and hot buttons and how to avoid pressing them; and being aware of your own anxieties and hot buttons as well as your tendencies to be emotionally upset and misperceiving if they are pressed so that these can be controlled.

A third set of skills is involved in developing a creative and productive group problem-solving and decision-making process. These include skills pertinent to group process, leadership, and effective group discussion, such as goal and standard setting; monitoring progress toward group goals; eliciting, clarifying, coordinating, summarizing, and integrating the contributions of the various participants; and maintaining group cohesion. The third set also includes such problem-solving and decision-making skills as identifying and diagnosing the nature of the problem confronting the group; acquiring the relevant information necessary for developing possible solutions; creating or identifying several possible, alternative solutions; choosing the criteria for evaluating the alternatives (such as the “effects” on economic costs and benefits, on relations between the conflicting parties, and on third parties); selecting the alternative that optimizes the results on the chosen criteria; and implementing the decision through appropriate action.

People are not novices with regard to conflict. From their life experiences, many people have developed some of the component skills involved in building rapport, constructive conflict resolution, and effective group process and problem solving. However, some are not aware that they have the skills; nor are they aware of how and when to use them in a conflict. The fact that everyone has been a participant and observer in many conflicts from childhood on results in implicit knowledge, preconceptions, attitudes, and modes of behavior toward conflict that may be deeply ingrained before any systematic training occurs. Many of a person’s preexisting orientations to conflict and modes of behavior in it reflect those prevalent in his or her culture, but some reflect individual predispositions acquired from unique experiences in the contexts of family, school, watching TV, and the like.

Before students can acquire explicit competence in conflict resolution, they have to become aware of their preexisting orientations to conflict as well as their typical behaviors. Awareness and motivation are developed by having a model of good performance that students can compare with their preconscious, preexisting one. Internalization comes from guided and repeated practice in imitating the model. Feedback on the students’ successfulness gradually shapes their behavior to be consistent with the model, and frequent practice leads to its internalization. Once the model has been internalized, recurrence of earlier incompetent orientations to conflict is experienced as awkward and out of place because there are internal cues to the deviations of one’s behavior from the internalized model. In tennis, if you have internalized a good model of serving, internal cues tell you if you are deviating from it (say, by throwing the ball too
high). If self-taught tennis students have internalized poor serving models, training should be directed at making them aware of this and providing a good model. So too in conflict resolution.

In summary, the discussion in this and the preceding sections has centered on the orientation, norms, values, and skills that help to develop a cooperative, constructive process of conflict resolution. Without competence in the skills, having a cooperative orientation and knowledge of conflict processes is often insufficient to develop a cooperative process of conflict resolution. Similarly, having the skills is insufficient to develop a cooperative process without the cooperative orientation and motivation to apply the skills or without the knowledge of how to apply the skills in various social and cultural contexts.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING**

There are, for training, several implications of the material presented in the preceding parts of this chapter. They center on the social context of learning, the social context of applying one’s learning, the substantive content of the training, and the reflective practitioner.

**The Social Context of Learning**

The theory described in this chapter suggests that the social context of learning be one in which cooperation, constructive conflict resolution, and creative controversy are strongly emphasized. The teaching method employed should take the form of cooperative learning, and the conflictual interactions within the classroom or workshop between teacher and students and among students should model those of creative controversy and constructive conflict resolution. The social context of learning should walk the talk, and in so doing offer students the experiences that support a cooperative orientation, exemplify the values and social norms of cooperation, and model the skills involved in constructive management of conflict.

**The Social Context of Application**

It can be anticipated that many social contexts are unfavorable to a cooperative orientation and the use of one’s skills in constructive conflict resolution. In some social contexts, an individual who has such skills may expect to be belittled by friends or associates as being weak, unassertive, or afraid. In other contexts, she may anticipate accusations of being “disloyal,” a “traitor,” or an “enemy lover” if she tries to develop a cooperative problem-solving relationship with the other side. In still other contexts, the possibility of developing a constructive conflict resolution process seems so slim that one does not even try to do so. In other words, if the social context leads you to expect to be unsuccessful or
devalued in employing your skills, you are not apt to use them; you will do so if it leads you to expect approval and success.

The foregoing suggests that, in unfavorable social contexts, as a skilled conflict resolver you often need social support as well as two additional types of skill. One relates to the ability to place yourself outside or above your social context so that you can observe the influences emanating from it and then consciously decide whether to resist them personally or not. The other type involves the skills of a successful change agent, someone who is able to help an institution or group change its culture so that it facilitates rather than hinders constructive conflict resolution. I mention these additional skills because it is important to recognize that institutional and cultural changes are often necessary for an individual to feel free to express his or her constructive potential.

The common need for social support after training has occurred has implications for who are selected for training and also for post-training contacts. There are several ways to foster a social context that is supportive: train all of the participants in it, train the influential people, or train a cohort of people of sufficient size to provide effective mutual support in the face of resistance. Post-training contacts with the training institution and its trainers may also yield the social support necessary to buttress the individual in a hostile environment.

**The Substantive Content of Training**

In prior parts of this chapter, I have outlined what I consider to be the attitudes, knowledge, and skills that amount to a framework for education in constructive conflict resolution. A skillful trainer fleshes out such a framework with substantive content that is sufficiently vital and intellectually compelling to engage the interest and motivation of the student, is relevant to his or her most common and most difficult conflicts, and is sufficiently diverse in content and social context to facilitate generalizing and applying the training in a variety of situations. To accomplish these objectives, a trainer must not only have a clear framework for training, but also must be open and creative so that he or she can respond to the students’ needs effectively.

**The Reflective Practitioner**

One of the important goals of education in this area is to help the student, as well as the trainer, become a reflective practitioner of constructive conflict resolution. I refer to two kinds of reflection: on managing the conflicts that you are experiencing and on the framework of conflict resolution that you are employing. Self-reflection about how you are handling conflicts is necessary to continuing improvement and also to prevent old habits, your hot spots, social pressure, and the like from making you regress to less constructive modes of conflict resolution.
Conflict resolution as a field of study is relatively young; it is going through a period of rapid intellectual development. It is experiencing an upsurge in research, theoretical development, and practical experience that, we hope, result in improvement of the frameworks that are used for training in conflict resolution. The reflective practitioner, by reflecting on his or her practice, can learn from as well as contribute to this growing body of knowledge and reflected-on experience.

**CONCLUSION**

The central theme of this chapter is that a knowledgeable, skillful, cooperative approach to conflict enormously facilitates its constructive resolution. It is well to realize, however, that there is a two-way relation between effective cooperation and constructive conflict resolution. Good cooperative relations facilitate constructive management of conflict; the ability to handle constructively the inevitable conflicts that occur during cooperation facilitates the survival and deepening of cooperative relations.

**References**


That’s not fair expresses a feeling that frequently leads to conflict. A younger brother cries out that his older brother is getting “a bigger piece of cake than I am.” An applicant for a job feels that the selection procedures are biased against members of her race, gender, or ethnic group. A politician thinks the election was lost because his opponent stuffed the ballot boxes. A wife feels that her husband doesn’t help sufficiently with the household chores. These all involve issues of justice, which may give rise to conflict. Conflict can lead to changes that reduce injustice, or it can increase injustice if it takes a destructive form, as in war.

It is useful to make a distinction between injustice and oppression. Oppression is the experience of repeated, widespread, systemic injustice. It need not be extreme and involve the legal system (as in slavery, apartheid, or the lack of right to vote) nor violent (as in tyrannical societies). Harvey (1999) has used the term “civilized oppression” to characterize the everyday processes of oppression in normal life. Civilized oppression “is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutions and rules, and the collective consequences of following those rules. It refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions which are supported by the media and cultural stereotypes as well as by the structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms” (Young, 1990, p. 41).
Structural oppression cannot be eliminated by getting rid of the rulers or by making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in the major economic, political, and cultural institutions. While specific privileged groups are the beneficiaries of the oppression of other groups and thus have an interest in the continuation of the status quo, they do not typically understand themselves to be agents of oppression. (See Deutsch, 2006 for a fuller discussion on oppression.)

WHAT FORMS DOES INJUSTICE TAKE?

I consider here six types of injustices that are involved in oppression: distributive injustice, procedural injustice, the sense of injustice, retributive injustice, moral exclusion, and cultural imperialism. To identify which groups of people are oppressed and what forms their oppression takes, each of these six types of injustices should be examined. For a comprehensive discussion of social psychological research related to the following topics, see Tyler and associates (1997).

TYPES OF INJUSTICE

In the scholarly literature on injustice, there are several foci of attention:

- **Distributive injustice**, which is concerned with the criteria that lead you to feel you receive a fair outcome. (The boy receives a fair share of the pie being distributed.)

- **Procedural injustice**, concerned with fair treatment in making and implementing the decisions that determine the outcome. (Is the politician being treated with dignity and respect? Has he lost the election fairly?)

- **The sense of injustice**, centering on what factors determine whether an injustice is experienced as such. (If the wife does more than her fair share of the household chores, what will determine whether or not she feels it is unjust?)

- **Retributive and reparative injustice**, concerned with how to respond to the violation of moral norms and how to repair the moral community that has been violated (for example, in the case of job discrimination against an applicant because of race).

- **Moral exclusion** or the scope of injustice, is concerned with who is included in the moral community and who is thought to be entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatments. Generally, you don’t include such creatures as ticks and roaches in your moral community—and some
people think of other ethnic groups, heretics, or those with differing sexual orientation as “vermin” who are not entitled to justice.

• **Cultural imperialism** occurs when a dominant group imposes its values, norms, and customs upon subordinated groups so that members of these subordinated groups find themselves defined by the dominant others. To the extent that women, Africans, Jews, Muslims, homosexuals, the elderly, and so on must interact with the dominant group whose culture mainly provides stereotyped images of them, they are often under pressure to conform to and internalize the dominant group images of their group.

I discuss each focus separately in this chapter. Recognize, though, that there is considerable overlap among them.

**Distributive Justice**

Issues of distributive justice pervade social life. They occur not only at the societal level, but also in intimate social relations. They arise when something of value is scarce and not everyone can have what they want or when something of negative value (a cost, a harm) cannot be avoided by all. In the schools, such questions arise in connection with who gets the teacher’s attention, who gets what marks, and how much of a school’s resources are to be allocated for students who are physically handicapped or socioeconomically disadvantaged. Similarly, distribution of pay, promotion, benefits, equipment, space, and so forth are common problems in work settings. Also, issues of distributive justice are involved in health care and medical practice: how is a scarce or expensive medical resource, such as a mechanical heart, to be allocated?

Scholars have identified a large number of principles that could be used in distributing grades, pay, scarce medical resources, and the like. Discussions focus on three key principles—equity, equality, and need—and their variants. The *equity principle* asserts that people should receive benefits in proportion to their contribution; those who contribute more should receive more than those who contribute less. The *equality principle* states that all members of a group should share its benefits equally. The *need principle* indicates that those who need more of a benefit should get more than those who need it less.

In any particular allocation situation, the three principles may be in conflict. Thus, paying the members of a workgroup according to their individual productivity may conflict with paying all the members of a work group equally, and these two principles may conflict with paying them according to their need (such as giving higher pay to those with more dependents). Only if all are equally productive and equally needy is there no conflict among the principles.

The principles of distributive justice may be favored differently among individuals, groups, social classes, ideologies, and so forth. For example, in a
collectivist community such as an Israeli kibbutz, the members have essentially the same pay and standard of living no matter how much they differ in their individual work productivity. In contrast, in an individualistic society such as the United States, the CEO of a profit-making firm may get paid more than a thousand times what an individual worker makes. Conflict within the kibbutz arises if individuals feel that their standard of living does not adequately reflect their unusually valuable contribution to the community; conflict within the American firm is likely if workers feel that they are not getting a fair share of the profits.

Theory and research (Deutsch, 1985) suggest that the principles are usually salient in different social contexts. Equity is most prominent in situations in which economic productivity is the primary goal; equality is dominant when social harmony, cohesiveness, or fostering enjoyable social relations is the primary emphasis; and need is most salient in situations where encouraging personal development and personal welfare is the major goal.

Many times, all three goals are important. In such situations, the three principles can be applied in a manner that is either mutually supportive or mutually contradictory. In a mutually supportive application, the equity principle leads to recognizing individual differences in contribution and honoring those who make uniquely important contributions. In a socially harmonious honoring, no invidious distinctions are drawn between those who are honored and those who are not; the equal divine or moral value of everyone in the cooperative community is affirmed as the community honors those who give so much to it. Similarly, the equal moral worth of every individual leads to special help for those who are especially needy.

Thus, if a football player helps his team win by an unusually skillful or courageous feat, he is honored by his teammates and others in such a way that they feel good rather than demeaned by his being honored. His being honored does not imply that they have lost something; it is not a win-lose or competitive situation for them. If, in contrast, the equity principle is applied in a manner that suggests those who produce more are better human beings and entitled to superior treatment generally, then social harmony and cohesiveness are impaired. If the equality principle leads to a sameness or uniformity in which the value of unique individual contributions is denied, then productivity as well as social cohesion are impaired. It is a delicate balance that often tilts too far in one direction or the other.

The judgment that you have received a fair outcome is determined not only by whether the appropriate distributive principles are employed but also by whether your outcome is in comparative balance with the outcomes received by people like you in similar situations. If you and a coworker are equally productive, do you each receive the same pay raise? Are all members of a club invited to a party given by the club leader? If it’s my turn to receive a heart
transplant, is someone else—maybe a wealthy benefactor of the hospital—given higher priority?

The theory of relative deprivation indicates that the sense of deprivation or injustice arises if there is comparative imbalance: egoistical deprivation occurs if an individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals, and fraternal deprivation occurs if a person feels her group is disadvantaged relative to other groups. The sense of being deprived occurs if there is a perceived discrepancy between what a person obtains, of what she wants, and what she believes she is entitled to obtain. The deprivation is relative because one’s sense of deprivation is largely determined by past and current comparisons with others as well as by future expectations.

There is an extensive literature on the determinants of the choice of other individuals or groups with whom one chooses to compare oneself. This literature is too extensive to summarize here, but it clearly demonstrates that people’s feelings of deprivation are not simply a function of their objective circumstances; they are affected by a number of psychological variables. Thus, paradoxically, members of disadvantaged groups (such as women, low-paid workers, ethnic minorities) often feel less deprived than one might expect, and even less so than those who are more fortunate, because they compare themselves with “similar others”—other women, other low-paid workers. In contrast, men and middle-income workers who have more opportunities may feel relatively more deprived because they are comparing themselves with those who have enjoyed more success in upward mobility. Also, there is evidence that discontent, social unrest, and rebellion often occur after a period of improvement in political-economic conditions that leads to rising expectations regarding entitlements if they are not matched by a corresponding rise in one’s benefits. The result is an increased perceived discrepancy between one’s sense of entitlement and one’s benefits; this is sometimes referred to as the revolution of rising expectations.

Procedural Justice

In addition to assessing the fairness of outcomes, individuals judge the fairness of the procedures that determine the outcomes. Research evidence indicates that fair treatment and procedures are a more pervasive concern to most people than fair outcomes. (See Lind and Tyler, 1988, for a comprehensive discussion of procedural justice.) Fair procedures are psychologically important for several reasons, first in encouraging the assumption that they give rise to fair outcomes in the present and also in the future. In some situations, where it is not clear what fair outcomes should be, fair procedures are the best guarantee that the decision about outcomes is made fairly. Research indicates that one is less apt to feel committed to authorities, organizations, social policies, and governmental rules and regulations if the procedures associated with them are considered unfair. Also, people feel affirmed if the procedures to which they are subjected
treat them with the respect and dignity they feel is their due; if so treated, it is easier for them to accept a disappointing outcome.

Questions with regard to the justice of procedures can arise in various ways. Let us consider, for example, evaluation of teacher performance in a school. Some questions immediately come to mind. Who has “voice” or representation in determining whether such evaluation is necessary? How are the evaluations to be conducted? Who conducts them? What is to be evaluated? What kind of information is collected? How is its accuracy and validity ascertained? How are its consistency and reliability determined? What methods of preventing incompetence or bias in collecting and processing information are employed? Who constitutes the groups that organize the evaluations, draw conclusions, make recommendations, and make decisions? What roles do teachers, administrators, parents, students, and outside experts have in the procedures? How are the ethicality, considerateness, and dignity of the process protected?

Implicit in these questions are some values with regard to procedural justice. One wants procedures that generate relevant, unbiased, accurate, consistent, reliable, competent, and valid information and decisions as well as polite, dignified, and respectful behavior in carrying out the procedures. Also, voice and representation in the processes and decisions related to the evaluation are considered desirable by those directly affected by the decisions. In effect, fair procedures yield good information for use in the decision-making processes as well as voice in the processes for those affected by them, and considerate treatment as the procedures are being implemented.

The Sense of Injustice

Whether an injustice takes the form of physical abuse, discrimination in employment, sexual harassment, or disrespectful treatment, there will always be some people who are insensitive to the injustice and hence seemingly unaware of it. In what follows, we discuss factors that influence the sense of injustice.

Victims and Victimizers. Distributive as well as procedural injustice can advantage some people and groups and disadvantage others. Those who benefit from injustice are, wittingly or unwittingly, often its perpetrators or perpetuators, and they are usually not fully aware of their complicity. Awareness brings with it such unpleasant emotions as guilt, fear of revenge, and sometimes feelings of helplessness with regard to their ability to bring about the social changes necessary to eliminate the injustice. As one might expect, the disadvantaged are more apt to be aware of the injustice. Associated with this awareness are feelings such as anger (outrage, indignation), resentment, humiliation, depression, and a sense of helplessness. Positive emotions related to self-esteem, sense of power, and pride are experienced by those who are engaged in effective actions to eliminate injustice, whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged.
There seems to be a straightforward explanation for the asymmetry in sensitivity to the injustice of the disadvantaged (the victims) and the advantaged (the victimizers). The victims usually have relatively little power compared to the victimizers; the latter are more likely to set the terms of their relationship and, through their control of the state and other social institutions, to establish the legal and other reigning definitions of justice.

Thus, the victimizers—in addition to gains from their exploitative actions—commonly find reassurance in official definitions of justice and the support of such major social institutions as the church, the media, and the schools, to deaden their sensitivity to the injustices inherent in their relations with the victim. The victim may, of course, be taken in by the official definitions and the indoctrination emanating from social institutions and, as a result, lose sensitivity to her situation of injustice. However, the victim is less likely than the victimizer to lose sensitivity to injustice because she is the one who is experiencing its negative consequences. She is also less likely to feel committed to the official definitions and indoctrinations because of her lack of participation in creating them.

This explanation of differential sensitivity in terms of differential gains and differential power is not the complete story. There are, of course, relations in which the victimizer is not of superior power; even so, he avoids experiencing guilt for his actions. Consider a traffic accident in which a car hits a pedestrian. The driver of the car usually perceives the accident so as to place responsibility for it on the victim. Seeing the victim as responsible enables the driver to maintain a positive image of himself. Projecting the blame onto the victim enables the victimizer to feel blameless.

If we accept the notion that most people try to maintain a positive conception of themselves, we can expect differential sensitivity to injustice in those who experience pain, harm, and misfortune and those who cause it. If I try to think well of myself, I shall minimize my responsibility for any injustice that is connected with me or minimize the extent of injustice that has occurred if I cannot minimize my responsibility. On the other hand, if I am the victim of pain or harm, to think well of myself I have to believe that it was not my due; it is not just desserts for a person of my good character. Thus, the need to maintain positive self-esteem leads to opposite reactions in those who cause an injustice and those who suffer from it. There is, of course, also the possibility that a victim may seek to maintain her self-esteem by denying or minimizing the injustice she is suffering; denial may not be completely conscious. Resort to denial is less apt to occur if there are other similar victims who are prepared to acknowledge and protest their own victimization.

Although the need to maintain positive self-regard is common, it is not universal. If she views herself favorably, the victim of injustice may be outraged by her experience and attempt to undo it; in so doing, she may have to challenge
the victimizer. If the victimizer is more powerful than she and has the support of legal and other social institutions, she will realize that it is dangerous to act on her outrage—or even to express it. Under such circumstances, in a process that Anna Freud (1937) labeled “identification with the aggressor,” the victim may control her dangerous feelings of injustice and outrage by denying them and by internalizing the derogatory attitudes of the victimizer toward herself as well as toward others who are similar to her (other women, other disadvantaged groups). Paradoxically, by identifying with the aggressor you feel more powerful as you attack or aggress against others on whom you project the “bad” characteristics in yourself that you have suppressed because of your fear of being attacked by someone with the power to harm you. We can see this phenomenon in parents who were abused as children going on to abuse their own children and in traditionally submissive women derogating independent, assertive women.

From this discussion, it is evident that for numerous reasons victims as well as their victimizers may be insensitive to injustices that are occurring. I turn now to a brief discussion of how the sense of injustice may be activated in the victim and the victimizer. (See Deutsch and Steil, 1988, for an extended discussion.)

**Activating the Sense of Injustice.** The process entails falsifying and delegitimizing officially sanctioned ideologies, myths, and prejudices that “justify” the injustices. I am referring to such myths as these:

- Women like men to make sexual passes at them, even at work, because it makes them feel attractive.
- African Americans are morally and intellectually inferior to European Americans.
- The poor deserve to be poor because they are lazy.
- Everyone in the United States has equal opportunity in the competition to achieve success.

The activation process also involves exposing the victims and victimizers to new ideologies, models, and reference groups that support realistic hope about the possibility that the injustice can be eliminated. Because of the anxieties they elicit, one can anticipate that the changes necessary to eliminate an injustice produce resistance from others—and sometimes in oneself. It is easier to manage resistance and anxiety by becoming aware of the value systems that support the change and of models of successful change as well as of the social support you can get from groups and individuals who support the change. You feel less vulnerable if you know that you are not alone, that others are with you.

Additionally, the process entails the work necessary to make oneself and one’s group effective forces for social change. There is internally directed work,
aimed at enhancing cohesiveness, trust, and effective organization among those
who favor change; and there is external work, involved in building up one’s
political and economic strength as well as one’s bargaining power. Doing so
enables effective action to increase the incentives for accepting change among
the advantaged who are content with the status quo and among those who
desire change but are fearful of the consequences of seeking change. However,
some victims of injustice may have to free themselves from the seductive
satisfaction of feeling morally superior to the victimizers before they can fully
commit to and be effective in their struggle against injustice.

Retributive and Reparative Justice

In a study comparing responses to injustice and to frustration (reported in
Deutsch, 1985), it was found that an injustice that is experienced, whether to
oneself or to another, involves one not only personally but also as a member of
a moral community whose moral norms are being violated; it evokes an oblig-
ation to restore justice. The psychology of retributive and reparative justice is
concerned with the attitudes and behavior of people in response to moral rule
breaking. It is reasonable to expect a person’s response to be influenced by the
nature of the transgression, the transgressor, the victim, and the amount of harm
experienced by the victim, as well as by the person’s relations to the transgres-
sor and victim. A transgression such as murder evokes a different response than
violation of customary norms of courtesy and politeness. In the United States,
a white murderer is less likely to be executed than a black one. Similarly, beat-
ing and raping a black woman is less apt to result in widespread media atten-
tion than in the case of a white victim. Burning a synagogue is considered a
more serious offense than painting swastikas on its walls. An Israeli Jew is less
apt to be concerned about Israeli discrimination against Palestinians than Arabs
are, and Arabs are unlikely to be as concerned about discrimination against
Jews in their countries as Israeli Jews are.

A number of means are employed to support and reestablish the validity of
moral rules once they are violated. They generally call for one or a combination
of these actions on the part of the violator: full confession, sincere apology con-
trition, restitution, compensation, self-abasement, or self-reform. They also may
involve various actions by the community addressed to the violator, such as
humiliation, physical punishment, incarceration, or reeducation. These actions
may be addressed not just to the violator but also to others related to the violator,
such as his children, family, or ethnic group.

Retribution can serve a number of functions:

• Violation of a moral code tends to weaken the code; one of the most
important functions of retribution is to reassert the continuing strength
and validity of the moral rule that has been violated. For example, many
communities are experiencing a breakdown of the rules of courtesy and respect because children and adolescents are no longer taught these rules and there is no appropriate response when they are violated.

- Retribution can also serve a cathartic function for members of the moral community who have been affronted and angered by the transgression.
- Punishment of the violator may have a deterrent effect against future violation as well as a cathartic effect.
- Retribution may take the form of compulsory reeducation and reform of the transgressor so that he is no longer likely to engage in immoral behavior.
- Retribution in the form of restitution, in addition to its other functions, may serve to help the victim recover from the losses and damages that he or she has suffered.

There are considerable variations among cultures and subcultures with regard to both the nature of moral rules and how to respond to violations of them. Ignorance with regard to the moral rules of another culture as well as ethnocentrism are likely to give rise to misunderstanding as well as conflict if one violates the moral code of the other’s group.

The Scope of Justice

The scope of justice refers to who (and what) is included in one’s moral community. Who is and is not entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatment by inclusion or lack of inclusion in one’s moral community? Albert Schweitzer included all living creatures in his moral community, and some Buddhists include all of nature. Most of us define a more limited moral community.

Individuals and groups who are outside the boundary in which considerations of fairness apply may be treated in ways that would be considered immoral if people within the boundary were so treated. Consider the situation in Bosnia. Prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia were more or less part of one moral community and treated one another with some degree of civility. After the start of civil strife (initiated by power-hungry political leaders), vilification of other ethnic groups became a political tool, and it led to excluding others from one’s moral community. As a consequence, the various ethnic groups committed the most barbaric atrocities against one another. The same thing happened with the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi.

At various periods in history and in different societies, groups and individuals have been treated inhumanly by other humans: slaves by their masters, natives by colonialists, blacks by whites, Jews by Nazis, women by men, children by adults, the physically disabled by those who are not, homosexuals by heterosexuals, political dissidents by political authorities, and one ethnic or religious group by another.
Lesser forms of moral exclusions, marginalization, occur also against whole categories of people—women, the physically impaired, the elderly, and various ethnic, religious, and racial groups—in many societies where barriers prevent them from full participation in the political, economic, and social life of their societies. The results of these barriers are not only material deprivation but also disrespectful, demeaning, and arbitrary treatment as well as decreased opportunity to develop and employ their individual talents. For extensive research and writing in this area, see the work of Susan Opotow (2001), a leading scholar in this area.

Three central psychological questions arise with regard to moral exclusion:

1. What social conditions lead an individual or group to exclude others from the individual or group’s moral community?
2. What psychological mechanisms enable otherwise moral human beings to commit atrocities against other human beings?
3. What determines which individuals or groups are likely to be excluded from the moral community?

Existing knowledge to answer these questions adequately is limited; their seriousness deserves fuller answers than space allows here.

Social Conditions. Studies of political, ethnic, and religious violence have identified several social conditions that appear particularly conducive to developing or intensifying hatred and alienating emotions that permit otherwise nonviolent members of a society to dehumanize victims and kill (Gurr, 1970; Staub, 1989).

The first of these conditions is emergence of, or increase in, difficult life conditions, with a corresponding increase in the sense of relative deprivation. This may happen as a result of defeat in war, economic depression, rapid social change, or even physical calamity. The resulting decrease in living standards often leads to a sense of insecurity and a feeling of being threatened by potential rivals for scarce jobs, housing, and the like.

The second condition is an unstable political regime whose power may be under challenge. In such situations, scapegoating may be employed by those in power as a means of deflecting criticism and of attacking potential dissidents and rivals.

Third, there may be a claim for superiority—national, racial, gender, class, cultural, religious, genetic—that justifies treating the other as having inferior moral status.

The fourth condition is when violence is culturally salient and sanctioned as a result of past wars, attention in the media, or availability of weapons.

Fifth, there may be little sense of human relatedness or social bonding with the potential victims because there is little in the way of cooperative human contact with them.
The sixth condition consists of social institutions that are authoritarian; there, nonconformity and open dissent against violence sanctioned by authority are inhibited.

Finally, hatred and violence are intensified if there is no active group of observers of the violence, in or outside the society, who strongly object to it and serve as a constant reminder of its injustice and immorality.

**Psychological Mechanisms.** There are many mechanisms by which reprehensible behavior toward another can be justified. One can do so by appealing to a higher moral value (killing physicians who perform abortions to discourage abortion and “save unborn children”). Or one can rationalize by relabeling the behavior (calling physical abuse of a child “teaching him a lesson”). Or one can minimize the behavior by saying it is not so harmful (“it hurts me more than it does you”). Or one can deny personal responsibility for the behavior (your superior has ordered you to torture the prisoner). Or one can blame the victim (it is because they are hiding the terrorists in their village that the village must be destroyed). Or one can isolate oneself emotionally or desensitize oneself to the human consequences of delegitimizing the others (as many do in relation to beggars and homeless people in urban areas).

**Selection of Targets for Exclusion.** We are most likely to delegitimate others whom we sense as a threat—to anything that is important to us: our religious beliefs, economic well-being, public order, sense of reality, physical safety, reputation, ethnic group, family, moral values, institutions, and so on. If harm by the other was experienced in the past, we are apt to be increasingly ready to interpret ambiguous actions of the other as threats. A history of prior violent ethnic conflict predisposes a group to be suspicious of another’s intentions. We also delegitimate others whom we exploit, take advantage of, or otherwise treat unfairly because of their deviance from normative standards of appearance or behavior. However, as indicated earlier in this chapter, there is an asymmetry such that the ability to exclude the other is more available to the powerful as compared to the weak; the powerful can do this overtly, the weak only covertly. Thus, the targets for exclusion are likely to be those with relatively little power, such as minority groups, the poor, and “sexual deviants.”

Sometimes suppressed inner conflicts encourage individuals or groups to seek out external enemies. There are many kinds of internal needs for which a hostile external relationship can be an outlet:

- It may amount to an acceptable excuse for internal problems; the problems can be held out as caused by the adversary or by the need to defend against the adversary.
- It may be a distraction so that internal problems appear less salient.
- It can provide an opportunity to express pent-up hostility arising from internal conflict through combat with the external adversary.
• It may enable one to project disapproved aspects of oneself (which are not consciously recognized) onto the adversary and to attack those aspects through assault on the adversary. The general tendency is to select for projection those who are weaker, those with whom there is a prior history of enmity, and those who symbolically represent the weaker side of the internal conflict. Thus, someone who has repressed his homosexual tendencies, fearing socially dangerous consequences for acting on them, may make homosexuals into an enemy group.

• Especially if it has dangerous undertones, conflict can serve to counteract such personal feelings as aimlessness, boredom, lack of focus, lack of energy, and depression. It can give a sense of excitement, purpose, coherence, and unity as well as energize and mobilize oneself for struggle. It can be an addictive stimulant masking underlying depression.

• It may permit important parts of oneself—including attitudes, skills, and defenses developed during conflictual relations in one’s formative stages—to be expressed and valued because relations with the present adversary resemble earlier conflictual relations.

Cultural Imperialism

“Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture and establishing it as the norm.” (Young, 1990, p. 59). Those living under cultural imperialism find themselves defined by the dominant others. As Young (op cit) points out: “Consequently, the differences of women from men, American Indians or Africans from Europeans, Jews from Christians, becomes reconstructed as deviance and inferiority.” Culturally dominated groups often experience themselves as having a double identity, one defined by the dominant group and the other coming from membership in one’s own group. Thus, in my childhood, adult African American men were often called “boy” by members of the dominant white groups but within their own group, they might be respected ministers and wage earners. Culturally subordinated groups are often able to maintain their own culture because they are segregated from the dominant group and have many interactions within their own group, which are invisible to the dominant group. In such contexts, the subordinated culture commonly reacts to the dominant culture with mockery and hostility fueled by their sense of injustice and of victimization.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT

There are several interrelated implications for conflict in this discussion. First of all, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, perceived injustice is a frequent source of conflict. Second, if the processes or outcomes of a conflict are perceived to be unjust, the resolution of a conflict is likely to be unstable and
give rise to further conflict. Third, conflict may exist about what is “just.” Fourth, paradoxically, justifying as a negotiation technique—that is, blaming the other for an injustice and claiming special privilege because of the injury one has presumably suffered—is apt to lead to conflict escalation unless the other agrees that she has been unjust and takes responsibility for remedying it. Blaming tends to be inflaming.

Injustice as the Source of Conflict

A paradigmatic example of procedural as well as distributive injustice is two people who have to share something to which each is equally entitled (found cash, space, equipment, inherited property) and the one who gets at it first takes what he wants of it and leaves the remainder (a smaller or less valuable portion) to the other. Thus, if two children have to share a piece of cake and the one who divides it into two portions takes the larger one, then the other child is likely to get mad. If not afraid of the other, the child may challenge the unfair division and try to restore equality. If afraid, the child may be unwilling to admit the injustice but, if he or she does, will be resentful and try to get even covertly. Thus, conflict continues even though the episode ends.

There is a clear procedural way to avoid this sort of injustice (see also the later section, Inventing Solutions), in which the person who divides the cake (or whatever) does not get first choice with regard to his or her portion of the division. There is also final-offer arbitration, a form sometimes employed when the parties cannot resolve conflict by themselves. It is based on a similar notion, namely, creating an incentive for making fair offers. Each party to a conflict agrees to binding arbitration and secretly informs the arbitrator of his or her last and best offer for an agreement; the arbitrator then selects the one that is the fairest.

Suppose two ethnic groups in a country are in conflict over how many representatives they are each allocated in the national parliament. One group wants to make the allocations in terms of the proportion of each ethnic group in the population; the other group wants to do it in terms of the proportion of the territory occupied by each ethnic population. Ethnic group A, which has fewer people but more land, makes its final offer a bicameral legislature in which one legislative body would be elected by per capita vote and the other in proportion to the size of the territory. Ethnic group B makes a final offer of a simple legislative body based on per capita vote.

Injustice in the Course of Conflict

Unfair procedures employed in resolving conflict undermine confidence in the institutions that establish and implement the policies and rules regulating conflict. Thus, people become alienated from political institutions if they feel that elections are not conducted fairly, or that their interests are ignored and they
have no voice in affecting social policies and how they are implemented, or that they are discriminated against such that they are apt to be the losers in any political conflict. Similarly, people lose confidence in legal and judicial institutions and third-party procedures such as mediation and arbitration if the police, judges, and other third parties are biased, if they are not treated courteously, if competent legal representation is not available to them, or if they have little opportunity to express their concerns.

Trust in organizations and groups as well as in interpersonal relations is also undermined if, when conflict occurs, one is abused, not given opportunity to voice one’s concerns and views, treated as an inferior whose rights and interests have legitimacy only as they are bestowed by others, or otherwise not respected as a person.

Alienation and withdrawal of commitment, of course, are not the only possible forms of response to unjust processes of conflict resolution. Anger, aggression, rebellion, sabotage, and similarly assertive attempts to remove the injustice are some other forms of response. Depending on the perceived possibilities, one may become openly or covertly active in attempting to change the institutions, relations, and situations giving rise to the injustice. Conflict is central in the functioning of all institutions and relations. If the processes involved in conflict resolution are unfair, pressures to bring about change arise; they may take a violent form if there are no socially recognized and available procedures for dealing with grievances.

**Conflict About What Is Just**

Many conflicts are about which principle of justice should be applied or how a given principle should be implemented. Thus, disputes about affirmative action often center on whether students (or employees) should be selected on the basis of individual relative merit as measured by test scores, academic grades, and prior work experience, or selected so as to reflect racial and ethnic diversity in the population. Each principle, in isolation, can be considered to be just. However, selection by the criterion of relative merit as measured by test scores and grades often means that ethnic diversity is limited. Selection so as to achieve ethnic diversity frequently means that some individuals from the majority group, with higher relative standing on tests, are not selected even as some minority group members with lower standing are. These results are possible even when only well-qualified applicants are chosen.

Conflict over affirmative action may not only be about principles of justice; it also concerns the justness of the procedures for measuring merit. Some claim that the standard measures of merit—tests, grades, prior work experience—are biased against individuals who are not from the dominant culture. Others assert that the measures are appropriate since selection is for performance in a setting—a college or workplace—that reflects the dominant culture.
The BTC-SBM conflict described in the Introduction is between two principles of justice. Should teacher representatives on the school council be selected to represent their academic department by vote of the department members? Or should they be selected to represent their academic departments but also chosen to represent the ethnic diversity of the teachers?

In dealing with conflict between reasonable principles of justice, it is well to apply the notions advanced in the previous chapter. Specifically, you want to turn the conflict into a win-win one in which it is perceived to be a mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively. In the illustration of affirmative action, there are many ways in which both claims—for diversity and for merit—can be represented in selection policies. It is better to discuss how these two principles can be combined, so that the claims of each can be adequately realized, than to create a win-lose conflict by denying the claims of one side so that the other’s can be victorious.

“Justifying” as a Negotiation Tactic

“Justice” can be employed as a tactical weapon during negotiations to claim higher moral ground for oneself. Doing so claims greater morality for your position as compared to the other’s. This form of justifying commonly has several effects. It hardens your position and makes it inflexible as you become morally committed to it as well as increasingly self-righteous. It leads to blaming the other and implicit denigration of the other as morally inferior. It produces a similar effect in the other and escalates the conflict into a conflict about morality.

As this happens, the conflicting parties often lose sight of the actual interests underlying their respective positions and the conflict becomes a win-lose one that is not likely to advance the interests of either side. It is not the justifying or giving reasons for your interests that is harmful but rather the claim of moral superiority, with its explicit or implicit moral denigration of the other. Whatever justifying takes place, it should be in the context of full recognition of one another’s equal moral status.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

There are several important implications here for training in constructive conflict resolution. First, knowledge of the intimate connection between conflict and injustice has to be imparted. (This chapter is an introduction to the knowledge in this area.) Second, training should help to enlarge the scope of the student’s moral community so that he or she perceives that all people are entitled to care and justice. Third, it should help increase empathic capacity so that the student can sense and experience in some measure what the victims of injustice experience.
Fourth, given the nature of the many embittered conflicts between groups that have inflicted grievous harm, we need to develop insight into the processes involved in forgiveness and reconciliation. Finally, training should help to develop skill in inventing productive, conflict-resolving combinations of justice principles when they appear to be in conflict.

Many training programs deal in some measure with the first three implications, but few if any deal with the last two. Before turning to a more extended consideration of the latter implications, I briefly consider the first three.

**Knowledge of Systematic Forms of Injustice in Society**

Some injustices are committed by people with full realization that they are acting unjustly. Most are unwitting participants in a system—a family, community, social organization, school, workplace, society, or world—in which there are established traditions, structures, procedures, norms, rules, practices, and the like that determine how one should act. These traditions, structures, and so on may give rise to profound injustices that are difficult to recognize because they are taken for granted since they are so embedded in a system in which one is thoroughly enmeshed.

**Illustrations of Types of Injustice**

How can we help become aware of systemic injustices? I suggest taking each type of injustice (distributive, procedural, retributive, and morally exclusionary) discussed at the beginning of the chapter and using them to probe the system we wish to examine to heighten awareness of its structural sources of injustice. Illustrations for each type of injustice follow.

**Distributive Injustice.** Every type of system—from a society to a family—distributes benefits, costs, and harms (its reward systems are a reflection of this). One can examine such benefits as income, education, health care, police protection, housing, and water supplies, and such harms as accidents, rapes, physical attacks, sickness, imprisonment, death, and rat bites, and see how they are distributed among categories of people: males versus females, employers versus employees, whites versus blacks, heterosexuals versus homosexuals, police officers versus teachers, adults versus children. Such examination reveals some gross disparities in distribution of one or another benefit or harm received by the categories of people involved. Thus, blacks generally receive fewer benefits and more harm than whites in the United States. In most parts of the world, female children are less likely than male children to receive as much education or inherit parental property, and they are more likely to suffer sexual abuse.

**Procedural Injustice.** Similarly, one can probe a system to determine whether it offers fair procedures to all. Are all categories of people treated with politeness,
dignity, and respect by judges, police, teachers, parents, employers, and others in authority? Are some but not others allowed to have voice and representation, as well as adequate information, in the processes and decisions that affect them?

Retributive Injustice. Are “crimes” by different categories of people less likely to be viewed as crimes, to result in an arrest, to be brought to trial, to result in conviction, to lead to punishment or imprisonment or the death penalty, and so on? Considerable disparity is apparent between how “robber barons” and ordinary robbers are treated by the criminal-justice system, between manufacturers who knowingly sell injurious products to many (obvious instances being tobacco and defective automobiles) and those who negligently cause an accident. Similarly, almost every comparison of the treatment of black and white criminal offenders indicates that, if there is a difference, blacks receive worse treatment.

Moral Exclusion. When a system is under stress, are there differences in how categories of people are treated? Are some people apt to lose their jobs, be excluded from obtaining scarce resources, or be scapegoated and victimized? During periods of economic depression, social upheaval, civil strife, and war, frustrations are often channeled to exclude some groups from the treatment normatively expected from others in the same moral community.

**Enlarging the Scope of One’s Moral Community**

Our earlier discussion of the scope of justice suggests several additional, experientially oriented foci for training. A good place to start is to help students become aware of their own social identities: national, racial, ethnic, religious, class, occupational, gender, sexual, age, community, and social circle. Explore what characteristics they attribute to being American, or white, or Catholic, or female, and so on and what they attribute to other, contrasting identities such as being Muslim or black. Help them recognize which of these identities claim an implicit moral superiority and greater privilege in contrast to other people who have contrasting identities. Have them reverse roles, to assume an identity that is frequently viewed as morally inferior and less entitled to customary rights and privileges. Then act out, subtly but realistically, how they are treated by those who are now assuming the morally superior and privileged identity. Such exercises help students become more aware of implicit assumptions about their own identity as well as other relevant contrasting identities and more sensitive to the psychological effects of considering others to have identities that are morally inferior and less privileged.

Intergroup simulations can also be used to give students an experience in which they start developing prejudice, stereotypes, and hostility toward members of other, competing groups—even as the students have full knowledge that
they have been randomly assigned to the groups. Many such experiences can be employed to demonstrate how a moral community is broken down and to illustrate the psychological mechanisms that people employ to justify this hostility toward out-group members. (Some widely used intergroup simulations are identified in the Recommended Reading section for this chapter at the back of the book.)

It is also useful to give students the experience of how their moral community can expand or contract as a function of temporary events. Thus, research has demonstrated that people are apt to react to a stranger with trust after being exposed by radio broadcasts to “good” news about people (such as acts of heroism, altruism, and helpfulness) and with suspicion after “bad” news (such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and fraud). By helping students become aware of the temporary conditions, inside as well as outside themselves, that affect the scope of their moral community, they gain capacity to resist contracting their moral community under adverse conditions.

**Increasing Empathy**

Empathic concern allows you to sympathetically imagine how someone else feels and put yourself in his or her place. It is a core component of helpful responsiveness to another. It is most readily aroused for people with whom we identify, with those we recognize as people who are like ourselves and belong to our moral community. Empathy is inhibited by excluding the other from one’s moral community, by dehumanizing him, and by making him into an enemy or a devil. Empathy stimulates helpfulness and altruism toward those who are in need of help; dehumanization encourages neglect, derogation, or attack.

Enlarging one’s moral community increases one’s scope of empathy. However, empathy can occur at different levels. The fullest level contains all of several aspects of empathy: (1) knowing what the other is feeling; (2) feeling in some measure what the other is feeling; (3) understanding why the other is feeling the way she does, including what she wants or fears; and (4) understanding her perspective and frame of reference as well as her world. Empathic responsiveness to another’s concern helps the other feel understood, validated, and cared for.

Role-playing, role exchanging or role reversal, and guided imagination are three interrelated methods commonly employed in training people to become empathically responsive to others. *Role-playing* involves imagining that you are someone else, seeing the world through his eyes, wanting what he wants, feeling the emotions he feels, and behaving as he would behave in a particular situation or in reaction to someone else’s behavior. *Role exchange* or role reversal is similar to role-playing, except that it involves reversing or exchanging roles with the person with whom you are interacting in a particular situation (as during a conflict). In *guided imagination*, you help the student take on the role
of the other by stimulating the student to imagine and adopt various relevant characteristics (not caricatures) of the role or person that is being enacted, such as how he walks, talks, eats, fantasizes, dresses, and wakes up in the morning.

Forgiveness and Reconciliation

After protracted, violent conflicts in which the conflicting parties have inflicted grievous harm (humiliation, destruction of property, torture, assault, rape, murder) on one another, the conflicting parties may still have to live and work together in the same communities. This is often the case in civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, gang wars, and even family disputes that have taken a destructive course. Consider the slaughter that has taken place between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi; between blacks and whites in South Africa; between Bloods and Crips of Los Angeles; and among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Is it possible for forgiveness and reconciliation to occur? If so, what fosters these processes?

There are many meanings of forgiveness in the extensive and growing literature concerned with this topic. I shall use the term to mean giving up rage, the desire for vengeance, and a grudge toward those who have inflicted grievous harm on you, your loved ones, or the groups with whom you identify. It also implies willingness to accept the other into one’s moral community so that he or she is entitled to care and justice. As Borris (2003) has pointed out, it does not mean you have to forget the evil that has been done, condone it, or abolish punishment for it. However, it implies that the punishment should conform to the canons of justice and be directed toward the goal of reforming the harmdoer so that he or she can become a moral participant in the community.

There has been rich discussion in the psychological and religious literature of the importance of forgiveness to psychological and spiritual healing as well as to reconciliation (see Minow, 1998; Shriver, 1995). Forgiveness is, of course, not to be expected in the immediate aftermath of torture, rape, or assault. It is unlikely, as well as psychologically harmful, until one is able to be in touch with the rage, fear, guilt, humiliation, hurt, and pain that have been stored inside. But nursing hate keeps the injury alive and active in the present, instead of permitting it to take its proper place in the past. Doing so consumes psychological resources and energy that is more appropriately directed to the present and future. Although forgiveness of the other may not be necessary for self-healing, it seems to be very helpful, as well as an important ingredient in the process of reconciliation.

A well-developed psychological and psychiatric literature deals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), that is, the psychological consequences of having been subjected or exposed to grievous harm, and a growing literature is emerging from workshop experiences centering on forgiveness and reconciliation.
These literatures are too extensive and detailed for more than a brief overview of the major ideas here.

Treatment of PTSD (Basoglu, 1992; Foa, Keane, and Friedman, 2000; Ochberg, 1988) essentially (1) gives the stressed individuals a supportive, safe, and secure environment (2) in which they can be helped to reexperience, in a modulated fashion, the vulnerability, helplessness, fear, rage, humiliation, guilt, and other emotions associated with the grievous harm (medication may be useful in limiting the intensity of the emotions being relived), thus (3) helping them identify the past circumstances and contexts in which the harm occurred and distinguish current realities from past realities; (4) helping them understand the reasons for his emotional reactions to the traumatic events and the appropriateness of their reactions; (5) helping them acquire the skills, attitudes, knowledge, and social support that make them less vulnerable and powerless; and (6) helping them develop an everyday life characterized by meaningful, enjoyable, and supportive relations in their family, work, and community.

PTSD treatment requires considerable professional education beyond that involved in conflict resolution training. Still, it is well for students of conflict to be aware that exposure to severe injustice can have enduring harmful psychological effects unless the posttraumatic conditions are treated effectively.

Forgiveness and reconciliation may be difficult to achieve at more than a superficial level unless the posttraumatic stress is substantially relieved. Even so, it is well to recognize that the processes involved in forgiveness and reconciliation may also play an important role in relieving PTSD. The causal arrow is multidirectional; progress in forgiveness or reconciliation or posttraumatic stress reduction facilitates progress in the other two.

There are two distinct but interrelated approaches to developing forgiveness. One centers on the victim and the other on the relationship between the victim and the harmdoer. The focus on the victim, in addition to providing some relief from PTSD, seeks to help the victim recognize the human qualities common to victim and victimizer. In effect, various methods and exercises are employed to enable victims to recognize the bad as well as good aspects of themselves, that they have “sinful” as well as “divine” capabilities and tendencies. In other words, one helps victims become aware of themselves as total persons—with no need to deny their own fallibility and imperfections—whose lifelong experiences in their family, schools, communities, ethnic and religious groups, and workplaces have played a key role in determining their own personality and behavior. As the victim comes to accept their own moral fallibility, they are likely to accept the fallibility of the harmdoer as well and to perceive both the good and the bad in the other.

Both victims and harmdoers are often quite moral toward those they include in their own moral community but grossly immoral to those excluded. Thus, Adolf Eichmann, who efficiently organized the mass murder of Jews for the
Nazis, was considered a good family man. The New England captains of the slave ships, who transported African slaves to the Americas under the most abominable conditions, were often deacons of their local churches. The white settlers of the United States, who took possession of land occupied by native Americans and killed those who resisted, were viewed as courageous and moral within their own communities.

Recognition of the good and bad potential in all humans, the self as well as the other, facilitates the victim’s forgiveness of the harmdoer. But it may not be enough. Quite often, forgiveness also requires interaction between the victim and harmdoer to establish the conditions needed for forgiving. This interaction sometimes takes the form of negotiation between the victim and harmdoer. A third party representing the community (such as a mediator or judge) usually facilitates the negotiation and sets the terms if the harmdoer and victim cannot reach an agreement. It is interesting to note that in some European courts, such negotiations are required in criminal cases before the judge sentences the convicted criminal.

Obviously, the terms of an agreement for forgiveness vary as a function of the nature and severity of the harm as well as the relationship between the victim and harmdoer. As I have suggested earlier in this chapter, the victim may seek full confession, sincere apology, contrition, restitution, compensation, self-abasement, or self-reform from the harmdoer. (For an excellent discussion of apology and other related issues, see Lazare, 2004.) The victim may also seek some form of punishment and incarceration for the harmdoer. Forgiveness is most likely if the harmdoer and the victim accept the conditions, whatever they may be.

Reconciliation goes beyond forgiveness in that it not only accepts the other into one’s moral community, but also establishes or reestablishes a positive, cooperative relationship among the individuals and groups estranged by the harms they inflict on one another. Borris (2003) has indicated: “Reconciliation is the end of a process that forgiveness begins.” (For excellent discussions of reconciliation processes, see Nadler, 2003, and Staub, 2005).

In Chapter One, I discussed in detail some of the factors involved in initiating and maintaining cooperative relations; that discussion is relevant to the process of reconciliation. Here, I wish to consider briefly some of the special issues relating to establishing cooperative relations after a destructive conflict. In the following list I outline a number of basic principles.

1. Mutual security. After a bitter conflict, each side tends to be concerned with its own security, without adequate recognition that neither side can attain security unless the other side also feels secure. Real security requires that both sides have as their goal mutual security. If weapons have been involved in the prior conflict, mutually verifiable disarmament and arms control are important components of mutual security.
2. **Mutual respect.** Just as true security from physical danger requires mutual cooperation, so does security from psychological harm and humiliation. Each side must treat the other side with the respect, courtesy, politeness, and consideration normatively expected in civil society. Insult, humiliation, and inconsiderateness by one side usually leads to reciprocation by the other and decreased physical and psychological security.

3. **Humanization of the other.** During bitter conflict, each side tends to dehumanize the other and develop images of the other as an evil enemy. There is much need for both sides to experience one another in everyday contexts as parents, homemakers, schoolchildren, teachers, and merchants, which enables them to see one another as human beings who are more like themselves than not. Problem-solving workshops, along the lines developed by Burton (1969, 1987) and Kelman (1972), are also valuable in overcoming dehumanization of one another.

4. **Fair rules for managing conflict.** Even if a tentative reconciliation has begun, new conflicts inevitably occur—over the distribution of scarce resources, procedures, values, and so on. It is important to anticipate that conflicts will occur and to develop beforehand the fair rules, experts, institutions, and other resources for managing such conflicts constructively and justly.

5. **Curbing the extremists on both sides.** During a protracted and bitter conflict, each side tends to produce extremists committed to the processes of the destructive conflict as well as to its continuation. Attaining some of their initial goals may be less satisfying than continuing to inflict damage on the other. It is well to recognize that extremists stimulate extremism on both sides. The parties need to cooperate in curbing extremism on their own side and restraining actions that stimulate and justify extremist elements on the other side.

6. **Gradual development of mutual trust and cooperation.** It takes repeated experience of successful, varied, mutually beneficial cooperation to develop a solid basis for mutual trust between former enemies. In the early stages of reconciliation, when trust is required for cooperation, the former enemies may be willing to trust a third party (who agrees to serve as a monitor, inspector, or guarantor of any cooperative arrangement) but not yet willing to trust one another if there is a risk of the other failing to reciprocate cooperation. Also in the early stages, it is especially important that cooperative endeavors be successful. This requires careful selection of the opportunities and tasks for cooperation so that they are clearly achievable as well as meaningful and significant.
Inventing Solutions

It is helpful in trying to resolve any problem constructively (as with a conflict between principles of justice) to be able to discover or invent alternative solutions that go beyond win-lose outcomes such as selecting the more powerful party’s principle or flipping a coin to determine the winner. Flipping a coin provides equal opportunity to win, but it does not result in satisfactory outcomes for both sides.

For simplicity’s sake, let us consider a conflict over possession of a valuable object, say, a rare antique clock bequeathed to two sons who live in separate parts of the world. Each wants the clock and feels equally entitled to it. Unlike the cake in an earlier example, the clock is not physically divisible. However, they could agree to divide possession of the clock so that they share it for equal periods, say, six months or one year at a time. Another solution is to sell the clock and divide the resulting money equally.

Let us assume, though, that the mother’s will has prohibited sale of the clock to anyone else. Here is an alternative: the two sons can bid against one another in an auction, and the higher bidder gets the clock while the other gets half the price of the winner’s bid. The auction can offer open bidding against one another or a closed, single, final bid from each person. Thus, if the winning bid is $5,000, the winner gets the clock but has to pay the other $2,500; each ends up with equally valued outcomes. The winner’s net value is $2,500, but the loser also ends up with $2,500.

Another procedure employs a version of the divide-and-choose rule discussed earlier. A pool to be divided between the sons comprises the clock and an amount of money that each son contributes equally to the pool, say, $3,000. One son divides the total pool (the clock and $6,000 in cash) into two bundles of his own devising, declares the contents of the bundles, and lets the other party choose which bundle to take. Thus, if the son who values the clock at $5,000 is the divider, he might put the clock and $500 in one bundle and $5,500 in the other. Doing so ensures that he receives a gross return of $5,500 and a net return of $2,500 ($5,500 minus $3,000), no matter which bundle the other chooses. The chooser can also obtain a net return of $2,500 if he chooses the cash bundle; presumably he would do so if he values the clock at less than $5,000. Such an outcome would be apt to be seen as fair to both sons.

The outcome of the divide-and-choose approach as well as the auction procedure seem eminently fair. Both sons win. The one who wants the clock more obtains it, while the other gets something of equivalent value. Other win-win procedures can undoubtedly be invented for types of conflict that at first glance seem to allow only win-lose outcomes. (See Bram and Taylor, 1996, for a very useful discussion of developing fair outcomes.) Training, I believe, creates readiness to recognize the possibility that win-win procedures can be discovered or
invented. Skill in developing such procedures can be cultivated, I further believe, by showing students illustrations and modeling this development as well as giving them extensive practice in attempting to create them.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between conflict and justice is bidirectional. Injustice breeds conflict, and destructive conflict gives rise to injustice. It is well to realize that preventing destructive conflict requires more than training in constructive conflict resolution. It also necessitates reducing the gross injustices that characterize much of our social world at the interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels. Such reduction requires changes in how various institutions of society—political, economic, educational, familial, and religious—function so that they recognize and honor the values underlying constructive conflict resolution, described in the preceding chapter (human equality, shared community, nonviolence, fallibility, and reciprocity). Adherence to these values not only eliminates gross injustices, but also reduces the likelihood that conflict itself takes a destructive course and, as a consequence, gives rise to injustice.

References


CHAPTER THREE

Constructive Controversy

The Value of Intellectual Opposition

David W. Johnson
Roger T. Johnson
Dean Tjosvold

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLECTUAL CONFLICT

Since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinion that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.
—John Stuart Mill

An airline flight crew is taking their large passenger jet with over 150 people on board in for a landing. The instruments indicate the plane is still 5,000 feet above the ground and the pilot sees no reason to doubt their accuracy. The copilot thinks the instruments are malfunctioning and the plane is much lower. Will this disagreement endanger the passengers and crew by distracting the pilot and copilot from their duties? Or will this disagreement illuminate a problem and increase the safety of everyone on board?

We know what Thomas Jefferson would have said. He noted, “Difference of opinion leads to inquiry, and inquiry to truth.” Jefferson had a deep faith in the value and productiveness of constructive controversy. He is not alone. Conflict theorists have for hundreds of years posited that conflict could have positive as well as negative benefits. Freud, for example, indicated that extra psychic conflict was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for psychological development. Developmental psychologists have proposed that disequilibrium within
a student’s cognitive structure can motivate a shift from egocentrism to accommodation of the perspectives of others, and what results is a transition from one stage of cognitive and moral reasoning to another. Motivational theorists believe that conceptual conflict can create epistemic curiosity, which motivates the search for new information and the reconceptualization of the knowledge one already has. Organizational theorists insist that higher-quality problem solving depends on constructive conflict among group members. Cognitive psychologists propose that conceptual conflict may be necessary for insight and discovery. Educational psychologists indicate that conflict can increase achievement. Karl Marx believed that class conflict was necessary for social progress. From almost every social science, theorists have taken the position that conflict can have positive as well as negative outcomes.

Despite all the theorizing about the positive aspects of conflict, there has been until recently very little empirical evidence demonstrating that the presence of conflict can be more constructive than its absence. Guidelines for managing conflicts tend to be based more on folk wisdom than on validated theory. Far from being encouraged and structured in most interpersonal and intergroup situations, conflict tends to be avoided and suppressed. Creating conflict to capitalize on its potential positive outcomes tends to be the exception, not the rule. In the late 1960s, therefore, building on the previous work of Morton Deutsch and others, we began a program of theorizing and research to identify the conditions under which conflict results in constructive outcomes. One of the results of our work is the theory of constructive controversy.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an integration of theory, research, and practice on constructive controversy for individuals who wish to deepen their understanding of conflict and how to manage it constructively. The first part of the chapter provides (a) the definitions and procedure and (b) a theoretical framework that illuminates fundamental processes involved in creating and utilizing conflict at the interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, and international levels. The second half of the chapter is aimed at helping readers use constructive controversy effectively in their applied situations.

**WHAT IS CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY?**

_The best way ever devised for seeking the truth in any given situation is advocacy: presenting the pros and cons from different, informed points of view and digging down deep into the facts._

—Harold S. Geneen, Former CEO, ITT

Constructive controversy exists when one person’s ideas, information, conclusions, theories, and opinions are incompatible with those of another, and
the two seek to reach an agreement. Constructive controversies involve what Aristotle called *deliberate discourse* (that is, the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions) aimed at synthesizing novel solutions (that is, *creative problem solving*). Structured constructive controversies are most commonly contrasted with concurrence seeking, debate, and individualistic learning (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). *Concurrence seeking* occurs when members of a group inhibit discussion to avoid any disagreement or arguments, emphasize agreement, and avoid realistic appraisal of alternative ideas and courses of action. Concurrence seeking is close to Janis’ (1982) concept of *groupthink* (in which members of a decision-making group set aside their doubts and misgivings about whatever policy is favored by the emerging consensus so as to be able to concur with the other members).

**Figure 3.1** Processes of Controversy, Debate, Concurrence Seeking.
Reprinted with permission from Johnson and Johnson (1995).

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Presented with Problem/Decision, Initial Conclusion

Present and Listen; Confronted with Opposing Position

Uncertainty, Cognitive Conflict Disequilibrium

Cooperative/Controversy

Competitive/Debate

Concurrence Seeking

Epistemic Curiosity, Information Search

Closed-Minded Rejection

Ignore, Avoid

Incorporation of New Information, Adapt to Diverse Perspectives, New Conclusion

Rigid Adherence to Original Position

Quick Compromise to End Conflict

---
Debate exists when two or more individuals argue positions that are incompatible with one another and a judge declares a winner on the basis of who presented their position the best. An example of debate is when each member of a group is assigned a position as to whether more or less regulation is needed to control hazardous wastes, and an authority declares as the winner the person who makes the best presentation of his or her position to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructive Controversy</th>
<th>Debate</th>
<th>Concurrence Seeking</th>
<th>Individualistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categorizing and organizing information to derive conclusions</td>
<td>Categorizing and organizing information to derive conclusions</td>
<td>Categorizing and organizing information to derive conclusions</td>
<td>Categorizing and organizing information to derive conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting, advocating, elaborating position and rationale</td>
<td>Presenting, advocating, elaborating position and rationale</td>
<td>Presenting, advocating, elaborating position and rationale</td>
<td>No oral statement of positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being challenged by opposing views results in conceptual conflict and uncertainty about correctness of own views</td>
<td>Being challenged by opposing views results in conceptual conflict and uncertainty about correctness of own views</td>
<td>Being challenged by opposing views results in conceptual conflict and uncertainty about correctness of own views</td>
<td>Presence of only one view results in high certainty about the correctness of own views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic curiosity motivates active search for new information and perspectives</td>
<td>Closed-minded rejection of opposing information and perspectives</td>
<td>Apprehension about differences and closed-minded adherence to own point of view</td>
<td>Continued high certainty about the correctness of own views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconceptualization, synthesis, adherence to own point of view</td>
<td>Closed-minded adherence to own point of view</td>
<td>Quick compromise to dominant view</td>
<td>Adherence to own point of view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High achievement, positive relationships, psychological health</td>
<td>Moderate achievement, relationships, psychological health</td>
<td>Low achievement, relationships, psychological health</td>
<td>Low achievement, relationships, psychological health</td>
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</tbody>
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*Debate* exists when two or more individuals argue positions that are incompatible with one another and a judge declares a winner on the basis of who presented their position the best. An example of debate is when each member of a group is assigned a position as to whether more or less regulation is needed to control hazardous wastes, and an authority declares as the winner the person who makes the best presentation of his or her position to the
group. *Individualistic efforts* exist when individuals work alone without interacting with each other, in a situation in which their goals are unrelated and independent from each other (Johnson, Johnson, and Holubec, 2002).

**THEORY**

*There is no more certain sign of a narrow mind, of stupidity, and of arrogance, than to stand aloof from those who think differently from us.*

—Walter Savage Landor

Rique Campa, a Professor in the Department of Fisheries and Wildlife at Michigan State University, asked his class, “Can a marina be developed in an environmentally sensitive area where piping plovers (a shorebird) have a breeding ground?” Constructive controversy begins with a strong cooperative goal for the group to achieve. The group members are to examine the two sides to the issue and come to their best reasoned judgment as to how to solve the problem. All students must agree on the final plan. Professor Campa emphasizes that there are no “winners” or “losers,” only the quality of the final decision matters. He assigns students to groups of four, divides each group into two pairs, and assigns one pair the Developer Position and the other pair the Department of Natural Resources Position. He then follows the structured academic constructive controversy procedure over several class periods. Participants research the issue, prepare a persuasive case for their position, present their position in a compelling and interesting way, refute the opposing position while rebutting criticisms of their position, take the opposing perspectives, and derive a synthesis or integration of the positions. In conducting the constructive controversy, Professor Campa is operationalizing the theoretical process by which constructive controversy is implemented.

Professor Campa is conducting a lesson based on the process of constructive controversy. The process, which is based on cooperation, involves the following theoretical assumptions (D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson, 1979, 1989, 1995):

1. When individuals are presented with a problem or decision, they have an initial conclusion based on categorizing and organizing incomplete information, their limited experiences, and their specific perspective. They have a high degree of confidence in their conclusions. (They freeze the epistemic process.)

2. When individuals present their conclusion and its rationale to others, they engage in cognitive rehearsal, deepen their understanding of their position, and use higher-level reasoning strategies.
3. When individuals are confronted with different conclusions based on other people’s information, experiences, and perspectives, they become uncertain as to the correctness of their views and a state of conceptual conflict or disequilibrium is aroused. They unfreeze their epistemic process.

4. Uncertainty, conceptual conflict, or disequilibrium motivates epistemic curiosity, an active search for (a) more information and new experiences (increased specific content) and (b) a more adequate cognitive perspective and reasoning process (increased validity) in hopes of resolving the uncertainty.

5. By adapting their cognitive perspective and reasoning through understanding and accommodating the perspective and reasoning of others, individuals derive a new, reconceptualized, and reorganized conclusion. Novel solutions and decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better are detected. The positive feelings and commitment individuals feel in creating a solution to the problem together is extended to each other and interpersonal attraction increases. The competencies in managing conflicts constructively gained tend to improve psychological health. The process may begin again at this point, or it may be terminated by freezing the current conclusion and resolving any dissonance by increasing the confidence in the validity of the conclusion.

The process of debate, on the other hand, is based on competition. Two sides prepare their positions, they present the best case possible, listen carefully to the opposing position, attempt to refute it, rebut the opponent’s attempts to refute their position, and wait for the judges to declare the winner. While the process of debate begins the same as the process of controversy, the uncertainty created by being challenged results in a closed-minded, defensive rejection of other points of view and dissonant information. Individuals thus stay committed to their original position. Since the debate requires refutation of other points of view, however, individuals do learn opposing information. Moderate achievement, relationships, and psychological health may result. The process of concurrence seeking is based on cooperation with the avoidance of conflict. Two sides prepare their positions, present the best case possible, experience uncertainty once they realize there is disagreement, but immediately seek to avoid and suppress all conflict by finding a compromise position that ends all discussion become apprehensive about the disagreement, and then seek a quick compromise to suppress the conflict. Since the differences among positions are not explored, achievement tends to be low and relationships and psychological health tend to be poor.

In individualistic situations, individuals study both sides of the issue but make no oral statements, their initial conclusions are never challenged, and so
their study tends to confirm what they initially thought. Low achievement tends to result. The absence of interpersonal interaction results in neutral relationships and no advances in psychological health.

**Conditions Determining the Constructiveness of Controversy**

Although controversies can operate in a beneficial way, they will not do so under all conditions. Whether controversy results in positive or negative consequences depends on the conditions under which it occurs and the way in which it is managed. These conditions include the context within which the constructive controversy takes place, the heterogeneity of participants, the distribution of information among group members, the level of group members’ social skills, and group members’ ability to engage in rational argument (D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson, 1979, 1989, 1995).

**Cooperative Goal Structure.** Deutsch (1973) emphasizes that the context in which conflicts occur has important effects on whether the conflict turns out to be constructive or destructive. There are two possible contexts for controversy: cooperative and competitive. A cooperative context tends to facilitate constructive controversy, whereas a competitive context tends to promote destructive controversy. Controversy within a competitive context tends to promote closed-minded disinterest and rejection of the opponent’s ideas and information (Tjosvold, 1998). Within a cooperative context, constructive controversy induces feelings of comfort, pleasure, and helpfulness in discussing opposing positions, an open-minded listening to the opposing positions, motivation to hear more about the opponent’s arguments, more accurate understanding of the opponent’s position, and the reaching of more integrated positions where both one’s own and one’s opponent’s conclusions and reasoning are synthesized into a final position.

**Skilled Disagreement.** For controversies to be managed constructively, participants need collaborative and conflict-management skills (Johnson, 2006; D. W. Johnson and F. Johnson, 2006). The skills are necessary for following and internalizing these norms:

1. I am critical of ideas, not people. I challenge and refute the ideas of the other participants, while confirming their competence and value as individuals. I do not indicate that I personally reject them.
2. I separate my personal worth from criticism of my ideas.
3. I remember that we are all in this together, sink or swim. I focus on coming to the best decision possible, not on winning.
4. I encourage everyone to participate and to master all the relevant information.
5. I listen to everyone’s ideas, even if I don’t agree.
6. I restate what someone has said if it is not clear.
7. I differentiate before I try to integrate. I first bring out all ideas and facts supporting both sides and clarify how the positions differ. Then I try to identify points of agreement and put them together in a way that makes sense.

8. I try to understand both sides of the issue. I try to see the issue from the opposing perspective in order to understand the opposing position.

9. I change my mind when the evidence clearly indicates that I should do so.

10. I emphasize rationality in seeking the best possible answer, given the available data.

11. I follow the golden rule of conflict. The golden rule is act toward opponents as you would have them act toward you. I want the opposing pair to listen to me, so I listen to them. I want the opposing pair to include my ideas in their thinking, so I include their ideas in my thinking. I want the opposing pair to see the issue from my perspective, so I take their perspective.

One of the most important skills is to be able to disagree with each other’s ideas while confirming each other’s personal competence (Tjosvold, 1998). Disagreeing with others, at the same time imputing that others are incompetent, tends to increase their commitment to their own ideas and their rejection of the other person’s information and reasoning. Disagreeing with others while simultaneously confirming their personal competence, however, results in being better liked and in opponents being less critical of others’ ideas, more interested in learning more about others’ ideas, and more willing to incorporate others’ information and reasoning into their own analysis of the problem. Protagonists are more likely to believe their goals are cooperative, integrate their perspectives, and reach agreement.

Another important set of skills for exchanging information and opinions within a constructive controversy is perspective taking (Johnson, 1971; D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson, 1989). More information, both personal and impersonal, is disclosed when one is interacting with a person who is engaging in perspective-taking behaviors, such as paraphrasing, which communicate a desire to understand accurately. Perspective-taking ability increases one’s capacity to phrase messages so that they are easily understood by others and to comprehend accurately the messages of others. Engaging in perspective taking in conflicts results in increased understanding and retention of the opponent’s information and perspective. Perspective taking facilitates the achievement of creative, high-quality problem solving. Finally, perspective taking promotes more positive perceptions of the information exchange process, of fellow group members, and of the group’s work.
A third set of skills involves the cycle of differentiation of positions and their integration (D. W. Johnson and F. Johnson, 2006). Group members should ensure that there are several cycles of differentiation (bringing out differences in positions) and integration (combining several positions into one new, creative position). The potential for integration is never greater than the adequacy of the differentiation already achieved. Most controversies go through a series of differentiations and integrations before reaching a final decision.

**Rational Argument.** During a constructive controversy, group members have to follow the canons of rational argumentation (D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson, 1995). Rational argumentation includes generating ideas, collecting relevant information, organizing it by using inductive and deductive logic, and making tentative conclusions based on current understanding. Rational argumentation requires that participants keep an open mind, changing their conclusions and positions when others are persuasive and convincing in their presentation of rationale, proof, and logical reasoning.

**RESEARCH RESULTS: HOW PARTICIPANTS BENEFIT**

*He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper.*

—Edmund Burke, *Reflection of the Revolution in France*

The research on constructive controversy has been conducted in the last thirty-five years by several different researchers in a variety of settings using many different participant populations and many different tasks within an experimental and field-experimental format (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). For a detailed listing of all the supporting studies, see D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson (1979, 1989, 1995, 2003). All studies randomly assigned participants to conditions. The studies have all been published in journals (except for one dissertation), have high internal validity, and have lasted from one to sixty hours. The studies have been conducted on elementary, intermediate, and college students. Taken together, their results have considerable validity and generalizability. A recent meta-analysis provides the data to validate or disconfirm the theory. Weighted effect sizes were computed for the twenty-eight studies included in the analyses.

**Quality of Decision Making, Problem Solving, and Learning**

Effective decision making and problem solving includes higher-level reasoning, accurate understanding of all perspectives, creative thinking, and openness to influence (that is, attitude change). Compared with concurrence seeking
Table 3.2. General Characteristics of Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970–1979</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1989</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random assigned subjects</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No random assignment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades 1–3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades 4–6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades 10–12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published in journals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissertations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 session</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–9 sessions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–20 sessions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+ sessions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(Effect Size = 0.68), debate (Effect Size = 0.40), and individualistic efforts (Effect Size = 0.87), constructive controversy tends to result in higher-quality decisions (including decisions that involve ethical dilemmas) and higher-quality solutions to complex problems for which different viewpoints can plausibly be developed. Skillful participation in a constructive controversy tends to result in (a) significantly greater mastery and recall of the information, reasoning, and skills contained in one’s own and others’ positions, (b) more skillful transfer of this learning to new situations, and (c) greater generalization of principles learned to a wider variety of situations than do concurrence seeking, debate, or individualistic efforts. Being exposed to a credible alternative view results in recalling more correct information, more skillfully transferring learning to new situations, and generalizing the principles they learned to a wider variety of situations. The resolution of a controversy is likely to be in the direction of correct problem solving, even when the initial conclusions of all group members are erroneous and especially when individuals are exposed to
a credible minority view (as opposed to a consistent single view) even when the minority view is incorrect.

Consider the following question: can the advocacy of two conflicting but wrong solutions to a problem result in a correct solution? The value of the constructive controversy process lies not so much in the correctness of an opposing position, but rather in the attention and thought processes it induces. More cognitive processing may take place when individuals are exposed to more than one point of view, even if one or more of the points of view is incorrect. A number of studies with both adults and children have found significant gains in performance when erroneous information is presented by one or both sides in a constructive controversy. Thus, the resolution of the conflict is likely to be in the direction of correct performance. In this limited way, two wrongs came to make a right.

**Cognitive Reasoning**

When difficult issues are being discussed and effective decisions are needed, higher-level reasoning strategies are needed. Controversy tends to promote more frequent use of higher-level reasoning strategies than do concurrence seeking (ES = 0.62), debate (ES = 1.35), or individualistic efforts (ES = 0.90). Controversy tends to be more effective than modeling and nonsocial presentation of information in influencing nonconserving children to gain the insights critical for conservation. In classrooms where students are free to dissent and are also expected to listen to different perspectives, students tend to think more critically about civic issues and be more tolerant of conflicting views.

### Table 3.3. Meta-Analysis of Academic Controversy Studies: Weighted Effect Sizes (ESs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Controversy/Concurrence Seeking</th>
<th>Controversy/Debate</th>
<th>Controversy/Individualistic Efforts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive reasoning</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective taking</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward task</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal attraction</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social support</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perspective Taking
Understanding and considering all perspectives is important if difficult issues are to be discussed, the decision is to represent the best reasoned judgment of all participants, and all participants are to help implement the decision. Constructive controversy tends to promote more accurate and complete understanding of opposing perspectives than do concurrence seeking (ES = 0.91), debate (ES = 0.22), and individualistic efforts (ES = 0.86). Engaging in controversy tends to result in greater understanding of another person’s cognitive perspective than the absence of controversy, and individuals engaged in a controversy tend to be better able subsequently to predict what line of reasoning their opponent would use in solving a future problem than were individuals who interacted without any controversy. The increased understanding of opposing perspectives tends to result from engaging in controversy (as opposed to engaging in concurrence-seeking discussions or individualistic efforts) regardless of whether one is a high-, medium-, and low-achieving student.

Creativity
Constructive controversy tends to promote creative insight by influencing individuals to (a) view problems from different perspectives and (b) reformulate problems in ways that allow the emergence of new orientations to a solution. Compared with concurrence, seeking, debate, and individualistic efforts, constructive controversy increases the number of ideas, quality of ideas, creation of original ideas, the use of a wider range of ideas, originality, the use of more varied strategies, and the number of creative, imaginative, novel solutions. Being confronted with credible alternative views has resulted in the generation of more novel solutions, varied strategies, and original ideas. Participants tend to have a high degree of emotional involvement in and commitment to solving the problems the group was working on.

Attitude Change About the Issue
Open-minded consideration of all points of view is critical for deriving well-reasoned decisions that integrate the best information and thought from a variety of positions. Participants should open-mindedly believe that opposing positions are based on legitimate information and logic that, if fully understood, will lead to creative solutions that benefit everyone. Involvement in a controversy tends to result in attitude and position change. Participants in a controversy tend to reevaluate their attitudes about the issue and incorporate opponent’s arguments into their own attitudes. Participating in a controversy tends to result in attitude change beyond what occurs when individuals read about the issue, and these attitude changes tend to be relatively stable over time (that is, not merely a response to the controversy experience itself).
Motivation to Improve Understanding

Effective decision making is typically enhanced by a continuing motivation to learn more about the issues being considered. Most decisions are temporary because they may be reconsidered at some future date. Participants in a constructive controversy tend to have more continuing motivation to learn about the issue and come to the best reasoned judgment possible than do participants in concurrence seeking (ES = 75), debate (0.45), and individualistic efforts (ES = 0.64). Participants in a controversy tend to search for (a) more information and new experiences (increased specific content) and (b) a more adequate cognitive perspective and reasoning process (increased validity) in hopes of resolving the uncertainty. There is also an active interest in learning the others’ positions and developing an understanding and appreciation of them. Lowry and Johnson (1981), for example, found that students involved in a controversy, compared with students involved in concurrence seeking, read more library materials, reviewed more classroom materials, more frequently watched an optional movie shown during recess, and more frequently requested information from others.

Attitudes Toward Controversy

If participants are to be committed to implement the decision and participate in future decision making, they must react favorably to the way the decision was made. Individuals involved in controversy liked the procedure better than did individuals working individualistically, and participating in a controversy consistently promoted more positive attitudes toward the experience than did participating in a debate, concurrence-seeking discussions, or individualistic decisions. Controversy experiences promoted stronger beliefs that controversy is valid and valuable.

Attitudes Toward Decision Making

If participants are to be committed to implement the decision and participate in future decision making, they must consider the decision worth making. Individuals who engaged in controversies tended to like the decision-making task better than did individuals who engaged in concurrence-seeking discussions (ES = 0.63). Interpersonal attraction and support among participants’ decision making, to be effective, must be conducted in ways that bring individuals together, not create ill will and divisiveness. Within controversy there is disagreement, argumentation, and rebuttal that could create difficulties in establishing good relationships. Constructive controversy, however, has been found to promote greater liking among participants than did debate (ES = 0.72), concurrence-seeking (ES = 0.24), or individualistic efforts (ES = 0.81). Debate tended to promote greater interpersonal attraction among participants than
did individualistic efforts (ES = 0.46). In addition, constructive controversy tends to promote greater social support among participants than does debate (ES = 0.92), concurrence-seeking (ES = 0.32), or individualistic efforts (ES = 1.52). Debate tended to promote greater social support among participants than did individualistic efforts (ES = 0.85). The combination of frank exchange of ideas coupled with a positive climate of friendship and support not only leads to more productive decision making and greater learning, it disconfirms the myth that conflict inevitably leads to divisiveness and dislike.

Self-Esteem
Participation in future decision making is enhanced when participants feel good about themselves as a result of helping make the current decision, whether or not they agree with it. Constructive controversy tends to promote higher self-esteem than does concurrence-seeking (ES = 0.39), debate (ES = 0.51), or individualistic efforts (ES = 0.85). Debate tends to promote higher self-esteem than does individualistic efforts (ES = 0.45).

STRUCTURING CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSIES

Conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates invention. It shocks us out of sheeplike passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving . . . Conflict is a “sine qua non” of reflection and ingenuity.

Over the past thirty-five years, we have (a) developed a theory of constructive controversy, (b) validated it through a program of research, (c) trained teachers, professors, administrators, managers, and executives throughout North America and numerous other countries to field-test and implement the constructive controversy procedure, and (d) developed a series of curriculum units, academic lessons, and training exercises structured for controversies. There are two formats, one for decision-making situations and one for academic learning. A more detailed description of conducting constructive controversies may be found in D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson (1995) and D. W. Johnson and F. Johnson (2006).

CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY AND DECISION MAKING

A large pharmaceutical company faced the decision of whether to buy or build a chemical plant (The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 1975). To maximize the likelihood that the best decision was made, the president established two
advocacy teams to ensure that each, both the “buy” and the “build” alternatives, received a fair and complete hearing. An advocacy team is a subgroup that prepares and presents a particular policy alternative to the decision-making group. The “buy” team was instructed to prepare and present the best case for purchasing a chemical plant, and the “build” team was told to prepare and present the best case for constructing a new chemical plant near the company’s national headquarters. The “buy” team identified over one hundred existing plants that would meet the company’s needs, narrowed the field down to twenty, further narrowed the field down to three, and then selected one plant as the ideal plant to buy. The “build” team contacted dozens of engineering firms and, after four months of consideration, selected a design for the ideal plant to build. Nine months after they were established, the two teams, armed with all the details about cost, (a) presented their best case and (b) challenged each other’s information, reasoning, and conclusions. From the spirited discussion, it became apparent that the two options would cost about the same amount of money. The group, therefore, chose the “build” option because it allowed the plant to be conveniently located near company headquarters. This procedure represents the structured use of constructive controversy to ensure high-quality decision making.

The purpose of group decision making is to decide upon well-considered, well-understood, realistic action toward goals every member wishes to achieve. A group decision implies that some agreement prevails among group members as to which of several courses of action is most desirable for achieving the group’s goals. Making a decision is just one step in the more general problem-solving process of goal-directed groups—but it is a crucial one. After defining a problem or issue, thinking over alternative courses of action, and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each, a group will decide which course is the most desirable for them to implement. To ensure high-quality decision making, each alternative course of action (a) must receive a complete and fair hearing and (b) be critically analyzed to reveal its strengths and weaknesses. In order to do so, the following constructive controversy procedure may be implemented. Group members:

1. Propose several courses of action that will solve the problem under consideration: When the group is making a decision, identify a number of alternative courses of action for the group to follow.

2. Form advocacy teams: To ensure that each course of action receives a fair and complete hearing, assign two group members to be an advocacy team to present the best case possible for the assigned position. Positive interdependence is structured by highlighting the cooperative goal of making the best decision possible (goal interdependence) and noting that a high-quality decision cannot be made without considering the information that is being organized by the other advocacy teams.
Individual accountability is structured by ensuring that each member participates in preparing and presenting the assigned position. Any information discovered that supports the other alternatives is given to the appropriate advocacy pair.

3. Engage in the constructive controversy procedure:
   a. Each advocacy team researches its position and prepares a persuasive presentation to convince other group members of its validity. The advocacy teams are given the time to research their assigned alternative course of action and find all the supporting evidence available. They organize what is known into a coherent and reasoned position. They plan how to present their case so that all members of the group understand thoroughly the advocacy pair’s position, give it a fair and complete hearing, and are convinced of its soundness.
   b. Each advocacy team presents without interruption the best case possible for its assigned alternative course of action to the entire group. Other advocacy teams listen carefully, taking notes and striving to learn the information provided.
   c. There is an open discussion characterized by advocacy, refutation, and rebuttal. The advocacy teams give opposing positions a “trial by fire” by seeking to refute them by challenging the validity of their information and logic. They defend their own position while continuing to attempt to persuade other group members of its validity. For higher-level reasoning and critical thinking to occur, it is necessary to probe and push each other’s conclusions. Members ask for data to support each other’s statements, clarify rationales, and show why their position is the most rational one. Group members refute the claims being made by the opposing teams and rebut the attacks on their own position. They take careful notes on and thoroughly learn the opposing positions. Members follow the specific rules for constructive controversy. Sometimes a time-out period needs to be provided so that pairs can caucus and prepare new arguments. Members should encourage spirited arguing and playing devil’s advocate. Members are instructed to, “Argue forcefully and persuasively for your position, presenting as many facts as you can to support your point of view. Listen critically to the opposing pair’s position, asking them for the facts that support their viewpoint, and then present counterarguments. Remember that this is a complex issue, and you need to know all sides to make a good decision.”
   d. Advocacy teams reverse perspectives and positions by presenting one of the opposing positions as sincerely and forcefully as team members can. Members may be told, “Present an opposing position
as if it were yours. Be as sincere and forceful as you can. Add any new facts you know. Elaborate their position by relating it to other information you have previously learned.” Advocacy pairs strive to see the issue from all perspectives simultaneously.

e. **All members drop their advocacy and reach a decision by consensus.** They may wish to summarize their decision in a group report that details the course of action they have adopted and its supporting rationale. Often, the chosen alternative represents a new perspective or synthesis that is more rational than the two assigned. All group members sign the report, indicating that they agree with the decision and will do their share of the work in implementing it. Members may be instructed to, “Summarize and synthesize the best arguments for all points of view. Reach a decision by consensus. Change your mind only when the facts and the rationale clearly indicate that you should do so. Write a report with the supporting evidence and rationale for your synthesis that your group has agreed on. When you are certain the report is as good as you can make it, sign it.”

f. **Group members process how well the group functioned and how their performance may be improved during the next constructive controversy.**

4. **Implement decision:** Once the decision is made, all members commit themselves to implement it regardless of whether they initially favored the alternative adopted.

Controversies are common within decision-making situations. In the mining industry, for example, engineers are accustomed to addressing issues such as land use, air and water pollution, and health and safety. The complexity of the design of production processes, the balancing of environmental and manufacturing interests, and numerous other factors often create the opportunity for constructive controversy. Most groups waste the benefits of such disputes, but every effective decision-making situation thrives on what constructive controversy has to offer. Decisions are by their very nature controversial, as alternative solutions are suggested and considered before agreement is reached. When a decision is made, the constructive controversy ends and participants commit themselves to a common course of action.

**CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY AND ACADEMIC LEARNING**

In an English class, participants are considering the issue of civil disobedience. They learn that in the civil rights movement, individuals broke the law to gain equal rights for minorities. In numerous literary works, such as Mark Twain’s
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, individuals wrestle with the issue of breaking the law to redress a social injustice. Huck wrestles with the issue of breaking the law in order to help Jim, the run away slave. In the 1970s and 1980s, prominent public figures from Wall Street to the White House felt justified in breaking laws for personal or political gain. In order to study the role of civil disobedience in a democracy, participants are placed in a cooperative learning group of four members. The group is given the assignment of reaching its best reasoned judgment about the issue and then divided into two pairs. One pair is given the assignment of making the best case possible for the constructiveness of civil disobedience in a democracy. The other pair is given the assignment of making the best case possible for the destructiveness of civil disobedience in a democracy. In the resulting conflict, participants draw from sources such as Thomas Jefferson’s “Declaration of Independence,” Henry David Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience, Abraham Lincoln’s “Cooper Union Address,” and Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” to challenge each other’s reasoning and analyses concerning when civil disobedience is, or is not, constructive.

In order to use constructive controversy to foster academic learning, you implement the following procedure (D. W. Johnson and R. Johnson, 1979, 1989, 1995).

Structure the Task
The task must be structured (a) cooperatively and (b) so that there are at least two well-documented positions (pro and con). The choice of topic depends on the interests of the instructor and the purposes of the course. In math courses, controversies may focus on different ways to solve a problem. In science classes, controversies may focus on environmental issues. Because drama is based on conflict, almost any piece of literature may be turned into a constructive controversy, such as having participants argue over who is the greatest romantic poet. Because most history is based on conflict, controversies can be created over any historical event. In any subject area, controversies can be created to promote academic learning and creative group problem solving.

Make Preinstructional Decisions and Preparations
The teacher decides on the objectives for the lesson. Students are typically randomly assigned to groups of four. Each group is then divided into two pairs. The pairs are assigned randomly to represent either the pro or con position. The instructional materials are prepared so that group members know what position they have been assigned and where they can find supporting information. The materials helpful for each position are (a) a clear description of the group’s task, (b) a description of the phases of the constructive controversy procedure and the relevant social skills, (c) a definition of the positions to be advocated with a summary of the key arguments supporting each position, and (d) relevant resource materials (including a bibliography).
Explain and Orchestrate the Task, Cooperative Structure, and Constructive Controversy Procedure

The teacher explains the task so that participants are clear about the assignment and understand the objectives of the lesson. The task must be structured so that there are at least two well-documented positions (pro and con). The choice of topic depends on the interests of the teacher and the purposes of the course. Teachers may wish to help students “get in role” by presenting the issue to be decided in an interesting and dramatic way. Teachers structure positive interdependence by assigning two group goals. Students are required to:

1. Produce a group report detailing the nature of the group’s decision and its rationale. Members are to arrive at a consensus and ensure everyone participates in writing a high-quality group report. Groups present their report to the entire class.

2. Individually take a test on both positions. Group members must master all the information relevant to both sides of the issue.

To supplement the effects of positive goal interdependence, the materials are divided among group members (resource interdependence) and bonus points may be given if all group members score above a preset criterion on the test (reward interdependence).

The purpose of the constructive controversy is to maximize each student’s learning. Teachers structure individual accountability by ensuring that each student participates in each step of the constructive controversy procedure, by individually testing each student on both sides of the issue and by randomly selecting students to present their group’s report. Teachers specify the social skills participants are to master and demonstrate during the constructive controversy. The social skills emphasized are those involved in systematically advocating an intellectual position and evaluating and criticizing the position advocated by others, as well as the skills involved in synthesis and consensual decision making. Finally, teachers structure intergroup cooperation. When preparing their positions, for example, students can confer with classmates in other groups that are also preparing the same position.

Academic Controversy Procedure

The students’ overall goals are to learn all information relevant to the issue being studied and ensure that all other group members learn the information, so that (a) their group can write the best report possible on the issue and (b) all group members achieve high scores on the test. The constructive controversy procedure is as follows.

1. Research, learn, and prepare position: Students are assigned randomly to groups of four, each of which is divided into two pairs. One pair is
assigned the pro position and the other pair is assigned the con position. Each pair is to prepare the best case possible for its assigned position by:

a. *Researching the assigned position and learning all relevant information.* Students are to read the supporting materials and find new information to support their position. The opposing pair is given any information students find that supports its position.

b. *Organizing the information into a persuasive argument* that contains a thesis statement or claim (“George Washington was a more effective president than Abraham Lincoln was”), the rationale supporting the thesis (“He accomplished a, b, and c”), and a logical conclusion that is the same as the thesis (“Therefore, George Washington was a more effective president than Abraham Lincoln was”).

c. *Planning how to advocate the assigned position effectively* to ensure that it receives a fair and complete hearing. Make sure both pair members are ready to present the assigned position so persuasively that the opposing participants will comprehend and learn the information and, of course, agree that the position is valid and correct.

2. *Present and advocate position:* Students present the best case for their assigned position to ensure it gets a fair and complete hearing. They need to be forceful, persuasive, and convincing in doing so. Ideally, more than one medium will be used. Students are to listen carefully to and learn the opposing position, taking notes and clarifying anything they do not understand.

3. *Engage in an open discussion in which there is spirited disagreement:* Students discuss the issue by freely exchanging information and ideas. Students are to (a) argue forcefully and persuasively for their position (presenting as many facts as they can to support their point of view), (b) critically analyze the evidence and reasoning supporting the opposing position, asking for data to support assertions, (c) refuting the opposing position by pointing out the inadequacies in the information and reasoning, and (d) rebutting attacks on their position and presenting counterarguments. Students are to take careful notes on and thoroughly learn the opposing position. Students are to give the other position a trial by fire while following the norms for constructive controversy. Sometimes a time-out period will be provided so students can caucus with their partners and prepare new arguments. The teacher may encourage more spirited arguing, take sides when a pair is in trouble, play devil’s advocate, ask one group to observe another group engaging in a spirited argument, and generally stir up the discussion.
4. **Reverse perspectives:** Students reverse perspectives and present the best case for the opposing position. Teachers may wish to have students change chairs. In presenting the opposing position sincerely and forcefully (as if it was yours), students may use their notes and add any new facts they know of. Students should strive to see the issue from both perspectives simultaneously.

5. **Synthesize:** Students are to drop all advocacy and find a synthesis on which all members can agree. Students summarize the best evidence and reasoning from both sides and integrate it into a joint position that is new and unique. Students are to:
   a. Write a group report on the group’s synthesis with the supporting evidence and rationale. All group members sign the report indicating that they agree with it, can explain its content, and consider it ready to be evaluated. Each member must be able to present the report to the entire class.
   b. Take a test on both positions. If all members score above the preset criteria of excellence, each receives five bonus points.
   c. Process how well the group functioned and how its performance may be improved during the next constructive controversy. The specific conflict management skills required for constructive controversy may be highlighted.
   d. Celebrate the group’s success and the hard work of each member to make every step of the constructive controversy procedure effective.

**Monitor the Controversy Groups and Intervene When Needed**

While the groups engage in the constructive controversy procedure, teachers monitor the learning groups and intervene to improve students’ skills in engaging in each step of the constructive controversy procedure and use the social skills appropriately. Teachers may also wish to intervene to reinforce particularly effective and skillful behaviors.

**Evaluate Students’ Learning and Process Group Effectiveness**

At the end of each instructional unit, teachers evaluate students’ learning and give feedback. Qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of performance may be addressed. Students are graded on both the quality of their final report and their performance on the test covering both sides of the issue. The learning groups also process how well they functioned. Students describe what member actions were helpful (and unhelpful) in completing each step of the constructive controversy procedure and make decisions about what behaviors to continue or change. In whole-class processing, the teacher gives the class feedback and has participants share incidents that occurred in their groups.
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY AND DEMOCRACY

Thomas Jefferson believed that free and open discussion should serve as the basis of influence within society, not the social rank within which a person was born. Based on the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their fellow revolutionaries, American democracy was founded on the premise that “truth” will result from free and open-minded discussion in which opposing points of view are advocated and vigorously argued. Every citizen is given the opportunity to advocate for his or her ideas and to listen respectfully to opposing points of view. Political discourse is the formal exchange of reasoned views as to which of several alternative courses of action should be taken to solve a societal problem. It is intended to involve all citizens in the making of the decision. Citizens are expected to persuade one another (through valid information and logic) as to what course of action would be most effective. Political discourse is aimed at making a decision in a way that ensures all citizens are committed to (a) implementing the decision (whether they agree with it or not) and (b) the democratic process. Once a decision is made, the minority is expected to go along willingly with the majority because they know they have been given a fair and complete hearing. To be a citizen in our democracy, individuals need to internalize the norms for constructive controversy as well as master the process of researching an issue, organizing their conclusions, advocating their views, challenging opposing positions, making a decision, and committing themselves to implement the decision made (regardless of whether one initially favored the alternative adopted or not). In essence, the use of constructive controversy teaches the participants to be active citizens of a democracy.

CONCLUSION

Thomas Jefferson based his faith in the future of democracy on the power of constructive conflict and creative group problem solving. In well-structured controversies, participants make an initial judgment, present their conclusions to other group members, are challenged by opposing views, become uncertain about the correctness of their views, actively search for new information and understanding, incorporate others’ perspectives and reasoning into their thinking, and reach a new set of conclusions. This process results in significant increases in the quality of decision making and problem solving, the quality of relationships, and improvements in psychological health. While the constructive controversy process can occur naturally, it may be consciously structured in decision making and learning situations. This involves dividing a cooperative group into two pairs and assigning them opposing positions. The pairs then (a) develop their position, (b) present them to and listen to the opposing
position, (c) engage in a discussion in which they attempt to refute the other side and rebut attacks on their position, (d) reverse perspectives and present the other position, and (e) drop all advocacy and seek a synthesis that takes both perspectives and positions into account. Engaging in the constructive controversy procedure skillfully provides an example of how conflict creates positive outcomes.

References


The relationship between conflict and trust is an obvious one. Most people think of trust as the “glue” that holds a relationship together. If individuals or groups trust each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they do not trust each other, conflict often becomes destructive, and resolution is more difficult. Bitter conflict itself generates animosity and pain that is not easily forgotten; moreover, the parties no longer believe what the other says, nor believe that the other will follow through on commitments and proposed actions. Therefore, acrimonious conflict often serves to destroy trust and increase distrust, which makes conflict resolution ever more difficult and problematic.

In this chapter, we review some of the work on trust and show its relevance to effective conflict management. We also extend some of this work to a broader understanding of the key role of trust in relationships, and how different types of relationships can be characterized according to the levels of trust and distrust that are present. Finally, we describe procedures for rebuilding trust that has been broken, and for managing distrust in ways that can enhance short-term conflict containment while rebuilding trust over the long run.

WHAT IS TRUST?

Trust is a concept that has received attention in several branches of social science literature: psychology, sociology, political science, economics, anthropology, history, and sociobiology (see Gambetta, 1988; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995;
Worchel, 1979, for reviews). As can be expected, each literature approaches the problem with its own disciplinary lens and filters. Until recently, there has been remarkably little effort to integrate these perspectives or to articulate the key role that trust plays in critical social processes, such as cooperation, coordination, and performance (for notable exceptions, see Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Sitkin, Rousseau, Burt, and Camerer, 1998).

Worchel (1979) proposes that these differing perspectives on trust can be aggregated into at least three groups. (See also Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996, for detailed exploration of theories within each category.)

1. The views of personality theorists, who focus on individual personality differences in the readiness to trust, and on the specific developmental and social contextual factors that shape this readiness. At this level, trust is conceptualized as a belief, expectancy, or feeling deeply rooted in the personality, with origins in the individual’s early psychosocial development (see Worchel, 1979).

2. The views of sociologists and economists, who focus on trust as an institutional phenomenon. Institutional trust can be defined as the belief that future interactions will continue, based on explicit or implicit rules and norms (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998). At this level, trust can be conceptualized as a phenomenon within and among institutions, and as the trust individuals put in those institutions. For example, one group of researchers explored the role of trust in interfirm relationships at both the interpersonal and organizational levels. These researchers showed that high levels of interorganizational trust enhanced supplier performance, lowered costs of negotiation and reduced conflict between firms (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). Others argue that organizations must significantly redesign their governance mechanisms in order to restore the trust that has resulted from a significant loss of public confidence in American corporations in the last decade (Caldwell and Karri, 2005).

3. The views of social psychologists, who focus on the transactions between individuals who create or destroy trust at the interpersonal and group levels. At this level, trust can be defined as expectations of the other party in a transaction, risks associated with assuming and acting on such expectations, and contextual factors that either enhance or inhibit development and maintenance of the relationship. Examples of elaborated models of trust, particularly in organizations, can be found in Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2005) and Dirks and Ferrin (2001).
A DEFINITION OF TRUST

The literature on trust is rich with definitions and conceptualizations (see Bigley and Pearce, 1998). In this chapter, we adopt as the definition of trust “an individual’s belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another” (McAllister, 1995, p. 25; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998, p. 440). Implicit in this definition, as in other comparable ones (Boon and Holmes, 1991), are three elements that contribute to the level of trust one has for another: the individual’s chronic disposition toward trust (see our earlier discussion of personality), situational parameters (some are suggested above, others below), and the history of their relationship. Our current focus is on the relationship dimension of trust, which we address throughout this chapter.

WHY IS TRUST CRITICAL TO RELATIONSHIPS?

There are many types of relationship, and it can be assumed that the nature of trust and its development are not the same in all the types. In this chapter, we discuss two basic types: professional and personal relationships. The former is considered to be a task-oriented relationship in which the parties’ attention and activities are primarily directed toward achievement of goals external to their relationship. The latter is considered to be a social-emotional relationship whose primary focus is the relationship itself and the persons in the relationship (see Deutsch, 1985, for a complex treatment of types of interdependence in relationships; see also Sheppard and Sherman, 1998; and Chapters 1 and 10 in this volume).

An effort to describe professional relationship development in a business context was proposed by Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992). Those authors suggest that three types of trust operate in developing a business relationship: deterrence-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. In recent papers, Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) adopted these three types of trust and made several major additions and modifications to the paper by Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992). These ideas are briefly presented below; you are encouraged to consult these papers for a richer and fuller description of each type of trust and how it is proposed that the types are linked together in a developmental sequence.

Calculus-Based Trust

Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) identified the first type as “deterrence-based trust.” They argued that this form of trust is based in ensuring consistency of behavior; simply put, individuals do what they promise because they fear the consequences of not doing what they say. Like any behavior based on
a theory of deterrence, trust is sustained to the degree that the deterrent (punishment) is clear, possible, and likely to occur if the trust is violated. Thus, the threat of punishment is likely to be a more significant motivator than the promise of reward.

Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) called this form calculus-based trust (CBT). We argued that deterrence-based trust is grounded not only in the fear of punishment for violating the trust, but also in the rewards to be derived from preserving it. This kind of trust is an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation whose value is determined by the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. Compliance with calculus-based trust is often ensured both by the rewards of being trusting (and trustworthy) and by the “threat” that if trust is violated, one’s reputation can be hurt through the person’s network of friends and associates. Even if you are not an honest person, having a reputation for honesty (or trustworthiness) is a valuable asset that most people want to maintain. So even if there are opportunities to be untrustworthy, any short-term gains from untrustworthy acts must be balanced, in a calculus-based way, against the long-term benefits from maintaining a good reputation.

The most appropriate metaphor for the growth of CBT is the children’s game Chutes and Ladders. Progress is made on the game board by throwing the dice and moving ahead (“up the ladder”) in a stepwise fashion. However, a player landing on a “chute” is quickly dropped back a large number of steps. Similarly, in calculus-based trust, forward progress is made by climbing the ladder, or building trust, slowly and stepwise. People prove through simple actions that they are trustworthy, and similarly, by systematically testing the other’s trust. In contrast, a single event of inconsistency or unreliability may “chute” the relationship back several steps—or, in the worst case, back to square one. Thus, CBT is often quite partial and fragile.

The dynamics of this trust development may not be as rational as this description suggests. In fact, trusters and those who are trusted may be motivated by different things. Trusters are more likely to focus on the risk associated with taking the trusting action; trusters attribute high initial trust to others as a way to manage the anxiety associated with taking the risk to place that trust. Thus, trust-building activities, such as placing trust in the other in spite of the possible associated risks, may be both irrational and necessary to develop that trust. At the same time, the trusted are more likely to focus on the level of benefits they are receiving. So, while trusters will focus on risk and may be more likely to initiate trusting actions that do not risk extending high (but potentially unreciprocated) rewards to the other, the trusted will focus on benefits, and may be more likely to reciprocate (and create joint gain for the parties) when the reward level is high (Malhotra, 2004; Weber, Malhotra and Murnighan, 2006).
Identification-Based Trust

While CBT is usually the first, early stage in developing more intimate personal relationships, it often leads to a second type of trust, based on identification with the other’s desires and intentions. This type of trust exists because the parties can effectively understand and appreciate one another’s wants. This mutual understanding is developed to the point that each person can effectively act for the other. Identification-based trust (IBT) thus permits a party to serve as the other’s agent and substitute for the other in interpersonal transactions (Deutsch, 1949). Both parties can be confident that their interests are fully protected, and that no ongoing surveillance or monitoring of one another is necessary. A true affirmation of the strength of IBT between parties can be found when one party acts for the other even more zealously than the other might demonstrate, such as when a good friend dramatically defends you against a minor insult.

A corollary of this “acting for each other” in IBT is that as the parties come to know each other better and identify with the other, they also understand more clearly what they must do to sustain the other’s trust. This process might be described as “second-order” learning. One comes to learn what really matters to the other and comes to place the same importance on those behaviors as the other does. Certain types of activities strengthen IBT (Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin, 1992; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996; Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998), such as developing a collective identity (a joint name, title, or logo); colocation in the same building or neighborhood; creating joint products or goals (a new product line or a new set of objectives); or committing to commonly shared values (such that the parties are actually committed to the same objectives and so can substitute for each other in external transactions). For example, at the organization level, Kramer (2001) has argued that identification with the organization’s goals leads individuals to trust the organization and share a presumptive trust of others within it.

Thus, IBT develops as one both knows and predicts the other’s needs, choices, and preferences, and as one also shares some of those same needs, choices, and preferences as one’s own. Increased identification enables us to think like the other, feel like the other, and respond like the other. A collective identity develops; we empathize strongly with the other and incorporate parts of their psyche into our own identity (needs, preferences, thoughts, and behavior patterns). This form of trust can develop both in working relationships if the parties come to know each other very well, but it is most likely to occur in intimate, personal relationships. Moreover, this form of trust stabilizes relationships during periods of conflict and negativity. Thus, when high trusting parties engage in conflict, they tend to see the best in their partner’s motives because they make different attributions about the conflict compared to low trusting parties. The determinant of whether relationships maintain or dissolve in a conflict may be due to the
attributions parties make about the other’s motives, determined by the existing level of trust (Miller and Rempel, 2004).

Music is a suitable metaphor for IBT, as in the harmonizing of a barbershop quartet. The parties learn to sing in a harmony that is integrated and complex. Each knows the others’ vocal range and pitch; each singer knows when to lead and follow; and each knows how to work with the others to maximize their strengths, compensate for their weaknesses, and create a joint product that is much greater than the sum of its parts. The unverbalized, synchronous chemistry of *a cappella* choirs, string quartets, cohesive work groups, or championship basketball teams are excellent examples of this kind of trust in action.

**Trust and Relationships: An Elaboration of Our Views**

In addition to our views of these two forms of trust, we need to introduce two ideas about trust and relationships. The first is that trust and distrust are not simply opposite ends of the same dimension, but conceptually different and separate. Second, relationships develop over time, and the nature of trust changes as they develop.

**Trust and Distrust Are Fundamentally Different.** In addition to identifying types of trust, Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) have recently argued that trust and distrust are fundamentally different from each other, rather than merely more or less of the same thing (see also Ullman-Margalit, 2004). Although trust can be defined as “confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct,” distrust can indeed be “confident negative expectations” regarding another’s conduct (Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998). Thus, just as trust implies belief in the other, a tendency to attribute virtuous intentions to the other, and willingness to act on the basis of the other’s conduct, distrust implies fear of the other, a tendency to attribute sinister intentions to the other, and desire to protect oneself from the effects of another’s conduct.

**Relationships Are Developmental and Multifaceted.** In discussing our views of the types of trust, we also pointed out that these forms of trust develop in different types of relationships. Work (task) relationships tend to be characterized by CBT but may develop some IBT. Intimate (personal) relationships tend to be characterized by IBT but may require a modicum of CBT for the parties to coordinate their lives together.

All relationships develop as parties share experiences with each other and gain knowledge about the other. Every time we encounter another person, we gain a new or confirming experience that strengthens the relationship. If our experiences with another person are all within the same limited context (I know the server at the bakery because I buy my bagel and juice there every morning),
then we gain little additional knowledge about the other (over time, I have a rich but very narrow range of experience with that server). However, if we encounter the other in different contexts (if I join a colleague to talk research, coteach classes, and play tennis), then this variety of shared experience is likely to develop into broader, deeper knowledge of the other.

People come to know each other in many contexts and situations. Conversely, they may trust the other in some contexts and distrust in others. You may have friends you would trust to babysit your child, but not to pay back money you loaned them. A relationship is made up of components of experience that one individual has with another. Within these relationships, some elements hold varying degrees of trust, while others hold varying degrees of distrust. Our overall evaluation of the other person involves some complex judgment that weighs the scope of the relationship and elements of trust and distrust. Most people are able to be quite specific in describing both the trust and distrust elements in their relationship. If the parties teach a class together, work together on a committee, play tennis together, and belong to the same church, the scope of their experience is much broader than for parties who simply work together on a committee.

Finally, we cannot assume that we begin with a blank slate of trust or distrust in relationships. In fact, we seldom approach others with “no information.” Rather, we tend to approach the other with some initial level of trust or of caution (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervaney, 1998; Malhotra, 2004). In fact, some authors have argued that there is a strong disposition to overtrust in early relationships, a situation in which the truster’s trust exceeds the level that might be warranted by situational circumstances (Goel, Bell, and Pierce, 2005). Thus, determining the appropriate level of initial trust prior to substantial data about the other party may be more difficult than determining the appropriate level after some data have been collected (Ullman-Margalit, 2004).

In addition, we develop expectations about the degree to which we can trust new others, depending on a number of factors:

- **Personality predispositions.** Research has shown that individuals differ in their predisposition to trust another (Rotter, 1971; Wrightsman, 1974; Gillespie, 2003). The higher an individual ranks in predisposition to trust, the more she expects trustworthy actions from the other, independent of her own actions. Similarly, research has shown that individuals differ in their predispositions to be cynical, or show distrust (Kanter and Mirvis, 1989).

- **Psychological orientation.** Deutsch (1985) has characterized relationships in terms of their psychological orientations, or the complex synergy of “interrelated cognitive, motivational and moral orientations” (p. 94). He maintains that people establish and maintain social relationships partly on the basis of these orientations, such that orientations are influenced by relationships and vice versa. To the extent that people strive to keep
their orientations internally consistent, they may seek out relationships that are congruent with their own psyche.

• *Reputations and stereotypes.* Even if we have no direct experience with another person, our expectations may be shaped by what we learn about them through friends, associates, and hearsay (Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, and Treadway, 2003). The other’s reputation often creates strong expectations that lead us to look for elements of trust or distrust and also lead us to approach the relationship attuned to trust or to suspicion (for example, Glick and Croson, 2001).

• *Actual experience over time.* With most people, we develop facets of experience as we talk, work, coordinate, and communicate. Some of these facets are strong in trust, while others may be strong in distrust. For example, in one study of organizational communication, it was shown that as frequency of communication increases, the parties’ general disposition toward the other party decreased in importance, while organizational and situational factors (for example, tenure, autonomy, and so on) increased in importance in the determination of trust. Over time, it is likely that either trust or distrust context/experience elements begin to dominate the experience base, leading to a stable and easily defined relationship (Becerra and Gupta, 2003). As these patterns stabilize, we tend to generalize across the scope of the relationship and describe it as one of high or low trust or distrust.

**Implications of This Revised View of Trust**

By incorporating the revisions just described into existing models of trust, we can summarize our ideas about trust and distrust within relationships:

• Relationships are multifaceted, and each facet represents an interaction that provides us with information about the other. The greater the variety of settings and contexts in which the parties interact, the more complex and multifaceted the relationship becomes.

• Within the same relationship, elements of trust and distrust may peacefully coexist, because they are related to different experiences with the other or knowledge of the other in varied contexts.

• Relationships balanced with trust and distrust are likely to be healthier than relationships grounded only in trust. Particularly in organizational/managerial relationships, “neither complete lack of trust, nor total trust, nor very high levels of affective attachment, nor enduring social reliance, nor destructive mistrust and betrayal, are appropriate or positive for organizational purposes” (Atkinson and Butcher, 2003). Particularly in business relationships, unquestioning trust, without distrust, is likely to create more problems than solutions (Wicks, Berman, and Jones, 1999; Blois, 2003).
Similarly, unquestioning distrust (or even paranoia) can sometimes be healthy, but sometimes perverse (Kramer, 2001, 2002).

- Facets of trust or distrust are likely to be calculus based or identification based. Earlier, we defined trust as confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct and distrust as confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct. We elaborated on those definitions in this way:
  - Calculus-based trust (CBT) is a confident positive expectation regarding another’s conduct. It is grounded in impersonal transactions, and the overall anticipated benefits to be derived from the relationship are assumed to outweigh any anticipated costs.
  - Calculus-based distrust (CBD) is defined as confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct. It is also grounded in impersonal transactions, and the overall anticipated costs to be derived from the relationship are assumed to outweigh the anticipated benefits.
  - Identification-based trust (IBT) is defined as confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct. It is grounded in perceived compatibility of values, common goals, and positive emotional attachment to the other.
  - Identification-based distrust (IBD) is defined as confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct, grounded in perceived incompatibility of values, dissimilar goals, and negative emotional attachment to the other.

**Characterizing Relationships Based on Trust Elements**

Because there can be elements of each type of trust and distrust in a relationship, there are many types of relationships, varying in the combination of elements of calculus-based trust, calculus-based distrust, identification-based trust, and identification-based distrust. All of these types of relationships theoretically exist, but given the relative infancy of this theory we cannot effectively explore or discuss all of the possibilities. To simplify this framework, let us assume that we can characterize relationships as simply “high” or “low” in the number of CBT, CBD, IBT, and IBD elements. This reduces the framework to sixteen possible combinations of trust elements (see Table 4.1). Each row in this table represents a type of relationship, based on the pattern of high or low levels of CBT, CBD, IBT, and IBD. These combinations are listed in the first four columns, and a brief description of the relationship is found in the last column.

Based on our model, all sixteen types of relationship are hypothetically possible and may be found among one’s friends, acquaintances, and professional associates. However, space limitations in this chapter permit us to offer only a few selective illustrations.

Relationship 1 of Table 4.1, low in all forms of trust and distrust, represents new relationships in which the actors have little prior information and no
## Table 4.1. Sixteen Relationship Types Based on Dominant Trust and Distrust Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>CBT</th>
<th>CBD</th>
<th>IBT</th>
<th>IBD</th>
<th>Brief Description of the Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Arm’s-length relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High CBT; good working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High CBD; working relationship</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>characterized by cautiousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>“Instant good chemistry” with the other</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>based on strong perceived value</td>
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<td></td>
<td>compatibility but limited experience</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(few bands and low bandwidth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>“Instant bad chemistry” with the other</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>based on strong perceived value</td>
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<td>incompatibility but limited experience</td>
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<td>(few bands and low bandwidth)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Classic “high-trust” relationship,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>based on strong elements of CBT and IBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Classic “high-distrust” relationship,</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Low</td>
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(Continued)
expectations about each other. Type 1 relationships may also not be new to us, but because we have had such limited interaction with the other there has been no basis for developing significant trust or distrust. Nevertheless, as we mentioned earlier, we tend to extend a modicum of trust to others even where there is little data to warrant it. We walk into a new dry cleaning store chosen at random and give the attendant our favorite suit because we trust that the dry cleaner will clean it, not ruin it. The very existence of the shop’s appearance as a legitimate business is sufficient to satisfy our trust. Thus, while the low-low-low-low situation may exist hypothetically, in fact this type of relationship may occur only when there is actual data for the truster to infer that low levels of trust and distrust are the most appropriate disposition (compare Jeffries and Reed, 2000).

Relationship 2 is high only in CBT. This is likely to be a business or professional relationship in which the actors have had a number of successful exchanges and transactions that are beneficial to them. Over time, each person’s behavior has been positive and consistent, and the parties rely on each other to continue to act in the same way. For example, my investment counselor has made very good decisions about my money over time, and I continue to take his advice about when it is time to buy or sell.
Relationship 6, high in CBT and IBT, represents a prototypical high-trust relationship. Both parties benefit greatly from the relationship, so they seek out opportunities to be together and do things together. Continued success in these interactions enhances their trust.

Relationships 15 and 16 are high in CBT, CBD, and IBT, and low or high respectively in IBD. These relationships are characterized by a high degree of ambivalence. The parties find that there are contexts in which they can work together successfully, but they also have to regulate and limit those interactions to minimize the distrust. Additionally, the parties have some strong positive commonalities in values, goals, and interests, but they may (or may not) have strong dissimilarities in the same areas. The parties learn to manage their relationship by maximizing interaction around those areas where they have strong CBT and IBT, while regulating, controlling, or minimizing interaction in those areas with strong CBD (and perhaps IBD). However, ongoing uncertainty, coupled with the potential for strong emotional reactions to one another in a variety of circumstances, may make it difficult for the parties to sustain a stable relationship over time (Jones and Burdette, 1994).

MANAGING TRUST AND DISTRUST IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

As we have noted, trust and distrust develop as people gain knowledge of one another. One of the benefits of our model of relationships based on trust is its clear explanation of changes in relationships over time. Relationship changes can be mapped by identifying actions that change the balance of the trust and distrust elements in the relationship or fundamentally alter the type of interaction in the relationship. In this section, we identify behaviors that previous research suggests can change perceptions of trust and distrust.

Actions That Build Calculus-Based Trust

People who are involved in relationships with high levels of CBT and low levels of IBT (such as relationship 2 in Table 4.1) may have relatively stable expectations about these relationships. Initially, CBT may be based only on the other’s reputation for trustworthiness (Gabarro, 1978; Butler, 1991). Over time, CBT develops as we observe the other and identify certain behavior patterns over time. Previous research has demonstrated that effective business relationships are based on predictability (Jennings, 1971), reliability (McAllister, 1995), and consistency of behavior (Gabarro, 1978). In work relationships, then, CBT is enhanced if people (1) behave the same appropriate way consistently (at different times and in different situations), (2) meet stated deadlines, and (3) perform tasks and follow through with planned activities as promised.
In any context, if people act consistently and reliably, we are likely to see them as credible and trustworthy (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998). For example, students often want to be able to trust their faculty instructors. To the degree that faculty clearly announce their course requirements and grading criteria, use those standards consistently, follow the course outline clearly, and keep their promises, they enjoy a great deal of trust from students.

Emotions can also build trust. Happiness and gratitude can build trust, while anger decreases trust. The salience of the emotion’s cause and familiarity with the target moderate the relationship between emotions and trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005).

Strategies to Manage Calculus-Based Distrust

As we have noted, CBT and CBD are often founded on a cost-benefit analysis. If the costs of depending on someone’s behavior outweigh the benefits, we are typically inclined to either change or terminate the relationship. This may be feasible with personal friendships, but it is often not possible to leave professional relationships, even when CBD is high. Consequently, it is necessary to manage CBD so that the parties can continue to work together.

There are several strategies for managing CBD:

- Agree explicitly on expectations as to what is to be done, on deadlines for completion, and on the penalties for failing to comply with them. This up-front commitment by the parties to a course of action and to the consequences for nonperformance sets explicit expectations for behavior that may reduce the fear parties have about the vulnerabilities associated with working together.

- Agree on procedures for monitoring and verifying the other’s actions. If we distrust someone, we seek ways to monitor what he does to ensure that future trust violations do not occur. Writing about disarmament during the Cold War, Osgood (1962) explicitly proposes unilateral steps that antagonistic parties can take to signal good faith and an intention to build trustworthiness.

- Cultivate alternative ways to have one’s needs met. When one distrusts another (and the other’s possible performance in the future), one tries to find ways to minimize future interaction or alternative ways to get needs met. Distrust can be managed by letting the other know that one has an alternative and is willing to invoke it if there are further trust violations.

- Increase the other’s awareness of how his own performance is perceived by others. Workplace difficulties are sometimes alleviated when supervisors discuss performance expectations with subordinates, rather than assuming that both have the same understanding of what
constitutes appropriate work behavior. Many workplace diversity efforts are actually attempts to familiarize workers from different cultures with one another. Behaviors that seemed strange or inconsistent may be explained as differences in cultural patterns of interaction. Once the parties recognize the logic inherent in each other’s behavior, they are likely to view the other as consistent and predictable (Foeman, 1991), which enhances CBT.

**Actions That Build IBT**

Research indicates that trust is enhanced if the parties spend time sharing personal values, perceptions, motives, and goals (Gabarro, 1978). But specific time must be set aside for engaging in this activity. Parties in work relationships may do this in the course of working together, while parties in personal relationships explicitly devote time to these activities. In general, parties should engage in processes that permit them to share:

- Common group membership (Brewer and Kramer, 1986)
- Common interests
- Common goals and objectives
- Similar reactions to common situations
- Situations in which they stand for the same values and principles, thereby demonstrating integrity (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998)

For example, Kramer (2001), interpreting a stream of research on the impact of common group membership on identity and trust, argues that common group and organizational membership was sufficient to solidify trust, and in a way that went significantly beyond the ability of simple reputation or calculus-based considerations for trust development. Common group membership creates actions that also have expressive and symbolic meanings; “engaging in acts of trust thus provides organizational members with an opportunity to communicate to others the symbolic value they attach to their organizational identity. From this perspective, the psychological significance of trust acts resides . . . in the social motives and affiliative needs of group members that are met through such actions” (Kramer, 2001, p. 171).

Similarly, Rothman (1997) has proposed a four-step framework for resolving identity-based disputes. The second key step in the framework is **resonance**, or the process of reflexive reframing by which parties discover common values, concerns, interests, and needs. In Rothman’s framework, effective completion of the resonance step permits individuals to establish a basis of commonality (IBT) on which to build mutually acceptable solutions to managing their dispute. Moreover, studies in organizations have indicated that one component of managers’ trust in their subordinates is the degree to which employees
demonstrate that they have the best interests of the manager or the organization (or both) at heart (Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, 1996; Butler, 1995). If we believe that the other shares our concerns and goals, IBT is enhanced. IBT may also be increased if we observe the other reacting as we believe we would react in another context (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998); however, research on the connection between similarity and perceptions of trustworthiness has produced mixed results (Huston and Levinger, 1978).

It should be noted that IBT has a strong emotional component and is probably largely affective in nature (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996; McAllister, 1995). Despite our attempt to think logically about our relationships, how we respond to others often depends on our idiosyncratic, personal reactions to aspects of the other’s physical self-presentation (Chaiken, 1986), the situation and circumstances under which we meet the person (Jones and Brehm, 1976), or even our mood at the time of the encounter. Consequently, we are likely to build IBT only with others who we feel legitimately share our goals, interests, perceptions, and values, and if we meet under circumstances that facilitate our learning of that similarity.

Strategies to Manage IBD

If we believe that another’s values, perceptions, and behaviors are damaging to our own, it is often difficult to maintain even a semblance of a working relationship. However, if we anticipate that we will have a long-term relationship with someone that contains elements of IBD, and we believe we have limited alternatives, there are strategies for managing the encounter that offer opportunities for both self-protection and attainment of mutual goals. One of the most important strategies is to develop sufficient CBT so that the parties can be comfortable with the straightforward behavioral expectations that each has for the relationship.

As noted in the section on managing CBD, explicitly specifying and negotiating expected behaviors may be necessary to provide both parties with a comfort zone sufficient to sustain their interaction. It may also be helpful for the actors to openly acknowledge the areas of their mutual distrust. By doing so, they can explicitly talk about areas where they distrust each other and establish safeguards that anticipate distrustful behaviors and afford protection against potential consequences (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998). Thus, for example, if the parties have strong disagreements about certain value-based issues (religious beliefs, political beliefs, personal values), they may be able to design ways to keep these issues from interfering with their ability to work together in more calculus-based transactions. If the costs and benefits of consistent action are clear to both parties, the groundwork for CBT may be established. This enables them to interact in future encounters with some confidence that despite deep-seated differences, they will not be fundamentally disadvantaged or harmed in the relationship.
It should be noted here that our working assumption is that the truster’s strong IBD is healthy and appropriate—that is, grounded in accurate perceptions and judgments of the identity differences between the parties. Kramer (2001, 2002) has also written extensively about the conditions under which paranoid cognitions develop and the conditions under which this paranoia may be both prudent and/or highly destructive to the truster and to relationships.

What Happens If Trust Is Violated?

Trust violations occur if we obtain information that does not conform to our expectations of behavior for the other. Note that trust violations can occur in both directions—that is, we can expect trusting behavior and encounter distrust, or we can expect distrusting behavior and encounter trust. If this disconfirming information is significant enough, or if it begins to occur regularly in ongoing encounters, we are likely to adjust our perceptions of trust dramatically and alter the type of relationship we have with the other (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). It is likely that we have less emotional investment in relationships that are low in IBT and IBD. Thus, in those relationships violations of CBT are probably viewed as annoyances, although the associated costs of the loss may be emotionally troubling in the short term. We may need to adjust our behavior to deal with the other party differently, but the trust violations are not likely to affect our emotional well-being over the long term.

Research on the consequences of trust violations consistently shows that violations lead to a reduction in subsequent trust and cooperation (Deutsch, 1958; 1973; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Kramer, 1996). For example, employees’ trust in their employer declines when they perceive that their employer has violated the workplace psychological contract (Morrison and Robinson, 1997). More specifically, trust violations stifle mutual support and information sharing (Bies and Tripp, 1996), reduce the level of organizational citizenship behavior and job performance (Robinson, 1996), and may lead to low employee morale that affects relationships with customers (Berry, 1999). There is also some indication that when managers are low in behavioral integrity (the perceived alignment between their words and actions) it can actually affect the profitability of these organizations (Simons and McLean Parks, 2000).

When CBT is violated, the truster often pursues actions to repair or restore the violated trust. There has been a great deal of recent research on trust repair strategies; this research has yielded the following insights:

- After a trust violation, apologies are more effective than no apologies (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks, 2004).
- Apologies in which the violator takes responsibility for the violation are more effective than apologies in which the violator tries to place the
blame elsewhere (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin, 2006).

- Apologies in which the violator is actually guilty, as revealed by subsequent evidence, are more effective than when the violator is eventually found not guilty (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks, 2004).

- Apologies that are conveyed with sincerity are more effective (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004).

- Apologies are more effective when they are conveyed quickly after the violation has occurred, when the parties have had a past relationship that has been violation-free, and when the parties expect a violation-free relationship in the future (Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004).

Violations of CBT can thus be managed by making a quick, timely apology, taking personal responsibility for the trust violation, and communicating with sincerity. However, this approach may not work for all trust violations. Several recent studies have shown that this approach may work only when the trust violation is grounded in the actor’s perceived competence (their technical and interpersonal capability to perform a job). When the actor’s violation was grounded in his integrity (the actor’s principles or willingness to deliver on commitments), *denials* of culpability were actually more effective (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks, 2004). Similarly, when the actor had committed an integrity violation, apologies with an *external* causal attribution (placing the blame elsewhere) were more effective than violations where the actor took responsibility for the violation (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin, 2006). Finally, reticence—responding with silence and refusing to offer either apology or explanation—is less effective than offering apology or explanation for both forms of trust violation (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, and Dirks, 2005).

On the other hand, if relationships are established that are high in IBT, there is also a higher level of emotional investment. In these relationships, trust violations contain both an affective and a practical component. Once a shared identity has been established, any disconfirming trust violation can be viewed as a direct challenge to a person’s most central and cherished values (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995), and it may also represent conflict with the person’s psychological orientation (Deutsch, 1985). The parties are likely to feel upset, angry, violated, or even foolish, if loss of face is a result of trusting the other when trusting turned out to be inappropriate. In cases where IBT is violated, we argue that the situation must be addressed for a high-IBT relationship to continue. A number of studies have shown that when parties cannot or will not communicate about a major problem in their relationship, they are more likely to end the relationship than continue interacting (Courtright, Millar, Rogers, and Bagarozzi, 1990; Gottman, 1979; Putnam and Jones, 1982).
We envision three stages to the process of restoring IBT trust. First, the parties exchange information about the perceived trust violation (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). They attempt to identify and understand the act that was perceived as a violation. Miscommunication and misunderstandings are often cleared up at this stage. A husband might accuse his wife of admiring another man at a party, perceiving this to be an uncharacteristic violation of the IBT he has for her and the integrity of their marriage. When the wife explains that she was merely admiring the man’s sweater and thinking of purchasing a similar one for her husband, it might transform the husband’s perception of an IBT trust violation. An explanation either that the act was not what he perceived it to be or that the motivation for the act was consistent with his expectations of his wife’s commitment to their relationship may be adequate to restore the IBT relationship. (Note, however, that if this pattern persists whenever the couple is out together, the wife’s explanation will cease to be adequate over time.)

Second, the victim must be willing to forgive, rather than to engage in other forms of reaction to trust betrayal. (See Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro and Hannon, 2002; McCullough, Pargament, and Thoresen, 2000 for reviews.) Research reveals that the victim’s commitment to the relationship plays an important role. Commitment occurs as a result of high satisfaction with the relationship, increasing investments in the relationship by the victim, and the declining availability or suitability of alternative relationships to meet important needs. When the victim is highly committed to the relationship (as measured by these indicators), he or she is far more willing to forgive than to experience negative feelings, make negative attributions to the violator, or engage in behaviors such as revenge or retaliation toward the violator (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, and Hannon, 2002; Rusbult and Martz, 1995).

In the final communication stage, the parties reaffirm their commitment to a high-IBT relationship. They may affirm similar interests, goals, and actions (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998) and explicitly recommit to the relationship. They may also explicitly realign their psychological orientations (Deutsch, 1985). They may also discuss strategies to avoid similar misunderstandings, miscommunications, or disconfirmations in the future.

However, when the parties either fail to reconcile the trust violation within their shared identity or are unable to do so, high-IBT relationships may be transformed to low IBT or even IBD. If the violation is largely inconsistent with the core beliefs and values of one of the partners, and if it cannot be adequately explained within the context of the current relationship, then the parties must elect to either renegotiate their shared identity or terminate the high-IBT relationship (Larson, 1993).

Naturally, not every IBT relationship is as all-encompassing as a marriage. But there are kinds of business and professional relationships where the same
dynamics apply. One worker may take another into confidence and share strong dissatisfaction with the boss’s behavior, only to discover that the coworker has told the boss about the negative comments. A student may ask a favorite teacher to read some poetry that the student has written and later discover that the teacher published the poetry under his own name. Strategies of trust restoration necessarily differ with the kind of relationship the parties have (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, and Murnighan, 1996). It may also be that those who are heavily invested in high-IBT relationships are actually less sensitive to trust violations (Robinson, 1996). Thus, no model of trust restoration can explain the idiosyncrasies of each individual relationship. Our intent is merely to explore the dynamics of trust restoration within the context of various kinds of relationship, to better understand the link between relationship and trust type.

Despite the generally negative effect associated with distrust, we should note that trust restoration is not always a desirable alternative. Distrust is necessary when people perceive a need to protect themselves or others from possible harm, or when other parties in the relationship are not well known (Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998). Some work teams also perform better in CBD situations, perhaps because each member takes more care to ensure that the partners perform as expected. This self-policing contributes to higher product quality.

Implications for Managing Conflict More Effectively

Some of what we have said about trust we have known for a long time, but other parts are quite new and somewhat speculative. They remain to be validated through further research on how people develop and repair trust in their relationships. By way of summarizing this chapter, we would like to make some statements about trust and its implications for managing conflict.

1. The existence of trust between individuals makes conflict resolution easier and more effective. This point is obvious to anyone who has been in a conflict. A party who trusts another is likely to believe the other’s words, assume that the other will act out of good intentions, and probably look for productive ways to resolve a conflict should one occur. Conversely, if one distrusts another, one might disbelieve the other’s words, assume that the other is acting out of bad intentions, and defend oneself against the other or attempt to beat and conquer the other. As we have tried to indicate several times in this chapter, the level of trust or distrust in a relationship therefore definitively shapes emergent conflict dynamics.

2. Trust is often the first casualty in conflict. If trust makes conflict resolution easier and more effective, eruption of conflict usually injures trust and builds distrust. It does so because it violates the trust expectations, creates the perception of unreliability in the other party, and
breaks promises that have been broken. Moreover, the conflict may serve to undermine the foundations of identification-based trust that may exist between the parties. Thus, as conflict escalates—for whatever reason or cause—it serves to decrease trust and increase distrust. The deeper the distrust that is developed, the more the parties focus on defending themselves against the other or attempting to win the conflict, which further serves to increase the focus on distrust and decrease actions that might rebuild trust.

3. Creating trust in a relationship is initially a matter of building calculus-based trust. Many of those writing on trust have suggested that one of the objectives in resolving a conflict is to “build trust.” Yet in spite of these glib recommendations, few authors are sufficiently detailed and descriptive of those actions required to actually do so. From our review of the literature and the research we have reported in this chapter, it is clear to us that to build trust a party must begin with those actions we outline in this chapter: act consistently and reliably, meet deadlines and commitments, and repeatedly do so over time or over several bands of activity in the relationship.

4. Relationships can be further strengthened if the parties are able to build identification-based trust. Strong calculus-based trust is critical to any stable relationship, but IBT (based on perceived common goals and purposes, common values, and common identity) is likely to strengthen the overall trust between the parties and enhance the ability of the relationship to withstand conflict that may be relationship fracturing. If the parties perceive themselves as having strong common goals, values, and identities, they are motivated to sustain the relationship and find productive ways to resolve the conflict so that it does not damage the relationship.

5. Relationships characterized by calculus-based or identification-based distrust are likely to be conflict laden, and eruption of conflict within that relationship is likely to feed and encourage further distrust. At the calculus-based level, the actor finds the other’s behavior (at least) unreliable and unpredictable, and the other’s intentions and motivations might be seen as intentionally malevolent in nature. At the identification-based level, the actor believes that he and the other are committed to dissimilar goals, values, and purposes and might thus attribute hostile motives and intentions to the other. Once such negative expectations are created, actions by the other become negative self-fulfilling prophecies (I expect the worst of the other and his behavior confirms my worst fears), which often lead the conflict into greater scope, intensity, and even intractability.
6. As we have noted, most relationships are not purely trust and distrust but contain elements of both. As a result, we have positive and negative feelings about the other, which produces another level of conflict: an intrapsychic conflict often called *ambivalence*. States of ambivalence are characterized by elements of both trust and distrust for another; the internal conflict created by that ambivalence serves to undermine clear expectations of the other’s behavior and force the actor to scrutinize every action by the other to determine whether it should be counted in the trust or the distrust column. Ambivalent relationships are often finely grained and finely differentiated (Gabarro, 1978) because the actor is forced to determine the contexts in which the other can be trusted and those in which the other should be distrusted. As noted elsewhere (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995; Lewicki and McAllister, 1998), ambivalence can lead actors to become incapacitated in further action, or to modify strategies of influence with the other party. Thus, an actor’s internal conflict between trust and distrust probably also affects how he or she handles the interpersonal conflict between him- or herself and the other party. Because of the number of bands in the bandwidth of a relationship, and the ways in which trust and distrust can mix in any given relationship, we also argue that relationships holding varied degrees of ambivalence are far more common than relationships characterized by “pure” high trust or high distrust.

7. Finally, it is possible to repair trust—although it is easier to write about the steps of such repair than to actually perform it. Effective trust repair is often a key part of effective conflict resolution. In the preceding section of this chapter, we talked about some of the steps that are necessary to repair trust.

However, as we noted, repairing trust may take a long time, because the parties have to reestablish reliability and dependability that can only occur over time. Therefore, although rebuilding trust may be necessary for effective conflict resolution in the relationship over the long run, addressing and managing the distrust may be the most effective strategy for short-term containment of conflict. By managing distrust, as noted earlier, we engage in certain activities:

1. We explicitly address the behaviors that created the distrust. These may be actions of unreliability and undependability, harsh comments and criticism, or aggressive and antagonistic activities occurring as the conflict escalated.

2. If possible, each person responsible for a trust violation or act of distrust should apologize and give a full account of the reasons for the trust violation. Acknowledging responsibility for actions that created
the trust violation, and expressing regret for harm or damage caused by the violation, is often a necessary step in reducing distrust.

3. We restate and renegotiate the expectations for the other’s conduct in the future. The parties have to articulate expectations about the behavior that needs to occur and commit to those behaviors in future interactions.

4. We agree on procedures for monitoring and verifying the designated actions, to ensure that commitments are being met.

5. We simultaneously create ways to minimize our vulnerability or dependence on the other party in areas where distrust has developed. This often occurs as the vulnerable parties find ways to ensure that they are no longer vulnerable to the other’s exploitation or identify alternative ways to have their needs met. If one person depends on another for a ride to work and the driver is consistently late or occasionally forgets, then even if the actor accepts the other’s apology and commitment to be more reliable, the actor may also explore alternative ways to get to work.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we described the critical role that trust and distrust play in relationships. We reviewed some of the basic research on trust and elaborated on the types of trust that exist in most interpersonal relationships. We suggested that trust and distrust coexist in most relationships, that trust and distrust can be calculus based or identification based, and that relationships differ in form and character as a function of the relative weight of the two types of trust in the relationship. Finally, we suggested that managing any relationship requires us to both create trust and manage distrust effectively. These processes are most critical when trust is broken and needs to be repaired. A great deal of research remains to be done on these propositions, but we hope that the ideas proposed in this chapter serve to move this work forward.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank Carolyn Wiethoff for her contribution to the first edition draft of this chapter.

2. Results of such incremental trust development are seen even in the neuroscience literature. In one study, researchers found that as parties played a game of economic reciprocity and one party gained a reputation for trustworthy choices, the other’s intention to make a reciprocal trusting choice and actual trust decision
could be tracked through changes in brainwaves in the dorsal striatum (King-Casas, Tomlin, Anen, Camerer, Quartz, and Montague, 2005).

3. In earlier work, Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) identified knowledge-based trust as a separate trust. We now believe that knowledge is a dimension of relationships, along which people move from uncertainty to confidence about the other’s intentions, motivations, and behaviors.

4. This is an important point. If CBD is high, we believe that parties are likely to leave the relationship—assuming the interdependence between them and the other is not required and they have viable alternative ways of getting their needs met (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1981; Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton, 1999; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959).

5. Although we do not have empirical evidence to support it at this writing, our belief is that expectation violations function much like the Chutes-and-Ladders process we described in discussing calculus-based trust. Thus, the impact of expecting trust and experiencing distrust is more disconfirming and distressing than expecting distrust and encountering trust. Expecting trust and having it violated in a high-trust environment is more disruptive than encountering trust in a high-distrust environment (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). To our knowledge, no research has been done on reactions to expecting distrust and experiencing trust.

6. Although we indicated that trust violations can occur in both directions, we discuss only violations of trusting expectations, and not violations of distrusting expectations.

7. Both theory and research on this subject are currently unclear about whether trust is actually repaired or restored. Most research simply looks at changes in trust following efforts to repair a trust violation. It is still unclear whether rebuilt or restored trust is significantly different in structure and character from trust that has never been violated.

References


Trust After a Competence vs. Integrity-Based Violation.” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 2006, in press.


In the Sonagachi red-light district in Calcutta, India, prostitutes have organized to mobilize against AIDS, altering the power structure by challenging any pimp or madam who would insist on a customer’s right to sex without a condom.

At a company in the United States, in an attempt to avoid layoffs, the great majority of employees agreed to cut their own salaries by 20 percent; the offer was rejected by the CEO, who chose instead to fire 20 percent of the workforce, stating that “it was very important that management’s prerogative to manage as it saw fit not be compromised by sentimental human considerations” (Harvey, 1989, p. 275).

In the wilds of Wyoming, groups of ranchers and environmentalists, who historically were bitter adversaries, have teamed up to fight the problems posed by an increase in the population of wolves in their neighboring national parks.

All of these conflicts have one basic element in common: power. Power to challenge, power to resist, and power through cooperating together. In fact, virtually all conflicts directly or indirectly concern power. Conflict is often a means of seeking or maintaining the balance or imbalance of power in relationships. It may also be waged as a symbolic expression of one’s identity and right to self-determination. Power is commonly used in conflict as leverage for achieving one’s goals. It influences the types of conflicts to which people of differing levels of power are more or less frequently exposed to, as well as the relative
availability of the strategies and tactics employed. The powerful also largely
determine what is considered to be important, fair, and just in most settings and
thus shape and control many methods of resolution. Of course, changes in
power, particularly when dramatic, can also affect conflict, substantially affect-
ing people’s motivations, aspirations, and tactics. Because of its ubiquity, it is
paramount that when we address conflict, we consider power.

This chapter provides an overview of some key components of the relation-
ship between power and conflict. It is organized in four sections, beginning with
a definition of power and a discussion of those dimensions of power that are
important to considering conflict and its constructive resolution. In the second
section, I describe some of the personal and environmental factors that affect
people’s behavioral tendencies and responses to power in social relations. In
the third section, I discuss the relevance of these ideas to conflict resolution,
discussing some of the central principles of the dynamics of power and conflict
and outlining the tendencies of members of both high-power and low-power
groups in conflict. I conclude the chapter by discussing the implications of these
ideas for training in conflict resolution.

A DISCUSSION OF POWER

Bertrand Russell wrote, “The fundamental concept in social science is power,
in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics”
(1938, chap. 1). The construct of power, however, is abstract and ambiguous,
even though its consequences are real. As is illustrated by the vast literature on
power from philosophy, history, sociology, political science, and psychology,
there are about as many conceptualizations of power as there are authors who
have written on the subject. This is largely due to the fact that our individual
understanding of power is filtered through our personal experiences (such as
the relative level of power that we enjoy in our lives) and our basic assump-
tions about human nature and the nature of relations between people. The
many conceptualizations of power also stem from our training in different areas
(psychology, international affairs, community activism, and so on) as they shape
our thinking through the associated paradigms, theories, and models, which
tend to orient us to specific aspects and levels of power. But to effectively ana-
lyze, understand, and respond to power in conflict, we will need a manner of
approaching it that is both comprehensive and practical.

Following Mary Parker Follet ([1924] 1973), I begin by defining power
generally as the ability to make things happen or to bring about desired out-
comes. This definition avoids the common misconception that power is funda-
mentally competitive and coercive, the belief that power holders gain only by
using their power “against” rather than “for” others. This belief is grounded in
the erroneous assumption that power is a scarce resource, a fixed or finite entity of which there is only so much to go around.

There are other common misconceptions of power as well. For example, many people assume that power and control are concentrated in some physical location in systems (as in a boardroom or behind the lectern of a classroom). This was evident in the 1960s when student activists seized the administrative offices of their schools as a means of gaining power. Another misconception is that power flows in one direction (usually from the top down) and that individuals with differing levels of power do not mutually influence one another. Such misconceptions are not completely invalid but are largely so, and so become problematic heuristics.

**Distinctions of Power**

The literature on social power that has accumulated over many decades has identified a number of important distinctions that can help us to better specify the general idea of power as “the ability to make things happen” and thus better comprehend power. They include:

**Power as a Dynamic.** Power is often attributed to people as a stable characteristic. (“Donald Trump is a very powerful person.”) However, the ability to make things happen is most often determined not only by people but by the dynamic interaction of particular people behaving in a certain manner in a given situation. Accordingly, Deutsch (1973) described power as a relational concept functioning between the person and his or her environment. Power, therefore, is determined not only by the characteristics of the person or persons involved in any given situation, nor solely by the characteristics of the situation, but by the interaction of these two sets of factors. The power of the Indian prostitutes, for example, can be seen as the result of their ability to organize and mobilize their colleagues in this particular setting where demand for their services was high.

**Environmental, Relational, and Personal Power.** Deutsch (1973) offered a distinction between three specific meanings of power: environmental power, the degree to which an individual can favorably influence his or her overall environment; relationship power, the degree to which a person can favorably influence another person; and personal power, the degree to which a person is able to satisfy his or her own desires. These three meanings for power may be positively correlated (for example, high relationship power equals high personal power), but this is not necessarily so. For example, the CEO mentioned at the beginning of the chapter may have had more relationship power than his employees in that situation (in terms of his power over their jobs) and so could resist their attempts to influence the layoff decision, but by doing so and firing 20 percent of the workers he may well have sacrificed environmental power (his company’s
efficiency or market share) given the effects of his actions on the morale and commitment of the remaining employees. This loss of environmental power could result in diminution of the CEO’s personal power if it adversely affects his sense of self-efficacy, self-esteem, or even his personal income. The important point is that these are three distinct, but interrelated, realms of power; a shift in one type of power (relationship) may result in a gain or loss of another type (personal or environmental) depending on the people and circumstances.

Potential and Kinetic Power. Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, and Saunders (1994) distinguish among three aspects of power: power bases, power use, and influence strategies. Power bases are the resources for power or the tools available to influence one’s environment, the other party, or one’s own desires. This is potential power. There exist in the literature many typologies of the bases of power (such as wealth, social capital, physical strength, weapons, intelligence, knowledge, legitimacy, respect, affection, organizational skills, allies, and so on). These typologies can be useful for discerning different resources for power, but they should not be confused with the enactment of power. Kinetic power involves the active employment of strategies and tactics of influence, which are simply the manner in which the resources are put to use to accomplish particular objectives. Lewicki and others (1994) identified such diverse strategies as persuasion, exchange, legitimacy, friendliness, ingratiation, praise, assertiveness, inspirational appeal, consultation, pressure, and coalitions.

Primary and Secondary Power. Power can be seen as operating at two distinct levels; one determining the nature of the interactions between players on the field, and one determining the nature of the field itself. Secondary power refers to the exercise of power in the conventional sense—the ability to get one’s goals met in a relational context. This can take either a coercive or positive form; however, it entails operating in a domain that has already been defined normatively. Primary power refers to the ability to shape the normative domain, or to affect the socio-historical process of reality construction (Coleman and Voronov, 2003). This is the process by which our sense of reality, as we know it, our sense of truth, fairness, and justice, is constructed. As Deutsch (2004) writes:

The official ideology and myths of any society help define and justify the values that are distributed to the different positions within the society; they codify for the individual what a person in his position can legitimately expect. Examples are legion of how official ideology and myth limit or enhance one’s views of what one is entitled to (p. 25).

Thus, primary power refers to the ability to affect those activities (the law, the media, policies, and so on) that define the domain. This includes defining what is considered “good” in a society: prosocial versus antisocial forms of violence (for example, “freedom fighting” versus “terrorism”), morality, religion, ideology,
politics, education, and so on. This can be achieved through the blatant tactics used by totalitarian rulers (such as Hitler and Stalin) or more subtly through political "spin" by emphasizing biased accounts of history in schools and textbooks, by indirectly controlling or censuring the media, or by keeping the judiciary and the legislature in the hands of the dominant group. It is important to recognize that the various sources of power (see French and Raven, 1959) are not concrete but socially constructed. "Legitimacy," for example, is not objective but is created through management of meaning. Only once the domain has been defined does it become possible for power as conceived of in a conventional sense to be exercised. Thus, the two forms of power are interconnected. Primary power opens and constrains the possibilities for exercising secondary power. Secondary power can be seen as expressing and reproducing the status quo of primary power relations. However, secondary power can also contribute to transforming primary power. Revolutions or hostile coups are dramatic examples of secondary power being used in an attempt to transform primary power.

Top-down, Middle-Out, and Bottom-Up Power. Power in any social system can be the result of resources and influence strategies employed by way of three distinct channels within systems: top-down, middle-out, and bottom-up (Coleman, forthcoming). Top-down channels are typically used by formal or elite leaders and decision makers (although third parties often employ this channel) and, although they can take many forms, often involve command and control strategies of influence that have a rapid and dramatic effect on systems. Middle-out channels reside with the midlevel leaders, managers, and organizations of social systems (such as community-based and nongovernmental organizations) that can influence systems through their social capital and social networks. The influence employed at this level can have a strong effect on systems, but typically takes time to unfold. Bottom-up power is the result of changes at the local level (such as changes in individual attitudes or behaviors) that can have a substantial emergent effect on systems but that tend to take the longest amount of time to emerge.

Effective Power and Sustainable Outcomes. Having resources and knowledge of influence strategies does not necessarily translate to power; they may be employed more or less effectively in terms of bringing about desired outcomes. Deutsch (1973) outlined the conditions for "effective power" as having control of the resources to generate power, motivation to influence others, skill in converting resources to power, and good judgment in employing power so that it is appropriate in type and magnitude to the situation. However, outcomes can be short or long term. Achieving sustainable outcomes requires both long-term strategic thinking and the ability of power users to read changes in situations, identify negative feedback, and respond adaptively when required (Coleman, forthcoming).
Perceived Power. Saul Alinsky (1971) said, “Power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have.” Thus, for power to be effective, it doesn’t necessarily have to be the result of actual resources owned and strategies employed by people but, in some circumstances, by what they are merely perceived to have. In fact, many of the less-than-powerful go out of their way to create an image of power as the critical element of effective influence (see Tzu, 1983).

General Versus Relevant Power. Often, initial assessments of another’s power are erroneous because they are based on aggregates of relative power (the sum total of another’s power in comparison to my own), and not on the other’s relevant power resources or on the other’s efficacy in implementing the strategies relevant to the interaction at hand (Salacuse, 2001). This typically leads to a sense of overconfidence on the part of general power holders and to a sense of helplessness for those in low power.

In summary, power is dynamic and complex. It can be usefully conceptualized as the ability (or the perception of the ability) to leverage relevant resources in a specific situation in order to effectively achieve personal, relational, or environmental goals, often through using various strategies and channels of influence of both a primary and secondary nature. Now, I turn to a discussion of some of the central factors that influence power dynamics in social relations.

COMPONENTS OF POWER

The extensive literature on social power has offered a wide array of conceptual frameworks for studying and analyzing power. (See Foucault, 1980; Clegg, 1989; Pfeffer, 1981; and Blalock, 1989 for examples.) Here, I employ a rather simple schema to organize a presentation of some of the many factors that research has shown affect people’s orientations and actions with regard to power. The schema, borrowed from social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1999), suggests that human behavior, and in particular human agency, can be understood as the result of dynamic interactions between three sources of influence: personal factors, behavioral patterns, and environmental events.

“Human behavior has often been explained in terms of unilateral causation, in which behavior is depicted as either being shaped and controlled by environmental influences or driven by internal dispositions. Social cognitive theory explains psychosocial functioning in terms of triadic reciprocal causation. In this model of reciprocal causality, internal personal factors in the form of cognitive, affective, and biological events; behavioral patterns; and environmental events all operate as interactive determinants that influence one another bidirectionally” (Bandura, 1999, p. 23).
This triadic model is consistent with a dynamic view of power and conflict but allows for the categorization of factors into the three separate but interrelated categories. Below, I summarize some of the key personal and environmental factors that can interact to determine people’s behavioral patterns regarding power in social relations.

**Personal Factors**

**Power Orientations.** In his seminal work on power and motivation, McClelland (1975) presented a developmental framework for categorizing people’s experiences and expressions of power. He argued that people everywhere seek power through support, autonomy, assertion, and togetherness.

- **Support.** Obtaining assistance and support from others, often through a dependence relationship. Such relationships can serve to meet the needs of the low-power person, but they can take many forms, from benign and supportive (as in many mentor-mentee relationships) to oppressive and abusive (as with a dictatorial parent). The negative physical and psychological impact of prolonged experiences of dependence and powerlessness by adults has been shown to be dire (Sashkin, 1984) and can lead to a tendency to become more rigid, critical, controlling of others in lower power, and, ultimately, more irrational and violent (Kanter, 1977).

- **Autonomy.** Establishing one’s autonomy and independence from others. Scholars have referred to this approach as having “power to” or “power from,” in the sense that one has enough power to achieve one’s objectives without being unduly constrained by someone or something else. If individuals feel empowered in a particular situation, it reduces their need for dependence on others and opens up the possibility of acting independently, thereby bolstering their sense of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and confidence.

- **Assertion.** Assertively acting on, influencing, and dominating others. This approach to power has been termed “power over” and is consistent with the popular definition of power as “an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done” (Dahl, 1968, p. 158). This orientation to power is commonplace and was evident in the earlier example of the CEO and his response to the employees’ initiative.

- **Togetherness.** Becoming part of an organization or a group. Mary Parker Follett suggested that even though power is usually conceived of as power over others, it would also be possible to develop the conception of “power with” others. She envisioned this type as jointly developed, coactive, and noncoercive (Follett, [1924] 1973). Bandura (1999) labeled
this approach as one of collective agency. This is the form of power illustrated in the vignette about partnership between ranchers and environmentalists.

McClelland proposed that as people mature, they progress sequentially through each of these stages of development and orientations to power, ideally moving toward the stage of togetherness. This is commensurate with the developmental progression of humans from more egocentric to more sociocentric beings (Piaget, 1937). McClelland also stressed, however, that each of the four power orientations may be useful in any given situation, and that problems typically arise for people when they become fixated on any one orientation (such as assertion), or when an individual’s chronic orientation fits poorly with the particular realities or demands of a situation. From this perspective, an individual’s flexibility and responsiveness to changes in his or her environment can be seen as critical to the ability to respond effectively to situations involving power.

For example, returning to the CEO in the previous example, it is possible that he may have been operating from a chronically assertive orientation to power (power over) and therefore interpreted the employees’ offer as a competitive tactic (“they’re trying to humiliate me or ingratiate themselves”), was motivated to win at all costs, and saw this as morally legitimate because of a belief that low-level employees must make sacrifices for the greater good of the organization. Ultimately, one’s power orientation affects one’s behavior through an assessment of the feasibility of a given action (do I have the capacity to act in such a manner and what will the consequences be?), unless the orientation is excessively chronic.

Authoritarianism. A classic area of research that has been found to influence people’s orientations to power is authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkl-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950), which involves an exaggerated need to submit to and identify with strong authority. Originating from psychodynamic theory, this syndrome is thought to stem from early rearing by parents who use harsh and rigid forms of discipline, demand unquestioning obedience, are overly conscious of distinctions of status, and are contemptuous or exploitative toward those of lower status. The child internalizes the values of the parents and therefore is inclined toward a dominant, punitive approach to power relations. Individuals high in authoritarianism tend to favor absolute obedience to authority and resist personal freedom. These tendencies would most likely orient one toward either authoritarian or submissive orientation to power, depending on the relative status of the other party.

Need for Power. The need for power (“nPower”, McClelland, 1975; McClelland and Burnham, 1976) has been described as an individual difference in which people high on nPower experience great satisfaction in influencing people and
arousing strong emotions in them. Individuals high on nPower tend to seek out positions of authority and display a more dominating style in conflict (Bhowon, 2003). This orientation, however, is thought to interact with another personality difference, known as activity inhibition (see also Chapter Fourteen). This is, essentially, the individual’s level of self-control and general orientation to others. These two traits combine to produce two separate types of power orientation: the “personalized power orientation” and the “socialized power orientation.” Individuals high on nPower and low on activity inhibition exhibit a more personalized power orientation, exemplified by a tendency to dominate others in an attempt to satisfy one’s hedonistic desires. Individuals with high nPower and high activity inhibition tend to exhibit socialized power orientation, using power for the good of a cause, an organization, or an institution. McClelland (1975) postulated that individual power orientations develop through various stages, with the personalized orientation emerging at an earlier stage of development and the socialized orientation at a later stage. This is consistent with Kohlberg’s work on moral development (1963, 1969), which has found that individuals in the latter stages of moral development place much higher value on justice, dignity, and equality. The personal-social separation is a useful distinction between the destructive and constructive sides of power; it contradicts the notion of Lord Acton that all power necessarily corrupts.

Ideological Frames. Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified differences in people’s ideological frames of reference as determining of their approach to power. These frames are comprehensive belief systems about the nature of relations between individuals and society. They classified three types of ideological frames: the unitary, the radical, and the pluralist. From the unitary view, society is seen as an integrated whole where the interests of the individual and society are one and where power can be largely ignored and assumed to be used benevolently by those in authority to further the mutual goals of all parties. This perspective is common in collectivist families and cultures and in some benevolent business organizations. In contrast, the radical frame pictures society as comprising antagonistic class interests that are “characterized by deep-rooted social and political cleavages, and held together as much by coercion as by consent” (Morgan, 1986, p. 186). This perspective, epitomized by Marxist doctrine, focuses on unequal distribution of power in society and the significant role that this plays in virtually every aspect of our lives. Finally, the pluralist frame views society as a space where different groups “bargain and compete for a share in the balance of power . . . to realize a negotiated order that creates unity out of diversity” (Morgan, 1986, p. 185). Power is seen as distributed more or less equally among the groups, and as the primary medium through which conflicts are resolved. This pluralist view of power is prevalent in the many forms of liberal democracies.
Each distinct ideological frame engenders its own set of expectations about what one can anticipate, what one should attend to, and therefore how one should respond to situations of power and conflict. For example, Stephens (1994) has described how such differences in ideological frames lead various conflict practitioners to use conflict resolution processes to achieve vastly disparate objectives in their work (unitarians favoring maintenance of the status quo of power relations; radicals favoring fundamental systems change and redistribution of power; and pluralists favoring a combination of both, depending on the situation). These translate into significant differences in procedures (such as alternative dispute resolution practices to achieve organizational unity, versus peace education and activism to produce community change).

**Implicit Power Theories.** Research on implicit power theories (Coleman, 2004) has shed light on a central problem within the power-and-conflict dynamic, namely: the unwillingness of the powerful to share their power (wealth, information, access, authority, and so on) with those in need. Implicit theories are cognitive structures, naïve, unarticulated theories about the social world, which influence the way people construe events. Research has identified two theories of power that people can hold: a limited-power theory that portrays power as a scarce resource that triggers a competitive orientation to power sharing, and an expandable-power theory that views power as an expandable resource and fosters a more cooperative power-sharing orientation. The two competing views of power have been shown to affect people’s decisions and actions on whether to share or withhold resources, as well as the degree to which they involve others in decision-making processes (Coleman, 2004).

Subsequent research on implicit power theories has demonstrated that the social environment can play a critical role in influencing their use by making different theories more or less cognitively salient. For example, in a study conducted in China, participants portraying managers in an organizational simulation were found to share more power (information and assistance) with subordinates when they were led to believe that their organization had a history of approaching organizational power as an expandable resource than when it was portrayed as traditionally viewing and approaching power as a scarce resource (Tjosvold, Coleman, and Sun, 2003). This research emphasizes the critical role the context plays in triggering and fostering differences in implicit theories. Thus, social and organizational structures, norms and climate around empowerment, as well as more informal influences such as myths and legends regarding preferred ways of interacting, may be formative and go a long way in providing a context of meaning through which to interpret the value of power sharing.

**Social Dominance Orientation.** A more recent model relevant to power and conflict comes from social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), which
contends that societies worldwide organize according to group-based hierarchies, with dominant social groups possessing a disproportionate share of positive social value (wealth, health, status, and so on). These hierarchies are maintained by several key factors, including the social dominance orientation (SDO) of members of the groups. SDO is defined as a very general orientation expressing antiegalitarianism; a view of human existence as zero-sum with relentless competition between groups; the desire for generalized, hierarchical relationships between groups; and a desire for in-group dominance over out-groups. The research on SDO has identified consistent gender differences in women's and men's levels of SDO (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo, 1994), with men having significantly higher levels of SDO than women. We could expect this type of general orientation to group relations to contribute to a chronically competitive orientation (assertion) to power differences.

Other individual differences—as wide-ranging as interpersonal orientation (high or low sensitivity to others), Machiavellianism, interpersonal trust, and gender—are relevant to discussing people's orientation to power, but space does not allow for further elaboration. (See Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, and Saunders, 1994, for discussion of these variables). Each of the distinct personal factors described here can work in concert to contribute to a chronic orientation and fixation on any one of the power orientations (such as powerlessness). These orientations affect how people perceive conflict, how they evaluate authority relations, and ultimately the decisions and responses they make to power differences in conflict situations. However, except for extreme cases, the influences of these individual difference factors need to be understood as operating in interaction with the individual's environment.

**Environmental Factors**

Again, the environmental factors affecting personal differences and behavioral patterns regarding power are innumerable. (See Deutsch, 2004 and Blalock, 1989 for summaries.) Following are a few major factors.

**Deep Structure.** A few scholars propose that the deep structure of most conflicts is dictated by preexisting power relations (Chomsky, 2002). This structure, established through past relations between the parties, their differential access to resources, and existing norms and roles, has been historically constructed. This history is composed of the decisions and actions, victories and defeats, justices and injustices experienced by those who came before us: members of our families, our gender, our communities, our race, our nation, and so on. These cumulative experiences have in many ways defined the rules of the power game. This perspective emphasizes the influences exerted on power by factors such as class and race relations, intergroup conflicts of interest and social competition, inequity between social groups on highly valued dimensions, opportunity
structures and the educational systems that perpetuate them, the relative sta-
bility of status and power differences, and the perceived legitimacy of all of
these factors. Understanding the historical context encourages us to look
beyond the current surface manifestations of secondary power and into the
processes of primary power. From this perspective, people are seen as agents
or carriers of power relations embedded in the wider structure of history and
society. They can learn to understand the rules but are rarely able to change
them significantly.

Culture. The culture in which we are immersed is another important influence
on our experience of power. Hofstede (1980) identified power distance as a
dimension of social relations that is determined by and varies across cultures.
He defined it as the extent to which the less powerful persons in a society accept
inequality in power and consider it as normal. Hofstede argued that inequality
exists within every culture, but the degree to which it is tolerated by society
varies from one culture to another. So, for example, in some high-power-distance
cultures (such as in parts of India) the notion of empowering employees through
participation in decisions and delegation of authority is considered inappropri-
ate and insubordinate by the employees themselves. This cultural difference
regarding power not only is the source of much cross-cultural misunderstanding
and conflict, but it also significantly affects how individuals from different
cultures respond to conflicts with others in high and low power.

Legitimizing Myths. The extent to which power disparities between people and
between groups are accepted in any society is embedded and constructed within
a contradictory set of “legitimizing myths” about hierarchy and group superior-
ity present in every society (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). These myths, or sys-
tems of beliefs, tend to either support and enhance hierarchical relationships
and dominant group superiority (examples include sexism, racism, classism,
meritocracy, and conservatism) or challenge and attenuate these social arrange-
ments (for example, feminism, multiculturalism, pluralism, egalitarianism, and
liberalism). These divergent sets of myths exist in a state of oppositional tension
in many social systems (for example, conservatism versus liberalism), which
can provide important checks and balances against the fanaticism of either side.
In some settings, these myths become infused into the “fairness-making” and
“conflict-resolving” structures, thereby institutionalizing group dominance, bias,
and conflict (Rapoport, 1974).

Roles. Another powerful aspect of the structure of many social situations is the
roles people assume. Role theory views power relations as if they were scripted
theater. The theory holds that the roles we have in society or in our organiza-
tions (manager, laborer) often dictate the social rules or norms for our behavior.
These roles establish shared expectations among members of a system, which in most cases came into existence long before the individuals who now inhabit them. It argues that we largely act out these preexisting scripts in our institutions and organizations, and that it is these roles, these shared norms and scripts, that dictate our experiences, our expectations, and our responses to power. So, for example, role theory argues that the CEO from our initial example was acting more or less consistently with what would be expected from someone in his position. Furthermore, if any one of his employees had been in the same position, they would have made essentially the same decision; for it is within the underlying structure of the organization and its place in society that power relations between groups are largely predetermined and thereby constrained and perpetuated.

One of the most blatant examples of the power of roles to determine behavior is the classic experiment conducted at Stanford University on the effects of deindividuated roles on behavior in institutional settings (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973). Student subjects were recruited for this study and randomly assigned to play the role of either a guard or a prisoner in a simulated prison environment for two weeks. From the very beginning, the “guards” abused and denigrated the “prisoners,” showing increasingly brutal, sadistic, and dehumanizing behavior over time. The research observations were so disturbing that the study was called off after only six days.

Hierarchy. A related component of structure is hierarchy. Barnard (1946) argued that distinctions of status and authority are ultimately necessary for effective functioning and survival of any group above a certain size. As a result, most groups form some type of formal or informal hierarchical structure to function efficiently. Often, the greater advantages associated with higher positions lead to competition for these scarce positions and an attempt by those in authority to maintain their status. This is consistent with the findings of social dominance theory discussed previously (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

However, a hierarchical structure does not necessarily lead to competitive or destructive power relations within a group. In a series of studies on power and goal interdependence, Tjosvold (1997) found that variation in goal interdependence (task, reward, and outcome goals) affected the likelihood of constructive use of power between high-power and low-power persons. Cooperative goals, when compared to competitive and independent goals, were found to induce “higher expectations of assistance, more assistance, greater support, more persuasion and less coercion and more trusting and friendly attitudes” between superiors and subordinates (Tjosvold, 1997, p. 297). The abundant research on cooperative and competitive goal interdependence (see Chapters One and Three in this book) has consistently demonstrated the contrasting effects of these goal structures on people’s attitudes and behaviors in social relations. Among other
things, competition fosters “attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other,” in contrast with cooperation, which fosters “an orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences” (Deutsch, 1973). In cooperative situations, people want others to perform effectively and to use their joint resources to promote common objectives.

**Inequitable Opportunity Structures.** At the structural level we also see the establishment of opportunity structures that often grant the powerful unequal or exclusive access to positions of leadership, jobs, decent housing, education, health care, nutrition, and the like. Galtung (1969) labeled the effects of this “structural violence” because of its insidious and deleterious effects on marginalized communities. These inequities contribute to a setting where difficult material circumstances and political conflict lead to social disorganization, which makes it harder for some people to get their basic physical and psychological needs met. This results in a pervasive sense of powerlessness for many members of low-power groups. The privileged circumstances of the powerful, on the contrary, insulates them and contributes to their lack of attention and response to the concerns of those in low power until a crisis, such as an organized or violent act of protest, demands their attention (Deutsch, 1985). Typically, the powerful respond to such acts of protest with “pro-social” violence to quell the disturbance and maintain the status quo.

The environmental factors of deep structure, culture, myths, roles, hierarchy, and inequitable opportunity structures again interact with various individual-level factors to both encourage and constrain responses to power inequality and conflict. In the next section, I outline some of the resulting principles derived from this and other theory and research on the dynamics of power and conflict.

**Principles of Power-Conflict Dynamics**

The following set of principles is grounded in the assumption that power differences affect conflict processes, which in turn can affect power differences. In addition, the various personal, environmental, and behavioral factors involved are themselves mutually influential in determining the exact nature of the power-conflict dynamic in any setting.

*Significant changes in the status quo of the balance of power between parties can affect experiences of relative deprivation and increase conflict aspirations.* Relative deprivation theory is a central model of the origins of conflict, which specifies the conditions under which need deprivation produces conflict (Merton and Kitt, 1950; see Chapter Thirty-Seven in this book). Relative deprivation is said to occur when need achievement falls short of a reasonable standard determined by what one has achieved in the past, what relevant comparison others are achieving, what law or custom entitles one to, or what one expects to achieve. Research has shown that people compare themselves with others who
are salient or similar to themselves in group membership, attitudes, values, or social status (Major, 1994). However, when changes in the status quo lead to a reordering of relative group status (such as through changes brought on by elections or military coups), new comparisons will be made to the previously dominant (and incomparable) groups leading to an increase in awareness of deprivation relative to those groups (Gurr, 1970). Such changes are likely to increase demands for change by those experiencing deprivation, and thus to the open expression of conflict. This dynamic has been central to many social movements in the United States, such as the civil rights and women’s rights movements.

Obvious power asymmetries contain conflict escalation while power ambiguities foster escalation. Research suggests that situations where there exist significant imbalances of power between groups are more likely to discourage open expressions of conflict and conflict escalation than situations of relatively balanced power (Deutsch, 1973). For instance, in an historical analysis of wars between 1816 and 1989, Moul (2003) found that approximate parity in power capabilities (abilities to oppose individual states) encouraged wars between great power disputants. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have argued that this can account for the utility and ubiquity of asymmetrical group status hierarchies worldwide. However, research in the interpersonal realm has shown that the relationship between power symmetry and destructive conflict is moderated by trust; when parties of equal power are trusting of each other they will choose more cooperative strategies to resolve their differences (Davidson, McElwee, and Hannan, 2004).

Sustainable resolutions to conflict require progression from unbalanced power relations between the parties to relatively balanced relations. Adam Curle (1971), a mediator working in Africa, proposed a particularly useful model for understanding the longitudinal relationships between conflict, power, and sustainable outcomes (see Lederach, 1997 for more detail). He suggested that as conflicts moved from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships, their course could be charted on a matrix that compares two elements: the level of power between the disputants and the level of awareness of the conflict. Curle described this progression toward peace as involving four stages. In the first stage, conflict is “hidden” to some of the parties because they are unaware of the imbalances of power and injustices that affect their lives. Here, any activities or events resulting in conscientization (erasing ignorance and raising awareness of inequalities and inequities) move the conflict forward. This is where the experience of relative deprivation fits it. An increase in awareness of injustice leads to the second stage, confrontation, when demands for change from the weaker party bring the conflict to the surface. Confrontations, of course, can take many forms from cooperative to nonviolent to violent. Under some conditions, these confrontations result in the stage of negotiations, which are aimed at achieving a rebalancing
of power in the relationship in order for those in low power to increase their capacities to address their basic needs. Successful negotiations can move the conflict to the final stage of sustainable peace, if they lead to a restructuring of the relationship that addresses effectively the substantive and procedural concerns of those involved. Support for this model is anecdotal and could be considerably enhanced through case studies and longitudinal survey research.

Our orientations to power influence our preferred strategies in conflict. How we experience power affects how we perceive conflict and how we respond to it. Salacuse (2001) applied McClelland's four power orientations to a discussion of four grand strategies for achieving goals in international conflict resolution. Like the four orientations, these strategies, which he labeled dependence, autonomy, assertion, and community, can be seen as different but complementary approaches to managing power differences in conflict, each being more or less effective in a given situation.

With a dependent strategy, low-power parties seek help and support from more powerful others either by becoming dependent on them or by making use of their dependence. For example, a daughter in a conflict with her parents over her curfew could seek support from an aunt or a family friend who is understanding of her perspective and is willing and able to influence her parents’ thinking on the subject.

This is in contrast with an autonomous strategy, where parties seek to limit their dependence on the other by restricting their interactions or by removing themselves from the conflict or the relationship altogether. One method of reducing dependence in conflict is by developing a strong BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). The daughter might explore other means of getting her social needs met, such as having sleepovers at her home or organizing daytime parties during the weekend. Having these as options reduces her need to remain in conflict with her parents over the curfew.

An assertive strategy is the traditional power-over approach, very common among the powerful. This is the unilateral attempt to use the power resources at one’s disposal to impose a solution that one favors. This approach is contrasted with the community strategy, whereby a party attempts to become a member of an organization or a community that includes the other. If the curfew conflict escalates and persists, it might be useful for the family to join a parent-adolescent support group where family conflict of this sort is explored openly and normalized. Joining groups or organizations that involve the other party can put the conflict into a broader perspective and help emphasize the commonalities that both parties share. Once again, what is important is that individuals (and groups and nations) avoid becoming chronically committed to any one strategy, instead remaining skilled at each of them, particularly when trying to achieve enhanced environmental or personal power.
A chronic competitive (assertive) orientation to power is often costly. From a practical perspective, a chronic competitive approach to power has harmful consequences. Deutsch (1973) suggested that reliance on competitive and coercive strategies of influence by power holders produces alienation and resistance in those subjected to the power. This, in turn, limits the power holder’s ability to use other types of power based on trust (such as normative, expert, referent, and reward power) and increases the demand for scrutiny and control of subordinates. A parent who demands obedience from an adolescent in a climate of mutual distrust fosters more distrust and must be prepared to keep the youngster under surveillance. If the goal of the power holder is to achieve commitment from subordinates (rather than merely short-term compliance), excessive reliance on a power-over strategy eventually proves to be costly as well as largely ineffective. Research by Kipnis (1976) supported this contention by demonstrating that a leader’s dependence on coercive strategies of influence has considerable costs in undermining relationships with followers and in compromising goal achievement.

Furthermore, it is evident that when power holders have a chronic competitive perspective on power, it reduces their chance to see sharing power with members of low-power groups as an opportunity to enhance their own personal or environmental power (Coleman, 2004). From this chronic competitive perspective, power sharing is typically experienced as a threat to achieving one’s goals, and the opportunities afforded by power sharing are invisible. If the father views the conflict over curfew as a win-lose power struggle, he is unlikely to reflect on the advantages of involving his daughter in reaching a solution and thereby engendering in her an improved sense of responsibility, collaboration, and trust.

Cooperative interdependence in conflict leads to an orientation of gaining “power with” others. When conflicts occur in situations that have cooperative task, reward, or outcome interdependence structures, or between disputants sharing a cooperative psychological orientation, there is more cooperative power (Tjosvold, 1981, 1997). In other words, in these situations conflict is often framed as a mutual problem to be solved by both parties, which leads to an increased tendency to minimize power differences between the disputants and to mutually enhance each other’s power in order to work together effectively to achieve their shared goals. Thus, if the parents can recognize that their daughter’s social needs and their own needs to have a close family life are positively linked, then they may be more likely to involve her in the problem-solving and decision-making processes, thereby enhancing her power and their ability to find mutually satisfying solutions to the conflict.

The overwhelming evidence seems to indicate that the powerful tend to like power, use it, justify having it, and attempt to keep it. The powerful tend to be more satisfied and less personally discontent than those not enjoying high
power; they have a longer time perspective and more freedom to act and therefore can plan further into the future. These higher levels of satisfaction lead to vested interests in the status quo and development of rationales for maintaining power, such as the power holders’ belief in their own superior competence and superior moral value (Deutsch, 1973). Kipnis (1976) argued that much of this may be the result of the corrupting nature of power itself. He proposed that having power and exercising it successfully over time lead to an acquired “taste for power,” inflated sense of self, devaluing of those of lesser power, and temptation to use power illegally to enhance one’s position.

Fiske (1993) has demonstrated that powerful people tend to pay less attention to those in low power because they view them as not affecting their outcomes, they are often too busy to pay attention, and they are often motivated by their own high need to dominate others. Inattention to the powerless makes powerful people more vulnerable to use of stereotypes and implicit theories when interacting with the powerless. Mindell (1995) explained the state of unawareness that having privilege often fosters in this way: “Rank is a drug. The more you have, the less aware you are of how it affects others negatively” (p. 56).

Thus, in conflict situations high power holders and members of high-power groups (HPGs) often neglect to analyze—as well as underestimate—the power of low power holders and members of low-power groups (LPGs; Salacuse, 2001). Additionally, they usually attempt to dominate the relationship, to use pressure tactics, to offer few concessions, to have high aspirations, and to use contentious tactics. HPGs, therefore, make it difficult to arrive at negotiated agreements that are satisfactory to all parties.

When met with a substantial challenge to their power from LPGs, the common responses of members of HPGs fall into the categories of repression or ambivalent tolerance (Duckitt, 1992). If the validity of the concerns of the LPG is not recognized, HPGs are likely to use force to quell the challenge of the LPG. But if the challenges are acknowledged as legitimate, HPGs may respond with tolerant attitudes and expressions of concern—though ultimately with resistance to implementing any real change in their power relations (Duckitt, 1992). This has been termed the attitude-implementation gap.

In light of their unreflective tendency to dominate, it becomes critical for members of HPGs to be aware of the likelihood that they will elicit resistance and alienation (from members of LPGs with whom they are in conflict) through using illegitimate techniques, inappropriate sanctions, or influence that is considered excessive for the situation (Deutsch, 1973). The cost to the HPG is not only ill will but also the need to be continuously vigilant and mobilized to prevent retaliation by the LPG.

The tendencies for members of LPGs are opposite to those of members of HPGs, with one important exception. LPG members tend to be dependent on others, to have short time perspectives, to be unable to plan far ahead, and to be generally
discontent. Often, LPG members attempt to rid themselves of the negative feelings associated with their experiences of powerlessness and dependence (such as rage and fear) by projecting blame onto even less powerful groups or onto relatively safe in-group targets. The latter can result in a breakdown of LPG in-group solidarity (Kanter, 1977) and impair their capacities for group mobilization in conflict. Intense negative feelings may also limit the LPG members’ capacities to respond constructively in conflict with HPGs and impel such destructive impulses as violent destruction of property (Deutsch, 1973).

Several tactics can enhance the power of LPGs. The first is for the group to amass more power for assertion—either by increasing their own resources, organization, cohesion, and motivation for change or by decreasing the resources of (or increasing the costs for) the HPGs (see Chapter Three). The latter can be accomplished through acts of civil disobedience, militancy, or by what Alinsky (1971) described as “Jujitsu tactics”: using the imbalance of power in the relationship against the more powerful. Another approach available to LPG members is to attempt to appeal to the better side of the members of the HPG by trying to induce them (through such tactics as ingratiation, guilt, and helplessness) to use their power more benevolently or by trying to raise the HPG’s awareness of any injustice that they may be party to. LPGs would also do well to develop a broad menu of tactics and skills in implementing the strategies of autonomy, dependence, and community.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

In conclusion, I offer a few propositions from this chapter for use in designing training approaches for power and conflict. The general goals of such training are to enhance people’s understanding of power, to facilitate reflection of their own tendencies when in low or high power, and to increase their ability to use it effectively when in conflict.

- Training should help students understand and reflect critically on their commonly held assumptions about power, as well as the sources of these assumptions. It should also educate students on the dynamic complexity of processes of power and influence, on the importance of localized, situation-specific understanding, and on the importance of distinctions such as primary and secondary power.
- Students should be supported in a process that helps them become aware of their own chronic tendencies to react in situations in which they have superior or inferior power to others.
- Students should be encouraged to become more emotionally and cognitively aware of the privileges or injustices they and others experience as
a result of their skin color, gender, economics, class, age, religion, sexual orientation, physical status, and the like.

- In a conflict situation, students should be able to analyze for the other as well as themselves the resources of power, their orientation to power, and the strategies and tactics for effectively implementing their available power. Students should also be able to identify and develop the necessary skills for implementing their available power in the conflict.

- Students should also be able to distinguish between conflicts in which power with, power from, and power under, rather than power over, are appropriate orientations to and strategies for resolving the conflict.

Here is an exercise, developed by Susan Fountain, showing the type of training that gives students simple yet rich experience useful for exploring and examining many of the principles described throughout the chapter.

Participants are asked to leave the training room momentarily. It is then organized into two work areas, with several tables grouped to accommodate four or five people per group in each area. In one work area, the tables are filled with markers, colored pencils, paste, poster board, magazines, scissors, and other colorful and decorative items. In the other work area, the tables receive one piece of white typing paper and two black lead pencils. The participants are then randomly assigned to two groups and allowed into the room and seated.

The groups are then told that their objective is to use the materials they have been given to generate a definition of power. They are informed that once each group has completed its task, they will display their definition and everyone will vote on the best definition generated from the class. The groups then begin their work on the task. The trainers actively support and participate in the work of the high-resource group, while attempting to avoid contact with members of the low-resource group. When the work is complete, the class votes on the best definition of power. The participants are then brought into a circle to debrief.

In my experience with this exercise, many useful learning opportunities present themselves. For example, the types of definition generated can differ greatly between the high-resource and low-resource groups. The former tend to produce definitions that are mostly positive, superficial, and largely shaped by the mainstream images from the magazines (beauty, status, wealth, computers, and so on). The low-resource group definitions tend to be more radical and rageful, often challenging the status quo—and even the authority of the instructors. One image listed a series of negative emotions and obscenities circled by pencils that were then jabbed into the paper like daggers. These starkly contrasting definitions often lead to discussion that identifies the source of these differences.

It is also fairly common in this exercise for many members of the high-resource group to remain completely unaware of the disparity in resources until it is explicitly pointed out to them at the conclusion of the exercise. Members
of the low-resource groups, in contrast, are all very aware of the discrepancies. This can be a very powerful moment. Again, the actual difference in resources is minor, but it is symbolic of more meaningful ones, and the participants begin to make the connection to other areas in their lives where they are often blind to their own privilege.

Finally, members of the low-resource group often attempt during the exercise to alter the imbalance of power. Various strategies are employed, including demanding or stealing resources, ingratiating, playing on the guilt of high-resource group members, appealing to higher authorities (the instructors), or challenging the legitimacy of the exercise. Of course, there are also members of the low-resource group who simply accept their lot and follow the rules. These choices are all opportunities to (1) explore the sort of strategies and tactics that can be useful when in low power, (2) have participants reflect on their own inclinations and reactions in the situation (whether in low or high power), and (3) examine the beliefs and assumptions on which many of the strategies were based.

**CONCLUSION**

Rosabeth Kanter once said that power is the last dirty word. I have attempted to challenge that notion in this chapter and to emphasize the potential for an expansive approach to power in conflict. The realists of the day may remain skeptical, for the world is filled with evidence to the contrary: evidence of coercive power holders, of power hoarding, and of the defensiveness and resistance of the powerful under conditions that cry out for change. Perhaps the time is ripe for a new approach to power.

**References**


CHAPTER SIX

Communication and Conflict

Robert M. Krauss
Ezequiel Morsella

Battle, n. A method of untying with the teeth
a political knot that would not yield to the tongue.
—Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)

When neighbors feud, lovers quarrel, or nations war, the predictable remedy prescribed by the voices of reason is communication. The prevailing view is that, faced with conflict, communicating is always the right thing to do: the U.N. Security Council encourages hostile countries to “hold talks,” and marriage counselors advise quarreling couples to “express their feelings.” So commonplace is the prescription that advice to the contrary seems anomalous; it’s difficult to imagine the Secretary General imploring hostile nations to refrain from dialogue. The positive role of communication in ameliorating conflict seems so obvious that the premise is seldom given serious examination. Why should communicating be so helpful? Under what conditions does communication reduce conflict?

An attempt to answer such questions is the main burden of this chapter. In large part, the answers derive from considering what communication entails and what its instantiation precludes, that is, what it brings to, and demands of, particular situations. To understand the complex interplay between communication and conflict, we describe four paradigms of communication—four models of the communication process—and consider how each relates to conflict.¹ We briefly examine communicative mishaps that are potential sources of conflict and consider how and why communication can ameliorate conflict. Finally, we discuss some inherent limitations of communication as a peacemaker, limitations that result from the realization that understanding, the cardinal goal of communication, does not imply agreement, as Bierce’s definition illustrates.
FOUR COMMUNICATION PARADIGMS

Before we begin discussing the intricate interplay of conflict and communication, it is important to specify what we mean by the latter term. The concept of communication is an important focus for fields as diverse as cell biology, computer science, ethology, linguistics, electrical engineering, sociology, anthropology, genetics, philosophy, semiotics, and literary theory, each of which employs the term in its unique way. Indeed, communication has been used in so many ways and in so many contexts that, as sociologist Thomas Luckman observes, it “has come to mean all things to all men.”

Common to all conceptualizations of communication is the idea of information transfer. Information that originates in one part of a system is formulated into a message that is transmitted to another part of that system. As a result, information residing in one locus comes to be replicated at another. In human communication, the information corresponds to what are loosely referred to as ideas, or more scientifically, mental representations. In its most elemental form, human communication may be construed as the process by which ideas contained within one mind are conveyed to other minds. Though attractive because of its simplicity, this description fails to capture the true richness and subtlety of the process by which humans communicate, an enterprise that involves far more than automatically transferring ideas.

The Encoding-Decoding Paradigm

The most straightforward conceptualization of communication can be found in the encoder-decoder paradigm, in which communication is described as transferring information via codes. A code is a system that maps a set of signals onto a set of meanings. In the simplest kind of code, the mapping is one-to-one: for every signal there is one and only one meaning, and for every meaning there is one and only one signal. Such is the case for Morse code. The sequence \textit{dot dot dot dot} signifies the letter \textit{H}, and only \textit{H}; conversely, the letter \textit{H} is uniquely represented by the sequence \textit{dot dot dot dot}, and only that sequence.

Much of the communication in nonhuman species is based on the encoding-decoding principle. For example, vervet monkeys have two distinctive vocalizations for signaling the presence of their main predators, eagles and snakes. When one or the other signal is sounded, the vervets respond quickly and appropriately, scanning the sky in the first case, and scanning the grass around them in the second. Just as the Morse code \textit{dot dot dot dot} invariably designates the letter \textit{H}, the vervet “aerial predator call” unambiguously signals the presence of predacious eagles.

Viewing human communication as encoding and decoding assumes a process in which an abstract proposition is (1) encoded in a message (that is,
transformed into a signal whose elements have a one-to-one correspondence with the elements of the proposition) by the sender, (2) transmitted over a channel to the receiver, and (3) decoded into an abstract proposition that, it is believed, is isomorphic with the original one. For example, a speaker may formulate the proposition [John] [give book] [Mary] and thus transmit the message, “John, please give Mary the book.” After receiving and processing the message, John presumably understands that he has been asked to give a particular book to someone named Mary.

One reason the received message may not be identical to the transmitted one is that all communication channels contribute some degree of noise (any undesired signal) to the message. The more signal there is relative to the amount of noise (the signal-to-noise ratio), the closer the transmitted message is to the received message; hence the more similar the received proposition is to the original one. A low signal-to-noise ratio can distort the meaning of a message, or even render it incomprehensible.

Noise, of course, has a deleterious effect on all communication, but its effect in the arena of conflict can be especially pernicious because it forces the recipient of a message to “fill in” information the noise has distorted. Given the antagonistic interpersonal orientation that parties in such situations often have, the filled-in information is more likely to worsen conflict than reduce it.

As an example of how noise may be introduced into communication, consider what happens when using third (or fourth or fifth) parties to transmit messages, in contrast to direct communication. As in the children’s game of Telephone, each party’s successive retelling of a message is likely to introduce some distortion, so that when it arrives at the ultimate destination it may bear little resemblance to the original. There may be times when discussing delicate subjects is inadvisable in environments where misunderstanding is likely to occur. Also, whenever distortion is likely, redundancy (multiply encoded messages) can be helpful. Restating the same idea in different forms does not guarantee its acceptance, but it should increase the probability of correct understanding.

**Principle 1.** Avoid communication channels with low signal-to-noise ratios; if that is impossible, increase redundancy by restating the same idea in various forms.

Noise is not the only factor that can compromise communication. Even if the transmitted and received messages are identical, the retrieved proposition may vary significantly from the original. Speaker and listener may be employing codes that differ subtly, and this may lead to misunderstanding. For example, lexical choice often reflects a speaker’s implicit attitude toward the subject of the utterance. In a given situation, any one of several closely related terms (woman, lady; Negro, black, African American; crippled, handicapped, disabled, physically challenged) might serve adequately to designate or refer to a particular
individual, yet each term may be associated with a somewhat different conceptualization of its referent, as part of a complex ideology or network of attitudes and values. If such ideologies or values are not shared, application of a term may be construed as antagonistic.

For example, at the height of the Cold War, an offhand comment made by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to a British diplomat was translated as “We will bury you.” According to linguist Alan K. Melby, Khrushchev’s remark, made in the context of a conversation about the competition between communism and capitalism, was essentially a restatement (in considerably more vivid language) of Marx’s claim of communism’s historic inevitability. Although “we will bury you” is an acceptable literal rendering of Khrushchev’s words, an equally accurate, and contextually more appropriate, translation would have been, “We will be present at your burial.” Such a rendering is consistent with Khrushchev’s comment later in the same conversation that communism did not need to go to war to destroy capitalism, since the latter would eventually self-destruct. In the United States, the common interpretation of “we will bury you” was that “we” referred to the USSR, “you” meant the United States, and “bury” denoted annihilate. For many, especially those who viewed communism as a malign doctrine, the phrase became prima facie evidence of the USSR’s malevolent intentions toward the United States.

The controversy over proper translation of Khrushchev’s remark reveals a serious shortcoming of the encoder-decoder account of human communication: although language is in some respects a code, in other respects it is not. The fact that “we will bury you” could yield two equally “correct” renderings that differed so radically underscores the fact that humans do not use language simply as a set of signals mapped onto a set of meanings.

The Intentionalist Paradigm

The Khrushchev episode dramatically illustrates why the process of encoding and decoding is not a good characterization of human communication. There was no question about the specific words Khrushchev had uttered, nor did competent translators differ on the ways the Russian utterance might be rendered in English. At issue was a more complicated question: What had Khrushchev intended the utterance to mean?

The view of communication implicit in the encoder-decoder position is that meanings of messages are fully specified by their elements—that meaning is encoded, and that decoding the message is equivalent to specifying its meaning. However, it is easy to demonstrate that this is often not the case. Unlike the vervet’s aerial-predator call, which has an invariant significance, in human communication the same message can be understood to mean different things in different circumstances, and this fact necessitates a distinction between a message’s literal meaning and its intended meaning. “Do you know what time it is?”
is literally a question about what the addressee knows, but it is usually understood as a request. Although its grammatical mood is interrogative, it is conventionally taken to be an imperative; a reasonable paraphrase might be “Tell me the time.” However, not all sentences of the form *Do you know X?* are intended as requests; “Do you know C++?” is likely to be understood as a question about familiarity with a programming language.

Understanding consists of recognizing communicative intentions—not the words used, but rather what speakers intend those words to mean. The intentionalist paradigm highlights the danger of participants’ misconstruing each other’s communicative intentions.

**Principle 2.** When listening, try to understand the intended meaning of what your counterpart is saying.

What might be called the Humpty Dumpty approach to communication (“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”) is a formula for disaster. In fact, communicators in a conflict situation should assume precisely the opposite of what Humpty Dumpty’s maxim advises.

**Principle 3.** When formulating a message, consider what the listener will take your words to mean.

Had Khrushchev prefaced “We will bury you” with an allusion to Marx’s claim of communism’s historic inevitability, it is unlikely that the remark would have fanned the flames of the Cold War.

In conflict, misunderstandings are especially likely because individuals interpret utterances to be consistent with their own attitudes. More than half a century ago, Solomon Asch (1946) demonstrated that the same message (“I hold that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms are in the physical”) would be interpreted quite differently depending on whether it was attributed to V. I. Lenin or to Thomas Jefferson (its actual author). The word *rebellion* can be interpreted in more than one way. Respondents’ knowledge of the purported author was an important determinant of their interpretation of the word, and hence of the message’s intended meaning.

The problem can become considerably more problematic when the parties to the conflict use different languages to communicate, as the furor caused by Khrushchev’s remark illustrates. The translator had provided a literal English rendering of a Russian phrase that was intended to be understood figuratively. Nonliteral usage is a pervasive feature of language use. It adds enormously to our ability to formulate colorful and nuanced messages, but it does pose particular problems for a translator. In the first place, correctly apprehending the intended meaning of a nonliteral expression often requires cultural knowledge.
that goes beyond just technical mastery of the language. Understanding the significance of Ronald Reagan’s challenge to Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev—"Go ahead, make my day!"—requires at least a vague awareness of the Clint Eastwood film it echoes, Dirty Harry. It can require considerable cognitive effort to apprehend a speaker’s communicative intention, but the effort must be expended if the parties are to understand each other. In the absence of this effort, communication can become bogged down in a cycle of misinterpretation and denial:

PARTY 1: You said X.
PARTY 2: Yes, but it should have been obvious that I meant Y.
PARTY 1: Well, how was I to know you didn’t mean X?

Given the flexible relationship between the literal and intended meanings of an utterance, it is remarkable how well we understand each other. Utterances that are intended to be understood nonliterally are a common feature of everyday language use. Although some canonical forms of nonliteral usage are so salient that they have names (irony, metaphor, hyperbole), more mundane examples of nonliteral usage pervade everyday talk. When we say that we understand what others say, we are implicitly claiming to comprehend what they intend for us to understand. The decoded meaning of the utterance certainly contributes to that intended meaning, but it is only part of it. Occasionally, misunderstandings do occur (as when an addressee interprets an ironic statement literally), but for the most part, we understand nonliterally intended utterances correctly, usually without being consciously aware of possible meanings that such an utterance could have in other contexts.

Despite facility in accomplishing this, the process by which a listener constructs the intention of an utterance is exceedingly complex and a matter of some contention among psycholinguists. In large part, it depends on the existence of knowledge that is shared between speaker and addressee, or common ground, as it is often called.

The most elemental kind of common ground communicators rely on is knowledge of the language they are speaking. But, as many an embarrassed tourist has discovered, much of the common ground that underlies language use derives from a complex matrix of shared cultural knowledge. Without this knowledge, many utterances are incomprehensible, or perhaps worse, interpreted incorrectly. This point is particularly relevant to use of language in conflict situations, especially when the conflict stems from differences in intention, goal, value, and ideology. To the extent that such variations derive from a lack of mutually shared knowledge, communication suffers. Understanding the importance of common ground in interpreting utterances points to one of the drawbacks of relying too heavily on an intentionalist interpretation of communication: the addressee
cannot derive the intended meaning from a message if the meaning resides outside the realm of shared knowledge. Moreover, since what is common ground for a given speaker varies as a function of the addressee (that is, it varies from addressee to addressee), the speaker is obliged to generate only those utterances that he or she believes the addressee is capable of understanding.

Of course, it is within participants’ power to make this easy or less easy to accomplish. Not only can addressees try to look beyond the speakers’ words to the underlying communicative intention, but speakers can seek to express themselves in ways that will lead to the desired interpretation on their addressees’ part. This, of course, requires one to see the world through the eyes of another.

The Perspective-Taking Paradigm

Perspective taking assumes that individuals perceive the world from differing vantage points and that, because the experiences of each individual depend to some degree on his or her vantage point, messages must be formulated with this perspective in mind. The late Roger Brown put the essential idea succinctly: “Effective coding requires that the point of view of the auditor be realistically imagined” (1965, p. 242). However, apart from the general admonition that the addressee’s perspective be taken into account, it is not always clear how one should go about implementing what is sometimes referred to as the principle of audience design—the idea that messages should be designed to accord with an addressee’s ability to comprehend them. In the best of circumstances, it is difficult to take the perspective of another accurately; the more unlike oneself the other happens to be, the more difficult the task becomes.

In conflict situations, even more problematic than the absence of common ground may be the misperception of common ground—incorrect assumptions that communicators make about what their partners know. It is well established that people’s estimates of what others know, believe, or value tend to be biased in the direction of their own beliefs—what they themselves know. As a result, comprehending the intended meaning of an utterance may require knowledge one lacks, and this is particularly likely if the cultural situations of the parties involved are markedly different. In all probability, it would never have occurred to so confirmed a Marxist as Nikita Khrushchev that the context for the interpretation of his ill received remark would be anything other than the doctrine of Marxism’s historic inevitability.

Such misperceptions are common in conflict for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the perspectival differences that communicators must accommodate may itself be an important source of conflict. For an ardent pro-life activist, it may be difficult to conduct a discussion about abortion that is not grounded in the position that abortion is a kind of murder; messages grounded in this premise, directed at the activist’s pro-choice counterpart, are unlikely to ameliorate conflict.
Second, conflict tends to make perceived distinctions among participants more salient and in so doing heighten the tendency to categorize them as members of in-groups or out-groups. The language people use in such situations reflects these distinctions. One manifestation of this is what Maass, Semin, and their colleagues have termed the linguistic intergroup bias (Maass and Arcuri, 1992; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin, 1989). Any interpersonal act can be characterized at various levels of generality. For example, an observer might remark, “John carried Mary’s suitcase,” or “John helped Mary,” or “John is a helpful person,” all in reference to the same incident. A well-established research finding is that people describe the actions of in-group and out-group members with systematic differences. For an action that is negatively valent, the behavior of out-group members tends to be characterized at a relatively high level of abstraction, while that of in-group members is characterized more concretely. For positively valent behaviors, however, the pattern is reversed. Positively valent behavior of out-group members is characterized as a specific episode, while that of in-group members is characterized abstractly.

One consequence of the linguistic intergroup bias is to make stereotypes resistant to disconfirmation, since behavior that is congruent with a negative out-group stereotype tends to be characterized as a general property (“Smith is aggressive”), while behavior that is inconsistent with the stereotype tends to be characterized in quite specific terms (“Smith gave CPR to an accident victim”). The enhanced salience of stereotypes in conflict situations enormously complicates the process by which, again in Brown’s words, “the point of view of the auditor [can be] realistically imagined,” and by so doing undermines the effectiveness of communication.

**Principle 4.** When speaking, take your listener’s perspective into account.

Just as the speaker must take pains to be aware of the possible constructions listeners may place on an utterance, listeners have to be sensitive to the alternative constructions an utterance might yield. Although we habitually respond to what others say as though it could mean one and only one thing, this is seldom the case.

How insensitivity to this principle can affect communication is illustrated in a recent controversy involving Washington, D.C., public advocate David Howard’s use of the word “niggardly” in a conversation with two aides. The aides, both African Americans, were unfamiliar with the obscure synonym for stingy and took it to be a form of a similar sounding racial epithet, to which it is in fact etymologically unrelated. The ensuing flap (Howard, who is Caucasian, initially resigned but was then reinstated by Mayor Anthony Williams) polarized activists on both sides of the political spectrum. Although Howard was correct philologically, he was mistaken in assuming the word “niggardly” was in common ground. In retrospect, it seems clear that his choice of words was
injudicious. Because the word was obscure, there was a good chance that at least some people would not know its meaning, and because of its similarity to a taboo word, the likelihood was great that it would be misinterpreted. Especially in situations where the addressee’s interpretation is consequential, an effective communicator tries to view his or her own utterances from the other’s perspective.

A serious complication of perspective taking in conflict situations derives from what is called the multiple audience problem. It is not uncommon for a communication to be designed to simultaneously convey different messages to different listeners, and this seems particularly likely to occur in conflict situations. For example, a mayor negotiating a salary increase with the teachers’ union may feel it is necessary to “send a message” to other municipal unions that he is willing to run the risk of a strike. Or the leader of the union may go to great lengths to ensure that a reasonable concession, part of the normal give-and-take of negotiation, is not seen by union members as a sign of weakness.

The number of different (and sometimes contradictory) perspectives that a speaker may feel obliged to take into account can make public or open negotiations extremely difficult. Other things being equal, participants would be well advised to reduce the number of audiences to which their messages are addressed.

Of course, another person’s perspective is not always self-evident. It probably is in the best interests of the parties to expend some effort ascertaining what is and is not in common ground, and if necessary enlarging its contents. Such mutually cooperative efforts to ensure coordination on meaning is the essence of a dialogic approach to communication (discussed next). Participants deeply enmeshed in an acrimonious and apparently intractable conflict may find it difficult to achieve the degree of sensitivity to the other that such an approach requires. But without it there can be no communication of any consequence.

The Dialogic Paradigm

Thus far, our discussion has depicted communication as an unremittingly individualistic process—the product of contributions by what Susan Brennan has called “autonomous information processors.” Speakers and addressees act with respect to one another, but they act as individual entities. Communication consists of a set of discursively related, but independent, episodes. This kind of depiction may be appropriate for certain communications, such as the process by which writers communicate with their readers and broadcasters with their audiences, but it seems to miss the essence of what happens in most of the situations in which people communicate.

Participants in conversations and similar highly interactive communicative forms behave less like autonomous information processors and more like participants in an intrinsically cooperative activity. Brennan and Herbert Clark
have made the point nicely: “It takes two people working together to play a duet, shake hands, play chess, waltz, teach, or make love. To succeed, the two of them have to coordinate both the content and process of what they are doing... Communication... is a collective activity of the first order” (Clark and Brennan, 1991, p. 127).

What we call the dialogic paradigm focuses on the collaborative nature of communicative activity. Perhaps the most fundamental respects in which the other three paradigms we have discussed differ from the dialogic is where they locate meaning. For the encoding-decoding paradigm, meaning is a property of messages; for the intentionalist paradigm, it resides in speakers’ intentions; for the perspective-taking paradigm, it derives from the addressee’s point of view.

In dialogic perspective, communication is regarded as a joint accomplishment of the participants, who have collaborated to achieve some set of communicative goals. Meaning is “socially situated”—deriving from the particular circumstances of the interaction—and the meaning of an utterance can be understood only in the context of those circumstances. Because the participants are invested in understanding, and being understood by, each other, speakers and addressees take pains to ensure that they have similar conceptions of the meaning of each message before they proceed to the next one.

An encoding-decoding approach to communication puts the listener in the role of a passive recipient whose task is to process the meaning of the transmitted message, but a participant in a communicative interchange is not limited to this role. Active listeners raise questions, clarify ambiguous declarations, and take great pains to ensure that they and their counterpart have the same understanding of what has been said. It is instructive to observe the person who is not speaking in a conversation in which the participants are deeply involved. Typically, such listeners are anything but inactive. They nod, interject brief comments ("uh-huh," "yes," "right, right," "hmmm"), and change their facial expressions to mirror the emotive content of what is being said. These actions—sometimes called communicating in the back channel—are one means by which participants demonstrate their involvement in the interaction, and their understanding of what has been said. Considerable research has shown that the absence of back-channel responses makes communication significantly more difficult (Krauss, 1987). Effective communication requires that listeners be responsive.

**Principle 5.** Be an active listener.

This recommendation seems to ask parties involved in an unresolved conflict to behave cooperatively; indeed, that is precisely what they do. Communication is intrinsically a cooperative activity. As the dialogic perspective makes clear, in communication the participants must collaborate to create meaning, and one reason that communication between conflicting parties so often is unavailing is that
the parties are unable to collaborate to that degree. As Bismarck might have remarked, communication becomes a continuation of conflict by verbal means. Of course, the cooperation necessary for effective communication is of a minimal sort, and participants may collaborate to express (one hopes regretfully) their inability to see a resolution that is mutually acceptable. Nevertheless, that communication can be a first step, and developing lines of communication can be the foundation on which a solution ultimately rests. A paradoxical fact about human nature is that few things are as effective in inducing conflicting parties to cooperate as a common foe. In communication, the common foe is misunderstanding, and in collaborating to vanquish this enemy the parties to a conflict may be taking the first step toward reducing their differences.

**Principle 6.** Focus initially on establishing conditions that allow effective communication to occur; the cooperation that communication requires, once established, may generalize to other contexts.

**FORM VERSUS SUBSTANCE: BOTH MATTER**

Each of the four paradigms reveals pitfalls that an effective communicator should avoid (noise, third-party transmitters, multiple audiences, and so on). Our discussion thus far has mainly focused on the inherent complexity of communication, and how its misuse can engender or exacerbate conflict. At first glance, the picture it presents is bleak. Tallying all the ways a communicative interchange can go awry leads one to wonder whether communication can ever have an ameliorative effect. Nevertheless, we all know that at least some disputes do get resolved peacefully, that long-standing adversaries can become allies, and that even seemingly irresolvable conflicts can be isolated, allowing parties to “agree to disagree.” In this section, we consider some simple behaviors that can enhance (though not guarantee) the ameliorative effects of communication.

Given a genuine desire to resolve the conflict, communication, artfully employed, can help achieve that end. Obviously, what is most critical is the substance of the communication—the quality of the proposals and counterproposals that each participant makes. It would be foolish to expect others to accept solutions not in their best interests just because of “good communication.” However, quite apart from substance, the form that messages take can have (sometimes unintended) consequences. The very flexibility that makes communication so adaptable a tool also allows for more and less effective ways of achieving the same ends. For example, “Shut the door,” “Would you mind closing the door?” and “I wish we could leave the door open, but it’s so noisy” could (in appropriate contexts) be instances of utterances understood to have
the same intended meaning. Although they differ in grammatical type and in the particular words they employ, all are understood as directives—attempts to induce the addressee to do something.

Utterances often are described in terms of the speech acts (Austin, 1962) they represent. Like physical actions, the things we say are intended to accomplish certain purposes; but unlike physical actions, they accomplish their purposes communicatively rather than directly. As we have just illustrated, the same speech act can be accomplished by a variety of utterances. Nevertheless, although “Shut the door” and “Would you mind closing the door?” both represent directives to close the door, they differ in another respect. The latter is an indirect speech act (one whose literal and intended meanings differ), while the former is a direct speech act that represents its meaning literally. Generally speaking, indirect speech acts are perceived as more polite than direct ones, probably because the two kinds of directive have implications for the status or power differential of requester and requestee. Although different versions of the same speech act may be identical insofar as the message’s explicit content (construing that term narrowly) is concerned, it behooves a communicator to ensure that the form of the message does not undermine the information it conveys.

**Principle 7.** Pay attention to message form.

**CONCLUSION**

We conclude this discussion with a point we alluded to earlier. Communication is not a panacea, and in the absence of genuine desire to resolve conflict it is as likely to intensify the parties’ disagreement as to moderate it. Although the point may seem too obvious to warrant mentioning, conflicts often serve multiple functions, and the parties may approach resolution with some ambivalence. They may find that the perceived benefits of continuing conflict outweigh its costs. In such cases, communication aimed at resolving the conflict may be unavailing—and could conceivably make things worse.

In a study published more than forty years ago, Krauss and Deutsch (1966) provided subjects in a bargaining experiment with an opportunity to communicate. The bargaining problem they confronted in the experiment was a relatively simple one to solve. However, allowing participants the means by which they could obstruct each other’s progress complicated matters considerably, typically resulting in poorer outcomes for both. The means of obstruction transformed participants’ focus from jointly solving a simple coordination problem to devising individual strategies that would defeat the other. Giving them a verbal communication channel did not materially improve matters; indeed, in some cases it made things worse.
The results of this experiment underscore the naïveté of regarding communication as the universal solvent for conflict, one whose application is certain to improve matters. More realistic is a view of communication as a neutral instrument—one that can be used to convey threats as well as offers of reconciliation, to put forth unreasonable offers as well as acceptable ones, to inflame a tense situation as well as to defuse it.

Given a genuine desire to resolve a conflict, communication can facilitate achieving this goal. Although we can affect others (and be affected by them) through communication, we can affect them (and be affected by them) only so much. The fruit of communication is to establish understanding, but beyond this, communication can do little (directly) to change the state of affairs or sway the outcome of a conflict based on irreconcilable goals. Good communication cannot guarantee that conflict is ameliorated or resolved, but poor communication greatly increases the likelihood that conflict continues or is made worse.

Note

1. In this chapter, we try to summarize very briefly a large body of theory and research on the social psychology of communication as it relates to conflict. Space limitations prevent us from doing much more than skimming the surface, and in so doing we present a picture that is distorted in certain respects. Detailed treatments of these issues can be found in Krauss and Fussell (1996) and Krauss and Chiu (1998).

References


CHAPTER SEVEN

LANGUAGE, PEACE, AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Francisco Gomes de Matos

This chapter aims at enhancing an understanding of the interrelationship of language, peace, and conflict resolution by drawing on approaches, insights, and practices from current interdisciplinary sources. It is organized in three sections, beginning with a discussion of the key concepts in the title and an updated, expanded definition of language. The second section summarizes the implications, for applied peace linguistics, of four communication-based approaches to conflict resolution, selected from the literature in English and Portuguese. In the third section, implications are drawn for the preparation of peaceful language users and examples are given for a mnemonically based technique designed to help language users communicate peacefully in socio-political contexts. The chapter concludes with a plea for the integration of language, peace, and conflict as a new type of communicative right/responsibility to be considered in the peace education of language users.

CONCEPTS OF LANGUAGE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

To examine the interconnectedness of language, peace, and conflict resolution would call for probing each core concept, in the perspective of each of the three fields and then relationally. Instead, a brief description will be made of how linguists, peace educators/psychologists, and conflict resolution researchers view those fundamental processes for human interaction, growth, and development.
What is language? is the first question posed by scientists called linguists, whose goals may be broad and deep. Thus, a look at the table of contents of a reference work by Crystal and Crystal (2000) shows that linguists’ interests can range from the nature of language—analysis of its structure, diversity, functions, meanings, forms—through its uses and effects (friendly/unfriendly). How do linguists define or characterize language? In that source we find these statements: “Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols” (Sapir, [1921] 2001) and “Language is a social fact” (Ferdinand de Saussure, [1916] 2000). Definitions of language reflect the theoretical or applicational views of definers, thus, cognitively oriented linguists might regard language as “a cognitive system which is part of a human being’s mental or psychological structure” (Atkinson and others, 1999, p. 1).

If one looks at lists of traits of language, the most recurring defining element is that of systematicity. In my surveys of the literature for distinguishing features of language (Gomes de Matos, 1973, 1994), the view of language as a system occurred more frequently than descriptions such as “Language is social” or “Language varies/changes.” Although lists of traits of language have been enriched with the cognitive dimension, an important feature has been conspicuously missing, namely, that of humanization. To fill that conceptual gap, I suggested that “the humanizing nature of language” be added to the linguistics literature (Gomes de Matos, 1994, p. 106). It is argued that in merely stating that language is human, we do not do full justice to another distinguishing trait of that system: its humanizing power. Such a trait would subsume both making language human (the traditional sense) and making language humane (the newer sense). Realistically, such characterization of language would be worded so as to cover both its humanizing and dehumanizing power, because, as linguists Bolinger (1980) and Crystal and Crystal (2000, p. 202) have emphasized, language can also be used as a weapon.

That such a (de)humanizing trait of language is still invisible in works for a general audience can be seen by looking up current dictionaries. Thus, the Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997, p. 737) carries on the tradition of defining language as “communication using a system of arbitrary vocal sounds, written symbols, signs, or gestures in conventional ways with conventional meanings” but it does not make the dehumanizing trait explicit, despite offering its readers a useful section on avoiding insensitive and offensive language, with examples of linguistic sexism and ageism (pp. 1507–1511). If I were to update definitions of language, within the perspective adopted for this chapter, I would sum it up in this way: Language is a mental marvel for peaceful meaning making and problem solving. Such formulation reflects the fact that we are cognitive, communicative, creative, and (potentially) peaceful language users.
Another critical question to be posed in this introductory section is: Have the concepts of peace and conflict been dealt with in the linguistics literature? The answer is in the affirmative, but minimally so, with possible increasing attention as Peace Linguistics gains momentum. For more on that, see page 162. Interestingly, the expression Linguistics of Conflict appears in a sociolinguistics book (Downes, 1998) and “Discourse and Conflict” is the title of a chapter in a comprehensive handbook (Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton, 2001). Precursorily, dehumanization (through vocabulary and syntax) is discussed in Van Dijk’s Handbook for Discourse Analysis (1985). What about peace? How do linguists define or characterize it? A suggested definition is given by Hungarian scholars Szepe and Horanyi, in a publication sponsored by the World Federation of Modern Language Teachers Association (FIPLV) (1995, p. 66): “Peace is a dynamic process of cooperation for the resolution of conflicts.” Significantly, in that volume we are told that in UNESCO’s Linguapax Program, “language can be viewed in a broader sense, as the merger of two global fields: language and peace” (p. 65). Given this chapter’s threefold conceptual focus—language, peace, and conflict resolution—two exemplary definitions of peace by scholars of conflict resolution seem appropriate: one by the author of the Dictionary of Conflict Resolution (Yarn, 1999) and the other by this volume’s senior editor: “Peace: state or condition of quiet, security, justice, and tranquility” (Yarn, personal communication, September 15, 2001) and “Peace—whether intrapsychic, interpersonal, intragroup, or international—is a state of harmonious cooperation among the entities involved” (Deutsch, personal communication, October 6, 2003).

Let’s look at the third concept in the chapter’s title: conflict resolution. How would peace researchers define it? A renowned peace educator says, “Conflict is a part of all our lives: yet few of us have the skills to transform conflict from a painful destructive process to one of significant learning and constructive change” (Reardon, 2001, p. 103). She cogently argues that “conflict resolution is one function of non-violence” (p. 106).

Mention of violence is a good reminder of the major goal of this chapter: helping to integrate language, peace, and conflict resolution as an approach to understanding, preventing, monitoring, overcoming, and, if possible, eliminating forms of communicative violence in our personal lives, our communities, and the world. Alas, that human beings can be communicatively violent is easy to demonstrate through a sample list of thirty verbs in English expressing violent communicative acts: abuse, antagonize, attack, belittle, blow off steam, browbeat, bully, coerce, calumniate, debase, defame, deprecate, discriminate, disparage, disrespect, degrade, force, fustigate, humiliate, intimidate, insult, irritate, mock, offend, oppress, ridicule, scorn, slander, stigmatize, and vilify. As an instructive and revealing exercise, readers are urged to produce a corresponding list of verbs representing peaceful communicative acts: would these lexical items outnumber those in the list of verbally destructive actions? Here are some peace-enhancing verbs (contextualization would provide the
necessary positiveness): affirm, agree, acknowledge, applaud, approve, assist, benefit, bless, build, celebrate, commend, compliment, congratulate, console, construct, dignify, encourage, enhance, exalt, hail, help, honor, improve, like, love, praise, promote, recommend, reconcile, and respect. That human beings need to be educated as peaceful language users is one of the chief motivations for writing this article. Another reason is the powerful, pervasive role played by metaphors in the uses of language(s), especially as regards representations of conflict, war, and peace.

To illustrate how much language users activate metaphors based on war, here is a list of verbs used by Ellison (2002): attack, be vulnerable, camouflage, counterattack, deface, disarm, entrap, fight, fight back, retaliate, sabotage, and supply with ammunition. Given this chapter’s focus on the interplay of language, peace, and conflict resolution, a strategy for enhancing language users’ awareness of the pervasiveness of war-based metaphors is what I call the use of contrastive metaphors. It consists of presenting sets of three verbs, displayed as a continuum from war-based to peace-based. Thus: X attacked/strongly criticized/questioned Y’s views. X’s views conflict/differ from/are not the same as mine. Of Y’s argument, X demolished it/showed that it was wrong/showed that it was questionable.

Such practice of using contrastive metaphors in continuums of human attitudes, emotions, and feelings could have its place in the educational sun all over the world. After having characterized language, here is a brief definition of the science that is exclusively focused on language, both theoretically and applicationally: linguistics.

Linguistics is the scientific study of language, that is, of the universal human faculty of communication and expression, as realized through specific systems called languages. Applied linguistics (AL) is an interdisciplinary field that addresses an increasing variety of language-based problems in areas such as language learning and teaching, literacy, language contact, language policy and planning, language pathology, and language use. For details, see Grabe (2002). Given the diversity of research approaches in AL (Duff, 2002) and the increasing importance of peace and conflict in the social and political sciences, it is natural to expect a growing interest, among applied linguists, in peaceful and conflictive aspects of language use. I first started to explore the language and peace connection in the early 1990s, through workshops and seminars on constructive communication in Portuguese, the outcome of which was a book advocating a pedagogy of positiveness (Gomes de Matos, 1996). The core concept underlying that approach—communicative peace—had been formally presented in a sociolinguistics publication three years earlier (Gomes de Matos, 1993). It has been revisited recently in a brief discussion for a new journal in the field of peace education (Gomes de Matos, 2005a). Peace linguistics is an emerging approach with a focus on peaceful/nonviolent uses of languages and an emphasis on “attitudes which respect the dignity of individual language users and
“communities” (Crystal, 1999, p. 255). Its complementary side, applied peace linguistics (APL) could be defined as an interdisciplinary approach aimed at helping educational systems create conditions for the preparation of human beings as peaceful language users. My commitment to APL reflects the conviction that every citizen should have the right to learn to communicate peacefully for the good of humankind (Gomes de Matos, 2005b, p. 211).

**IMPLICATIONS FOR AN APPLIED PEACE LINGUISTICS**

After briefly characterizing linguistics, applied linguistics, peace linguistics, and applied peace linguistics—an Internet search for such terms can be instructive—attention will be focused on possible implications of four language-based approaches to conflict resolution. The key question to be asked is, “What implications can we draw that would inspire work in APL?” Because limitations of space would prevent the exploration of different kinds of implications, I have opted for educational implications, as a means of translating some key concepts/insights from each conflict resolution approach (CRA) into an applied peace linguistics perspective.

**Nonviolent Communication (NVC)**

The first CRA, known as nonviolent communication, is grounded on a broadly based conceptual repertoire: appreciation, compassion, conflict, feeling(s)/nonfeelings, judgments, needs, positive action, responsibility, and vocabulary (for feelings).

Because our focus here is on applications of CRA by human beings as language users, it is well to mention that the author of *Nonviolent Communication* has commendably included a chapter titled “Applying NVC in Our Lives and World” (Rosenberg, 2003, pp. 8–12). The finding of such applicational sense in a conflict resolution (CR) work helps bring together its author—in this case, a psychologist—and applied linguists engaged in peaceful communication.

How can the key concepts in NVC be translated into APL? A simple way of bringing the two approaches closer is to add the adjective “communicative” to each of the concepts in the NVC system, thus: communicative appreciation, communicative compassion, communicative conflict, communicative responsibility, and so forth. The addition of “communicative” gives each NVC concept greater specificity and serves as a reminder to language users that peace in/through language is a varied and vast territory inhabited by interrelated dimensions.

Another educationally relevant contribution of the NVC to APL: its two lists of Vocabulary for Feelings (Rosenberg, 2003, pp. 44–46). The first list, of adjectives representing positive feelings (needs being met), can serve as a checklist of communicative responsibilities. In such spirit, language users would be challenged to
be communicatively affectionate, appreciative, cheerful, free, friendly, good-
humored, loving, optimistic, peaceful, pleasant, tender, and warm. That same enu-
meration could become a list of nouns, representing communicatively desirable
actions: communicative affection, appreciation, and so forth. The second list pro-
vided by Rosenberg is focused on negative feelings (needs not being met). Accord-
ingly, language users could use them as reminders of what to avoid in interacting
with other human beings. Such a preventive/self-monitoring checklist would
include, for example, communicative anger, bitterness, despair, exasperation, hos-
tility, impatience, irritation, pessimism, resentment, shock, and wretchedness. A
third inspiring insight from NVC that could be borrowed by applied peace linguists:
the translation of judgmental vocabulary and phraseology into nonjudgmental,
peace-promoting equivalents. Provocatively, Rosenberg makes a case against the
objectionable use of “should” when it creates shame or guilt. He argues that “this
violent word, which we commonly use to evaluate ourselves, is so deeply
ingrained in our consciousness that many of us would have trouble imagining how
to live without it,” and he counsels, “Avoid shoulding yourself!” (Rosenberg, 2003,
p. 131). His mention of violent words provides food for thought and action by
applied peace linguists: what violent vocabulary do we use not only about other
human beings, but about ourselves, and how can that be self-monitored? How can
our condition of peaceful communicative creatures be improved, in that respect?
The seemingly unconscious use of negative verbs, which may reflect imposed
authority or oppression, would be another area for collaborative investigation by
CR experts and applied peace linguists. An example would be a teacher’s use of
the verb “force” in a classroom context: “I don’t force my students to read texts
aloud in front of the class.” In this case, the humanizing verb expected of a peaceful-
language-aware educator would be “ask.” Two other authoritarian verbs that may
be found in teacher discourse are “have” and “let,” as in these remarks heard dur-
ing a teacher-education workshop:

“Do you have your students share their notes with their peers?” (alternate
humanizing verbs: ask/encourage) and “I let/allow my students to use a bilin-
gual dictionary, during essay-writing in English” (alternate humanizing equiva-

tents: “I assure my students their right . . .” or, more empathically, “My
students have the right . . .”). The very use of “should” in classroom instruc-
tions can also be questioned. Thus, saying “One student should assume the role
of minigroup leader” instead of “could” may reflect the fact that teachers and
teacher educators are unaware of the humanizing nature of language use, a trait
of language that is new in the linguistics/communication literature.

Nonviolent Communication Research

Founded in 1984 by far-sighted, innovative psychologist Marshall Rosenberg, the
Center for Nonviolent Communication has grown into an international nonprofit
organization that provides expertise in the NVC approach through a network of
“well over 150 certified trainers worldwide” (Cox and Dannahy, 2005, p. 41). Given its longevity and increasing internationalization, NVC has been tested in varied contexts. According to Caruso (personal communication, November 2, 2005), research was conducted in Costa Rica in 2004 on the impact of NVC Training at the Elias Castro School of Excellence; in the United States in 2002 as A Step Toward Violence Prevention: NVC, part of a college curriculum; in the Netherlands in 2001 on NVC as a way to reduce violence in kindergartens; in Finland in 2001 on how NVC reduces bullying by 26 percent at the International School of Helsinki; and in Yugoslavia in 1996 as “Mutual Education: Giraffe Language in Kindergartens and Schools.” (The giraffe, the land animal with the largest heart, is the symbol for the compassionate language advocated by NVC practitioners.) Researchers in conflict resolution can have an idea of the high quality of empirical research on effects of NVC by reading a recent paper by Cox and Dannahy (2005), in which the Rosenberg model is used “as a way of developing the openness needed for successful communication in e-mentoring relationships.” According to those researchers (one from the United States, the other from the United Kingdom), “there is evidence to suggest that the use of NVC, with its focus on feelings and needs, encourages trusting relationships characterized by openness.” Interestingly, “case study research was undertaken with students participating in an online coaching and mentoring module that formed part of a Masters degree at a British university.” In their conclusion, Cox and Dannahy state that “the most noteworthy indication of NVC’s ability to facilitate electronic dialogue is illustrated through the speed at which in-depth relationships were forged with students” (2005). For insights on applied research possibilities by NVC for individual and group practice, the Nonviolent Communication: Companion Workbook by Leu (2003) is well worth reading.

**Appreciative Inquiry**

This approach places “language at the center of human organizing and change” (Whitney and Trosten-Bloom, 2003, p. 53) and characterizes that system as “the vehicle by which communities of people create knowledge and make meaning” (p. 56). Four key concepts of appreciative inquiry (AI) are positive change, meaning making, freedoms, and power. Positive change emphasizes the positive potential of people and organizations by focusing on “the best of what has been, what is, and what might be” (p. 15). Interestingly, from a peace linguistics perspective, AI authors believe that “words create worlds” and that language has the power to create social change and reality (p. 53). The term “meaning making” means the sharing of interview data—stories, quotes, and inspirational highlights—for deeper interaction (p. 165). Freedoms, “six conditions for the liberation of power” (p. 238), include the freedom to be heard. In AI, “having no voice . . . is the experience of the oppressed. To be heard is to have a recognized and credible voice . . .” (p. 241). By “power” the authors mean “the capacity to
create, innovate, and positively influence the future” or “an unlimited relational resource” (p. 236). Also of possible applicational interest is AI’s “Positive Principle: Positive Questions Lead to Positive Change” (p. 66). Such formulation is similar to the philosophy underlying the checklist for asking questions positively proposed by Gomes de Matos (1996, pp. 34–37).

Although the core concept of conflict is not dealt with explicitly in the Whitney and Trosten-Bloom (2003) volume, examples are provided of communicative conflicts in the workplace. Of additional interest, especially to researchers in typologies of conflict, is Whitney and Trosten-Bloom’s mention of AI meetings of people experiencing conflicts of a cultural, generational, or religious nature (p. 71). Those researchers in organizational change acknowledge the relevance of the field of positive psychology and claim that the approach initiated by the American Psychological Association president Martin Seligman in 1998, “along with Appreciative Inquiry, may well revolutionize the way that we live, work, and organize our families, communities, and businesses” (p. 85). For applied peace linguists, it is gratifying to learn from Whitney and Trosten-Bloom that “psychologists, like organization development consultants, believe that, to contribute constructively to human and societal well-being, they need to develop a vocabulary of joy, hope, and health” (p. 85).

**Research on AI**

Appreciative inquiry, a process for positive change, had its beginnings at Case Western Reserve University in 1985. It is being used by businesses, educational institutions, health care systems, governments, and communities in the United States and abroad. As Whitney and Trosten-Bloom state: “Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a bold invitation to be positive. . . . Over and over people have told us that AI works, in part, because it gives people the Freedom to be Positive” (2003, p. 250). The positive impact of AI comes from its capacity to bring together and to liberate the power of diverse groups of people. In a personal communication (November 2, 2005), Whitney clarifies that “the research into why AI works shows that its 4-D Cycle (discovery, dream, design, and delivery) is effective as a change process for five reasons: 1) it lets people meet and be known to each other in relationships rather than in roles; 2) it enables people to be heard for what they value and care about; 3) it creates opportunities for people to share their dreams in a broader community of colleagues and friends; 4) it fosters an environment in which people are able to choose how they want to contribute; and 5) it builds systems and structures through which people are supported in taking risks to create and to innovate.” An example of the use of AI as a tool for conflict transformation is given by Ríos and Fisher (2003), in which the authors explore how the positive features of AI might help bring about reconciliation between conflicting parties in the long-standing maritime conflict between Bolivia and Chile. In their conclusion, the two researchers say
that “Although AI applications in corporate and community settings have been successful in addressing complicated issues, scenarios of deep-rooted and longstanding conflict within or between countries can bring quite different challenges” (p. 247). According to Whitney, “It is AI’s relational, narrative approach to the cooperative discovery of what matters to people that is at the heart of its success as a process for creating positive futures in human organizations and communities” (personal communication, May 2, 2005). On other uses of AI methodology, see Sampson, Abu-Nimer, Liebler, and Whitney (2003).

**Powerful Non-defensive Communication**

This approach shares with NVC the use of the negative prefix “non,” which has been universalized in such foundational concept as Gandhi’s nonviolence, a term coined in 1915, meaning “the policy or practice of refraining from the use of violence, as in protesting oppressive authority” (*Random House*, 1997, p. 891). When asked why she used a negative hyphenated word, “non-defensive,” powerful non-defensive communication (NDC) author Ellison explains that she “couldn’t find a word in the English language that describes how to communicate without (a) being dependent on the other person’s cooperation and (b) joining in the power struggle” (personal communication, April 21, 2005). She adds that “most of the words like peaceful, cooperative, and so on, inspire most people to think of the cooperative . . .” and she argues that “My process allows people to speak with power regardless of whether s/he cooperates.”

On Ellison’s combining power and non-defensiveness in her book’s subtitle—*The Art of Powerful Non-Defensive Communication*—she clarifies that people respond strongly to those two adjectives together and want to know more about being powerful and non-defensive at the same time (personal communication, April 21, 2005).

The core concepts in PNDC are power, the war model—a traditional system of communicating—and the powerful non-defensive model—tools instead of weapons. Although the term “peace” is conspicuously absent from the book’s index, it is given prominence in its conclusion: Peace and Power (pp. 264–271). In another personal message, Ellison sums up her approach to power, language, and peace in this way: “The tendency toward power struggle among individuals and groups of people and conflict in epidemic proportions is often seen simply as human nature. It seems to be the story of recorded human history. I believe that we have used a particular understanding of power as the foundation of all human communication and if we were to change how we conceive of power and use it, we could change human destiny” (August 10, 2005). Ellison states that “the war model reflects a unilateral view of power, with subsequent need to control and manipulate expressed in how we use language, asking questions that are interrogating, making statements of opinion as fact, and trying to convince others to agree, as well as making predictions designed to threaten or punish others.” She further clarifies
that in the war model, reciprocity is seen as being effective only if others cooperate and argues that the alternative is what she call reciprocal power, “where I choose how to respond to you based on how you treat me, but I do not try to control you, or convince you to be different. I call the language for this system powerful non-defensive communication.” She goes on to explain, “In this system, reciprocity is not dependent on anyone else’s cooperation. I simply judge how much I do for you and with you based on how you treat me. Of course, there is still oppression and many circumstances where one person or group can use violence to take control. However, my belief is that in millions of personal interactions, reciprocal power expressed through a powerful non-defensive system of language not only has more power for the individual using it, but the other person is very likely to disarm their own defenses. This non-defensive system of language addresses the human need for connection, love and respect.” In Ellison’s concluding remarks, she speaks of what in my approach is called communicative peace: “If we change how we communicate in our own families and communities, it will begin to change our human mindset and someday, when one more person changes to a non-defensive way of listening and speaking, using power in reciprocal ways,... our wisdom can guide us in finding peaceful solutions to the global issues that we all face.” For applied peace linguists, of special interest in Ellison’s applicational insights might be her description of questions, statements, and predictions as tools of PNDC, her formats for NDC (content- or process-based questions, descriptive statements, If-type predictions), and a list of individual reactions in interactions.

**CONSTRUCTIVE COMMUNICATION**

My approach, described in greater length in Portuguese (Gomes de Matos, 1996, 2002a), and briefly in English (Gomes de Matos, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2005), reflects the assumption that communicating well is communicating for the good of humankind. In my 1996 book, several checklists and guidelines are provided on how to communicate constructively. The following sample guidelines are translated from the text in Portuguese:

**How to interact positively:**

1. Help integrate seemingly conflicting points of view (yours and your conversational partner’s).
2. Be cordial to your linguistic neighbor.
3. React responsibly, in a spirit of dignifying reciprocity.
4. Interact for mutual good and kindness.
5. Find out as much as possible about your interactive neighbor’s beliefs and values. Remember: People are more important than problems.
6. Ask for constructive feedback.
7. Form questions positively.

Another checklist is centered on how to write constructively. It was first used by undergraduate students of Portuguese at the local Federal University of Pernambuco, then by police officers in a Community Policing Program, sponsored by the Pernambuco State Department of Social Defense and by the Center for Applied Social Sciences.

How to write constructively:

1. In writing texts for academic or administrative/management purposes, be sure to foster constructive interpersonal relations.
2. In closing a personal exchange (traditional mail or e-mail), enhance interaction with your communicative friend by creating variants for the complimentary close: go beyond “sincerely” and depending on prevailing weather conditions, wish your addressee sunniest regards, and so on. Exercise your right to be communicatively creative.
3. In writing to friends, wish them health, peace, friendship, faith, development, and so forth as established by your culture and theirs, or boldly go beyond conventions. Underlying such constructive writing-centered guidelines is the belief that writing well is writing for the good of writers and readers, and more broadly, of one’s group, as well as of national, regional, or international communities.

Peace linguists might be interested to know that in my workshops aimed at positive or constructive writing, self-monitoring checklists such as the following are shared:

1. What constructive knowledge do/did I have about my readers?
2. How can/could I contribute to their individual or collective well-being?
3. What constructive values do/did I communicate/enhance/prioritize? How?
4. What constructive vocabulary and phraseology do/did I have to change to communicate more constructively? How?
5. What can/could my text-contribute to my readers’ (and my own) communicative, cultural, ecological, economic, ethical, moral, political, social, and spiritual well being?

My constructive communication (CC) approach capitalizes on the applicational possibilities of checklists. Also included in the 1996 book are guidelines on how to read and listen positively (this adverb is often used instead of constructively), how to criticize positively, how to interact with older persons positively, and how to use linguistics at the service of positive communication.
CONSTRUCTIVE COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

Given its relatively young age and the fact that its two foundational works were published in Portuguese (Gomes de Matos, 1996 and 2002a), the constructive communication approach has experienced somewhat more diffusion in Brazil, but it is slowly being made known in English. For two examples, see Gomes de Matos (2001) in which his pedagogy of positiveness is applied to diplomatic communication, and Gomes de Matos (2005), in which uses of peaceful language are discussed and exemplified. Empirical research on the effects of such approaches is still to be conducted, but it seems to hold promise for an understanding of some of the challenges facing language users when being asked to explore the Friendly-to-Unfriendly Communication Continuum, through the use of contrastive metaphors, as illustrated in this chapter. Gomes de Matos’ 2002 book on communicative peace was reviewed in English by Rector (2003, pp. 529–531). According to the University of North Carolina linguist, “the book is a new step in the development of linguistic theory” and “it constitutes an interdisciplinary work, intertwining philosophy, psychology, and social sciences.”

The reviewer adds that Gomes de Matos “suggests a method for achieving a positive and humane communication for peace” and “teaches how to be positive and avoid being offensive or destructive.”

A more recent, brief appraisal in English, of the constructive communication approach can be found in a linguistic introduction to Portuguese, by Berkeley linguist Azevedo (2004, p. 290): “Research on negative language has led some scholars to make a case for intentional use of positive language as a strategy to improve communication, and ultimately, one would hope, human relations. Whether such efforts can be effective as a tool for social change is an open empirical question (Gomes de Matos, 1996, 2002).

Implications for educating for peaceful language use in educating for human rights and responsibilities—one of the still little-explored dimensions—has to do with what I call the right to communicative peace, the right every person should have to learn to communicate peacefully for the good of humankind. In such spirit, a plea of mine was the subject of a message by the president of the International Communication Association (Craig, 2003, p. 2), in which my formulation is described as an in-depth integration of three fundamental human rights, namely, the right to live in peace, the right to learn, and the right to communicate. Here is my updated version of that interpretation, with the addition of the notion of conflict resolution: human beings should have the right/responsibility to learn to communicate peacefully in varied societal contexts, especially in challenging, life-threatening situations. The right to communicate constructively is much neglected in schools and other forms of education. This neglect is detrimental to social life and is in need of change.
In such spirit, let’s make the humanizing force of language a frequent rather than an occasional feature of communicative use. Accordingly, a plea is made herein for organizations committed to helping persons, groups, communities, and nations (re)solve conflicts/disputes to invest more in interdisciplinary research aimed at integrating knowledge about peaceful uses of languages into programs such as, for example, Columbia University’s Peace Education Program, which sustains an International Institute of Peace, founded in 1982 by ever inspiring peace educator Betty Reardon (Jenkins, 2005, p. 209). An emphasis on peaceful communication in such initiatives would reflect the assumption of the need for transformative communicative change leading to the preparation of citizens as peaceful users of languages, a systematic practice conspicuously absent from school curricula in Brazil, for instance, and presumably in most other countries.

To provide a concise view of some implications of the approaches dealt with in the preceding section, I will resort to my THRIL (threefold repetition of the initial letter) technique, inspired by the long-cherished literary tradition of alliteration, still underexplored in communicatively vital contexts such as conflict resolution.

What follows are four sets of alliteration through which key concepts/insights from each approach are presented. Readers are urged to apply their alliterative talents to their readings in the CR field: it may prove both entertaining and provocative. By creating such alliteration, you make dual use of your meaning-making marvel—your mind: (1) you try as best you can to accurately translate some of the philosophy underlying each approach and (2) you challenge your ability to be concise, thus enhancing memorability. To illustrate how such a practice of making meaningful, memorable messages can be used effectively in political science contexts, here is a set, created for a lecture given to students of international relations at a local college, Faculdade Integrada do Recife. Only some letters have been selected for inclusion:

A  A  A — Aim at affinity and alliance.
B  B  B — Build bridges between nations.
C  C  C — Consider conflicts constructively.
D  D  D — Dignify your diplomatic discourse.
G  G  G — Generate gentleness and generosity.
H  H  H — Harvest humanity and humaneness.
I  I  I — Inspire for integration and interdependence.
L  L  L — Let liberty be the light.
M  M  M — Maximize mediation and meditation.
N  N  N — Nurture national negotiating styles.
Perceive persons as peace partners.
Recommend realistic reconciliation.
Support and sustain human solidarity.
Treat others with tact and tolerance.
Veto all varieties of violence.
Weigh your words wisely.

Nonviolent Communication
Express yourself empathically, rather than evaluatively.
Communicate by connecting compassionately.
Value a vital vocabulary for feelings.

Appreciative Inquiry
Act amiably and appreciatively.
Communicate for cooperation and change.
Foster faith and freedom.

Powerful Non-defensive Communication
Communicate constructively with compassion.
Relate through reciprocity and respect.
Promote peaceful power.

Constructive Communication
Communicate through cordial, caring language.
Love your linguistic neighbors in all lands.
Monitor your manipulative messages.

As a creative practice, alliteration has much to offer inquiring minds in all domains of human knowledge, especially those that call for language-peace-and-conflict awareness, a much needed trio in today’s increasingly turbulent world. In closing, may I say communicative peace be with you, so that in your language-based conflicts and disputes, you act as true humanizers, humanists who are imbued with the ideals of human rights, justice, peace and dignity and who, with a keen sense of global social responsibility, apply such values for the improvement of the human communicative condition everywhere.
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have tried to give the reader a sense of the theoretical and applied dimensions related to the emerging area of applied peace linguistics. I have summarized the key concepts of language, peace, and conflict resolution, and have described their interrelationship through a synthesis of implications from four communication-based approaches to conflict resolution, three of which are from the United States and one from Brazil. Finally, I have provided examples of applications of communicative peace and have made a plea for a new type of communicative right and responsibility to be considered in the education of peaceful language users.

References


Gomes de Matos, F. *Comunicar para o bem: Rumo à paz comunicativa*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Ave Maria, 2002a.


On Language

A Poem-Plea by Francisco Gomes de Matos

What is language? A mental marvel
Used for all kinds of meaning making
But how can we integrate languages
Into the blessed ways of peace making?
By avoiding forms of verbal abuse
Preventing aggressive acts of discourse
So that our communicative intentions
Can be free from a collision course
Being communicatively empathic and friendly
In speaking, listening, reading, writing, or signing
By interacting with persons, groups, communities
In language that is linguistically dignifying
For languages to shine everywhere
And deeply touch the human soul
Let’s promote peaceful language
And make it a permanent goal
Ensuring for everyone the right to learn
Is a universal human rights priority
Learning to communicate peacefully
Should also be a vital necessity
Language uses can be loaded
It’s like a weapon, some would say
Instead, let’s give it PeacePower
And make it a truly humane way
As language users, each of us is different
But in one role very much alike we can be:
That of acting as peaceful meaning makers
And believing a kinder world there will be
Intergroup conflict is expressed in many forms and in many different settings in all societies. In organizations, poorly managed differences between departments or between factions within the same unit can dampen morale, create animosity, and reduce motivation and productivity. In community settings, schisms between interest groups on important social issues can lead to polarization and hostility, while low-intensity conflict between ethnic, racial, or religious groups finds expression in prejudice, discrimination, and social activism to reduce inequity. At the societal level, high-intensity conflict between such identity groups on a broader scale can break out into ethnopolitical warfare, which engages the international community as well as local actors. At all levels of human interaction, poorly handled conflict between authorities and constituents or between majorities and minorities can lead to frustration and alienation on both sides. In fact, wherever important differences exist between groups, there is the potential for destructive intergroup conflict.

It is important to note that destructive intergroup conflict is only one major form of relationship in the wider domain of intergroup relations, that is, interactions among individuals that occur in terms of their group identifications. The discipline of intergroup relations is concerned with all manner of relationships among groups, including cooperative interactions and competitive ones, as well as constructive intergroup conflict. In most ongoing intergroup relationships in all manner of settings, cooperative relations exist and conflict is handled in a more or less constructive manner to the satisfaction of the parties involved.
However, when this does not occur around incompatible goals or activities, and the parties work to control or frustrate each other in adversarial and antagonistic ways, the scene is set for destructive intergroup conflict to occur. Given that such conflicts can be very costly to the parties involved as well as the wider system, especially at the intercommunal and international levels, it is essential to understand them and to look for ways of managing and resolving them, which is the focus of the current chapter.

From the point of view generally held in the social sciences, intergroup conflict is not simply a matter of misperception or misunderstanding, but is based in real differences between groups in terms of social power, access to resources, important life values, or other significant incompatibilities. However, these realistic sources of conflict are typically exacerbated by subjective processes in the ways that individuals see and interpret the world and in the ways that groups function in the face of differences and perceived threat. As individuals and within groups, human beings are not well-equipped to deal with important differences between themselves and others, and often engage in behaviors that make the situation worse, unless social processes and institutions are available to them to manage their incompatibilities effectively. When differences are handled constructively, such conflict can be a source of learning, creativity, and social change toward a more pluralistic, harmonious, and equitable world.

Although intergroup conflict finds innumerable expressions, this chapter will focus on the general processes of causation, escalation, and resolution that are applicable to these many forms. However, it needs to be understood that each organizational, community, cultural, political, and societal setting requires further analysis in order to truly understand the intergroup conflicts at that level of interaction and within that particular setting, prior to suggesting avenues for handling these constructively. In addition, the general concepts and principles that are available from Western social scientific research and practice have to be interpreted, modified, and augmented in culturally sensitive ways in order to have utility in different cultural settings. In some cases, general prescriptions will be inappropriate and counterproductive, and application will need to await further developments in theory and practice, both local and global.

While compatible with much theory and research in the social sciences on intergroup conflict, this chapter will draw especially on work in social psychology, an “interdiscipline” between sociology and psychology that seeks to integrate understanding of individual processes, especially in perception and cognition, with knowledge of social processes, particularly those at the group and intergroup level. Studies of the development and resolution of intergroup conflict over time (for example, with boys camp groups [Sherif, 1966], management personnel in training workshops [Blake and Mouton, 1961], volunteers in a prison simulation [Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973], and university students in a simulated community conflict over resources and values
[Fisher and others, 1990], have illuminated our understanding of the processes and outcomes that can arise from realistic group incompatibilities. Much of this understanding has been captured in general treatments of conflict—its sources, its tendency to escalate, and general strategies directed toward its management (see, for example, Deutsch, 1973, 1983, 1991; Fisher, 1990; Kriesberg, 2003; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Knowledge is also drawn from theories of social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), ethnocentrism (Levine and Campbell, 1972), social dominance (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), and intergroup relations (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). In addition, social and organizational psychologists have contributed to the development of methods to manage and resolve intergroup conflict in various settings (Blake and Mouton, 1984; Blake, Shepard and Mouton, 1964; Brown, 1983; Fisher, 1994, 1997).

From these and other sources, one can deduce a social psychological approach to addressing intergroup conflict that is phenomenological (stressing the subjective reality of the groups), interactive (emphasizing the behavioral interaction of the groups in expressing, maintaining, and resolving their conflict), and multilevel (realizing that understanding is necessary at multiple levels of analysis from various disciplines within a systems orientation). Thus, the ideas that are covered in this chapter come from many sources that are further identified in the preceding example references and need to be combined with the fruits of the other social sciences in order to gain the necessary context and greater meaning. Therefore, the interested reader is requested to search the literature for concepts and practices that are identified here, rather than referencing this chapter as the primary source.

### INTERGROUP CONFLICT: SOURCES AND DYNAMICS

The essence of intergroup conflict lies in three elements: incompatibilities, behaviors, and sentiments. A broad definition of destructive conflict sees it as a social situation in which there are perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two (or more) parties, attempts by the parties to control one another, and antagonistic feelings toward each other (Fisher, 1990). When the parties are groups, individuals are acting and reacting toward members of the other group in terms of their social identification with their group, which forms an important part of their social identity, rather than as individuals. The definition stresses that incompatibilities by themselves do not constitute conflict, since the parties could live in peaceful coexistence. However, when there are attempts to control the other party in order to deal with the incompatibility, and when such interactions result in and are fuelled by antagonistic emotions, destructive conflict exists. This definition is in line with an approach to studying conflict known as realistic group conflict theory, which stresses that
objective conflicts of interest cause conflict. In contrast, social identity theory holds that the simple categorization of individuals into groups (in a minimally competitive social context) is enough to create differentiation between groups and some amount of bias in favor of one’s in-group and discrimination against out-groups. In real life, both contributions are typically in play, and it is not easy to know which is the primary one, although the bias here is to put more weight into real differences of interest.

**Sources of Intergroup Conflict**

What are some areas of incompatibilities that can give rise to destructive inter-group conflict? One useful typology proposed by Daniel Katz identifies economic, value, and power differences as primary drivers. Economic conflict is competition over scarce resources and can occur in all manner of settings over all manner of desired goods or services. Resources are typically in finite if not short supply, and groups understandably often approach this “distributive situation” with a “fixed-pie” assumption that what one gains, the other loses. The stage is thus set for competitive strategies and behaviors to obtain one’s fair share (which is seen as unfair by the other group) and in so doing to frustrate the other group’s goal-directed behavior. Reciprocal interactions along this line usually generate perceptions of threat and feelings of hostility.

Value conflicts involve differences in what groups believe in, from minor variances in preferences or principles to major cleavages in ideologies or ways of life. Conflict can arise over valued means or valued ends, that is, over how goals are achieved or what their nature or priorities are. Organizations often comprise groups in conflict over how decisions should be made (such as autocratically or democratically) and over the outcomes to be prized (such as the best-quality service or highest return on investment). Societies and the world at large are composed of different cultural and religious groups, who have myriad variations in their preferences, practices, and priorities that can place them in situations of incompatibility. Again, the question is how the groups, particularly the dominant group(s) choose to deal with these differences, for example, by forcing their cultural norms on other groups or by supporting intercultural respect and harmony.

Power conflict occurs when each group wishes to maximize its influence and control in the relationship with the other. At base, this is a struggle for dominance, whether in a corporate office or a region of the globe, and is not resolvable in the first instance, often resulting in a victory and a defeat or a tense stalemate and deadlock. Power conflict often recycles through various substantive issues, and over time the dynamic of a mutual win-lose orientation becomes apparent. This, however, is not to confuse the inherent use of power in all types of conflict in which parties work to influence each other. Power conflict is often distinguished by the use of negative power, through behaviors such as threat,
deception, or manipulation, as opposed to tactics of positive power such as persuasion, the use of valid information, and a consideration of the pros and cons of alternative actions. (Also, see Chapter Five of this book.)

To this typology can be added the more contemporary concern with needs conflict, that is, differences around the degree to which the basic human needs of groups, and the individuals within them, are being frustrated or satisfied. This line of theorizing comes partly from the work of psychologist Abraham Maslow and sociologist Paul Sites and has been brought into the conflict domain by international relations specialists John Burton, Edward Azar, and others. Basic needs are seen as the fundamental requirements for human development, and proposed lists include those for security, identity, recognition of identity, freedom, distributive justice, and participation. Identity groups are seen as the primary vehicle through which these necessities are expressed and satisfied, thus leading to intergroup conflict when one group’s basic needs are frustrated or denied. It is proposed that the most destructive and intractable conflicts on the world scene between identity groups, that is, racial, religious, ethnic or cultural groups, are due to need frustration. However, identity groups also exist in organizations and communities, wherever groups form around a common social identity, and if needs for recognition of that identity or for dignity, safety, or control are denied, then conflict is similarly predicted (Rothman, 1997).

An important qualification is that many conflicts are mixtures of the preceding sources rather than pure types. This can be true in the initial causation, as when power and economic competition are simultaneously expressed, or over time, as when value differences or need frustrations are addressed through the increasing use of negative power. The typology also does not rule out misperception and miscommunication as potential sources of conflict, but it is unlikely that serious intergroup conflict could sustain itself for any period of time based solely on these subjective aspects. This is not to deny that misperceptions can lead to behaviors that give rise to serious conflict, as when, for example, one group launches a preemptive strike against another, out of the mistaken fear that the other is about to attack. However, destructive conflict is typically over real differences, poorly managed.

Perceptual and Cognitive Factors
Regardless of the source, conflict between groups often engages perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral mechanisms at both the individual and group levels, which exacerbate the initial incompatibilities. Social identity theory tells us that the simple perceptual act of group categorization in a minimally competitive context will set in motion a process of group differentiation with resulting in-group favoritism. This is apparently due to the need of individuals to attain and maintain a positive social identity, which they do by first engaging in the social categorization of groups, and then by making favorable social
comparisons of their own group in relation to other groups. Thus, there is pressure to gain distinctiveness for one’s own group and to evaluate it positively in comparison with other groups, thereby leading to discrimination against other groups.

The concept of “ethnocentrism” captures how identity groups tend to be ethnically centered, to accept and even glorify those who are alike (the in-group), and to denigrate, discriminate against, and reject those who are unlike (out-groups). Realistic group conflict theory sees ethnocentrism as an outcome of objective conflicts of interest and competitive interactions by groups to obtain their goals, a process in which a perception of threat plays a key role by heightening in-group solidarity and engendering hostility toward the threatening out-group, especially if there is a history of antagonism between the groups (Levine and Campbell, 1972). In contrast, research supporting social identity theory demonstrates that intergroup discrimination can occur without any clear conflict of interest or any intergroup interaction (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). However, the discrimination appears to be limited to in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation and hostility. A direct approach to intergroup discrimination is taken by social dominance theory, which augments both realistic group and social identity theories by stressing group differences in power while still explaining individual differences in discrimination (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin, 2004). This theory holds that individuals vary in their social dominance orientation (SDO) and that high SDO supports ideologies that promote group-based hierarchies and legitimize both individual and institutional discrimination in favor of more powerful groups in society (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). All three theories predict that individuals in intergroup conflict will engage in misperceptions that accentuate group differences.

Groups in conflict tend to develop negative stereotypes of each other—oversimplified, inaccurate, rigid, and derogatory beliefs about the characteristics of the other group that are applied indiscriminately to all the individuals in that group. These come about partly through the processes of group categorization, which exaggerate the differences between groups and the homogeneity of the out-group. However, they also come about through selective perception and memory retrieval, by which qualities and behaviors that fit the stereotype are accepted and retained, while those that do not are rejected. Mutual stereotyping leads in part to a “mirror image” in which each group sees the other negatively, as aggressive, untrustworthy, manipulative, and itself positively, as peaceful, trustworthy, and cooperative. Through the process of socialization, these simplified pictures are passed on to new group members (children, recruits, new employees) so that they can take their rightful place in defending the interests of their in-group against out-group enemies.

Cognitive biases also enter into intergroup conflict in the attributions that individuals make about the behavior of others, such as, how they make
 judgments about the causes of behaviors or events. In intergroup relations, there is a tendency to see outgroup members as personally responsible for negative behavior (“He is sadistic”), rather than this being due to situational factors (“He was ordered to do it”). In addition, the personal characteristics that are the focus of attribution tend to be group qualities that are embodied in the negative stereotype (“They are all monsters”). In contrast, undesirable behaviors by in-group members tend to be attributed to external conditions for which the member is not responsible (“What else could the poor man do?”). Thus, attributions perpetuate and strengthen stereotypes and mirror images and also fuel hostility between conflicting groups as each holds the other largely responsible for the shared mess they are in.

**Group-Level Factors**

The individual processes of perception and cognition make important contributions to understanding intergroup conflict, but its complexity and intractability are also due to group-level forces. Social groups, like individuals, do not usually respond in a constructive manner to differences that appear to threaten the identity or well-being of the group. The functioning of each group, in terms of identity, cohesiveness, conformity pressures, and decision making, has a significant impact on how conflict is played out and ultimately resolved or terminated. In addition, the structure and culture of the organization, community, or society in which intergroup conflict occurs will influence both its expression and its management. Unfortunately, these latter areas are not as well explored as they should be, and space limitations here preclude a consideration of these higher-level influences.

All individuals are members of social groups, either by birth or by choice, and the group identifications that one carries form the central element of one’s social identity. Many theorists, including those who developed social identity theory, believe that an individual’s self-esteem is linked to group membership, in that a positive self-concept requires favorable evaluations of one’s group(s) and invidious comparisons with other groups. Thus, the seeds are sown for ethnic groups to display ethnocentrism and national groups to exhibit nationalism—pride and loyalty to one’s nation and denigration of other nations. However, we do not need to be at the level of large collectivities to see the functioning of group identity. Professional groups, scientific disciplines, political parties, government departments, lobby groups, businesses, sports teams, street gangs—all have their sense of group identity that affects their relations with other groups. The dark side of social identity is that in expressing commitment and affection to in-groups, there is a tendency to devalue and disrespect out-groups, thus contributing to intergroup conflict in situations involving incompatibilities.
Along with identity, groups tend to develop cohesiveness, essentially a shared sense of attraction to the group and motivation to remain in it. In addition to increasing satisfaction and productivity, cohesiveness is a very powerful force in fostering conformity to the group and thus has important implications for intergroup conflict. Not only are cohesive groups more effective in striving toward their goals, but it is also generally accepted that intergroup conflict increases cohesiveness within the competing groups, primarily through the effects of threat. Thus, the interplay between group cohesiveness and competition is a significant factor in sustaining intergroup conflict.

Groups in conflict are notorious for the conformity pressures that they place on members to toe the line and support the cause. Group norms (standards of acceptable behavior) and related social influence processes dictate both the stereotypes and the discriminatory behavior that are appropriate with respect to out-groups. Members who deviate from these norms are called to task and may be ridiculed, punished, ostracized, or eliminated, depending on the severity of the conflict and the deviant behavior. Polarized opinions are a characteristic of cohesive groups under threat, and insidious and powerful influences are brought to bear on members who voice disagreement with the majority.

Cohesiveness is the main factor behind the phenomenon of “groupthink” as articulated by Irving Janis (1982), by which an insulated group of decision makers under stress pushes concurrence seeking to the point that it overrides the realistic and moral appraisal of alternatives. Janis identifies a number of U.S. foreign policy fiascos (the Bay of Pigs invasion, the bombing of Cambodia) as examples in which independent critical thinking was replaced by decisions to engage in irrational and dehumanizing actions toward out-groups. Groupthink is characterized by symptoms showing overestimation of the group’s power and morality, closed-mindedness, and severe pressures toward uniformity. This is compatible with a large body of theory and research that demonstrates that decision making in general is not a rational, orderly process but indeed involves cognitive biases, group liabilities, and organizational constraints that produce less than optimal outcomes. (Also see Chapter Nine of this book). The sobering thought with regard to intergroup conflict is that groups on both sides may be making faulty decisions that exacerbate rather than alleviate the situation.

The role of group leadership in intergroup conflict is also an important element of decision making, given that leaders and other higher-status members hold more power than the rank and file. A common phenomenon in situations of competition and conflict is that more aggressive leaders tend to come to the fore, while cooperative or accommodating leaders tend to lose power or position. Janis postulated that a lack of impartial leadership was also an important condition of groupthink, in that directive leadership that was committed to
particular directions or decisions tended to influence cohesive groups toward concurrence seeking. In addition, groups in conflict tend to influence leaders in aggressive directions, and this “constituent pressure” supports militant leaders toward the use of “contentious tactics” in interactions with the out-group.

Escalation Dynamics

All of the individual and group factors described so far have one thing in common—they tend to influence conflict interactions in the direction of escalation, that is, the process by which conflicts become more intense and more hostile. Escalation involves the increasing use of heavier methods of influence, especially coercive or punishing tactics, by each group to reach its goals in opposition to those of the other group. Escalation also typically results in the proliferation of issues, not simply basic ones that the conflict is perceived to be about (wages or benefits in union-management conflict), but also process issues that arise from how the two parties treat each other (the use of deception in negotiations). Escalation feeds largely on fear and defensiveness, in which threats by one party to gain its objectives are met by counterthreats from the other, and these reciprocal interactions move to a higher level of costs each time around in a climate of increasing mistrust. The “self-fulfilling prophecy” first identified by Robert Merton (1952) comes into play in a specific manner, in that defensiveness and mistrust motivate cautious or controlling moves, which elicit a defensive and hostile counteraction that is then perceived as justifying the initial action. This type of interaction, for example, led Ralph White (1984), to characterize the Cold War as partly due to “defensively motivated aggression.”

Our understanding of escalatory processes has been enhanced by the work of Morton Deutsch (see Chapter 2) on the differences between cooperative and competitive interactions. The modal approach that parties take in terms of perceptions, attitudes, communication, and task orientation tends to show a consistency that is very powerful in determining the nature of their interaction over time. Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations captures a great deal of the reality of intergroup conflict—the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship. As Deutsch points out, cooperative processes of problem solving are similar to constructive processes of conflict resolution, while competitive processes are similar to destructive ones in addressing conflict. The competitive-destructive dynamic has also been captured by Deutsch (1983) in his elucidation of the “malignant social process,” which describes the increasingly dangerous and costly interaction of high-intensity intergroup conflict. Through a combination of cognitive rigidities and biases, self-fulfilling prophecies, and unwitting commitments to prior beliefs and actions, parties are drawn into escalating spirals wherein past investments justify increasing risks and unacceptable losses foreclose a way out. Thus, it is understandable how
groups get locked into destructive conflict, and by themselves appear unable to de-escalate or resolve the situation.

**Resistances to Resolution**

The downside of escalation is not found only in the pains and costs that the parties endure, but in the resistances to de-escalation and resolution that the negative interactions create. The late Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, and their colleagues have been at the forefront of studying and theorizing about how parties get locked into their conflicts. At the individual level, they see psychological changes, including hostile attitudes and perceptions, which first encourage escalation (through the biases noted) but then support the persistence of escalatory interactions (through similar biases). To these they add the processes of “deindividuation” (by which out-group members are not seen as individuals but as members of a category who carry no inhibitions against maltreatment), and “dehumanization” (wherein out-group members are perceived as less than human and thus appropriate for inhumane treatment).

Structural changes at the group level also result from escalation. Hostile perceptions of the out-group and destructive motives toward them become cemented in group norms, and pressures are brought to bear for members to accept these as right. As mentioned above, increased cohesiveness and militant leadership tend to support more contentious tactics and aggressive objectives. In addition, militant subgroups, who benefit from the conflict in terms of status, power, or wealth, develop strong vested interests in its continuation. At the level of the larger social system, the organization, community, or global society, intense conflict induces “polarization,” by which other players, who are initially outside the conflict, get drawn into coalitions that ultimately fracture the system into two opposing camps. This not only increases the intensity of the conflict, but eliminates neutrals who could serve a useful third-party role in resolution.

The final contributor to de-escalation resistance is the phenomena of over-commitment and entrapment. Psychological and group changes tend to strengthen commitments made to contentious behaviors, such that they become self-reinforcing, partly through the act of rationalization. Whatever was done in the past is seen as necessary, and the barrier to conflict termination is the other party’s intransigence. Commitment to destructive and costly courses of action is increased further by “entrapment,” in which costs already incurred are justified by continuing expenditures in pursuit of victory. Even though irrational by outside judgment, each party pursues its goals, believing that the ultimate reward is just around the corner and that only its attainment will justify what has already been expended. The longer mutual intransigence persists, the more the parties feel compelled to justify their positions through continued intransigence.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICE

The complexity and intractability of destructive, escalated intergroup conflict boggle the mind and depress the spirit of those who would deign to do anything about it, whether members of the conflicting groups or outsiders. This is true whether the conflict involves factions in an organization that have crossed each other off, interest groups in a community that can only yell at each other about the issues that divide them, or ethnic groups that believe total eradication of the enemy is the only viable solution. Nonetheless, this horrendous social problem is a phenomenon that can be understood and that can be rendered amenable, over time, to actions and interventions that transform seemingly intractable incompatibilities into workable relationships. The task is not easy, and civilization is a far way from having the knowledge and expertise required. However, based on what we now know, some implications for addressing intergroup conflict can be discerned.

A number of implications are in the form of broad orientations to approaching the resolution of intergroup conflict, which need to be further operationalized as more specific strategies and tactics. First among these is the premise that intense intergroup conflict is both an objective and subjective phenomenon and that attempts to address only one set of factors or the other are doomed to failure, either immediate or long term. Thus, methods are required that settle substantive interests and that address psychological, social, and cultural aspects—the stuff of identity conflicts. Given this complexity and its attendant intransigence, it is typically the case that members of the parties themselves are unable to engage in the analysis and interaction required. Thus, it is implied that the involvement of third parties outside the conflict, who are perceived as impartial, competent, and trustworthy, is usually required to de-escalate and resolve the situation. In doing so, third parties must realize that de-escalation is not the simple reverse of escalation, because of the residues and resistances that have been built up through a history of antagonistic interaction.

A further implication of the objective/subjective mix is that different methods of intervention may be required at different stages of escalation in order to de-escalate the conflict to a level where subsequent interventions will now work. For example, interventions that focus on perceptual, attitudinal, and relationship issues may be required before third-party efforts at mediating agreements on substantive matters can be successful. This form of contingency modelling has been put forward by myself and Loraleigh Keashly as well as other scholar-practitioners in the field, including Dean Pruitt and Paul Olzack. (See also Chapter Twenty-One of this book).

A related implication is that intervention in intergroup conflict needs to start with a thorough analysis of the situation, including a cultural analysis where appropriate, before interventions are designed and implemented. Such analysis
should involve not only the third-party, but also the members or representatives of the groups themselves, because each phase of de-escalation and resolution depends on earlier ones. For example, analysis, understanding, and dialogue are necessary for reconciliation to occur, and the development of alternative solutions must be based on a diagnosis of each party’s motivations, aspirations, and constraints.

Finally, the objective and subjective mix of conflict also implies that changes are required in both the process or relationship qualities and in the substantive or structural aspects for intergroup conflict to be resolved in an enduring manner. That is, the clearing up of misattributions and the rebuilding of trust, for example, need to go hand in hand with the development of decision-making procedures and resource allocation systems that address the basic incompatibilities. Thus, conflict resolution is prescribed not simply as a mechanism for dealing with difficult differences within existing social systems, but also as an approach that can facilitate constructive social change toward more responsive and equitable systems.

Elsewhere, I have delineated a set of generic principles for resolving intergroup conflict, which embody implications that flow from these ideas (Fisher, 1994). These principles will be summarized here in a manner that specifies further implications that they incorporate or are based on. The principles are organized into three major phases of addressing intergroup conflict: analysis, confrontation, and resolution.

Implications for Analyzing the Conflict

As noted above, conflict analysis should be the lead activity in moving into a field of incompatibilities and destructive interactions. Unlike the analysis that parties usually engage in (which identifies political, economic, legal, and/or military strategies and resources they can use to prevail), conflict analysis carried out by third parties in a facilitative role focuses on the sources and dynamics of the conflict that have brought it to its present state of intractability. This will, of course, involve identifying the parties and factions, and the issues that they maintain the conflict is about. However, it will also go beneath the surface issues to identify the underlying interests, values, and needs that relate to the positions the parties take, that is, their demands and offers. A cultural analysis of parties who differ from each other and/or from the intervenor should also be carried out to illuminate their “culture of conflict,” that is, how they conceptualize conflict and believe it should be addressed in terms of accepted norms, practices, and institutions (Ross, 1993). In addition, this initial phase must entail a “process analysis” that surfaces and discusses the perceptions, thoughts, goals, fears, and needs of each party, and a “trust-building process” that allows for the parties to exchange clarifications, acknowledgments, assurances, and possible contributions to rebuilding their relationship.
It is implied in these activities and outcomes that the parties will be engaging in intense, face-to-face interaction that involves genuine communication and the development of realistic empathy for each other. It is further implied that this form of analysis needs to be carried out by a skilled, impartial, and trusted third party who carries knowledge of conflict processes and skills in group dynamics and intergroup relations. It is conceivable that members of the parties can form a balanced team to undertake this consulting role, but it is doubly difficult for them due to their group identifications. Given that the third party also requires knowledge of the system and culture in which the conflict is embedded, be it organizational, community, societal, or international, it is also implied that the intervenor will be a multiskilled team of diverse individuals.

The stage of conflict analysis may reveal that objective interests predominate and that the parties are motivated to settle their differences and either ignore subjective elements or defer their consideration to a future time. In this case, the parties may shift to a negotiation mode and move toward a mutually satisfactory agreement, or more likely they will need to engage the services of a mediator who will assist them in crafting a settlement. It is also possible that the parties will agree to engage and accept a binding third-party judgment by a superior authority—a higher manager or body in the organization, an arbitrator appointed for the purpose, or a legal adjudicator who is available to them. Unfortunately, in intense intergroup conflict, these options are either not engaged (because each group fears losing and believes they can still win) or are not successful in the long run (because the settlements do not deal with the underlying sources and subjective aspects that drove the conflict to high levels of escalation and intractability). In these cases, continuing involvement by a third party in a consultative role is often required, although it is not readily available in many settings.

**Implications for Confronting the Conflict**

When third-party-assisted interaction is possible, the stage of productive confrontation follows analysis, in which the parties directly engage each other on the issues that divide them and work toward mutually acceptable solutions through joint problem solving. It is essential that this process be carried out under norms of mutual respect, shared exploration, and commitment to the problem-solving process rather than a fixation on positions. It is implied that the “facilitative conditions of intergroup contact” (articulated by social scientists starting with Gordon Allport) are in place for these interactions, including equal status participants from each group, positive institutional supports for the process, a cooperative reward and task structure, a good potential for participants to get to know each other as persons, and the involvement of respected, competent, and well-adjusted individuals. Thus, it is further implied that intergroup engagements need to be well designed, with appropriate selection of
individual participants, and identification of both formal and informal activities and goals. This again is a role best left to knowledgeable, skilled, and trusted third-party consultants.

Equally challenging is the facilitation of the engagement sessions themselves, which need to incorporate qualities such as open and accurate representation of group perceptions, recognition of intergroup diversity including gender and cultural differences, and the persistence to attain mutually acceptable outcomes. A strong implication is that the parties must be encouraged to follow a strategy of collaboration rather than competition. That is, they need to engage in a combination of assertive behavior (stressing one’s own needs) and cooperation (showing concern for the other party’s needs). This “two-dimensional approach” or “dual concern model” is well represented in the conflict resolution field, building on the early work of Robert Blake and Jane Mouton with elaborations by Kenneth Thomas, Afzalur Rahim, and others. The parties must also engage in a joint problem-solving process that will get them to shared solutions. Knowledge of group problem solving is a starting point, but it was the pioneering efforts of Robert Blake, Jane Mouton, and their colleagues that led to the development of a social technology of intergroup problem solving. They have articulated how this technology can be applied by consultants or by members of the groups themselves, at least in organizational settings.

Implications for Resolving the Conflict

Conflict resolution refers to both the collaborative process by which differences are handled and the outcomes that are jointly agreed to by the parties. As distinct from conflict management, mitigation, or amelioration, conflict resolution involves a transformation of the relationship and situation such that solutions developed by the parties are sustainable and self-correcting in the long term. It also requires that an adequate degree of reconciliation occurs between the parties, in that harmony has been restored through processes such as acknowledgment of transgressions, forgiveness by the victims, and assurances of future peace. Future incompatibilities will of course occur and further problem solving toward social change will be required, but the manner of approaching differences and the quality of the outcomes will be different. Thus, one implication of this approach is that conflicts and the relationships in which they are embedded need to be transformed in an enduring fashion as opposed to simply settling disputes or, worse yet, suppressing differences. In order to accomplish this, the resolution process and outcomes must address the basic human needs for development and satisfaction to some acceptable degree. Needs for security, identity, recognition, participation, distributive justice, and so on, must be identified in the analysis, and mechanisms to address them (“satisfiers”) must be built into the outcomes. Relations between identity groups can then be built around each group having a satisfactory degree of recognition and autonomy.
(power), so that they can freely enter into an interdependent relationship that is mutually beneficial.

A further implication related to outcomes necessary for resolution is that mechanisms and procedures for dealing with differences assertively and cooperatively must be built into decision making and policy making. If all parties concerned with a situation of conflict are involved in a meaningful fashion, and if procedures that work to achieve consensus (not unanimity) are implemented, the chances of incompatibilities escalating into destructive conflict are markedly reduced. This assertion is built on humanistic and democratic values, which of course are not in play in many institutions, cultures, and societies, and that is why conflict resolution must be seen as part of the slow march of civilization toward a participative and egalitarian world. Each social unit (organization, institution, community, society) has choices to make regarding the benefits and costs of social control (oppression in the extreme), versus the benefits and ultimately reduced costs of moving in democratic directions.

Thus, at the far end of conflict resolution, it is implied that institutions and societies must create political and economic structures that support equality and equity among different groups as well as individuals. (Refer to the discussion of the values and norms underlying constructive conflict resolution in Chapter One.) At the societal level, democratic pluralism and multiculturalism are policies that will reduce destructive intergroup conflict. Depending on the geographical distribution of groups, political arrangements involving power sharing or federalism are congruent with a conflict resolution approach. Recognition of and respect among distinct identity groups in cultural and political terms needs to go hand in hand with equality of opportunities in economic terms. Conflict resolution thus does not imply assimilation or homogenization, although members of distinct identity groups may share a political or national identity as well, but it does imply a mosaic of integrated social groups, cooperating in an interdependent fashion for mutual benefit.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING**

The preceding implications cry out for new roles, innovative practices, and transformed policies and institutions to creatively deal with differences among diverse groups. Whether one is a member or representative of a group in conflict, or a third party charged with facilitating conflict resolution, the challenge in terms of the qualities and skills required is daunting. At the same time, there is now a welcome proliferation of education and training opportunities at all levels (elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, undergraduate and graduate programs, professional development workshops) in relevant areas such as interpersonal communication, problem solving, consensus
building, conflict management, and so on. The question to be addressed here is, what are the basic skills required to build on the understanding just outlined in order to operationalize conflict resolution processes? Only a rudimentary answer will be given, because of space limitations, but hopefully it will be a useful starting point. These comments will share some points made by Deutsch (in Chapters One and Two) on the skills required for maintaining a cooperative conflict resolution process and a productive group problem-solving process.

The list of analytical and especially behavioral skills to enact the facilitation role in resolving intergroup conflict is a long one indeed and is drawn from multiple areas of professional practice, including human relations training, counselling, cross-cultural communication, community development, organizational consulting, intergroup relations, and international diplomacy. No one intervenor can aspire to develop the full skill set required to facilitate productive confrontation at the intergroup level, and it is therefore assumed that such work will involve teams of professionals, often from different but complementary disciplines relevant to the particular context of the conflict, for example, organizational, urban community, or international region. Teams are also required since it is common at certain points to work with the groups separately as well as at the interface of their relationship.

**Analytical Skills**

Analytical skills from many domains of understanding are useful, but at the core of this practice is the ability to apply knowledge about social conflict, its causes, forms of expression, processes of escalation, and mechanisms for its de-escalation, management, and resolution. The task of the intervenor is to offer theoretical interpretations and insights at apparently useful points. Often these inputs will illuminate the functioning of groups in conflict, such as normative pressures toward aggressive actions, or dynamics of the interface between the groups, such as the typical manner in which majorities and minorities relate to each other. Further understanding of the context and the culture(s) in which the intergroup conflict is occurring is essential, whether one is working in an urban American community, a human service organization, or a particular region of the globe. In this regard, facilitators who are from the context and culture in question, and even from the parties in conflict, can play an especially illuminating role, if they are able to rise above their biases and preconceived notions about the conflict and its resolution.

**Personal Qualities**

At the personal level, intervenors require many of the qualities and skills of any professional, reflective practitioner, such as integrity and detachment. Considerable self-confidence and assuredness (although not overly so) is necessary to
move into the cauldron of intergroup conflict. A high level of self-awareness is essential in terms of how one is affected by the behaviors of others, such as criticism or attack, and how one’s own behavior is usually perceived by and affects others. One needs the capacity to tolerate considerable ambiguity and to respond constructively to defensiveness or resistance to one’s efforts. Sensitivity to gender, cultural, and other differences needs to be coupled with a respect for and capacity to work well with the wide variety of individuals and people that may be encountered. And finally, the intervenor needs the genuineness, caring, and strength of character to build meaningful and authentic relationships with others and to persevere with them in difficult times and over the long term.

**Interpersonal Skills**

In terms of interpersonal functioning, facilitators of interpersonal conflict should develop many of the commonly trained communication and relationship-building skills of the helping professions. The ability to speak in genuine and respectful ways and to convey messages in a concise, organized fashion needs to be coupled with the skills of reflective, empathic listening. Included are the importance of being able to give and receive feedback on behaviors and the ability to productively discuss differences in perceptions that often arise. Advanced skills of relating are also often useful, for example, confrontation (sensitivity to inconsistencies in another’s behavior and the capacity to describe these in a clear and nonjudgmental manner) and immediacy (the ability to relate another’s implied statements to your relationship or the situation at hand). In short, a team of facilitators needs the ability to respond to whatever messages members of antagonistic groups bring forward in a constructive and respectful fashion that does not antagonize individuals or escalate differences.

**Group Leadership Skills**

The third party role at the group level is that of a facilitative leader, who has the capacity to help the antagonistic groups work together toward their shared goals in the intervention and in the longer term. This requires a deep knowledge of group processes and the capacity to facilitate group interaction. With regard to task leadership, the facilitator needs the abilities to design and implement agendas that engage conflicting parties in productive confrontation and to keep them on track as necessary. On the socioemotional side of leadership, the facilitator needs to provide encouragement and support, release tension at certain points, and harmonize misunderstandings. The intervenor must also be capable of dealing with disruptive or aggressive behavior that challenges the work of the group. In essence, the facilitation team must work to model and uphold the norms of analytical and respectful interaction. Their role thus combines those of discussion moderator, human relations trainer, dialogue facilitator, and process consultant.
Intergroup Skills

Another important role for the intervenor involves the ability to manage the intergroup problem-solving process toward de-escalation and resolution. Although based in models of group problem solving, the process at the intergroup level has additional challenges and pitfalls. The facilitator needs to understand that at best only an uneasy coalition can be built between members or representatives of different identity groups. That is because of the constant pull of ingroup forces in ethnocentric directions, including all of the cognitive and social biases noted. Thus, moving the groups through the problem-solving process has to be a shared and mutually accepted experience at all stages. If any one stage, such as initial diagnosis or the creation of alternatives, is imbalanced through the domination of one group or biased in the interests of one group, the outcomes will not be sustainable. Mutuality and reciprocity are the keys, and the parties need to be constantly reminded that only through joint involvement and shared commitment can they be successful in dealing with their conflict.

An additional set of skills for individuals who intend to orchestrate intergroup confrontation revolves around the ability to manage difficult interactions at the interface of two or more groups. Building on all the previous skills, this challenge requires the facilitators to design and implement constructive interchanges between individuals from the conflicting groups that will move them toward resolving their difficulties and toward a renewed relationship. The ability to control disruptive interactions (arguments, debates, mutual accusations, and recriminations, attacks on the third party or the process) needs to be combined with the skill to manage a charged agenda over time, to stay on track, and to move toward accomplishment and closure. At all times, the facilitator is working toward increasing mutual understanding and inducing joint problem solving. Sometimes the best that can be done is for the parties to agree to disagree, but if that is done with full understanding and a sense of respect, it is a far cry from the usual antagonism and blaming. The skills of the human relations trainer are especially useful at this level of interaction. However, when working with intergroup conflict resolution, the focus of the trainer is not on individuals as they interact with other individuals in the group, but on how individuals are interacting in terms of their group identities with members of the other group.

Consultation Skills

This approach to intergroup conflict resolution sees it as a form of professional consultation, wherein the help giver uses his or her expertise to facilitate the problem solving of the client system. Thus, skills and ethical practices that are necessary to implement the process and attain the outcomes of consultation are the final requirement for this line of work. The skills of consultation revolve
around the capacity to initiate and manage the phases of consultation, from contact to closure. Contact with the groups in conflict should come from a base of credibility, legitimacy, and impartiality, even in the case of a facilitation team composed of members of the two groups, where intervenors are respected within and outside their communities and balance on the team provides for overall impartiality. In the entry process, the consultants need to assess the antagonists’ perceptions of these qualities, and all parties need to assess the goodness of fit between the intervenors’ values and capabilities and the client system’s need for consultation. If entry is successful, the consultant next concentrates on the critical process of contracting, wherein expectations of all parties are clarified and ground rules for the intervention are specified. Thus, the consultant must spell out the rationale, methods, and objectives of the proposed intervention and seek agreement of the parties on these. Diagnostic skills are central to the next phase of consultation, in which the intervenor gathers information about the current state of the client system, in this case the intergroup conflict, and about the preferred state as perceived by the parties. The phase of implementation then invokes many of the skills noted wherein the consultant delivers the activities at the intergroup interface that are intended to increase the capacity for joint problem solving. Evaluation is the last phase prior to exit and requires the methodological skills of the social scientist in order to judge how the intervention was carried out and what its effects were, both intended and unintended. In exiting the client system, the hope of the consultant is that the parties now have the understanding and skills to manage their future relations by themselves. In all phases of consultation, the intervenor needs to function with a high degree of ethical conduct, including the ability to deal with ethical issues as they arise. Thus, casting this work as professional consultation adds another challenging layer to the training requirements for would-be intervenors.

**CONCLUSION**

Intergroup conflict occurs frequently and is often handled poorly at all levels of society and between societies. It is based in numerous sources and involves a complex interplay of individual perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors as well as group factors that provide a built-in tendency for escalation. Therefore, there is a considerable need for skilled intervenors and social roles and institutions to support their practice. A wide range of knowledge, much of it from a social psychological base, yields implications for analyzing, confronting, and resolving intergroup conflict. One of the greatest challenges is training a wide range of professionals in the knowledge and skills required to facilitate the productive resolution of intergroup conflict. Through a combination of skills in
interpersonal communication, group facilitation, intergroup problem solving, and system-level consulting, outside third parties or balanced teams of representatives can assist groups to confront their differences effectively and build long-term partnerships.

Note: The author wishes to thank Morton Deutsch for helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

References


One way to think about what people do when they resolve conflict is that they solve a problem together. Another way to think about it is that they make a decision—again, together. Sometimes, problem solving and decision making are treated as synonymous. For convenience, we distinguish between the two in order to make clearer the ways in which they complement each other, even though the processes are intermingled in the course of conflict resolution. In the “Problem Solving” section of this chapter, we discuss diagnosis of the conflict and also the development of alternative possibilities for resolving a conflict. In “Decision Making,” we consider a range of the kinds of decisions people involved in resolving conflict have to make, both individually and together, including choice among the alternative possibilities and commitment to the choice that is made. When faced with the necessity for commitment and choice, the parties may decide that the alternatives are inadequate and reiterate the process of diagnosis and development of alternatives (problem solving); there may be repeated cycles of such reiteration before a conflict is resolved. This implies a cooperative conflict resolution process consisting of four general phases: (1) diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. As we discuss in this chapter, this process is not strictly linear, and it will often be necessary to loop back through parts of it repeatedly.

It is thus possible to think about problem solving and decision making as components of a broader conflict resolution process. Research and practice over
the past few decades have shown these ways of thinking about conflict to be profitable both for understanding conflict and for developing constructive approaches to resolving it. We begin by suggesting a simple model of the interaction between problem-solving and decision-making processes in conflict resolution. This model introduces a framework and guide for the remainder of the chapter.

A SIMPLE MODEL

In Figure 9.1, we suggest an integrated model of problem solving and decision making in conflict resolution. (For simplicity, we refer to it as the PSDM model.) When people are unable to resolve conflict constructively, they are in some way unable or unwilling to reach a resolution that is to all parties—at the least—acceptable. There are many potential sources of such stuckness. Their interests might appear to be (or actually be) incompatible; they might be too angry with one another to talk constructively; they might have fundamental differences in values about the subject of their conflict or about processes for resolving it; they may hold different versions of “the truth” about what has already happened, what will happen, or about any of the “facts” involved; they may have different views of, or desires for, the nature of their relationship, or they may have deep misunderstandings that are hard to sort out. (Because the word “interests” is often understood as a reference to the tangible outcomes people may be seeking, we use the term “concerns” to encompass not only interests but also values, emotional investments, views of reality, and so on.)

We could say, then, that there is a complex puzzle, or problem, to be solved: putting together the various interests, values, preferences, realities, emotional investments, and so on, of the parties involved, and finding a solution that accounts for these at least well enough. In that sense, problem solving needs to take place. Along the way, there are many decisions to be made, both individually and together (see Figure 9.1). The private decisions include prioritizing concerns, evaluating proposals, figuring out whether to offer or seek more, and deciding whether to trust, to name a few. Decisions to be made together may concern processes to be used, whether and when to get help from a third party, choices from among the options generated during problem solving, and whether to enter into an agreement. Some of these decisions are made during the course of problem solving and some after the problem-solving process has yielded a set of alternatives to consider. One possible decision to be made afterward is whether the options generated are adequate or inadequate. If inadequate, the parties must return to another round of problem solving. So, the process may be iterative, necessitating repeated return to the problem-solving stage until the parties decide to agree.
The process of solving the puzzle—problem of inventing a solution that meets a complex set of concerns at odds

Difficult Conflict

Problem Solving
1. Diagnosis
2. Generation of alternatives

Decision making during
- Individually
  - Prioritizing concerns
  - Evaluating desirability of new proposals
  - Can get more?
  - Can give more?
  - Should trust other(s)?
  - Should trust third party?
- Together
  - Go forward
  - Whether or when to get help
  - Various process decisions, implicit and explicit

Decision making After (choice and commitment)
- Individually
  - Evaluation of options
  - Assessment of agreement
  - Assessment of other
- Together
  - Which option
  - Entering into agreement

Deciding together on a solution and agreeing to it

Figure 9.1. An Integrated Model of Problem Solving and Decision Making in Conflict Resolution.

Note: The lists of decisions to be made are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
The rest of this chapter aims to move us through this outlined process. To do so, we must understand the parts of the process, and how they work.

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**PROBLEM SOLVING**

Broadly speaking, problem-solving approaches to understanding and resolving conflict deal with conflict as a puzzle, or interpersonal dilemma, to be worked out. There are two fundamental parts to the problem-solving process:

1. Diagnosing the conflict (figuring out what the cause of the stuckness is, or identifying the problem)
2. Developing alternative solutions to the problem

In this section, we give an overview of some problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution. We discuss some of the research that supports the use of problem-solving approaches, as well as research that helps us understand the conditions under which problem solving is more or less likely to be undertaken. We also consider some of the major critiques of problem-solving approaches, both in the literature and out in the field.

**Problem Solving as the Search for Good, Constructive, Mutually Satisfying Solutions**

An important part of the motivation to engage in problem solving is a desire to take some of the heat out of the process—to move people away from being stuck in their anger, their desire for revenge, and so on, and focus them on finding a way out.

One view of how problem-solving approaches attempt to do this has to do with a particular understanding of what the word “problem” means. One sense of the word is as dilemma, obstacle, difficulty, or predicament—generally, a bad thing. Another is as puzzle, enigma, riddle, or question—often seen as a challenge and even an opportunity for growth. Conflicts are often felt to be problems in the first sense of the word: as difficulties or predicaments. Problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution attempt to recast the conflict as a problem in the second sense—as puzzles or riddles—and attempt to engage the parties in solving those puzzles. In a training or intervention, we might hear the notion put something like this: “We’re in conflict. We can fight it out, or work it out. If we’re going to work it out, let’s figure out what that would take.” (See Chapters One and Twenty-Four for further discussion of reframing a conflict as a mutual problem to be solved cooperatively.)
Along these lines, Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim suggest that “problem solving can be defined as any effort to develop a mutually acceptable solution to a conflict” (1994, p. 168; emphasis added). Developing mutually acceptable solutions is the hallmark of problem-solving approaches.

A Discussion of Problem-Solving Approaches. In the third edition of their book Social Conflict, Pruitt and Kim (2004) (earlier editions were coauthored with the late Jeffrey Rubin) offer one of the best, most useful discussions available of problem-solving approaches. So it seems worthwhile to devote a few paragraphs to their work at the outset of this chapter.

Although the phrase “any effort” in the preceding quote might leave the definition a bit broad, those authors go on to clarify the highest aspirations of problem-solving approaches: “At its best, problem solving involves a joint effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. The parties or their representatives talk freely to one another. They exchange information about their interests and priorities, work together to identify the true issues dividing them, brainstorm in search of alternatives that bridge their opposing interests, and collectively evaluate those alternatives from the viewpoint of their mutual welfare” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 190).

In describing problem-solving approaches, the same authors describe two broad classes of outcomes that can be sought: compromise (meeting in the middle through a process of sacrifice on both sides) and integrative solutions (those in which all parties’ needs are considered and met).

The second type of solution, the integrative, is the hoped-for goal in problem-solving approaches, though it may not always be realistically possible (more on this later). Pruitt, and Kim (2004) review a variety of forms for finding such solutions:

- **Expanding the pie** (finding ways to work together to create more of a resource to be divided)
- **Nonspecific compensation** (finding new ways to compensate a party for yielding on an issue)
- **Cost cutting** (finding ways to reduce the cost for a party in yielding on an issue)
- **Logrolling** (each side concedes on issues it believes are less important, building momentum toward agreement and goodwill)
- **Bridging** (new options are created that satisfy critical underlying interests, if not the initial demands that were put on the table)

To illustrate, imagine the case of a hypothetical labor negotiation in which management and a union are divided over a range of issues, including wages, medical insurance, disability, workplace safety conditions, and productivity
goals. The first approach, expanding the pie, might entail raising prices to bring in more revenue to support the compensation desired by the union, while also providing more profit for the company. The second, nonspecific compensation, might oblige management to offer, say, additional vacation time or a flex-time arrangement to compensate for a concession on wage demands. Cost cutting might involve finding a new insurance company that is able to provide better benefits without costing the company as much as the old plan would have charged. The parties might also engage in the third approach, logrolling: the union concedes on a minor change in productivity goals (which union representatives view as less important in this case), and management concedes on an issue of work safety conditions that is relatively inexpensive to fix. The combination of agreements builds momentum toward reaching agreement on some of the more difficult issues. Finally, the parties might find a bridging solution, in which moderate redesign of the facility and work flow (1) eliminates the safety issue (union interest) and (2) increases productivity (management interest) without imposing an unacceptable burden on the workers, (3) thereby generating the revenue to pay for increased wages and benefits (union interest) as well as profits (management interest). What makes this bridging solution different from the price-raising, expanding-the-pie example is that it makes use of a new option (redesign) that addresses the various underlying interests on both sides of the table in an integrative way.

A key component, not only to the approach described by Pruitt and Kim, but to most of the problem-solving approaches, is analyzing underlying interests, those often unspoken real needs that produce the publicly stated demands in the first place. In addition, Pruitt and Kim suggest pushing further to look for interests under those interests, and so on, in an effort to find interests that are bridgeable—that is, satisfiable in newly created, mutually acceptable ways.

Pruitt and Kim (2004) offer a good description of a problem-solving process for conflicts of interest. They suggest (1) determining whether there is a real conflict of interest; (2) determining one’s own interests, setting high aspirations and sticking to them; and (3) seeking a way to reconcile both parties’ aspirations. Note that steps 1 and 2 are part of the diagnosis phase of problem solving, and step 3 represents the phase of generating alternatives. If step 3 is particularly difficult, it may be necessary to lower aspirations and search some more. Steps 2 and 3 represent the core of many problem-solving approaches: developing clarity as to the real issues and interests and developing mutually satisfactory solutions.

Evidence of Better Outcomes with Problem-Solving Approaches. There is evidence for the effectiveness of problem-solving approaches, in both the
short term (reaching agreements, short-term satisfaction) and the long term (long-term satisfaction with, adherence to, and quality of agreements).

In a key study, Kressel and his colleagues (1994) compared the effectiveness of mediators using a problem-solving style (PSS), focused on good problem solving rather than settlement itself, with those using a settlement-oriented style (SOS), focused on the goal of getting an agreement, “more or less independent of the quality of the agreements” (p. 73), in child custody cases. They found overwhelmingly that disputants working with mediators using PSS more frequently reached settlement and were more satisfied with their agreements. They also found that the PSS settlements tended to be more durable, produce long-term outcomes of higher quality, leave disputants with more favorable attitudes toward the mediation, and be more likely to have a lasting positive impact on the relationship between parties. It is also important to note that there were some consistent exceptions: for example, when one party “bargained in bad faith” or was psychologically disturbed, PSS did not produce workable agreements.

Although Kressel and colleagues focused on long-term outcomes, Zubek and her colleagues (1992) looked at short-term benefits of problem-solving behavior in mediation in community mediation centers. They demonstrated a greater likelihood of short-term success in mediation (STSM) with joint problem solving and less STSM with hostile and contending behavior by the conflicting parties. They then looked at the mediator behaviors that led to STSM and found them to include those that stimulate thinking and structure discussion. In addition, the more mediators applied pressure on disputants to reach agreement, the lower the rates of reaching agreement and goal achievement, satisfaction with the agreement, and satisfaction with the conduct of the hearing, which lends further support for the PSS versus SOS findings of Kressel and colleagues.

In yet another context, van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans (1995) found that problem solving tended to enhance effectiveness in conflict for police sergeants, with both superiors and subordinates. This is the type of traditional, hierarchical context many critics point to as one in which a problem-solving approach is unlikely to gain acceptance or be effective. Further, it is worth noting that problem solving tended to enhance the sergeants’ effectiveness in conflicts with both their subordinates and their superiors (though the latter effect represented a nonsignificant trend).

Finally, Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) reviewed a wide range of both experimental and field research on problem solving in negotiation and mediation. They concluded that problem solving is much more likely than other approaches to lead to win-win solutions to conflicts. In addition, they found that problem solving is more likely both to be engaged in, and to be effective, when disputants are concerned about the other party’s welfare than when they are focused solely on their own.
Research That Predicts Use of Problem Solving. Given the potential benefits of problem-solving approaches, it is helpful to know about the conditions under which disputants are more, or less, likely to engage in problem-solving behavior.

Some information is available. Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin (1993) found that if the psychological climate of an organization was characterized by higher levels of (1) cohesion, (2) fairness, (3) recognition of success, and (4) openness to innovation, members were more likely to choose problem-solving and persuasion strategies and less likely to engage in bargaining and politicking. In a study pointing to factors that might inhibit problem solving, Dant and Schul (1992) found that a group making frequent use of integrative problem-solving conflict resolution strategies among its members still preferred directive third-party intervention when stakes were high, issues were complex, there were significant policy implications, and dependence on the organization was high.

Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) as well as Pruitt and Rubin (1986) argue that disputants’ relative levels of concern for their own and each other’s interests predict the conflict resolution strategy that is adopted. Thus, when disputants do not care about their own or the other’s outcomes, they are likely to adopt a strategy of inaction; when they are concerned with the other’s outcome, but not their own, they are likely to yield; and when they are primarily concerned about their own interests, they tend to adopt contending strategies. But when disputants are concerned both about their own interests and the other’s as well (holding a dual concern), they are more likely to engage in problem solving. This suggests that strategies and techniques that help to cultivate a concern for the other’s interests and outcomes help to promote problem solving in conflict situations. (See also, in Chapter One, the section on initiation of cooperation.)

Individual and Social Interaction Perspectives on Problem Solving

Consistent with the viewpoint put forth by Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), another angle on problem solving in conflict has come from the social cognitive literature, particularly from developmental researchers interested in the development of social understanding and its relationship to thought processes during conflict and other social interactions. Within cognitive psychology, problem solving is viewed as a cognitive process, very much in the sense of working through puzzles (solving a math problem, stacking crates to get the banana, and so on). Social cognition theorists have tended to look at conflict resolution as a particular kind of cognitive problem solving, that of solving interpersonal problems.

Two complementary ways of looking at interpersonal conflict have arisen from this perspective. One takes an information-processing approach, in which each phase of the interpersonal problem-solving process is analyzed against an ideal standard (for example, Dodge, 1980; Spivack and Shure, 1976). The individual goes through an internal problem-solving process in determining how to engage
with the other. More effective strategies are equated with success at achieving some predetermined outcome. The phases include (1) identifying the problem, (2) generating alternative strategies, (3) evaluating consequences, and (4) using new or different strategies for resolution. It is important to note that these phases may be executed well or poorly and may lead to a decision to engage in contentious, collaborative, or any other type of tactics. Although these phases have been drawn from cognitive psychology, research has shown them to be applicable to the realm of social problems (see review by Rubin and Krasnor, 1986). If collaborative tactics are chosen by both parties, a joint problem-solving process may then occur that can be described with the same four phases.

The other approach emphasizes general social competencies such as communication skills, skills in finding common ground, and other social skills that are discussed in various chapters in this book. From this perspective, one of the primary social cognitive tasks that conflict presents to the individual is social perspective coordination. In other words, how do I understand the other’s perspective, and develop an understanding of the situation that accounts for both that perspective and my own? Within this framework, a model of interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS) has been described that depicts a developmental progression in the ability to coordinate social perspectives in conflict, ranging from an egocentric inability to differentiate subjective perspectives (that is, mine from yours) to the ability to coordinate the self’s and the other’s perspectives in terms of the relationship between them, or from a third-person viewpoint (Selman, 1980; Yeates, Schultz, and Selman, 1991). The functional steps of the INS model are similar to the steps articulated in information-processing approaches—that is, defining the problem, generating alternative strategies, selecting and implementing a specific strategy, and evaluating outcomes—but the INS model integrates additional developmental levels of perspective taking (egocentric, unilateral, reciprocal, and mutual) that underlie each of the functional steps (Selman, 1980). Here are descriptions adapted from Selman (1980) and Weitzman and Weitzman (2000):

- At the egocentric level, which is characterized by impulsive, fight-or-flight thinking, the other is viewed as an object and the self is seen as being in conflict with the external world. The types of behaviors that might be seen at this level are whining, fleeing, ignoring, hitting, cursing, or fighting.

- At the unilateral level, which is characterized by obeying or commanding the other person, although the other is now understood to have interests, the self is seen as the principal subject of the negotiation, with interests separate from the other. The types of behaviors typically seen at this level are threatening the other person, going behind the other’s back, avoiding the problem, or waiting for someone else to help.
• At the reciprocal level, which is characterized by exchange-oriented negotiations and attempts at influence, the needs of the other are appreciated but considered after the needs of the self. Typical behaviors are accommodation, barter, asking for reasons, persuasion, giving reasons, and appealing to a mediator.

• At the mutual level, which is characterized by collaborative negotiations, the needs of both the self and the other are coordinated, and a mutual, third-person perspective is adopted in which both sets of interests are taken into account. The types of behaviors that might be seen at this level are various forms of collaboration to develop satisfaction of mutual goals simultaneously.

In our work, we have used the INS model to explain the nature of everyday conflict in the lives of adults (Weitzman, 2001; Weitzman, Chee, and Levkoff, 1999; Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000). Our research has revealed some discontinuity between strategy choice and its social cognitive foundation. For example, in a study with elderly women, we found that although many women articulated reciprocal or mutual social perspective-taking skills, many of these same women opted for strategies associated with the unilateral level (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000). Similarly, Yeates, Schultz, and Selman (1991) have shown that although the essential sequence of problem-solving steps is stable across conflict contexts, perspective taking often is not. Cultural norms (for example, where older women are socialized to yield, particularly to men, rather than press to get their needs met), perceived power differentials between the parties in conflict, and other contextual factors may lead to the use of less sophisticated strategies, regardless of perspective-taking ability.

So even though the basic steps of individual problem solving remain fairly constant across situations, good, collaborative outcomes do not. The key issue this research brings to light is that an individual’s decision whether or not to coordinate his or her perspective with that of the other person is a central aspect of the conflict resolution process, one that may be highly relevant for training.

Critiques

There are also some serious critiques of problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution, and they deserve some attention here as well. For simplicity, we summarize them here as the Bush and Folger critique and the skeptic’s critique.

The Bush and Folger Critique. Bush and Folger (1994) argue that problem solving, an orientation they see as underlying a “satisfaction story” of mediation (focusing only on satisfying the disputants and not taking advantage of the broader opportunities inherent in mediation), is narrow and mechanistic in that it assumes that conflict is a problem. This is seen as at odds with widely held
values in the dispute resolution field to the effect that, because of its capacity for stimulating growth and leading to change, conflict is a good thing.

We happen to share those values, but we believe there is a fundamental error in this critique. That is, Bush and Folger (1994) cast what the problem-solving mediator does as looking to solve problems in the first of the two senses we offered at the beginning of this chapter: problems as obstacles, difficulties or predicaments, that is, “bad things.” The result is that their argument frames problem-solving approaches to mediation as more or less equivalent to the settlement-oriented style described by Kressel and colleagues (1994). This misses the fact that the work of Kressel and colleagues, Zubek and colleagues (1992), and others has found substantial differences between such approaches. Cooperative problem-solving approaches in mediation are working on a problem-as-puzzle model, which is very much consistent with the values of conflict as opportunity. If conflict is to be taken as an opportunity for change and growth, it is imperative that disputants move beyond fighting and take full advantage of the power of collaboration to develop new and better alternatives. That is the essence of problem-solving approaches. They can lead to transformation and empowerment of others as this approach becomes a general, personal orientation to resolving conflict.

The Skeptic’s Critique. There is a skeptic’s critique often heard out in the field—during training or in conversation among practitioners—that says, “This is fine on paper, but it isn’t realistic.” In detail, it goes something like this. People are angry and do not want to solve problems, work with each other, or talk to each other. What may help to persuade those holding this view of problem solving is that research and practical experience are firm in their conclusions. People do respond better to problem-solving approaches than settlement-oriented ones, they reach agreement more often and faster, they report being more satisfied, and both agreements and satisfaction hold up better in the long run.

Another critique argues that people often do not know what actually constitutes “the problem,” and even when they think they do know, each side often has a very different problem in mind. Recall, however, that an essential part of what problem-solving approaches do is attempt to get the parties to focus on identifying the issues at the heart of their quarrel (in other words, to diagnose the nature of their conflict) and do not assume that those central, underlying issues are already known. They then ask the parties to treat the collection of issues (or needs or interests or other types of concern) on the table as a mutual problem to be solved collectively. Note that there is no assumption here that the parties have the same basic issues in mind as they approach the negotiating table, nor that they define their conflict in terms similar enough even to give it the same name. The core of problem-solving approaches is helping parties see their own interest in finding solutions that meet not only their needs
but those of the other as well. That is often hard to do, and so there is this challenge: What kind of solution can we come up with such that my needs, which are A, B, and C, and your needs, which are X, Y, and Z, can all be met at least acceptably well? It is this puzzle that is the problem to be solved.

DECISION MAKING

Consider again, briefly, our simple PSDM model (Figure 9.1). We suggested that decision making is going on both during and after the problem-solving process. At both of those points, there are decisions that each party makes individually and decisions made by the parties together. In the following discussion, we look first at the individual as decision maker and then at group decision making.

First, a broad summary. Many of the theorists whose work is mentioned here define the negotiation process itself in decision-making terms (for example, Bazerman and Neale, 1986; Kahneman, 1992; Zey, 1992). Some taking this view conceptualize each party as a decision maker (for example, Kahneman, 1992; Mann, 1992), while others focus on the conflict resolution process as one of joint decision making (for example, Bennett, Tait, and Macdonagh, 1994; Brett, 1991). It is possible, on the one hand, to think of the negotiator as someone with a series of decisions to make in the course of a negotiation, ultimately leading to the decision of whether to agree to a particular solution. On the other hand, one can also think about the process of negotiation as one of joint decision making, in which two or more parties with differing interests must jointly reach a decision—the resolution they ultimately agree to. In fact, many clients, when engaging a third-party mediator, describe their conflicts precisely as decision-making problems in which people are having a hard time making a decision together.

The Individual as Decision Maker

The emphasis here is on the problem of choice among alternatives, be they alternative agreements or alternative actions to take along the way. Many theories of decision making emphasize the notion of rational choice and are built on the notion of expected utility. The expected-utility principle has been traced as far back as the eighteenth-century theorist Bernoulli (Abelson and Levi, 1985). The idea is that risky decisions involve choices in which we cannot be certain of what will happen as a result of our choice (as when a negotiator decides to hold out for a larger concession). For each option, we have to consider (1) the likelihood (expectation) that making this choice will get us what we hope it will and (2) the value, or utility, we attach to that outcome. Assuming that both the probability and the utility can be expressed as numbers, the expected utility for each option, then, is the product of probability and the associated utility. Thus
“the expected-utility principle says that preferences between options accord with their relative expected utilities” (Abelson and Levi, 1985, p. 244). In conflict resolution, this principle would imply that people’s preferences among outcomes, possible settlements, or offers will be determined rationally according to the expected-utility principle.

Various limits to this approach have been discovered, however, and they have led to a number of useful ideas. Here we briefly summarize a few of the key findings and theories.

**Anchors, Frames, and Reference Points.** It turns out that anchors, frames, and reference points can influence decision-making processes in such ways that people do not make the kinds of choices that the “rational” decision-making model predicts. The description here follows Kahneman (1992), whose excellent review is recommended to those interested in pursuing these ideas in detail.

The *reference point* in a negotiation is the point above which the party considers an outcome to be a gain and below which any outcome is considered a loss. In a given negotiation, several reference points might be available to a party: the status quo, the party’s opening offer, the other side’s initial offer, a settlement reached in a comparable case, and so on. Depending on which reference point a party has in mind, a given outcome might be seen (or framed) as a gain or a loss. The central finding here is that people tend to be *loss-averse*: avoiding loss is more important than achieving gain, and “concessions that increase one’s losses are much more painful than concessions that forgo gains” (Kahneman, 1992, p. 298). As a result, when faced with a possible loss, people become more willing to take risks rather than accept a large loss. For example, one may be inclined to risk impasse, rather than make an offer accepting a large loss. By contrast, if there is a possibility of gain, people tend to be less willing to take a risk (perhaps of impasse) in the hope of yet larger gains. If a decision is framed negatively (as one between losses), then people tend to be more risk-prone than if it is framed positively (as one between gains). There is an important exception to this effect: if the goods being lost or gained are desirable only, or mainly, to be used in exchange (money kept for spending, goods kept for trading), then giving them up may not be viewed as a loss, and concessions may not be as painful (Kahneman, 1992).

**Anchors** are salient values that influence our thinking about possible outcomes, much like reference points. The difference is that whereas reference points define the neutral point between gains and losses, anchors may be anywhere along the scale and are often at the extremes. One of the most striking of anchoring effects is that negotiators are often unduly influenced by an anchor that they clearly know to be irrelevant—such as an outrageously low offer. Kahneman defines anchoring effects as “cases in which a stimulus or message that is clearly designated as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases the [perceived] normality of a
possible outcome” (1992, p. 308). There are a great many subtleties to the effects of anchors. The critical point for conflict resolution is recognizing their existence and developing methods for coping with their influence.

Impact of Stress. Conflict often produces psychological states, such as stress, and affective (emotional) reactions that include anxiety, anger, and elation (Mann, 1992), thus introducing another set of barriers to “rational” decision making. From the perspective of Janis and Mann’s conflict theory of decision making (1977), there are important linkages among stress, conflict, and coping patterns (Janis, 1993; Mann, 1992); according to Mann, “the model is founded on the assumption that decisional conflict is a source of psychological stress. The task of making a vital decision is worrisome and can cause anxiety reactions such as agitation, quick temper, sleeplessness or oversleeping, loss of appetite or compulsive overeating, and other psychosomatic symptoms” (p. 209).

From this perspective come a number of interesting findings. Cognitive functioning in decision making declines under stress; time pressure increases stress and thus negatively affects decision making, as well as reduces the willingness to take risks; and mood has predictable effects on risk taking: when in a good mood (compared to a neutral mood), people are more risk seeking when the risk is low but less risk seeking when risk is high. This pattern appears to reflect the fact that in a good mood, people think more about loss under high-risk situations, but they think less about loss when risk is low (Mann, 1992).

Another View of Risk. In the previous sections, we discussed some of the impact of framing, stress, emotion, and mood on risk taking. Taking a slightly different view, Hollenbeck and his colleagues have argued that much of the research on risky decision making is limited in that it uses decisions that are static: they involve a one-shot decision with no future implications, no effect of past performance, and a high degree of specificity about outcomes and probabilities (Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Phillips, and Hedlund, 1994). By contrast, most decisions in conflict situations do not meet these conditions. Hollenbeck and colleagues conducted an experiment in which they varied these conditions and found that giving a general do-your-best goal instead of a specific goal actually reversed the framing effect described by Kahneman and Tversky (1984). Hollenbeck and colleagues conclude that to better understand the conditions that lead to risk taking, we need to know more about dynamic contexts, and we cannot freely generalize findings from static settings.

An Applied Approach. Approaches such as that of Janis and Mann (1977) are close in flavor to problem-solving approaches in being analytical and depersonalizing the conflict. In this approach, a decision maker fills out a “decisional balance sheet,” listing all outcomes, weighting and summing costs
and benefits, and thus analyzing the relative costs and benefits of each choice in order to make a decision. If the parties are willing to undertake the process together, they may be able to arrive at a decision they can agree to accept. But this approach makes some serious errors (as do others like it). In particular, it assumes that preferences on all issues can be translated into a common currency. This may be workable in some circumstances, as in a divorce mediation, for weighing relative preferences for the pots and pans on the one hand and a painting on the other. But it may be much less workable for weighing relative preferences for the house on the one hand and custody of the children on the other, since the house and the children do not readily convert into a common currency.

**Group Decision Making and Commitment**

Viewing negotiation as joint decision making opens up the possibility of exploring such decisional biases as overconfidence and lack of perspective taking—processes about which there is knowledge in the decision-making domain—that may alter performance and dispute resolution behavior (Bazerman and Neale, 1986).

**Behavioral Decision Making.** One prominent, and particularly helpful, approach to understanding group decision making is known as behavioral decision making (BDM). BDM emphasizes rational negotiation, with the goal of making decisions that maximize one’s interests (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). Bazerman, Neale, and their colleagues have conducted an extensive program of research based on this approach (Bazerman and Neale, 1986; Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989; Mannix and Neale, 1993; Neale and Bazerman, 1992; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992; Valley, White, Neale, and Bazerman, 1992). Their findings are informative in terms of understanding conflict and working to resolve it. From a behavioral decision theory perspective, negotiation is seen as “a multiparty decision making activity where the individual cognitions of each party and the interactive dynamics of multiple parties are critical elements” (Neale and Bazerman, 1992, p. 157). The approach aims at being both descriptive and prescriptive, and it works with such concepts as the perceptions of the negotiators, their biases, and their aspirations.

Bazerman and Neale (1992) offer a list of seven pervasive decision-making biases that interfere with the goal of negotiating rationally to maximize one’s interests. The first is “irrationally escalating your commitment to an initial course of action, even when it is no longer the most beneficial choice” (p. 2). Possible causes of this bias include the competitive irrationality that can ensue when winning becomes more important than the original goal, and also the biases in perception and judgment resulting from our tendency to seek information that confirms what we are doing and avoid information that challenges us.
The second bias is “assuming your gain must come at the expense of the other party, and missing opportunities for tradeoffs that benefit both sides” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). Earlier, we discussed some of the benefits of approaching mixed-motive conflict as potentially integrative rather than purely distributive. Bazerman and Neale argue that “parties in a negotiation often don’t find these beneficial trade-offs because each assumes its interests directly conflict with those of the other party” (p. 16). They call this mind-set the *mythical fixed pie*.

The third bias is “anchoring your judgments upon irrelevant information, such as an initial offer” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). For more on anchoring, see our earlier discussion in Anchors, Frames, and Reference Points.

The fourth is “being overly affected by the way information is presented to you” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). This refers to the effect of framing, discussed earlier. Bazerman and Neale suggest that a mediator who wants to encourage parties to compromise should work to help the parties see the conflict in a positive frame, one emphasizing gains rather than losses.

The fifth bias, “relying too much on readily available information, while ignoring more relevant data” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), has obvious implications for the quality of decisions. Bazerman and Neale urge negotiators to work to counteract this bias. Similarly, we urge mediators to be on the lookout for this tendency, both in disputants and in themselves.

The sixth bias, “failing to consider what you can learn by focusing on the other side’s perspective” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), takes a somewhat different slant on perspective taking from those presented earlier. In their version, emphasis is on gaining information about the other side’s motives by paying attention to their actions and taking their perspective into account.

The final bias, “being overconfident about attaining outcomes that favor you” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), is a particularly important one. Through anchoring on one’s own initial proposal, failing to learn from considering the other side’s perspective, distorting one’s perceptions of the conflict situation in order to feel better about oneself, and focusing too strongly on information that supports one’s position and ignoring information that challenges it, parties to a dispute often become overconfident in their ability to win; as a result, they miss out on opportunities to create integrative solutions. Thus, mediators in court-connected mediation programs may be faced with two parties, each absolutely certain that if they fail to settle the dispute, the judge or jury will find in their favor.

Let us now briefly discuss a number of other findings from the work of Bazerman, Neale, and their colleagues.

**Power Imbalance.** In an experimental study of the effects of power imbalance and level of aspiration, Mannix and Neale (1993) found that in a negotiation with integrative potential, (1) higher joint gains were achieved when power was equal than when unequal; (2) higher joint gains were achieved when aspirations
were high rather than low; and (3) when power was unequal, higher joint-gain solutions tended to be driven by the offers of the low-power party. That is, in unequal power situations the high-power party was less likely to initiate a joint-gain solution. As a result, the onus of generating and selling a joint-gain solution appeared to fall on the low-power party.

Interpretations of Fairness. Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found a tendency among negotiators, in a simulation of a collective bargaining process, to make “ego-centric interpretations of fairness.” That is, participants tended to assess fairness with a bias toward their own interests. This led to discrepancies between what each party saw as fair, each side tending to an interpretation benefiting themselves. Further, “the more people disagreed in terms of their perception of a fair settlement wage, the longer it took them to reach a settlement” (p. 184). Perhaps more surprisingly, providing the subjects with more background information, which might be expected to reduce bias, served only to exacerbate the self-serving nature of fairness assessments. (For more on biases, see Chapter Eleven.)

Preferences in Different Types of Relationships. Finally, in a study that bears directly on our earlier discussion of problem solving, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) found that people’s preferences for doing better than the other in disputes depended strongly on the nature of the relationship between the parties. The researchers manipulated two aspects of the dispute relationship: whether it was a business or personal dispute and whether the relationship between the parties was positive, negative, or neutral. They found that although parties (across combinations of dispute type and relationship) did not like outcomes in which they did more poorly than the other, there were substantial differences in how much parties preferred an outcome in which they did better than the other. First, in a negative relationship disputants tended to like doing better than the other, while in a positive or neutral relationship disputants tended to dislike doing better than the other (up to a certain high amount of gain, after which their preferences begin to rise again). Similarly, in business disputes, participants liked doing better than the other, but in personal disputes they disliked doing better than the other (again, up to a point). Significantly, these two tendencies reinforced each other; in business disputes, the preference for doing better was substantially enhanced in a negative relationship.

This study may have profound implications for the problem-solving approaches we have discussed. In particular, it tells us that in certain situations (such as a business dispute or negative relationship) people may be highly motivated to create a large difference between what they and their negotiating partners receive. Such motivation runs directly counter to the goal of the cooperative problem-solving approaches: to engage parties in maximizing mutual gain.
UNDERSTANDING PROBLEM SOLVING
AND DECISION MAKING IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Our simple model of the interaction of problem solving and decision making in conflict resolution (Figure 9.1) offers a framework for integrating what we know about these processes. In this section, we take a brief walk through the PSDM model, illustrating some of the ways these findings and perspectives can be used to enhance our understanding of conflict.

The PSDM Model Revisited

We have proposed that problem solving and decision making be viewed as integral parts of the cooperative conflict resolution process. We have also suggested that decision making takes place both during and after problem solving and that at each point some decisions are made by the parties as individuals and some by the parties together.

Both problem-solving and decision-making approaches to conflict resolution, be they conscious designs of the professional mediator or spontaneous behaviors by the most naïve of disputants, fundamentally work with the basic dynamics of cooperation and competition, as discussed at greater length in other parts of this book (see Chapter One). Briefly, if conflict is approached as a cooperative endeavor in which the parties see their outcomes as positively correlated, people tend to work hard to create a resolution that maximizes both parties’ outcomes. The goal becomes to do as well as possible for both self and other, rather than to engage in the kind of destructive win-lose struggle that exemplifies competitive, contentious conflict.

In the kind of integrated view we are taking, cooperative conflict resolution consists of four general phases: (1) diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. The left-hand part of the PSDM model (Figure 9.1) is concerned primarily with phases 1 and 2, with both problem solving and decision making taking place. The right-hand part of the model, labeled “Decision making after,” is concerned primarily with phases 3 and 4, where the solutions generated must be selected and committed to. As indicated in the model, if it becomes clear during phases 3 or 4 that an adequate solution has not been generated, it is necessary to return to the problem-solving process, looking for further solutions and, if necessary, reconsidering the original diagnosis.

Diagnosis

Diagnosis is the first part of the problem-solving process. Perhaps the first step in diagnosis involves an important decision: determining what kind of conflict
you are in. A fundamental problem in conflict resolution in applied work is determining those few conflicts that really are not amenable to a constructive, integrative approach.

**Determining What Kind of Conflict You Are In.** Often, we are working to convince our students and those we train that most of the conflicts initially appearing to be unalterably competitive, zero-sum situations by their nature are in fact at worst mixed-motive. Many of us even take an initial, dogmatic stance with students that there are virtually no cases in which collaborative approaches are impossible, in an effort to break them of the common tendency to respond competitively (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). (At least the first author of this chapter knows he is guilty of this.) Yet we know from practical experience, as well as some of the research findings discussed earlier, that this is not the case. It would seem naïve to deny that there are situations in which power-wielding, contentious tactics are warranted. Books such as Bazerman and Neale’s that alert readers to common biased misperceptions and urge them to look more closely are an important start. A set of empirically and theoretically justified principles, guidelines, or frameworks are badly needed to help identify those cases that really are immutably contentious.

This would serve at least two aims. It would be an indispensable tool for conflict resolution efforts both in the first person and by a third-party intervenor. It would also give us the ability to say to our students, “Here’s how you know a case that really can’t be transformed into a ‘mutual problem to be solved collaboratively.’ If it doesn’t meet these criteria, the potential is in there somewhere. Now let’s work on how to find it.”

**Identifying the Problem or Problems.** The next step in diagnosis is to develop an understanding of what the conflict is about—whether in substantive interests, values, or other types of concerns—that lends itself to problem solving. This involves identifying each side’s real concerns (getting past initial positions or bargaining gambits), and developing a common understanding of the joint set of concerns of each party. Some questions that might be asked or investigated at this stage include:

- What do I want?
- Why do I want it?
- What do I think are the various ways I can satisfy what I want?
- What does the other want?
- Why?
- What are the various ways the other believes he or she can satisfy his or her wants?
Do we each fully understand one another’s needs, reasons, beliefs, and feelings?
Is the conflict based on a misunderstanding, or is it a real conflict of interests, beliefs, preferences, or values?
What is it about?

Finally, during the diagnosis phase, social perspective coordination is important. To arrive at a joint diagnosis, parties have to be willing and able to appreciate the other as a person, with concerns of his or her own, and coordinate these concerns with the party’s perspective so as to create the joint diagnosis.

Identifying Alternative Solutions
Once the parties have reached a joint diagnosis, the next step is to begin generating alternative solutions that may meet each party’s goals at least acceptably well. One of the most commonly mentioned approaches to doing this is brainstorming. Here, the emphasis is on generating as many creative ideas as possible, hoping to encourage parties to think of the kinds of mutually acceptable solutions that have eluded them. Most brainstorming sessions employ a “no evaluation” rule: during the brainstorming session, no comments on proposed ideas are allowed, in the hope of encouraging parties to think of as many ideas as they can, no matter how silly or impractical. Once a list of alternatives is on a blackboard or newsprint, parties are often able to begin sorting through them and find options that are workable.

A list of other techniques is suggested by Treffinger, Isaksen, and Dorval (1994). For example, they recommend “idea checklists,” lists of idea-stimulating questions such as, “What might you do instead?” or “What might be changed or used in a different way?” (p. 43). They also recommend using metaphors or analogies to stimulate creativity, and blending active strategies (like brainstorming) with reflective strategies (such as built-in down time, for thinking things over).

In our earlier discussion of decision making, we emphasized research concerned with decision making under conditions of risk. Risk taking is important in this context in at least two ways. The research we have reported focused on the willingness to hold to a position and risk impasse—a risky decision that works against cooperative conflict resolution. But there are other kinds of risks where such a course of action is desirable. For example, offering a concession (or an apology!) can feel like a risk if you are not sure it will be reciprocated. In building trust where it is lacking between parties in conflict, it is often necessary to get one of the parties to take a risk and demonstrate trust in order to persuade the other party to begin trusting.
Social perspective coordination is important here as well. To create viable solutions that meet each party’s concerns, it is helpful—if not essential—for parties to be able to grasp and appreciate the importance of the other’s perspective and choose to engage in the search for solutions that satisfy the other’s concerns.

**Evaluating and Choosing**

Once a set of possible alternative solutions has been identified, the next task is to evaluate the various options and choose among them. This involves a variety of individual decisions: about preferences among the advantages the options offer, about which seem fairer, which are likely to last, and so on. As the parties make these decisions, such factors as stress, anchors, frames, and reference points may all play a role in interfering with reasonable, rational decision making. Procedures such as Janis and Mann’s decisional balance sheet exercise (1977) may be helpful here, as may the recommendations offered by Bazerman and Neale (1992) for overcoming biases.

There are also, at this stage, group decisions to be made, primarily as to which option is chosen. Several of the behavioral decision-making findings are important here, largely as things that negotiators as well as mediators and other third parties should look out for. Integrative solutions, for example, are more likely if power is relatively equal, and they tend to be driven by the low-power party if it is not (Mannix and Neale, 1993). There is a tendency to egocentric interpretations of fairness (Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992), which can add a sense of moral justification, and thus intractability, to a party’s sense of need. Also, people are less interested in doing better than the other (a competitive goal) when the relationship is personal and when it is positive (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989). Again, procedures such as that of Janis and Mann (1977) may be helpful.

**Committing to a Choice**

Finally, once a mutually agreeable solution has been found, the decision must be made to enter into agreement. Trust and the attendant risks are important factors. It is critical that parties be willing to put mutual satisfaction before the goal of “doing better than the other.” Social perspective coordination is important again, and here the issue of choosing to act on the social understanding gained is crucial; it is not enough just to understand—understanding must be translated into willingness to act. Among the key factors suggested by our work with elderly women (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000) for encouraging this translation are beliefs that the agreement will really work and be abided by and that the costs, emotional and otherwise, will not be too high.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND PRACTICE

We suggest that rather than being taught separately, in different training programs, problem-solving and decision-making approaches to cooperative conflict resolution should be taught together in integrated fashion. In the previous section, we have made an argument for considering the conflict resolution process in roughly four phases, incorporating problem solving and decision making throughout. We also recommend the development of training programs and intervention designs that approach the process in the same way. In this section, we briefly highlight a few factors that should be part of such efforts.

Conditions That Encourage Problem Solving

Training in problem-solving approaches should include information about the conditions that are likely to lead to parties’ willingness to engage in problem solving. We know for example, that a psychological climate characterized by cohesion, fairness, recognition of success, and openness to innovation encourages people to choose problem-solving and persuasion strategies, and less likely to engage in bargaining and politicking (Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin, 1993). Training for mediators, designs for organizational alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs, and conflict resolution programs for high schools, to name a few, could all make use of this information.

In addition, encouraging problem solving through cultivating concern for the other can be important (for example, Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). One common approach is to engage parties in perspective taking to help them see the other’s concerns as legitimate. Our work on social perspective coordination (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000) suggests not only that people must learn to take the perspective of the other but also that attention must be paid to translating perspective-taking ability into the choice of conflict resolution strategy. (See Chapters One and Three for more on the conditions that encourage conflict resolution.)

Although working to improve conditions that encourage problem solving is important, it is also essential to provide people with the tools to do it well. Trainings and intervention plans should include the sorts of specific problem-solving techniques referred to earlier, such as expanding the pie, logrolling, non-specific compensation, and bridging. Further, a consideration of some of the issues raised here can lead to novel approaches to intervention. To take an example from our practice, we were recently asked to mediate a community dispute in which there were known to be many “sides” with different perspectives. A consideration of the concern discussed as a critique, that people may not agree on a definition of the problem in the first place and that this alone can undermine conflict resolution efforts, led to an approach based on the very issue of problem definition. A group of about thirty community members were asked...
to begin the “mediation” session by engaging in brainstorming definitions of “the problem” they were facing. As the session proceeded, the group gradually worked toward a mutually agreed definition of the problem. By the time the group reached agreement on a definition of the problem, the solution was close to obvious and was easily agreed to.

Teaching the Lessons from the Decision-Making Literature

The information from the aforementioned decision-making literature that would be particularly helpful if built into conflict resolution training includes the concepts of anchors, frames, and reference points. Kahneman (1992) suggests what he calls the Lewinian prescription, based on the concept of loss aversion: concessions that eliminate losses are more effective than concessions that improve on existing gains. Mediators as well as negotiators could learn to look for these opportunities.

Earlier, we presented selected information about the decision-making phenomena that help explain and predict disputant behavior. Such information is often incorporated into negotiation training aimed at “winning” in competitive negotiations, but it seems, at least anecdotally, much less often to be a part of mediation training. Yet understanding issues such as the impact of stress, power imbalance, disclosure of information, egocentric interpretations of fairness, and preferences for relative outcomes, as well as the role of issues of risk taking and the factors that influence risk-taking propensity, would seem to be of enormous value for mediators.

One more approach from the decision-making literature needs introduction here. Building on the sort of literature described earlier, Brett argues for “transforming conflict in organizational groups into high quality group decisions” (1991, p. 291) and prescribes techniques for doing so. Her approach is based in the assumption that by harnessing negotiation and decision theory, one can bring conflict to a constructive outcome through a decision-making approach. Her prescriptions include:

- Criteria for determining if a high-quality decision has been reached
- Guidelines for improving the decision-making process
- Methods for integrating differing points of view
- Tactics for creating mutual gain, coalition gain, and individual gain
- Choosing decision rules that maximize integration of information
- Guidelines about when to use mutual gain, individual gain, and coalition gain approaches

This approach offers concrete, structured advice, based solidly in the research literature, for applying decision-making techniques to resolving group conflict. These techniques can be helpful at many of the decision-making moments identified in the PSDM model.
In a similar vein, Janis and Mann’s approach (1977) suggests that parties sit down together and analyze their conflict as a difficult decision. Their book offers devices such as the decisional balance sheet, a form for listing choice criteria (the things that matter to each party), assigning numerical values and valences (+ or −) to each, and manipulating the results. In this approach, disputants sit down together with a decisional balance sheet, carefully consider their own and the other’s concerns, and look for a solution that maximizes each side’s benefit and minimizes cost. With reference to the PSDM model presented here, such techniques might be helpful either at the stage of generating alternatives or at the stage of choosing among alternatives; in fact, it bridges the two.

Approaches such as those of Brett (1991) and Janis and Mann (1977) represent formalized, detailed technologies that can and should be taught more widely than they currently are. Though we have criticized some underlying assumptions of some of these approaches (questioning, for example, the common currency assumptions in the Janis and Mann approach), they remain tools that can be of great value if applied appropriately and as tools integrated into a problem-solving and decision-making approach. Our training programs would benefit from offering students more in the way of such concrete, specified techniques for incorporation into their toolkits.

CONCLUSION

We have suggested that problem solving and decision making are processes interwoven in many cooperative conflict resolution procedures, and have proposed an integrated PSDM model reflecting four general phases: (1) diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. This integrated model offers a way of thinking about the opportunities for applying both problem-solving and decision-making knowledge and techniques. An understanding of how problem-solving approaches work, are helpful, and can be encouraged in various contexts can be a critical component of training, intervention, and dispute-resolution program design. Similarly, an understanding of decision-making biases and strategies for overcoming them can be a vital component of both conflict resolution education and practice. Further, a consideration of the issues raised here, and even of some of the critiques of these approaches, can lead to new approaches to intervention, training, and program design.

References


Families are arenas of gender and generational struggles, crucibles of caring and conflict, in which claims for an identity are rooted and separateness and solidarity are continually created and contested (Ferree, 1990).

INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

In this chapter, we examine some of the changes that have led to one of the major conflicts of the last half century—the struggle for family gender equality. We examine the conflict primarily within the context of couple (particularly marital) relationships beginning by examining the precursors to change. We then examine why marital gender equality matters and ask why it is so difficult to achieve. We conclude by highlighting selected empirical findings relevant to establishing a context for constructively engaging in the conflict.

Precursors

Over the past quarter century, women have entered the paid labor force in significant numbers; the number of single-parent families has increased, as has the number of births to unmarried mothers; the number of married couple households has declined; and the racial gap in marriage rates has widened. These changing demographics have led some to argue that American society is currently at a unique juncture with regard to families (Vandewater and Antonucci,
1998). Others, most notably Coontz (2004), counter that many things that seem new in family life are actually quite traditional. According to Coontz, two-provider families were the norm throughout most of history. Stepfamilies were more numerous in much of history than they are today, and, at various points in history, cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, or nonmarital sex were more widespread than they are currently (Coontz, 2004).

The truly radical change in western families, according to Coontz, was fomented by the transition from a view of marriage that was primarily about property, politics, and natal family duty to one that was about love, intimacy, and satisfaction in the nuclear family. For thousands of years, marriage was a way of raising capital, constructing political alliances, and organizing the division of labor by age and gender. “The individual needs and desires of its members (especially women and children, its subordinate members) were secondary considerations” (Coontz, 2004, p. 977). By contrast, the transition to free choice in terms of whom to marry, with love as the basis, introduced the notion of personal satisfaction as an appropriate expected outcome of the marital relationship.

A second significant factor affecting family life was the reproductive revolution. From birth control to in vitro fertilization, the reproductive revolution transformed the traditional relationships among marriage, sex, conception, childbirth, and parenting. Children were no longer a financial necessity or a means of providing for the family in old age. Reproductive technology, combined with societal changes, allowed those who married the option to remain childless. Concomitantly, those who chose to have children could do so absent marriage or a partner.

Reproductive independence combined with an individualized, rather than an institutional, approach changed the priorities of marital relationships. The shift away from societal and natal family duty to love, affection, and companionship legitimized the importance of partner satisfaction and well-being. This lay the groundwork for one of the major family conflicts of the last half century—the struggle for gender equality in marriage.

**Why Gender Equality Matters:**

**The Asymmetrical Benefits of Marriage**

To the extent that partner satisfaction and well-being are legitimate relationship expectations, gender equality matters. Beginning with the early work of Jesse Bernard (1972) and continuing to the present, a long line of studies has shown that marriage is beneficial for both women and men but especially for men. Married men have better physical and psychological health than their unmarried counterparts. (See Steil, 2001 for a review.) Married men show lower levels of problem drinking, are less likely to be involved in crime, are less likely to be depressed or show serious symptoms of psychological distress, are less likely
to have surgery, and have lower risks of dying from all sources at any point in their lives than their never married, widowed, or divorced counterparts. Married men experience greater career success, occupy higher-level positions, earn more money, and are more satisfied with their careers than the unmarried, even after controlling for age (Friedman and Greenhaus, 2000). Indeed, men enjoy a marital “wage premium”—an increase in earnings relative to the unmarried, estimated at anywhere from 4.5 to 35 percent. The wage premium is greatest for married White men (relative to their unmarried peers) followed by Black men and Black women respectively. Studies find no marital wage premium for White women.

In other studies, married men report more emotional satisfaction with their sex lives than do men who are either unmarried or cohabiting. Like men, married women report more emotional satisfaction with their sex lives than do those who are single or cohabitating; yet, married women report significantly less satisfaction than married men (Waite, 1995).

Others have noted women’s disproportionate vulnerability to physical and sexual abuse. National surveys estimate the yearly incidence of all kinds of intimate violence at around 12 percent for the married and as high as 35 percent for cohabitating couples. Findings suggest that there is “almost perfect symmetry” in the use of violence by women and men against their partners (Johnson, 1995, p. 285), but many argue that this “symmetry” must still be viewed in a gendered context. Violent relationships are widely viewed as reflective of a particular kind of power struggle in which there is an escalation of hostility and no exit strategy (Gottman and Notarius, 2000). The likelihood of violence varies with a number of factors including age, race, cohabitation, and the availability of educational and economic resources. This has led some to suggest that men who lack the material means of expressing or maintaining power may engage in violence in an attempt to reestablish a dominant position. From this perspective, husbands who have less power and lack other means of demonstrating control and authority use violence to reaffirm masculine identity with devastating results (Anderson, 1997). Women sustain the overwhelming majority of serious injuries due to men’s greater size, strength, and use of more harm-inducing tactics (Christopher and Lloyd, 2000). Indeed, at the extreme, 30 percent of all murders of females are committed by their intimate partners (compared to 7 percent of murders of males) (Christopher and Lloyd, 2000; Rozee and Koss, 2001).

**Racial/Ethnic Differences in Marriage Benefits.** The extent to which, and the conditions under which, the sex differences in the benefits of marriage extend across race and class are not fully known. Class, ethnicity, and race are often confounded, and many groups, including Latinos and Asians, have rarely been studied. Yet, on some dimensions, the disparity seems to be greatest among Blacks. Almost a quarter century ago, Carmen, Russo, and Miller (1981)
constructed an index based on the proportional difference between the rates of illness among the married compared to the never married and found a 71-percent reduction in vulnerability to mental illness for minority-race men who married, a 63-percent reduction for White men, but only a 28-percent reduction for White women and a mere 8-percent reduction for minority race women. These findings were supported in two subsequent studies, both of which found that marriage had little if any protective effect for Black women (Taylor, Henderson, and Jackson, 1991; Waldron and Jacobs, 1989). More recently, Dillaway and Broman (2001) found that Black women reported lower levels of satisfaction with their marriages than any other group, including Black men, White men, and White women.

The Asymmetrical Costs of Marriage and Other Relationship Types. Several studies have tried to assess the extent to which the benefits of marriage are due to something unique about marriage per se, as compared to relationship factors that need not be exclusive to marriage. Ross (1995), conceptualizing relationships as a continuum of social attachment, examined the associations between emotional and economic support, relationship quality, and well-being among four groups—respondents who were married, respondents who were cohabitating but not married, respondents who were unmarried but with a partner outside the household, and those with no partner. Overall, those who were married reported the highest household incomes, the lowest levels of perceived economic hardship, and the happiest relationships. Levels of emotional support were negatively associated with depression; however, the highest levels of emotional support were reported not by the married, but by the unmarried who lived with their partners, followed by those with partners outside the household. Overall, findings showed that those who had partners, whether married or not, and had the benefits of economic and emotional support, were as well off as those who were married. People in happy relationships had the lowest levels of depression. Notably, those in unhappy relationships were worse off than those with no partner at all (Ross, 1995).

Other studies show that low-quality marriages are associated with significant reductions in physical and mental well-being, such that partners are more likely to have periodontal disease, dental cavities, and stomach ulcers. They suffer a 25-fold increase in the risk for depressive symptomatology, and notably a recent review reports evidence that poor marital quality affects immune functioning, hindering the body’s capacity to repair itself (Kielcolt-Glaser and Newton, 2001). These studies also show that the physiological effects of marital stress are stronger and last longer in women than they do in men, thereby suggesting that women disproportionately bear the brunt of marriage’s negative consequences (Lerner, 2002).
In sum, marriage is associated with a number of physical, psychological, emotional, and economic benefits for both women and men. The extent to which these benefits extend across other relationship types is unclear. Consistent with the findings by Ross (1995), some suggest that the benefits probably extend to gay couples in committed romantic partnerships and to unmarried heterosexual couples who have been together for years (Lerner, 2002). In contrast, other studies show that cohabitants are more similar to the unmarried than they are to the married in terms of well-being (Kim and McKenry, 2002). It is clear that the distribution of the benefits of marriage is asymmetrical. Marriage, overall, is associated with more benefits for men than for women, and unhappy marriages are associated with more costs for women than they are for men. The question, then, is why?

Understanding the Source of Asymmetrical Benefits and Costs
Attempts to explain the source of the gender differences in well-being have a long history. Early studies focused on three primary explanations: gender differences in help-seeking behavior, gender differences in mate selection, and sex differences in biological vulnerability. None of these was able to fully explain the gender differences in well-being among the married. (See Steil, 1997 for a review.) By the 1980s, investigators increasingly began to examine the extent to which gender differences in the benefits of marriage might be, at least partially, explained by the inequalities of heterosexual relationships. Studies of the relationship between inequality and well-being focused primarily on the way that say in decision making is shared, the extent to which domestic work and childcare are shared, the extent to which wives’ careers are equally valued relative to their husbands’, and, more recently, the extent to which husbands participate in the emotion work of relationships. Here, we will focus on two of these factors, decision-making say and emotion work, returning to the other points of conflict at a later point.

Decision-Making Say. Studies of the outcomes associated with differential say in decision making are extensive and the findings are consistent. Wife dominance is reported least often and is associated with the lowest levels of relationship satisfaction for men and women alike. Some studies found that husbands are equally satisfied either when they have greater say or when decision making say is equal. Most studies, however, show that husbands and, particularly, wives are most satisfied when decision making say is equal. Compared to relationships in which one partner is dominant, those in which decision making is described as equal are characterized by more mutually supportive communication, less manipulative forms of influence, more affirmation and affection, more constructive interaction and intimacy, greater sexual
and marital satisfaction, greater marital happiness, less divorce proneness for both partners, and less dysphoria for wives (Amato, Johnson, Booth, and Rogers, 2003; also see Steil 2001 for a review). Clearly, the way in which decision-making say is shared matters in terms of the well-being of husbands, wives, and relationships.

**Emotion Work.** The research on husband participation in emotion work is less extensive and has a shorter history. Emotion work has been defined both as the efforts partners make to understand each other and to empathize with the other’s situations and feelings (England and Farkas, 1986) and as emotional support aimed at the enhancement of the other’s emotional well-being (Erickson, 1993). Historically, emotion work was viewed as a natural outcome of marital intimacy and as something that women were naturally good at. Such constructions masked the fact that successful interaction does not just happen but depends on the work of the participants. Although empirical work in this area is limited, it seems that wives do vastly more of the emotion and interaction work that relationships require than do husbands. Fishman (1983), in a detailed analysis of the conversations of White, professional couples at home, effectively illustrated the gender differences in the work of relationships. An analysis of fifty-two hours of taped conversations concluded that wives were three times more likely than husbands to ask questions as a means of initiating and maintaining interaction. Wives used minimal responses such as “yeah” and “ummm” to demonstrate interest, whereas husbands more often used these same minimal responses to display a lack of interest. Wives tried more often to initiate conversation, but were less successful due to husbands’ failure to respond. Husbands tried less often, but seldom failed because wives were generally more attentive and responsive to their husbands’ efforts to establish a conversation topic (Fishman, 1983).

Research findings suggest that gender differences in emotion work result in wives providing better emotional support for husbands than husbands provide for wives. More men than women say they receive affirmation and support from their spouse (VanFossen, 1981). Moreover, when asked to focus on the person closest to them (excluding parents and siblings) wives were twice as likely as husbands (22 percent versus 12 percent) to describe a relationship with a same-sex best friend rather than their husband (Fischer and Narus, 1981). Indeed, 64 percent of a sample of married heterosexual women reported being more emotionally intimate with other women, compared to 11 percent who said they were more emotionally intimate with men (Rosenbluth, 1997). The gender difference in nurturance holds true for Blacks as well as Whites. Among married Black women, 43 percent named a family member (exclusive of spouse) as the person “to whom they felt closest,” 33 percent named a family friend, and only 19.6 percent named their spouse (Brown and Gary, 1985).
Yet, data from a number of studies confirm the importance of emotional support to partner well-being. Women who had a confiding relationship with a spouse or boyfriend were less likely to become depressed. Additionally, both men and women in relationships rated high in intimacy were less likely to report symptoms of depression and anxiety than those in relationships rated low in intimacy.

In one of the few explicit studies of emotion work, Erickson (1993) assessed wives’ perceptions of the frequency with which their husbands engaged in fifteen behaviors, including confiding innermost thoughts and feelings, initiating talking things over, offering encouragement, expressing concern for well-being, and respecting their points of view. Higher wives’ ratings of their husbands’ involvement in emotion work were associated with higher ratings of the quality of their marriage and lower ratings of marital burnout. Indeed, although husbands’ higher levels of involvement in childcare and housework were also associated with higher marital quality and lower marital burnout, husbands’ involvement in emotion work was a better predictor of marital well-being than either of the other two (Erickson, 1993).

In sum, a growing body of research suggests that the inequality of heterosexual relationships is a factor in partner well-being. This helps to explain why marriage is more beneficial for men than it is for women. We chose two areas on which to report in that regard, but studies in a number of areas show similar findings. For example, some studies have compared relationships in which men and women regard themselves as equally financially responsible, as compared to relationships in which the husband is viewed as responsible for providing for the family. These studies showed that husbands and wives in the equal sharing couples were more satisfied with their relationships, reported a greater likelihood of confiding and showing affection, and the wives were less likely to be depressed (Aida and Falbo, 1991; Perry-Jenkins, Seery, and Crouter, 1992). Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, when empirical interest in relationships emerged, there has been significant change. Women have increased their say in relationships and men have increased their participation in family work. Yet, despite the change, relationships remain asymmetrical. Why has change been so slow?

**IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT**

In his introduction to this volume, Deutsch recounts the conflict between a professional couple with whom he was doing therapeutic work. According to Deutsch, “the wife, who worked (and preferred to do so), wanted the husband to share equally in the household and child care responsibilities; she considered equality of the genders to be a core personal value. The husband (by contrast)
wanted a ‘traditional marriage’ with a conventional division of responsibilities in which he would be the primary income–producing worker outside the home, while his wife would principally do the work related to the household and child care. The husband considered the household work and child care inconsistent with his deeply rooted image of adult masculinity" (Deutsch, this book, p. 2).

This conflict, as described by Deutsch, encapsulates the professional dual career version of the struggle for increased family gender equality that is playing itself out in varied forms in families of all shapes and colors across the United States and beyond. According to a recent cross-cultural review, increases in women’s opportunities and changes in family roles are occurring virtually everywhere. Yet the world’s nations, including the United States, are still far from gender equality (Adams, 2004).

Over the last thirty years the participation of married women in the U.S. paid labor force has increased dramatically. Thirty years ago, approximately 40 percent of married women with husbands present were employed, with White women less likely to be employed than Black women. By the early 1990s, White women were just as likely to be employed as were Black women and as of 2003, approximately 61 percent of all married women, including nearly 60 percent of married mothers with children under the age of six, were employed (U.S. Census, 2005, Table 579). As a result, children today in two parent families are almost twice as likely to have an employed as compared to a full-time homemaker mother. As well, these dual earner families have the highest median incomes of any family type and this is increasingly due to the economic contributions of employed wives. In fact, households in which both the husband and wife are employed have 41.5 percent greater income than households in which just the husband is employed (U.S. Census, 2005, Table 675). This increased labor force participation of married women led to the expectations, for many, of greater relationship equality. Yet such expectations have proved difficult to achieve. To understand why, we must understand the struggle as one that takes place between individuals, in relationships, within a complex tangle of deeply embedded and often conflicted family and societal beliefs.

**The Social Context**

Many of the beliefs about gender, work, and families, including the theories that guide scholarly research and clinical practice, had their roots in the 1950s—a time of “remarkable sex segregation, gender asymmetry and stability in work and family patterns” (Barnett and Hyde, 2001, p. 781). The prevalent doctrine was one of separate spheres, which argued that “family functioning is optimized when the husband specializes in market work and the wife in domestic work” (Barnett and Hyde, 2001, p. 782). This view of family life was widely internalized such that a generation later, half of all women and 48 percent of all men continued to say that the most satisfying lifestyle was a marriage where the
husband worked and the wife stayed home and took care of the house and children, and more than 70 percent of women said that it was more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have a career herself (Mason, Czajka, and Arber, 1976; Roper Organization, Inc., 1980). Similar attitudes continued into the 1980s when national surveys showed that 50 percent of Americans believed that “working mothers are bad for children” and “weaken the family as an institution,” beliefs that have not been supported by the empirical literature (Greenberger, Goldberg, Crawford, and Granger, 1988; see Steil, 1997 for a review). By 1996, the proportion of survey respondents agreeing that “it is better for everyone if men are the achievers and women take care of the home” and that “it is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one of her own” decreased to a significant minority (30 percent and 20 percent, respectively, Brewster and Padavic, 2000). Yet, indicative of widespread ambivalence, a 1997 survey found that 41 percent of a nationwide sample of employed adults still agreed that, “It is much better for everyone involved if the man earns the money and the woman takes care of the home and children” (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg, 1997).

During this period, women, like Deutsch’s client, consistently reported more egalitarian attitudes than men, and women with at least some college education who were employed full time were the most egalitarian of all (Mason, and others, 1976). Among men, older, less educated and married men, especially those with full-time homemaker wives, were less egalitarian in their views than younger, unmarried and highly educated men, especially those who were of a high status with wives who were employed full time (Wilkie, 1993). There are differences by race and ethnicity as well. Hispanic women are less likely to be employed and less likely to endorse egalitarian beliefs than White or Black women. Little is known of Asians, who are underrepresented in these studies.

The findings with regard to men are mixed. Hispanic men seem least likely to endorse egalitarian attitudes. Some studies find Black men endorsing more egalitarian attitudes than White men, while others find the reverse (Ransford and Miller, 1983; Wilkie, 1993). Ethnic attitudinal patterns often parallel the demographics. In Wilkie’s study, for example, Black men, compared to other groups, tended to be younger and a higher proportion were unmarried. Of those who were married, more had wives who were employed full time.

These societal beliefs support structural barriers that impede the achievement of gender equality within the family. A study of highly educated professionals in forty-eight countries, grouped in four categories, identified as the United States, the affluent west, the developing west, and collective (as compared to individualistic) cultures, found that across all cultures women continue to experience more family work conflict than men and conflict is a more salient feature of their work lives than it is for men (Hill, Yang, Hawkins, and Ferris, 2004). As well, studies of eight industrialized countries in Europe and Asia
showed that gendered beliefs were primary factors in determining career opportunities for women and role sharing among couples. Defining masculinity in terms of the provider role, believing that children require full-time maternal care, and alleging that mothers work by choice, creates an atmosphere where there is little societal or partner support for women in the paid labor force. Societies that endorsed these beliefs provided little public child care, freed husbands from domestic responsibilities, and left employed mothers to work out their own support systems (Lewis, Izraeli, and Hootsmans, 1992).

And What of the Couples Themselves?

Attitudinal Factors. Comparing data from two national surveys conducted in the years 1980 and 2000 respectively, investigators found that nontraditional attitudes toward gender were associated with greater marital happiness and higher levels of interaction for both husbands and wives (Amato and others, 2003). Overall, those with similar belief systems and, particularly, those in egalitarian relationships fare best. When belief systems are discordant, however, adopting less traditional gender attitudes is associated with lower marital quality among wives but higher marital quality among husbands (Amato and others, 2003). As in Deutsch’s opening example, wives who adopt less traditional views often encounter resistance from husbands, whereas husbands who adopt less traditional views more often receive support from their wives.

Discordant belief systems have a number of other costs as well. Studies show that full-time employment is generally associated with positive outcomes for women. Yet, the quality of a woman’s work life is linked both to the characteristics of her work environment and to the quality of her parental and marital relationships. Women whose husbands supported their employment both behaviorally, by sharing the responsibilities of the home and children, and attitudinally, by respecting the importance of their wives’ work, were less depressed than women who had unsupportive husbands (Amaro, Russo, and Johnson, 1987; Elman and Gilbert, 1984; Hughes and Galinsky, 1994; Kessler and McRae, 1982; Krause and Markides, 1985; Ross, Mirowsky, and Huber, 1983; Ulbrich, 1988). There is a parallel effect for husbands. Wives’ employment is negatively associated with husbands’ well-being only infrequently, but when it is, it only occurs when husbands believe their wives should be home full-time. The source of the distress seems to lie in a husband’s belief that his wife’s employment is inconsistent with what “should be.”

Societal Beliefs Give Meanings to Our Behavior. Gendered beliefs can give different meanings to the same behaviors when they are performed by wives as compared to husbands or by husbands as compared to wives. It has been shown, for example, that for husbands, the more they earn relative to their partners, the lower their involvement in domestic work and the better they feel about
themselves as spouses. Yet, this is not the case for women. Wives who earn more than their husbands do not feel better about themselves as spouses. As wives’ earnings increase relative to their husband’s earnings, the proportion of housework they perform declines until it reaches its minimum at the point where their earnings are approximately equal. But, once women’s earnings surpass those of their husbands the pattern is reversed. As a wife’s income surpasses her husband’s, the proportion of housework she performs again increases while that of her husband decreases (Brines, 1994; Greenstein, 2000). In a similar vein, the asymmetries of domestic work take on different meanings in the context of opposing belief systems. For Deutsch’s clients, the husband believed that the work of the home was his wife’s responsibility. From his perspective, participation in domestic work would challenge his masculinity. His wife, by contrast, believed her husband should be more involved in domestic work. Equality was a core belief system for her, and it is likely that she viewed marriage as a partnership in which both partners are employed and fairness demands that housework be equally shared. Women who endorse more traditional values, however, often view housework as an expression of love and a way of caring for others. Indeed, studies have shown that feeling appreciated by their husbands for the domestic work they do is one of the best predictors of wives’ perceptions of marital fairness (Hawkins, Marshall, and Meiners, 1995). From this perspective, a context of support and appreciation changes the meaning of domestic tasks, and women perceive their relationships as fair, not on the basis of how tasks are shared, but when they receive the interpersonal outcomes they value.

Yet, even in couples where both endorse egalitarian views, partners can struggle with their own deeply entrenched gender expectations. An interview study with White, professional, dual-career couples found that almost all men and women felt it would be easier for wives’ careers to be less successful than their husbands’ careers than for the reverse. Among the reasons wives gave for this disparity were (a) his work has more importance to his sense of self, (b) she needed her husband to be successful, and (c) she feared that people would say his lack of success was her fault for making him help at home (Silberstein, 1992). In a subsequent study, Rosenbluth, Steil, and Whitcomb (1998) found that when women and men assessed the importance of their own careers, both rated their careers as “highly important” with no differences by sex. When these same men and women were asked to respond on behalf of their spouses, however, men perceived their wives’ careers as only “moderately important” to them, whereas women perceived their husbands’ careers as being “extremely important” to them.

Dual-career couples, it seems, “build life structures with one foot in the past, mimicking traditional marriages of their parents’ generation, and one foot in the feminist influenced present” (Silberstein, 1992, p. 174). They hold not only “consciously altered expectations (about gender roles, work, family, and marriage)
but also deeply socialized, internalized and probably change resistant experiences, emotional needs, and entrenched patterns of behavior” (p. 13). These entrenched beliefs often emerge after children arrive, influencing the numerous large and small decisions and acts that make up everyday life, limiting conscious choice, and impeding the achievement of more equally sharing relationships. Clearly, these beliefs, both one’s own and one’s partner’s, need to be fully examined if couples are going to move forward. To do so, however, requires faith in one’s partner’s willingness to listen and change as well as the courage to bring the conflict forward. The kind of strategies used, the way the conflicts are defined, and the context in which differences are discussed determine the kinds of outcomes that can be achieved (Bradbury and Karney, 2004).

**IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION**

It has been widely shown that it is not the presence of conflict in relationships but rather the conflict processes couples use that matters. One of the most widely documented dysfunctional processes is the demand/withdraw pattern of marital conflict. In this pattern, the demander, more often the partner who wants some kind of change, pressures the other through the use of emotional requests, criticism, and complaints. In contrast, the withdrawer, often the person who does not want change, retreats through defensiveness and passive inaction (Christensen and Heavey, 1990). As in the case of Deutsch’s couple, the partner who wants change is more likely to be the wife. This is particularly the case in conflicts of gender equality, which are often defined in terms of the costs to men. These costs include interference with their ability to meet career demands, loss of the power and privileges associated with being the sole provider, loss of the services of a nonemployed wife, increased stress, and demands to participate in family life in unfamiliar ways that conflict with masculine identity. Since simply being employed often reflects some element of increased power and independence, any movement in the direction of equality is often viewed as beneficial to women. As a result, women disproportionately bear the burden of initiating change. Even in a sample of dual-career respondents who indicated no differences in terms of the importance they placed on equality in their own relationships, 90 percent of wives and 55 percent of husbands reported that the wives were more likely to raise the issue of equality in their relationships (Rosenbluth, and others, 1998). Both the demand and the withdraw strategies are generally viewed as weak and ineffectual. In fact, implementation of these strategies is associated with one of the strongest predictors of divorce—a pattern of husband defensiveness, contempt and stonewalling, and the thought that it is better to work out problems alone. Thus, the result is living parallel rather than intersecting lives (Gottman, 1993).
Another widely studied process不同iating the distressed from the nondistressed is couples’ attribution styles. Partners in distressed relationships spend a great deal of time focusing on negative events that they explain in terms of internal, stable, and global negative traits of their partners (for example, “my partner does not contribute to household work, he never does, he is too self-absorbed”). Nondistressed couples, by contrast, tend to place more focus on positive events, which they explain in terms of internal, stable, and global positive traits of their partners. In these couples, negative events are seen as occurring because of fleeting situational causes. As a result, nondistressed couples engage in relationship-enhancing attributions, whereas distressed couples engage in distress-maintaining attributions. These attribution cycles become self-sustaining. Partners in the negative cycle are unable to disconfirm the negative attribution by positive acts because they are attributed to fleeting situational causes (for example, “yes, he did take our son to the park yesterday but it was because it was a beautiful day and he happened to have nothing else to do”) while negative acts are attributed to stable traits (Gottman, 1993).

In describing further his work with the distressed couple, Deutsch notes that the conflict seemed nonnegotiable to them. From the wife’s perspective, accepting her husband’s terms would mean betrayal of her feminist values. At the same time, the husband perceived the idea of becoming deeply involved in housework and childcare as violating his sense of male adult identity. Yet this nonnegotiable conflict became negotiable when the husband and wife were able to listen to and really understand the other’s feelings and the ways in which their respective life experiences had led them to the views each held.

In this instance, therapeutic intervention set the context in which differences were discussed and defined, and the therapist likely set limits on the kinds of strategies that could be used. Yet, without intervention, partners may bring limited skills to bear in addressing the conflict.

Individual Factors. Family of origin is the primary setting in which children and adolescents learn both adaptive and maladaptive interpersonal repertoires—including physical aggression, positive and negative affect, and effective and ineffective problem solving. For wives, divorce in their families of origin predicts higher levels of aggression in their newlywed marriages. Similarly, couples in which the woman’s parents had divorced, relative to those in which the women’s parents had not, evidenced higher rates of conflict, invalidation, withdrawal, and negative nonverbal behaviors. Experiences in a family while growing up appear to shape the interpersonal repertoires that newlyweds display. Such experiences are predictive of marital outcomes several years later (Bradbury and Karney, 2004).

Conflict, as Deutsch (1973) points out, can have many positive functions. It prevents stagnation. It stimulates interest and curiosity. It is the medium through
which problems can be aired and solutions can be arrived at. It is the root of personal and social change. Yet, developing the capacity to engage in constructive conflict is a skill. When husbands resist wives’ attempts at change, wives often defer. With this, wives pay a heavy price including a devaluation of themselves. “Keeping quiet” “to keep the peace” promotes resentment, undermines intimacy, compromises affection (Deutsch, 1999), and leads to a deterioration in the level of relationship satisfaction over time (Gottman and Krokoff, 1989). Conversely, when wives do not comply, husbands often withdraw and turn away. Yet, systematic research consistently shows that conflict avoidance whether through compliance or withdrawal is equally dysfunctional. Indeed, Gottman (1998) has identified withdrawal, also called stonewalling and disengagement, along with criticism, defensiveness, and contempt as the Four Horseman of the Apocalypse in dysfunctional relationships.

Couples who are struggling to achieve more equal relationships are often doing so in the face of little support. Yet, relational conflict is interpersonal. Therefore, for the outcome to be constructive, the conflict must be defined as a mutual problem that requires constructive engagement, empathic listening, and resolution through cooperative efforts, and it must be defined as a situation in which there are no individual winners and losers, only mutual gains for women, men, and relationships. Conflict involves sequential interaction and for the interaction to be successful there must be validation such that both partners feel their perspective is understood and valued. Understanding and affirmation need not imply agreement, but for the process to move forward, exchanges must occur in a context of empathic understanding. And finally, couples who engage constructively engage positively. They are five times as likely to make a positive as a negative response (Gottman and Krokoff, 1989).

The difficulties should not be minimized. Yet, studies show that spouses who are able to infuse their problem-solving discussion with humor, show genuine enthusiasm for what the partner is saying, find common ground, and, either verbally or nonverbally, express feelings of warmth and affection can overcome limited skill levels (Bradbury and Karney, 2004). Finally, while the difficulties should not be minimized, neither should the rewards. Returning to the precursors with which we started, the findings are strong and consistent. Gender equal relationships are associated with that which couples most desire—greater intimacy, greater respect, greater satisfaction, and greater well-being for both partners.

References


PART TWO

INTRAPSYCHIC PROCESSES
A common misconception held by negotiators and dispute resolution professionals is that conflict escalation, stalemates, impasses, and lose-lose agreements are driven by intransigence and self-interested motivation. Whereas self-interest and opposing motivations do interfere with productively resolving conflict, there are many seemingly benign beliefs and cognitions that also interfere with effective conflict resolution but often go undetected. Unfortunately, these beliefs are not easily corrected during the process of conflict resolution itself because it is difficult for negotiators to monitor them. Furthermore, third-party intervention is no guarantee that erroneous beliefs and cognitions will be adequately identified and eliminated. In fact, the mere presence of a third party may exaggerate the tendency of these faulty and erroneous beliefs to disturb the otherwise effective resolution of conflict. Further, third parties and other self-proclaimed neutrals often fall prey to similar cognitive bias.

We argue in this chapter that identifying and challenging negotiator biases can do much to effectively resolve dispute and conflict of interest. Unfortunately, most negotiators are not aware of the existence of cognitive biases and their deleterious effects. In the first section, we introduce our basic framework and key assumptions. In the second section, we provide illustrative examples of the effects of cognitive bias on conflict management. Finally, we examine methods for eliminating or reducing cognitive bias at the bargaining table.
In contrast to perception of external physical events (which usually can be directly observed), much of the information we need to know about people is not directly accessible; rather, we must infer it on the basis of their behavior and spoken words. As is easily imagined, this can lead to misperception and misunderstanding because of differences in background (gender, class, culture, ethnicity, social roles, and so on) between the target and the perceiver.

Given the complexity of the task, it is not surprising that misunderstanding, error, and bias in judgment occur naturally even under favorable circumstances. In conflict, bias is apt to occur because conflict often leads to inadequate communication between the negotiating parties; arousal of emotional tensions that constrict thinking to stereotypes and to black-and-white viewpoints; primary focus on opposed interests; and anxiety, which may propel one to deny the conflict or flee into agreement before thinking through its consequences.

This tendency to use shortcuts, or heuristics, when we process information is an extremely cost-effective strategy, and much of the time heuristic processing provides us with accurate information. It may seem peculiar that heuristics—cognitive shortcuts—are cost-effective, because they lead to biases and hinder effective conflict resolution; however, our point is that much of the time, these shortcuts may be effective when used in nonconflict situations because they can lead to an answer or solution that is acceptable and efficient. For example, in forming an impression of a new next-door neighbor, one could do an extensive search (interviewing friends and relatives, perhaps even hiring a private investigator), or one could simply rely on gut impression. The former strategy is obviously costly and time-consuming; the second strategy is simple, but prone to bias.

In competitive encounters such as negotiation, though, the heuristic-based judgments we make are often wrong. Furthermore, the nature of our errors is not random but instead systematic. For the purposes of our discussion, we focus on systematic error and patterned fallacy; these are known as biases. Biases come in many forms and shapes. For instance, people can be biased about other people, as when they use stereotypes (someone might perceive all New Yorkers as pushy). People can also be biased about situations (the gambler’s fallacy—having lost so many times in a row they are “due” to win) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Paradoxically, people can also be biased about themselves (the vast majority of people judge themselves to be above average on many positive characteristics and abilities, even though it is logically impossible for most people to be above average).
In this chapter, we focus on four key biases selected for special emphasis because of their fundamental pervasiveness in many kinds of conflict situations. We list these in Table 11.1. We regard these biases to be at the core of others that may crop up in conflict situations. In describing each bias, we offer relevant examples from empirical research and set forth some implications for conflict management. Because the first step in effectively managing conflict is to be aware of the existence of these particular biases, we discuss them in turn below.

### Need to Simplify Conflict

It may often seem that parties interlocked in conflict at the bargaining table are purposefully attempting to complicate matters. In fact, people tend to do the opposite: they dramatically oversimplify situations. At the negotiating table, as in many other situations, people form judgments and attitudes without much deliberation and without the benefit of complete evidence. There are a number of reasons, notably that the human mind—though highly evolved—is simply not a computer, capable of endless processing of full information. Rather, people focus on one or two salient points in a situation. In this sense, people do not pay attention to every detail; rather, they look for a few salient cues and then make an assumption about how to act.

In addition to the general problem of stereotyping (which we discuss further in this chapter), the need to simplify the conflict situation also can result in other...
biases or poor gathering of crucial information needed to optimally resolve conflict. The desire to simplify the situation leads us to ignore information that is inconsistent with our initial beliefs and, in some cases, to interpret ambiguous information as being consistent with them. For example, we often associate the color black with negative ideas: death, evil, or “bad guys” wearing black hats. As an illustration of how prior beliefs about the color black can influence perception, consider two groups of trained referees who were shown videotapes of the same aggressive play in a football game (Frank and Gilovich, 1988). One group of referees viewed a version of the tape in which the aggressive team wore white uniforms, whereas the other referees saw the aggressive team wearing black. The referees who watched the black-uniformed version rated the play as much more aggressive and deserving of a penalty than did referees who judged the white-uniformed team. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that in professional football and hockey, teams that wear black uniforms are penalized significantly more than average (Frank and Gilovich, 1988). If our initial beliefs about the color black are negative, then we tend to interpret ambiguous information as being consistent with those beliefs.

Further, the need to simplify a conflict situation can lead to faulty perception about cause-and-effect relationships. People may falsely infer a causal relationship where none exists, or they may assume that a given action by one person results in an action by the other person. This effect, known as the “biased punctuation of conflict,” occurs when people interpret interaction with their adversaries in other-derogating terms (Kahn and Kramer, 1990). Actor A perceives the history of conflict with another actor, B, as a sequence of B-A, B-A, B-A, in which the initial hostile or aggressive move was always made by B, obliging A to engage in defensive and legitimate retaliatory action. Actor B punctuates the same history of interaction as A-B, A-B, A-B, however, reversing the roles of aggressor and defender. Disagreement about how to punctuate a sequence of events in a conflict relationship is at the root of many disputes. When each side to the dispute is queried, they explain their frustrations and actions as defenses against the acts of the other party. As a result, conflict escalates unnecessarily.

Opposing Forces

In very general terms, people in negotiation and conflict situations tend to assume that the degree of opposition between themselves and other parties is greater than it actually is. A classic root cause of most ill-fated negotiations is the fixed-pie perception: the belief that the other party’s gain comes at our expense, and our gain at theirs (Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The fixed-pie perception simply means that most negotiators work under the assumption that the other party’s gain is one’s own loss, and vice versa. In one investigation, for example, more than two-thirds of the
negotiators assumed that the amount of available resources was fixed, even though this was not the case (Thompson and Hastie, 1990).

A close cousin of the fixed-pie perception is the lose-lose outcome (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996). The possibility of lose-lose negotiations often goes unchecked, because most people tend to view the opposite of win-win as win-lose; however, lose-lose negotiations do exist (Thompson, 1990). They occur if both parties settle for something that both prefer less than what they can readily have. Consider the following lose-lose situations:

- Two countries have been in conflict for decades. Each would benefit from peaceful coexistence, but their attempts at peace talks never achieve substantive progress, and the conflict rages on.
- The management and labor representatives for a local industry embroiled in contract-renewal talks both realize that, if the union goes on strike, company owners and union membership alike will suffer. But no agreement is reached by the time the contract expires.

**False Dichotomy: Choosing Between Cooperation and Competition**

If you view the world through the lens of a fixed-pie vision, the choices are pretty clear: either hold out to protect your own interests, which are by definition opposed to the other’s, or cooperate with the other party so that some kind of compromise can be reached. Cooperation and competition are thought to be the yin and yang of conflict resolution, and it is true that most conflicts are mixed-motive in the sense that we are motivated to get as much of the pie as we can for ourselves, but at the same time motivated to work together with the other person to ensure we reach mutual agreement. We argue, though, that this is a false dichotomy in most instances, because we need not choose to behave purely cooperatively or purely competitively. There is a third, enlightened strategy, which we call strategic creativity (Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Thompson, 2005).

Strategic creativity involves using both cooperation and competition. Specifically, cooperation is needed to reach some kind of mutual agreement with the other party. Fundamentally, cooperation implies concern for your own interests as well as those of the other party. Furthermore, pure cooperation also implies that the other party feels the same way about you. This, of course, is the basis for trust. Yet, it is often unrealistic or inappropriate to assume that people are concerned with the other party’s interests. This is true in conflict situations, as when two neighbors have a dispute about a fallen tree on the property line; it is also true in negotiation situations, as when an employer and an employee discuss the terms of employment. In most cases, the primary objective of the
parties is to further their own interests. Thus, we do not encourage parties to expect that others have their best interests in mind. Rather, we suggest that parties in conflict and negotiation situations attempt to discover points of mutual interest and use them to leverage mutually acceptable resolutions.

In addition, strategic creativity assumes that parties’ interests, though partially opposed, are not completely opposed. The strategically creative negotiators search for opportunities to satisfy the other party’s interests as well as their own.

One way to accomplish a mutually beneficial situation is to identify the issues at hand, and then assess which are important to oneself, and which are important to the other party. For example, in the peace treaty talks between Syria and Israel, technical experts formed committees to identify several key issues, including the extent of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, water rights, security measures, and the timetable for implementing an agreement. After these separate issues were identified, it became clear that Israel put a greater emphasis on security guarantees, and Syria placed greater weight on the withdrawal from the Golan Heights, thus allowing a more integrative agreement to emerge (Slavin, 2000).

**Egocentric Judgment: “I Only Want What’s Fair (for Me)”**

Underlying all of the biases we have discussed thus far is a basic tendency for people to protect their own egos and interests. Our psychological immune system is so efficient that we do not even realize our judgments are tainted with self-interest. For example, consider a husband and wife reflecting on their perceptions of responsibility for cleaning dishes, shopping, child care, and other household and relationship activities. Imagine asking each spouse independently to score who does what percentage of the work. In such a case, both partners generally assume themselves to be more responsible than the other (Ross and Sicoly, 1979). When both spouses’ contributions are totaled for a “couple” score, the perceived contributions frequently amount to more than 100 percent! The same pattern can occur in product development teams and numerous other settings. Such differences in perception undoubtedly exacerbate conflict at home, in the workplace, and elsewhere. For example, the presence of egocentric biases played an important role in the American Airlines negotiations in April 2003, in which bankruptcy was narrowly avoided. American said it had to have $1.8 billion in annual cuts from all employee groups as a part of a $4 billion effort to restructure the company. The airline was losing $5 million a day. The three major groups involved—the pilots union, the professional flight attendants, and the transport workers union all believed that they deserved more than what they believed others were entitled to (Torbenson, 2003).

Yet despite the egocentric bias, most negotiators describe themselves as wanting to be “fair” (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989). Most people
also prefer to divide resources “fairly” (Messick, 1993). The problem is that self-interest tinges otherwise fair allocation of resources. This is because fairness is not an absolute construct, but highly subjective. What is fair to one person may not be fair in the eyes of another. Multiple interpretations of fairness are equally valid in various situations.

Summary
The findings we have described represent four important and pervasive biases that occur in negotiation and conflict resolution. These four findings are enemies that theorists and practitioners must fight to eliminate. In the next section, we elaborate further on the biases that threaten successful dispute resolution in negotiation, focusing specifically on their impact on conflict management.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Practitioners and laypersons have neither the time nor the inclination to read the vast body of empirical research literature on negotiator bias and cognition. In this section, we distill decades of research into a few key principles that are best illustrated by real examples. We deliberately focus on the research literature that has proved to be reliable (replicable and generalizable across a variety of conflict situations, people, and domains) and valid (causal relationships, not just post hoc observation or intuition). We review the four key findings on bias already outlined in the context of conflict situations. At the end of each review, we describe what we think are the key implications for practitioners.

Exaggeration of Conflict
People involved in social or political conflict tend to overestimate the extremity of the other side’s beliefs, a reflection of the first bias: opposing forces.

Consider the reactions to the real-life conflict commonly referred to as the Howard Beach incident, in which a young black man, Michael Griffith, was struck and killed by a passing car as he attempted to escape a group of white pursuers in the Howard Beach neighborhood of Queens in New York City. In one study, people who characterized themselves as liberals or conservatives were asked to rate the extent to which they believed in the truth of certain statements about the case (“The white pursuers deliberately chased Michael Griffith into the path of oncoming traffic”; “Michael Griffith had consumed cocaine on the night in question”; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross, 1995). The same people were then asked to predict how “the other side” would rate the truth of the same statements. That is, conservatives were asked to predict liberals’ ratings for each question, as were liberals asked to predict conservatives’ ratings. Both liberals and conservatives overestimated the
difference between their side and the other. Liberals overestimated the extent to which conservatives believed in the truth of statements favoring the white perpetrators; conservatives overestimated the extent to which liberals believed in the truth of statements favoring the black victim. Thus, the partisans in this case believed that the distance between their positions was greater than it really was.

Perhaps most surprising, neutrals (people who described themselves as neither liberal nor conservative) also succumbed to this mistake; they too overestimated the gap between liberals’ and conservatives’ beliefs about the Howard Beach incident. All three groups (liberals, conservatives, and neutrals) exaggerated the extent of conflict: all three groups overestimated first the extent to which conservatives would interpret the events in ways that blamed the black victim, and second the extent to which liberals would interpret events in ways that favored the black victim.

The pattern of results is not unique to this incident. Exaggeration of perceived conflict exists in many other domains: abortion, the death penalty, the arms race, and even the “Western canon debate” (the dispute among educators about the choice of books in introductory college-level civilization and literature courses).

It is important to consider the implications of the tendency for people to exaggerate conflict. If the partisans in a conflict perceive their differences as greater than they really are, then they might be overly pessimistic about finding common ground. If people hold erroneous assumptions about the gap between their own position and that of the other side, then people might decide that it is not worth even sitting down at the bargaining table on the grounds that any discussion is fruitless (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross, 1995).

The fact that we exaggerate the extent of conflict means that information exchange among parties is crucial. Unless both sides to a conflict discuss the nature of their beliefs, assumptions, and concerns, each side continues to perceive the other as unreasonable and extreme. Because neutral third parties also tend to exaggerate conflict, these results have important implications for mediators as well. To be effective, mediators must understand the true nature of each side’s position. If a mediator relies on her preconceived assumptions about each party’s position, she is likely to overestimate the extremity of each party’s position and to overestimate the gap between the parties.

In addition to forming an accurate understanding of the conflict, mediators have an important role to play in helping parties overcome their own perception of exaggerated conflict. Exaggeration of conflict comes in two forms: each side tends to see the other side’s position as more extreme than it really is, and one’s own side is also seen as more extreme than it really is. Mediators can help parties see that their own position does not need to be as extreme as they think it needs to be.
Lose-Lose Outcomes

Sometimes all of the people in an interdependent decision-making situation prefer one settlement to another but nevertheless fail to achieve it.

In February 2005, the National Hockey League (NHL) Commissioner Gary Bettman officially cancelled the hockey season after a five-month player lockout. Because a new labor agreement could not be reached between the players union and the league, several billion dollars of revenue were lost. Furthermore, almost four hundred of the league’s seven hundred players decided to move to Europe to play hockey (often earning less than half of what they made annually playing in the NHL) (Lapointe, 2005). This is called a lose-lose agreement, because both sides have settled for an outcome that is clearly worse for each of them, than compared with coming to an agreement.

The frequency with which lose-lose agreements occur is both surprising and alarming. One statistical analysis involving more than five thousand participants revealed that lose-lose agreements occurred 20 percent of the time (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996). That is, in cases where the parties have compatible preferences with regard to a particular issue, fully one time in five they agree on an alternative that both prefer less than another outcome.

Moreover, it is unlikely that the lose-lose agreement is an artifact of the laboratory, with no real-world significance. Balke, Hammond, and Meyer’s examination (1973) of labor-management negotiations at Dow Chemical is a case in point. Analysis of that dispute revealed that labor and management both preferred the same wage increase; yet neither party realized it until after a costly two-month strike.

Another example is illustrated in Walton and McKersie’s analysis (1965) of the Cuban missile crisis, which stemmed from the Soviet Union’s buildup of missile bases in Cuba during the Cold War. The crisis had reached dangerous proportions when the United States threatened to retaliate against the Soviet Union when Cuba fired on American airplanes. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, unbeknown to the United States, also preferred that Cuba refrain from provoking the United States, because there was a danger that Cuba’s behavior would incite a war over issues not important to Soviet interests. The parties that had come to the brink of nuclear war shared compatible interests without realizing it.

Why does this happen? As discussed earlier, people sometimes adopt a fixed-pie perception in which they believe that the other person’s interests are completely opposed to their own. This belief is established at the outset, before people even have the opportunity to meet or talk with each other. In addition, the fixed-pie perception is remarkably durable; it remains even when people have high incentives and ample feedback is available to challenge the perception.

But sometimes people do realize their preferences are compatible with the other party’s, and yet still fail to capitalize on shared interests. Political pressures,
situational norms, and organizational constraints can prevent people from optimiz-
ing their compatible interests. A vacation rental company with a weeklong rental policy gets a call, late in the week, from a renter requesting a midweek stay. It would be better for both parties to rent the property. But this means that company policy would be broken, so the agency refuses. Parties may face similar kinds of social pressure in other situations, and the desire to save face may pre-
vent a person from settling on what is obviously a better deal (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994).

Invalid Perceptions of Control

We all like to think that we have control over our environment. To some degree, this is certainly true; when we pull on a door it usually opens, and when we say hello to a colleague we usually receive a hello in response. Theorists from several domains conclude that this sense of personal control is necessary to a healthy self-concept; without some sense of control over outcomes in our environment, we would feel helpless and worthless. But we easily become so accustomed to feeling in control that we automatically, egocentrically assume we have causal influence over certain events in our environment when, in fact, we have no such influence. As an intriguing example, craps players act as though they control the dice by throwing them softly to produce low numbers or throwing hard for high numbers (Henslin, 1967). As another, a baseball player on a hitting streak might wear the same pair of socks in every game for fear of jinxing the streak.

Inflated perceptions of control generally stem from the same sort of egocen-
tric bias that we described earlier. In short, people are acutely aware of their own actions, thoughts, and feelings and less aware of those of others. Moreover, we have a poor memory for contingency information, and our judgments are biased by self-serving motivations. Although people who are given a lottery ticket with a preassigned number gladly accept the opportunity to trade the ticket for one from a different lottery with a better chance of winning (Langer, 1975), those who choose their own number prefer to hold on to the ticket and forgo the opportunity to enter a lottery with a better chance of winning. Why? Because picking their own lottery number gives people an illusion of control; they try to choose a “good” number thinking it is more likely to win, even though in reality all numbers have equal likelihood. Thus, when it comes to causal relationships between events, people often falsely believe they exert more control than is actually the case.

Conflict situations often present circumstances that encourage people to adopt invalid perceptions of control. In one study, negotiators faced an oppo-
nent who was (unbeknown to the negotiator participating in the study) actually a confederate of the experimenter. During the negotiation, the confederate strictly follows a preset schedule of concessions. When the preprogrammed schedule called for the confederate to make an extreme initial demand followed
by retreats to a moderate demand, the participants felt they had control over the opponent and the final settlement. But when the schedule called for the confederate to make a moderate initial demand and then refuse to retreat, negotiators reacted unfavorably because they felt they had no causal influence on the outcome of the negotiation (Benton, Kelley, and Liebling, 1972).

In another study, participants played a game in which they had a choice of cooperating or competing with the other party. The other party faced a similar choice. The worst outcome for a player is to cooperate while the opponent competes. The best outcome for both players together is if both cooperate. As a player in this game, you are told either that your opponent has already made a choice or that your opponent will make a choice at the same time you do. In either case, you do not know your opponent’s choice before making your own, and your opponent does not know your choice before making his own. Faced with this situation, people are more likely to cooperate if the opponent’s decision is made at the same time as their own (Morris, Sim, and Girrotto, 1998). In this situation, players have the causal illusion that they can influence opponents who have not yet decided by “showing” their opponent that they are cooperating. On the other hand, if the opponent has already made a decision, the player knows there is no way of influencing it, because causation cannot work backward in time. Of course, in either case, the opponent has no way of knowing the player’s choice until after making his, so the player is unable to show the opponent anything about his choice.

These results suggest a tactic for concession making during conflict resolution: inform the opponent of an imminent concession simultaneously with, or just after, the opponent makes a concession. This fosters the illusion of control in your opponent; he reasons that by showing you he is making a generous concession, you will reciprocate and do the same. In the meantime, regardless of what you decide to do, you can benefit from the opponent’s generous concession. Similarly, mediators can suggest to each party that the other party is ripe for influence and suggest that a concession will greatly influence the other party.

**Biased Judgments of Fairness**

We have made the point that fairness is not an absolute construct; instead, it is socially defined. What is fair to one person may not be fair in the eyes of another. Consider what happened when two vice presidents of a major Fortune 100 company were promoted to senior vice president at about the same time in the late 1990s (Klein, 2003). Both of them moved into new offices, but one of them suspected an inequity. He pulled out blueprints and measured the square footage of each office. His suspicions were confirmed when it turned out the other’s office was bigger than his by a few feet. A former employee said, “He blew a gasket.” Walls were removed, and his office was reconfigured to make it as large as his counterpart’s. This example illustrates...
that in any situation, there are as many interpretations of fairness as there are parties involved. Here, equality, equity, and need are all plausible principles on which a decision can be made. Hence, in conflict resolution, two people may both truly want a fair settlement, but they may have very different and equally justifiable ideas about what is fair.

Although people generally want what is fair, their assessments of fairness are often self-serving (Messick and Sentis, 1979). Moreover, the fact that we have little or no self-awareness of this influence on our otherwise sound judgment heightens the intransigence of our views. Suppose you have worked for seven hours and have been paid $25. Another person has worked for ten hours doing the same work. How much do you think the other person should get paid? If you’re like most people, you believe the other person should get paid more for doing more work—about $30, on average (Messick and Sentis, 1979). This is hardly a self-serving response. Now, consider the reverse situation: the other person has worked for seven hours and been paid $25. You have worked for ten hours. What is a fair wage for you to be paid? Messick and Sentis found the average response to be about $35. The difference is about $10, and it illustrates the phenomenon of egocentric bias: people pay themselves substantially more than they are willing to pay others for doing the same task.

Consider another example. You are told about an accident in which a motorcyclist was injured after being hit by a car. After learning all the facts, you are asked to make a judgment of how much money you think is a fair settlement to compensate the motorcyclist for his injuries. Then, you are asked to play the role of either the injured motorcyclist or the driver of the car and to negotiate a settlement. Most of the time, people in this situation have no trouble coming to an agreement (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer, 1995).

Now imagine doing the same thing, except that your role assignment comes first. That is, first you are asked to play the role of the motorcyclist or the driver, and then you learn all the facts, decide on a fair settlement, and finally negotiate. In this situation, the only thing that changes is that you learn the facts and make a fair settlement judgment through the eyes of one of the parties, instead of from the standpoint of a neutral observer. As it turns out, this difference is crucial. Instead of having no trouble coming to an agreement (as do the people who do not know their roles until just prior to the negotiation), people who know their roles from the beginning have a very difficult time coming to an agreement (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer, 1995). The high impasse rate among people who know their roles from the beginning is linked to self-serving judgments of fairness. The more biased the prerogative fair-settlement judgment, the more likely the later negotiation will result in impasse. Thus, a person who knows she is playing the role of motorcyclist before making a fair-settlement judgment is likely to assess a large damage award (in her own favor). A person who knows he is playing the role of the car driver before
making a fair-settlement judgment is more likely to assess a small damage award (in his own favor). The result is that these two people have quite a hard time negotiating an agreement, because their assessments of what is fair are so far apart.

Although biased perceptions of fairness are quite common (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer, 1995), cultural factors can worsen or lessen these biases. In comparison to negotiators from individualistic cultures (for example, the United States), negotiators from collectivist cultures (for example, Japan) are less likely to hold such extremely biased perceptions of fairness (Gefland and others, 2002). In one investigation, Gefland and associates (2002) found that, because of their higher levels of biased perceptions of fairness, U.S. negotiators experienced impasse more often compared to Japanese negotiators.

In general, there are often as many proposed solutions as there are parties to the conflict. Each party sincerely believes its own proposed outcome is fair for everyone. At the same time, each party’s conception of fairness is tainted by self-interest, so that each solution is most favorable to the party proposing it.

The Illusion of Transparency

In our daily interactions with others, we tend to assume that when we express particular emotions or preferences, the people with whom we are interacting will accurately pick up on these cues. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. We often overestimate the degree to which others have access to our internal states. The tendency to overestimate the degree to which others understand what is on our minds is referred to as the illusion of transparency (Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec, 1998). In other words, the illusion of transparency means that negotiators believe that they are revealing more than they actually are. (In other words, they believe that others have access to information about them when in fact they do not.) For example, in one investigation, negotiators judged whether an observer to the negotiation would be able to accurately discern their negotiation goals from their behavior (Vorauer and Claude, 1998). Negotiators consistently overestimated the transparency of their objectives. Thus, people feel more like an “open book” with respect to their goals and interests in negotiations than they actually are.

In certain negotiations, one may stand to receive a better outcome if one does not show too much excitement over closing a deal. For instance, if a prospective home buyer is so enamored with the house that he would be willing to pay the asking price, then communicating this level of enthusiasm to the seller would put the buyer at a disadvantage. If the seller were aware of the buyer’s exuberance, she may simply refuse to lower the price at all, knowing that the buyer would likely be willing to settle for the asking price. In this case, it is in the buyer’s best interest to not let his enthusiasm for the home “leak out.” Yet, even when we are consciously trying to hide our true preferences, we still experience
the illusion of transparency. In one investigation, Van Boven, Gilovich, and Medvec (2003) found that negotiators who were consciously trying to conceal their preferences imagined that they had “tipped their hand” to the other party more than they actually had. “The illusion of transparency is thus due to the sense that one’s specific actions and reactions that arise in the give-and-take of negotiation—a blush here, an averted gaze there—are more telling than they actually are” (Van Boven, Gilovich, and Medvec, 2003, p. 128).

Sometimes, there are advantages to revealing information. For example, when negotiators have different priorities, negotiators who share information are more likely to reach integrative agreements than those who do not (Thompson, 1991). This is partly because of our inclination to reciprocate: if you share information, chances are that the other party will share information as well (Thompson, 1991). But the illusion of transparency can discourage beneficial information sharing, because it can mislead negotiators into falsely believing that the other party has enough (or too much) information already (Van Boven, Gilovich, and Medvec, 2003). Alternatively, a negotiator who is aware that he might fall prey to the illusion of transparency can make a conscious effort to share information with the other party, thereby increasing the likelihood of resolving a conflict in a mutually beneficial way.

Liking, Respect, and Collective Interests

Choices made by organizational decision makers often have implications for the choices made by other organizations within the same industry (for example, product pricing, employee salaries, and marketing strategy). These decision makers often must decide between pursuing a course of action that benefits their own organizations only and choices that also provide benefit to other organizations. Rather than engaging in mutually competitive actions that ultimately hurt each other (for example, engaging in a negative advertising campaign), some organizations have attempted to find points of cooperation that can align their competitive goals. For example, in 1998, two national dairy companies using separate advertising campaigns agreed to create a single marketing plan to increase milk sales in the United States. Dairy Management, Inc., which used the “Got Milk?” campaign and the National Fluid Milk Processor Promotion Board, which used a popular collection of advertisements in which celebrities wear milk mustaches, coordinated campaigns to increase total fluid milk sales by 4 percent by the year 2000 (Elliot, 1998).

This classic problem of choosing between furthering one’s own interests and those of the larger group or collective is at the heart of many conflicts. Our earlier discussion of egocentric judgment processes revealed that people tend to serve their own interests not necessarily because they are selfish and greedy, but because their own interests are immediately accessible to them. Thus, even people who truly desire to be evenhanded often behave in what may seem, to
a neutral observer, as self-interest. The question, of course, is how to mitigate this undesirable impulse. Merely telling people to monitor their own behavior is surely insufficient—and it may even increase self-interested behavior. Rather, to the extent that people can develop and enhance a sense of social identity—that is, derive meaning and identity from relationships with others—the egocentric effect may be mitigated.

The importance of social relationships in curbing self-interested behavior was illustrated in a study in which people were asked to decide between keeping resources for themselves and contributing to the organization as a whole (Thompson, Kray, and Lind, 1998). Not surprisingly, the better the relationship among the decision makers (the more they knew and liked each other), the more likely they were to agree to contribute resources to the organization as a whole. Remarkably, there was another important factor that affected people’s decisions to contribute to the organization: how much respect was bestowed by organizational authorities. People who were granted high respect from relevant organizational authorities (and who also knew and liked their fellow decision makers) contributed the most resources to the organization as a whole. Thus, in the team management example considered earlier, a group of managers who know and like each other, and who also feel that upper management respects and carefully considers their decisions, contributes the most team resources for the good of the organization as a whole. On the other hand, if managers do not know and like each other, or if they are not accorded respect from upper management, they are likely to contribute the least to organization wide concerns.

**I’m Happy Only If You’re Sad**

When a conflict is resolved, the parties often assess how satisfied they are with the outcome of the resolution. But parties to a conflict do not measure their outcomes on an absolute scale. Instead, success is a socially determined construct, measured by many factors, including comparison with similar others, views of significant others, and the outcomes of one’s opponent. In fact, there is little or no relationship between how good people feel and their actual outcomes. In conflict situations in which parties’ interests are not completely aligned, how good people feel is a converse function of the emotions displayed by the other person: when the other is sad, we feel good; when they are happy, we feel bad (Thompson, Valley, and Kramer, 1995).

Consider what happened to Joseph Bachelder, who was representing a grocery executive in critical negotiations. Bachelder demanded that his client—the grocer—get a 4.9 percent stake in the business. The words barely left his mouth when the company’s controlling shareholder jubilantly agreed. Says Bachelder, “I just died. I knew right away that I had underbid. We could have had more if I had just asked for it” (Anders, 2003).
Our feelings of satisfaction after the fact are not the only way we are affected by our opponent. Our preferences during an ongoing dispute can also be affected by the opponent’s expressed preferences. For example, in a survey of opinions regarding possible arms reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union, respondents were asked to evaluate the terms of a nuclear disarmament proposal, a proposal that was allegedly initiated by either the United States, Soviet Union, or a neutral third party (Ross and Stillinger, 1991). In all cases, the proposal was identical; however, reactions to it depended upon who allegedly initiated it. The terms were seen as unfavorable to the United States when the Soviets were the initiators, even though the same terms appeared moderately favorable when attributed to a neutral third party and quite favorable when attributed to the United States. (See also Oskamp, 1965.)

This case is an example of reactive devaluation, which is the tendency for a party to undervalue an offer just because it was the other party who offered it (Oskamp, 1965; Ross and Stillinger, 1991). The reasoning behind reactive devaluation might sound like: “My opponent wouldn’t make this offer unless it’s good for him. But if it’s good for him, then it’s probably bad for me, so I’ll refuse to accept it.” The examples of respondents to the arms reduction proposals and Bachelder’s displeasure in the other party’s immediate acceptance of his offer illustrate that our preferences and our evaluation of a dispute can be determined by the other party’s preferences and reactions. When the other party is happy, we are sad; when the other party seems to favor a particular outcome, we devalue it.

Curhan, Neale, and Ross (2004) have demonstrated that in typical negotiation formats, in which negotiators begin by simply exchanging initial proposals with one another, reactive devaluation of initial offers is a common response. By engaging in reactive devaluation—assuming the other party’s offer was primarily beneficial for the other party—many of these negotiators failed to reach agreement with one another. Two techniques helped to prevent reactive devaluation. First, asking negotiators to assign a rating to a variety of proposals reduced reactive devaluation by motivating negotiators to remain consistent with their original assessment even after one of the previously rated proposals is endorsed by the opponent. Second, asking negotiators to have a general discussion about the issues on the table, without making any proposals or offers, also reduced reactive devaluation. During these discussions, negotiators were able to express their needs and priorities, leading their counterparts subsequently to make more charitable attributions about the offers they received. Both prerating proposals and prior discussion are techniques that can be easily implemented by a mediator; if no mediator is present, the parties can try to structure the negotiation so that prediscussion of needs and priorities takes place before any specific offers are exchanged.
The Schmooze Effect

When people negotiate face-to-face, they rely on subtle behavior cues—posture, intonation, facial expression—to understand what the opponent is thinking and feeling. In fact, the credibility of a message is much affected by whether the nonverbal cues are consistent or inconsistent with the verbal message. We understand our opponent’s behavioral synchrony cues automatically; this is not something we are necessarily aware of. Yet this subtle process helps negotiators build rapport and trust, which can lead to favorable agreements for all parties.

When behavioral synchrony cues are absent—as when negotiators communicate via some method other than face-to-face contact—then rapport and trust must be built in some other way. In the absence of any rapport-building mechanism, negotiators endure strained and tense interactions, and they attribute their own feeling of ill ease to the malevolent intentions of the other party.

In recent years, changing organizational structures have created social networks composed of organization members who are physically separated, as in multinational corporations. Members of these organizations come to rely increasingly on electronically mediated communication methods (e-mail, fax, and phone) to conduct negotiations. But unless negotiators make a conscious effort to develop mutual cooperation and rapport, the absence of social cues in electronically mediated negotiations can lead to uncertainty about social norms and increased risk taking.

Developing rapport before plunging into an electronic negotiation ("e-negotiation") can help avoid misunderstandings and misattributions. Strangers conducting e-negotiations are more likely to avoid impasse, to feel good about their negotiation counterpart, and to want to negotiate with the same counterpart again in the future if they make efforts to develop rapport prior to negotiating (Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, and Morris, 1999; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson, 2002; Nadler, 2004). Developing rapport can be accomplished by using surprisingly simple techniques. In one study, e-negotiators exchanged photographs and biographical information and had an initial “getting to know you” chat with their counterpart via e-mail prior to beginning the negotiation (Moore Kurtzberg, Thompson, and Morris, 1999). In other studies, e-negotiators simply picked up the telephone and had a five-minute “getting to know you chat” with their counterpart prior to negotiating (Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson, 2002; Nadler, 2004). In all three studies, these simple “schmoozing” techniques had dramatic effects: negotiators who did not “schmooze” were much less successful than those who did. Nonschmoozers were angry and frustrated with their counterpart, trusted their counterpart less, and were less likely to reach an agreement than schmoozers were.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING PEOPLE

As contributors to the body of scientific empirical research on negotiation and conflict resolution, we admit with some embarrassment that much more thought goes into examining the nature of bias and error at the bargaining table than to solutions as to how to eliminate or reduce it. Perhaps this reflects the fundamental tension between basic and applied research. However, we are not content to naïvely suggest that mere awareness of bias is sufficient to deal with it. Thus, we have undertaken a line of empirical investigation that asks how negotiators learn and apply principles at the bargaining table; we review the highlights here. Our conclusion about learning to reduce cognitive bias and error at the bargaining table is based on three principles: feedback, analogical reasoning, and behavioral skills.

The Importance of Feedback

Most people do not get timely or accurate feedback about their performance. Thus, they continue to make the same mistakes time and again. To return to the fixed-pie perception, we enter the negotiation assuming that the other party’s gain comes at our expense and vice versa. Even if this assumption is false (as it often is), chances are good that we do not realize it and enter our next negotiation with the same fixed-pie assumption. Even if people receive feedback, it is often incomplete or misconstrued, whether by the sender or the recipient. This, of course, is completely consistent with the egocentric biases we discussed earlier.

As a way of combating bias, Thompson and De Harpport (1994) examined the effects of three feedback situations: process feedback, outcome feedback, and no feedback. Negotiators who received no feedback knew nothing about the other party or the underlying structure of the negotiation. They were given a blank sheet of paper and asked to write some comments about the nature of their experience in the negotiation they had just completed. Negotiators who received outcome feedback were told the value of the overall package to the other party in the completed negotiation. This feedback provided important information about the underlying structure of the negotiation. Finally, negotiators who received process feedback were given complete information about their opponent’s preferences for each issue negotiated. As an example, for a company representative who negotiated an employment contract, process feedback imparted information about how the employee subjectively valued the various issues discussed (salary, vacation, annual raise, and so on).

Negotiators who received process feedback were most likely to abandon the pervasive fixed-pie assumption in subsequent negotiations, and to recognize trade-offs that were mutually beneficial for both parties. Suppose two negotiators
have just received process feedback after negotiating a job contract. Assume these same parties are to negotiate again about a completely different set of issues, say, regarding a house rental. Having received process feedback, they are likely to assume correctly that not every gain for the other party constitutes an equal loss for themselves. Furthermore, they recognize that mutually beneficial exchanges can be made: if the landlord is to concede on an issue important to the tenant (say, monthly rent), then in exchange the tenant can concede on an issue important to the landlord (lease length). In this way, negotiators who receive process feedback reach agreements that are satisfactory to both parties. By contrast, negotiators who receive only outcome feedback are not as successful in recognizing this integrative potential, and those who receive no feedback are the least successful of all.

**Analogical Reasoning**

One of the most effective means by which people solve problems is analogical reasoning (Gick and Holyoak, 1983). Analogy is the process of mapping the solution for one problem into a solution for another problem. This involves noticing that a solution to a problem from the past is relevant, and then mapping the elements from that solution to the target problem. For example, a student learning about the structure of the atom enhances her understanding by drawing on her prior knowledge of the structure of the solar system.

In many instances, experienced negotiators have occasion to reason by analogy from a previous negotiation experience but often fail to do so. This problem of failing to capitalize on opportunities to learn by analogy is not limited to negotiators; in general, people’s ability to take full advantage of prior experience is highly limited (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner, 1999). Having solved one problem does not always help in solving an analogous problem if the two come from different contexts. We do not always access prior knowledge, given an analogous situation.

In a study of learning by analogy (Gick and Holyoak, 1983), students were given a problem about how to use radiation to destroy a patient’s tumor, given that the stream of rays at full strength will destroy the healthy tissue en route to the tumor. The solution is to converge on the tumor with low-strength radiation from multiple directions. Having been given this problem and learned the solution, people are then given an analogous one: a general needs to capture a fortress but finds he cannot use his entire army to make a frontal attack. One solution is to divide the army and converge on the fortress from many directions. Even when the tumor problem and the fortress problem are presented in the same session, only about 41 percent of students spontaneously applied the convergence solution to the radiation problem. Though they retained the knowledge about the first solution, they failed to access it. Yet, when simply told to “think about the earlier [tumor] problem,” a full 85 percent of students applied the
convergence solution to the new problem. Simply reminding people of an analogous problem helps them map the solution onto the new problem.

The good news for negotiators is that analogy training can substantially improve negotiation performance. In one study, managers who received analogy training were nearly three times as likely to recognize and apply the appropriate principle in future negotiations (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner, 1999). As a result, negotiators who had analogy training outperformed those who did not. For example, in negotiating a deal for a Broadway production, negotiation dyads with analogy training gained an average of $21,000 over their untrained counterparts, who made suboptimal agreements and left large amounts of money on the bargaining table—wasted, as far as both parties were concerned.

In another study of negotiator training, four other learning principles were compared to learning by analogy (Nadler, Thompson, and Van Boven, 2003): (1) learning by observation (watching other negotiators), (2) textbook learning (reading about negotiation principles), (3) learning by feedback (process feedback, as described in the previous section), and (4) learning by experience only (no explicit training). The greatest improvement in negotiator performance was seen with negotiators who had analogy training or observation training. Performance also improved, albeit to a lesser extent, when negotiators learned through feedback. Those exposed to textbook learning or to learning by experience alone showed no measurable improvement in performance. Thus, the picture emerging from this research is that training programs teaching negotiators how to make relevant comparisons between prior and current negotiation experiences is an extremely effective method for improving outcomes.

Behavioral Skills
To be effective at conflict resolution, people need to have strategies that work. Further, the strategies need to be general enough to apply to varying situations. Yet they cannot be so general as to be useless. In this subsection, we identify and discuss five key strategies in the bargaining literature that withstand the difficult test of empirical investigation. (See also Bazerman and Neale, 1992.)

**Build Trust and Share Information.** In long-term relationships, people learn to build trust as a way of responding to uncertainty. Even though we lack a close relationship with someone, we might expect to have future interactions: a car dealer who makes a sale might expect the customer to refer friends or engage in repeat business; a job candidate negotiating terms with an interviewer expects to interact with the same person after beginning the job; two managers from different divisions working together toward an organizational goal know they will inevitably have future contact. In all of these situations, opportunity for deceit exists because of informational uncertainty or asymmetry. One way
of dealing with this uncertainty is to build trust through sharing information of the sort that clearly indicates an interest in mutual well-being. Sharing such information helps ensure that the parties can continue to develop good working relations for the future.

**Ask Questions.** Building trust is not always possible. Sometimes negotiations are a one-shot deal, where the parties are aware they will never see one another again. Even where future interaction is possible, building trust is still difficult. If trust is absent or unclear, one of the most important strategies to pursue is to ask questions—specifically, to gather information about the opponent’s preferences to ascertain which issues the opponent values most, which option is most preferred on each specific issue, and whether the opponent’s expectations regarding the future differ from your own. Ideally, the issue most valued by your opponent is different from yours, in which case both parties can get what is most wanted by giving up something considered less valuable. But it is difficult to achieve trade-offs without asking about the opponent’s priorities.

**Provide Information.** If the opponent is reluctant to answer any questions, there is an alternative strategy available: share some information first. Offering information is usually an effective strategy because it invariably triggers the reciprocity principle. We often feel obligated to return in kind what others have offered or given to us. Reciprocity is a powerful behavioral tendency observable in all human societies. People feel upset and distressed if they receive a favor—or a slight—from another person but are prevented from returning it.

Negotiators who extend information about their own interests or priorities are likely to receive some information in return. Although they may not want to reveal their reservation price (the minimum for which they will settle) or their best alternative option, they can still offer information about the relative importance of the issues as they see them. The goal is to exchange just enough information so that the final agreement is maximally beneficial for both parties and divides all resources available without leaving anything left over on the bargaining table.

**Make Multiple Offers Simultaneously.** Sometimes, negotiators are disappointed to find that their attempts to obtain and seek information are not effective. There is an alternative strategy: make one offer, and wait to hear the opponent’s response. Little can be learned, though, about the opponent’s interests and preferences simply from a single offer that is rejected. A more productive strategy is to make multiple offers. This involves presenting the other party with two (or more) proposals of equal value to oneself. The other party is asked to indicate which of the proposals he prefers. This can reveal valuable information about which issues are important to him. Thus, the negotiator plays
detective by drawing conclusions based on the opponent’s response to the multiple offers (Medvec and Galinsky, 2004).

**Search for Postsettlement Settlements.** Sometimes, parties may decide to renegotiate after a mutually agreeable settlement has been reached. It may seem counterintuitive or counterproductive to resume negotiations after a deal has been struck. But the strategy of postsettlement settlements is remarkably effective in improving the quality of negotiated agreements. Negotiators using this strategy agree to explore other options, mindful that the goal is to find another agreement that both prefer to the current one—with the understanding that they are bound by the initial agreement if another is not found. The postsettlement settlement strategy allows both parties to reveal their preferences without fear of exploitation, because they can safely revert to their previous agreement (Bazerman, Russ, and Yakura, 1987).

**CONCLUSION**

We believe that the marriage between practitioners and theorists should be much more solid than it is. Theorists have identified a host of rather benign-looking beliefs and cognitions that hinder effective negotiations, but they have failed to produce a systematic body of research aimed at reducing cognitive biases that hinder effective dispute resolution. Unfortunately, most negotiators are not aware of the existence of cognitive bias and its deleterious effects. In this chapter, we have identified four key biases that conflict theorists and practitioners in particular must fight to eliminate. We have also examined the use of performance feedback and analogy training, and named five specific behavioral skills that meet the test of empirical investigation. We hope that theorists and practitioners continue to identify and examine new methods by which to eliminate or reduce cognitive bias at the bargaining table.

**References**


CHAPTER TWELVE

Emotion and Conflict: Why It Is Important to Understand How Emotions Affect Conflict and How Conflict Affects Emotions

Evelin G. Lindner

We have all experienced strong emotions related to conflict. Our emotions affect the conflicts in our lives and conflict, in turn, influences our emotions.

This chapter begins with two brief examples, one international and one personal, to show the interaction between emotions and conflict. For the international example, let us look at World War II.

Hitler was an isolated and alienated loner obsessed by the weakness of Germany during World War I and after. At some point, however, his obsessions began to resonate with the feelings of what was called in Germany "the little people" (die kleinen Leute, or the powerless). He offered a grand narrative of national humiliation and invited "the little people" to join in with the personal grievances they suffered due to the general political and economic misery. "The little people" occupied a distinctly subordinated position in Germany’s social hierarchy prior to Hitler’s rise. They rallied to Hitler’s cause because he provided them with a sense of importance. He was greeted as a savior, as a new kind of leader promising them love and unprecedented significance instead of insignificance. Only after World War II did they have to painfully recognize how he had abused their loyalty. As soon as he had enough popular support, Hitler built institutions that forced his manipulation on everybody, evoking noble feelings of loyalty and heroic resistance against humiliation, convincing the German people that the Aryan race was meant to lead and save the world. Hitler was an expert on feelings. Many Germans put such faith in Hitler that they followed
him until 1945, even when it became clear that the situation was doomed. Intense loyalty and highly emotional participation in a collective obsession undercut even the most basic rational and ethical considerations.

Now to a personal example: Envision yourself as a therapist with a client named Eve who came to you because she was depressed. She is severely and regularly beaten by her husband, Adam. Neighbors describe scenes of shouting and crying and the bruise marks on Eve’s body are only too obvious. You are afraid Eve may not survive and you visit her as frequently as your schedule permits. You try to convince her to protect herself by leaving her unsafe home to seek refuge in sheltered housing, at least at times of crisis. In your mind, you define her as a victim and her husband as a perpetrator. You explain to Eve that “domestic chastisement” has long been outlawed. You suggest that Adam utterly humiliates her and that she ought to develop a “healthy” anger as a first step toward collecting sufficient strength to change her life. To you, this situation clearly represents a destructive conflict loaded with hot and violent emotion and you wish to contribute to its constructive resolution.

Eve stubbornly undermines your efforts and thwarts your dedicated and well-intentioned attempts to help her. She argues along these lines: “Beating me is my husband’s way of loving me! I am not a victim. I bring his anger on myself when I fail to respect his authority! He saved me from a cruel father! My father never spoke of love and care—Adam does!” And Adam adamantly refuses to be labeled a “perpetrator,” accusing you of viciously disturbing the peace of his home and claiming that you violate his male honor.

From Adam’s perspective, there is no destructive conflict, no suffering victim, and no violent perpetrator. It is you, the therapist, the human rights defender, an uninvited third party, who introduces conflict. The definition of love and benevolence is crucial here. You define love as the meeting of equal hearts and minds in mutual caring, a definition embedded in the human rights ideal of equal dignity for all. Eve and her husband, on the other hand, connect love with female subservience. You introduce conflict by drawing Eve’s attention to a new definition of love, one that is in total opposition to the couple’s definition.

We can easily link the example of Eve and Adam to events at the international level. Human rights framings of equal dignity for all do not always meet friendly acceptance among the supposed perpetrators. The South African elites were defensive about Apartheid—they felt entitled to superiority. So-called honor-killings have only recently received attention. This practice has moved from the rather neutral category of cultural practice to the accusatory category of violation of human rights. Or consider the Indian caste system, which has only very recently been labeled Indian Apartheid, a new definition for a way of life that has endured for thousands of years.

In this conundrum, in which emotions and conflict are entangled in painful ways, questions arise such as when and in what ways are emotions (feelings of
suffering, pain and rage, or love and caring) part of a conflict that calls for our attention? And when are they not? Who decides? What we can be sure about is that emotions and conflict are not static. They are embedded in larger historical and cultural surroundings. We live in times of transition toward increasing global interdependence and more equal dignity for all. Emotion and conflict and their consequences—how we live them, how we define them—are part of this transition. They, too, change as the world transforms.

THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS

What are emotions? Are emotions cultural or biological, or both? Are they nothing more than constructs of folk knowledge? Are they merely bodily responses, dictated by hormones, skin conductance levels, and cerebral blood flows? Are there basic emotions? Affects? Feelings? Thoughts? Why do we have them? What functions do they serve? What about the so-called social emotions? Are there universal emotions across cultures? Are emotions rational? Controllable? To which actions do emotions lead? Is there an automatic link between emotion and action?

William James (1842–1910), one of the fathers of psychology, was interested in research on emotion; however, his immediate successors were much less so. Only a few visionary scholars, such as Silvan S. Tomkins, Magda B. Arnold, Paul Ekman, Carroll E. Izard, Klaus Scherer, and Nico H. Frijda, invested their energies in efforts to understand human emotion. The problem was that, for a while, behaviorism and cognitivism were “sexier” than the topic of emotion. However, behaviorism turned out to be too narrow, as did cognitivism.

Today we know that thought, behavior, and feeling are closely connected. Hence, interest in learning about emotions, though resuscitated only very recently, is now exploding and already rapidly changing. Up until only a few years ago, researchers were intent upon constructing classifications categorizing the fundamental “basic” emotions. For those who are interested, Andrew Ortony and Terence J. Turner (1990) give a tabular overview of some of the classification systems.

Today, the new cohort of researchers no longer endorses a single perspective on emotion, preferring a multilayered approach that conceptualizes elaborated emotions as comprehensive packages of meanings, behaviors, social practices, and norms that crystallize around primordial emotions. James R. Averill (1997) discusses how emotional experiences are “scripted.” Jan Smedslund (1997) describes the psycho-logic inherent in our dealings with emotion. The application of such scripts, however, varies according to cultural and historic influences. A rich overview of the new approaches to emotion research is to be found, among others, in David Yun Dai and Robert J. Sternberg (2004), Joseph P. Forgas (2001), or Tracy J. Mayne and George A. Bonanno (2001).
This approach has invalidated the old nature versus nurture debate. We are learning that emotions are both hardwired and malleable, and adaptive to social and cultural influences. Hardwired basic affects such as the fearful fight or flight reaction or its opposite, pleasurable approach, are the bedrock on which elaborated emotions build. Our primordial emotions are universal, biologically based response systems that have enabled humans to meet the problems of physical survival, reproduction, and group governance. Culture, however, has loosened the link between those primordial emotions and their functions. New solutions to old problems have emerged, as well as new uses for old emotions.

Humans display the greatest variety of feelings and emotions of all species and this is reflected in the complex web of connections between the more recently developed prefrontal area and the older limbic structures of the brain. The historical evolution of the brain and emotions is mirrored in each human being’s individual development. Ontogeny (development of an individual organism) often recapitulates phylogeny (evolution of a particular species). Newborns process basic affects in lower brain structures. Emotions, which are more recent in human evolution, become possible only when certain cognitive milestones have been reached in the life of a child. In the second half of the second year of life, the cognitive capacity of objective self-awareness emerges, with accompanying emotions such as embarrassment, empathy, and envy. Between two and three years of age, the complex ability to evaluate one’s behavior according to an external or internal standard emerges. Self-conscious evaluative emotions such as pride, shame, or guilt are now possible. Schemas for emotions evolve to organize what we believe and how we react to emotions. Finally, cognition and affect are forcefully intertwined in cultural symbol and knowledge systems such as religions.

The most immediate function provided to us by our emotional apparatus is to warn us. Fear alerts us to potential danger or to potential benefit. We hear a noise. It could be a thief—or just our favorite cat. The first brain structure to react is the amygdala, an almond-shaped neurostructure in the lower cortical brain. This structure identifies shapes, sounds, and other perceptual characteristics, sorting for threats and, very quickly and automatically, responding with avoidance if necessary. It acts as a preattentive analyzer of our environment and works without our conscious control, triggering fast and automatic emotional changes in autonomic tone and heart rate. Is it a thief? We jump up from our chair, breathe heavily, and feel frightened. Fear is a primary reaction that is processed via adrenergic neurons (as opposed to dopaminergic neurons). This system developed early in human evolution and dominates our first years as children. In adults, stress brings it to the fore again, often in unfortunate ways.

Let’s assume the noise proves to emanate from our favorite cat, back home from an excursion! If a situation shows itself to be rewarding, rather than a
threat, the amygdala can relax, passing the data on to the basal ganglia to encode and store, awash in positive-valence dopaminergic neurons. We get ready to approach the situation. We open our arms to our purring pet. This simple daily stimulus response is aided by information from two internal “library” structures (left prefrontal cortex and a posterior area), from which our brain draws stored abstract semantic and associative knowledge. All this is automatic. We are not in control.

Our brain “wakes up” to controlled emotion processing when another, higher brain structure (the anterior cingulate, ACC) signals discrepancy, uncertainty, errors, conflicts, pain, or violations of expectations. The AC tells us when something is wrong, when our automatic responses do not work and we need to do something different. At that point, two high cortical structures (ventromedial frontal cortex [VMFC] and orbital frontal cortex [OFC]) weigh our current goals and the affective value of the situation we face. We need these higher cortical structures particularly in conflict situations, because they empower us to regulate and control our emotional responses. Here we learn and adapt, and generate self-consciousness, abstraction, and imagination.

As we see, when Eve faces Adam—or when global neighbors negotiate nuclear disarmament—the participants’ brains loop through at least six brain structures that deal with emotion, from lower to higher brain structures, from evolutionarily older to more recent components, from stored memories of how we reacted as children to new modes of responses that are open to us as adults. There are several distinctions and dualities. Feelings can be hot or cold, they can be positive or negative, and they can be automatic or controlled. Furthermore, there is the doer-watcher duality. The duality of attention and processing is based on the fact that we can perform a task and at the same time watch ourselves performing this task. Emotions can interfere in this duality and disturb task focus and performance.

What we discussed so far indicates that emotions serve at least three functions. First, emotions monitor our inner world; second, they monitor our relationships with the outer world; and third, they help us act. There is order and coherence in these emotional processes, but that order can quickly degenerate into chaos if we are unaware and insufficiently in control. Research indicates that our behavior is regulated by feedback loops that are organized hierarchically. Superordinate loops attend to longer-term, abstract goals. Embedded within them are subordinate loops for short-term tasks. We create or maintain destructive conflict when we allow lower-order mechanisms to supersede higher-order mechanisms. We invite failure when we permit phylogenically more immediate and automated emotional processes to override more abstracted regulatory processes. Long-term goals require that we refrain from jumping at them with short-term mental tools.

Earlier, we discussed that emotions are hardwired and malleable. How can we imagine the various levels playing together in daily life? There is the
hardwired physiological response and negative state of “feeling bad” or, at the
psychological level, “this is bad for me.” Parallel, there is the hardwired positive
state of “feeling good” or “pleasure” or “this is good for me.” As the “me” acquires
social identity, these basic responses form the nucleus for our more elaborated
emotions toward other persons, groups, notions, or ideologies. Rejection and
enmity as well as affection, attachment, loyalty, cooperation, and other positive
emotions are no longer automatic. A very simple example shows this. Spiders or
worms are greeted as welcome delicacies in some cultures and in others
with disgust. Or, for a vegetarian, eating meat is sickening, while it is a joy for
a nonvegetarian. The example of Eve and Adam shows how our emotional reac-
tions are embedded in broader historic transformations of normative contexts.
The term “domestic chastisement” expresses positive valence—the “man of the
house” has the right and duty to “chastise” his wife and children, and it is
regarded as “good” for all involved to be reminded of “their place.” Nowadays,
particularly in social contexts influenced by human rights values, this term
transmutes into the negative concept of “domestic violence.” In other words,
the same sequence of behavior is no longer regarded as “good for everybody,”
but as “bad for everybody.”

It would be easy to overwhelm readers with an overabundance of concepts
and terms. Goals, attitudes, affects, feelings, emotions, emotional states, moods,
consciousness, self, psyche—the list of terms is endless and often scholars do
not agree on their definitions. For our purposes, it is sufficient to understand
that we have to give up any quest for rigid, context-free classifications of com-
plex elaborated emotions. Elaborated emotions are multifaceted clusters embed-
ded in culture and history. It is important to recognize, furthermore, that there
is an ongoing tension between older, more primitive emotional responses and
our more recently achieved capabilities. To some extent, we manage to resolve
this tension through a series of hierarchically structured feedback loops. If we
succeed, emotions can be helpful and guide us well. Unfortunately, those loops
are too often overridden in conflict situations, when the older parts of the brain
leap into action to ensure the organism’s immediate survival. This can lead to
disaster. Learning to recognize and defuse this tension may be one of the most
important skills an individual committed to healthy conflict resolution can
achieve.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EMOTION AND CONFLICT

This section focuses on key emotions (negative and positive) such as fear, anger,
humiliation, guilt, hope, confidence, and warmth, illustrating how they affect
conflict and are affected by conflict. What may happen when, during a conflict,
one experiences an emotion as a dominant emotion and the likely consequences
of trying to induce an emotion in the other (for example, trying to make the other
feel afraid, guilty, or humiliated) will be discussed. Furthermore, the issue of what distinguishes a “normal” from a “pathological” version of this emotion and under what circumstances an emotion may play a constructive or destructive role in a conflict or negotiation will be raised.

This section begins with the subject of fear, as a basic emotion processed in our “old” brain. From there, we will move on to more complex emotions.

**Fear and How It Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict**

The voice of intelligence is drowned out by the roar of fear. It is ignored by the voice of desire. It is contradicted by the voice of shame. It is biased by hate and extinguished by anger. Most of all, it is silenced by ignorance. (Karl A. Menninger)

Fear can lead to an avoidance of conflict (“flight”), or to a counterphobic aggressive response (“fight”), or to a desire to avoid disaster by reaching an agreement. It can hamper constructive conflict resolution or enhance it when it sharpens our senses and alerts our thoughts.

As discussed earlier, fear is basic. Its seat in the brain is the amygdala. Fear warns us. It jolts us into alertness in a split second, sending stress hormones soaring, making our vision narrower and more focused. Our old brain takes over to save us from immediate danger. We may gain short-term safety. However, there is a price to pay.

In 1998, Adam Bixi was interviewed by this author in Somaliland. He described growing up in the Somalian semidesert, learning as a very small boy to be constantly alert, even at night, for dangerous animals and “enemies” from other clans. He learned to be ready for fight or flight in a matter of seconds, at any time, day or night. Continuous emergency preparedness meant that all other aspects of life had to wait. Emergency trumped everything else. Bixi felt he had not lived life. Modern managers often feel the same way. Continuous emergency alertness diminishes our zest for life. It may even lead to cardiac failure. Essentials such as sound long-term planning and institution building are neglected.

Earlier, we saw that feelings can be hot or cold and automatic or controlled. We have a hot “go” system and a cool “know” system. The cool “know” system is cognitive, complex, contemplative, slow, strategic, integrated, coherent, and emotionally rather neutral. It is the basis of self-regulation and self-control. Fear, as well as acute and chronic stress, accentuate the hot “go” system. The hot system is impulsive and hastily reactive and undermines rational attempts at self-control. Intense fear causes “tunnel vision,” reducing the range of one’s perceptions, thoughts, and choices, risking that we make suboptimal decisions.

In other words, the hot “go” system represents a double-edged sword. It may save us from immediate danger. However, in case of a complex conflict, fear easily operates malignly. Fear and humiliation have the potential to link up in particularly disastrous ways. In Rwanda, fear of future humiliation, based on
the experience of past humiliation, was used as justification for genocide. In his speeches, Hitler peddled that he feared future humiliation by the World Jewry. The Holocaust was his horrific “solution.”

To conclude, we are well advised to cool down when we experience fear during a conflict, in order to avoid disastrous tunnel vision and reap the potential advantage of fear, enhanced alertness. Likewise, we should help our opponents in conflicts and in negotiations to calm their fears. In negotiations, operating with threats—making others afraid—may undermine constructive solutions rather than provide advantages.

Let us consider the example of Eve and Adam. At some point they both seek counseling. The counselor begins with reducing the level of threat and fear between them. The therapist works on transforming their fears into alertness and motivation for change. Adam is afraid to lose power and Eve is afraid to be empowered. Tackled in a calm manner, these fears can be translated into deep personal growth for both. However, this is possible only in an atmosphere of warm firmness that provides safety, an atmosphere of respect, love, understanding, empathy, and patience, all of which the therapist needs to make available, aided by the larger social support network.

**Anger and Hatred, and How They Affect Conflict and Are Affected by Conflict**

We easily get angry when we feel hurt. Sometimes we even kick a chair that stood in our way and gave us a bruise. Yet, anger is a more composite set of mental processes than fear. It unfolds in a complex fashion in time and entails cognitive and emotional elements. Our brain does three things. First, it maps a comprehensive representation of the thing, animal, or person who has hurt us; second, it maps the state of our body, for example our readiness to fight; and third, it maps the kind of relationship we have to the perpetrator and how we might respond. For example, we usually refrain from hitting our boss or a sumo wrestler.

We react with anger—rather than sympathy—when we believe the other person, either through neglect or intentionally, treats us with disrespect. The more we feel hurt, the more we get angry. We get angry when we deem that the person who hurts us has sufficient control over the situation to avoid harming us (the so-called controllability dimension). We get even angrier when we infer that the other intended to hurt us. Indeed, research shows that we want to harm others, either overtly or covertly, when we believe they could have avoided hurting us. It is one thing to be pushed accidentally by a drunken man, another to be harmed deliberately by an apparently clearheaded man. As Keith G. Allred (2000) explains, it is crucial how we attribute—in the case of the pushing man, whether we attribute his behavior to drunkenness or to fully conscious malevolence.
Our beliefs as to why others behave as they do are being addressed by attribution theory, one of the dominant paradigms in social psychology. Fritz Heider (1958) is regarded to be the first attribution theorist. This theory has been elaborated since and has been instrumental in shedding light on biases of which we are unaware and that can hamper conflict resolution—we know, for example, the fundamental attribution error or the actor-observer bias. The fundamental attribution error and the actor-observer bias refer to the tendency to attribute behavior coming from the other (for example, hostile remarks) to the other’s personality dispositions rather than to transient circumstances (such as your belittling remarks) while you attribute your own hostile remarks to circumstances (such as his hostile remarks) rather than your own dispositions. During a contentious conflict, this may lead each side to overestimate the other’s hostility as well as one’s own benignness. (For further discussion of attribution theory see Gilbert, 1998; Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; and Ross, 1977.)

For both Eve and Adam, anger can lead to destruction—or open a path to personal growth. Adam is angry that Eve is not submissive enough, while Eve does not dare to be angry at his wrath—frightened by him, and the possibility and the strength of her own anger, she seeks relief in subservience. The therapist attempts to transform the explosive fury that Adam projects onto Eve into deeper reflection on his own growth. The therapist ultimately invites Adam to relinquish using anger as an easy-to-use escape route and instead face deeper feelings of hurt and pain that lie buried. She explains to Eve and Adam that the new normative universe of mutual respect for equal dignity defines concepts such as love, loyalty, cooperation, attachment, connection, and relationship in profoundly new ways. She encourages Eve to embrace these new ways and no longer efface herself in front of Adam. It is important for Eve to dare to feel anger, at least sometimes—not frantic rage and hatred—but a definite firmness that she can use for constructing a richer and more comprehensive repertoire of being a person than merely shrinking into a self-effacing servant.

If we consider intergroup or international relations, the world will benefit from everybody getting firmly angry in the face of abuse instead of disengaging and looking away. What we have to heed, though, is that anger must be translated into Mandela-like strategies—rather than hatred and violence—to render constructive results.

Humiliation and How It Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict

It has always been a mystery to me how men can feel themselves honored by the humiliation of their fellow beings. (Mahatma Gandhi)

Fear is basic, anger more complex, and humiliation even more so. The act of humiliation involves putting down, holding down, and rendering the other helpless to resist the debasement. The feeling of being humiliated emerges when one
is unable to resist the debasement and one deems it to be illegitimate as well as unwanted. What counts as humiliation and the consequences of humiliation are determined by emotional scripts that vary from one historical period to another, from one cultural sphere to another, from one person to another, and within a single person as he or she reacts at different times to the same humiliation.

Morton Deutsch (2006) explains how Nelson Mandela “kept his self undistorted by preserving his dignity and refusing to submit, psychologically, to the definition of self that the oppressors tried to force upon him” (Deutsch, 2006, p. 38). Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela described the following incident after landing on Robben Island:

We were met by a group of burly white wardens shouting: “Dis die Eiland! Hier gaan julle vrek!” (This is the island! Here you will die!) . . . As we walked toward the prison, the guards shouted “Two—two! Two—two!”—meaning we should walk in pairs . . . . I linked up with Tefu. The guards started screaming, “Haas! . . . Haas!” The word haas means “move” in Afrikaans, but it is commonly reserved for cattle.

The wardens were demanding that we jog, and I turned to Tefu and under my breath said that we must set an example; if we give in now we would be at their mercy . . . . I mentioned to Tefu that we should walk in front, and we took the lead. Once in front, we actually decreased the pace, walking slowly and deliberately. The guards were incredulous (and said) “. . . we will tolerate no insubordination here. Haas! Haas!” But we continued at our stately pace. (The head guard) ordered us to halt and stood in front of us: “Look, man, we will kill you, we are not fooling around . . . . This the last warning. Haas! Haas!”

To this, I said: “You have your duty and we have ours.” I was determined that we would not give in, and we did not, for we were already at the cells. (Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, 1995, pp. 297–299)

Deutsch concludes: “By his persistent public refusal to be humiliated or to feel humiliated, Mandela rejected the distorted, self-debilitating relationship that the oppressor sought to impose upon him. Doing so enhanced his leadership among his fellow political prisoners and the respect he was accorded by the less sadistic guards and wardens of the prison” (Deutsch, 2006, p. 39).

Feelings of humiliation can be the “nuclear bomb of the emotions,” a term coined by Evelin G. Lindner (2002). Lindner’s research suggests that feelings of humiliation may acquire the quality and strength of obsessions and addiction. They can dominate people’s lives to the extent that their actions become destructive for themselves and others. If instigated by humiliation-entrepreneurs, such as in Rwanda in 1994, feelings of humiliation can fuel mayhem in ways that make even the purchase of expensive weaponry superfluous. In Rwanda, everybody had machetes at home for agricultural use. When people are intent to perpetrate atrocities—and feelings of humiliation may be most instrumental—costly military weaponry may not be needed for people to proceed in perpetrating mayhem.
Vamik D. Volkan (2004) in his theory of collective violence, in his recent book *Blind Trust*, puts forth that when a chosen trauma is experienced as humiliation and is not mourned, this may lead to feelings of entitlement to revenge and, under the pressure of fear/anxiety, to collective regression.

The view that humiliation may be more than just another negative emotion, but may indeed represent a particularly forceful phenomenon, is supported by the research of a number of authors, such as James Gilligan (1996), Linda M. Hartling and Tracy Luchetta (1999), Donald C. Klein (1991), Helen Block Lewis (1971), Evelin G. Lindner (2000), Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen (1996), and Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger (1991).

Until very recently, however, few researchers have studied humiliation explicitly—the phenomenon of humiliation typically figures only implicitly in literature on violence and war. When humiliation is treated explicitly, it is often used interchangeably with shame or conceptualized as a variant of that emotion. Humiliation has only very recently been studied on its own account, among others, since 1996, by Evelin G. Lindner (2000), and by Jennifer S. Goldman and Peter T. Coleman (2005). Humiliation is a complex phenomenon of acts and feelings that can occur without shame being involved. As in the case of Nelson Mandela, people who face humiliating treatment may sternly reject feeling humiliated or ashamed. And even when they feel humiliated, victims of torture and maltreatment recount that part of their success in being resilient was not to feel ashamed while indeed feeling humiliated.

Considering feelings of humiliation may shed more light on violence and terrorism than other explanations. We do not perceive conditions such as inequality, or conflict of interest, or poverty as automatically negative. As long as all players accept justifications (poverty as “divine order,” for example), there might be pain, but no shared awareness of a problem that needs fixing, no conflict, and no violent reactions. And conflict, even if it occurs, is not automatically destructive either—it can be solved mutually and creatively. It is when feelings of humiliation emerge that rifts are created and trust destroyed. If feelings of humiliation are not overcome constructively, cooperation fails. In the worst-case scenario, violence ensues.

As Lindner (2006) explains, at the current historic juncture, two new forces bring humiliation to the fore in unprecedented intensity. Globalization (or the coming-together of humankind), in concert with the human rights revolution, increases the significance of feelings of humiliation. As long as people live far away from each other, in isolation, relative deprivation goes undetected. But today, Western soap operas and Western tourists walking about are teaching the less privileged of the world to recognize their own deprivation. At the same time, the human rights call for equal dignity teaches underlings around the world that their poverty, their relative deprivation, is no longer to be accepted as divinely ordained, but represents a violation of their very humanity.
a deprived person identifies the rich of the world as perpetrators of her violation, when she suspects that the rich peddle empty human rights rhetoric to maintain their powerful positions, poverty turns into humiliation. Currently, the gap between the poor and the rich, locally and globally, grows wider. The underdogs in the world, and those who identify with them, listen to empty human rights rhetoric from elites and feel humiliated by the emptiness of the sermon: “to recognise humanity hypocritically and betray the promise, humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed” (Stephan Feuchtwang, November 14, 2002, in a personal note).

Thomas Friedman (2003), *New York Times* columnist, states, “If I’ve learned one thing covering world affairs, it’s this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation.” Aaron Lazare (2004) writes: “I believe that humiliation is one of the most important emotions we must understand and manage, both in ourselves and in others, and on an individual and national level” (pp. 262).

What happens when feelings of humiliation emerge? Blema S. Steinberg (1996) posits that feelings of humiliation may trigger narcissistic rage and acts of aggression meant to lessen pain and increase self-worth. Steinberg analyzes political crises and cautions that international leaders, when publicly humiliated, may instigate mass destruction and war. Roy F. Baumeister (1996) suggests that perpetrators of violent crime combine high self-esteem, albeit brittle, with poor self-regulation, particularly when it is challenged. Walter Mischel, Aaron L. DeSmet, and Ethan Kross (see Chapter Thirteen in this book) explain that rejection-sensitive men may even get “hooked” on situations of debasement in which they can feel humiliated.

In our example of Eve and Adam, Adam may be such a rejection-sensitive man. As long as Eve merely fades into subservience at his onslaught, no open destructive conflict and no cycles of humiliation occur. An unwise therapist could create such cycles of humiliation if he were to nurture feelings of humiliation in Eve that would lead to nothing but tit-for-tat retaliation. Eve would merely learn the same dysfunctional handling of humiliation as Adam engages in. The therapist needs to lay out a vision for a “Mandela-like” handling of feelings of humiliation for both Eve and Adam.

Cycles of humiliation occur when feelings of humiliation are translated into acts of humiliation that are responded to in kind. In cases of collectively perpetrated mayhem, Hitler-like humiliation-entrepreneurs invite followers to pour their frustrations into a grander narrative of humiliation that uses retaliatory acts of humiliation as remedy. Only “Mandelas,” individuals who know how to build dignified relationships, can avoid this. Massacres typically are not just efficient slaughter, but generally more cruel. Rape, torture, and mutilation often precede killing. Many soldiers engage in these actions, even though nothing suggests that they are rapists in civilian life or are drawn to sexual sadism or sadistic violence. The extreme
cruelty is therefore hard to explain with average forensic theories. In the Rwandan genocide, for example, killing was not enough. The victims were humiliated before they died. Why else would an old woman be paraded naked through the streets before being locked up with hungry dogs to be eaten alive?

To conclude, feelings of humiliation affect conflict in malignant ways when they are translated into violence à la Hitler, or modern terrorism, and set off cycles of humiliation. However, feelings of humiliation do not automatically trigger violence. There is no rigid link. Feelings of humiliation can also be invested into constructive social change. Nelson Mandela showed that there is a constructive script that proceeds from being humiliated and feeling humiliated to beneficial engagement in change, as opposed to retaliation with brutal humiliation-for-humiliation. Mandela was certainly exposed to humiliating treatment for twenty-seven years in prison, but he did not unleash genocide on the white elite in South Africa. Nelson Mandela did not allow himself to feel humiliated at the attempts to humiliate him, or, if he did feel humiliated, he did not allow himself to translate these feelings into violent retaliation. In contrast, in Rwanda, the former underlings killed their former elite in genocide.

Conflict, in turn, affects feelings of humiliation through the way conflict is managed. If managed in a respecting manner, the probability for finding constructive solutions is high. If managed in condescending, patronizing, and arrogant ways, even if this is done unwittingly, feelings of humiliation will undermine any constructive cooperation. This insight can be institutionalized. At a societal level, to secure peace, in his book *The Decent Society*, Avishai Margalit (1996) calls for institutions that do not humiliate.

**Guilt and How It Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict**

It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity. Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal. I believe that the horrifying deterioration in the ethical conduct of people today stems from the mechanization and dehumanization of our lives, a disastrous by-product of the scientific and technical mentality. Nostra culpa! (Albert Einstein)

Guilt is an elaborated emotion and a topic for psychology, psychiatry, ethics, criminal law, and other related fields. To feel guilty, we need self-awareness and the ability to measure our behavior in relation to standards. Self-conscious evaluative emotions such as pride, shame, or guilt are not possible earlier than the second or third year of life. However, as discussed earlier, elaborated emotions are very culturally dependent. The concept of guilt might never evolve, at least not in the Western sense—in some cultural spheres a word for guilt simply does not exist.

In its simplest description, guilt may be understood as an affective state of regret at having done something one believes one should not have done.
Humiliation, humility, shame, and guilt are related concepts. When I feel ashamed, I accept that I fell short. I blush when I break wind inadvertently; I can be ashamed even if nobody notices. Norbert Elias (1897–1990) places the emerging “skill” of feeling shame at such transgressions at the center of his theory of civilization. Being able to feel shame is prosocial, as is the ability to feel guilt. When I feel guilty, I accept that I have committed a moral transgression. People who are not capable of feeling shame or guilt are seen as “shameless” monsters. We all hope that the desire to avoid shame and guilt will safeguard social cohesion and foster humility before social and legal rules and the need to cooperate for building a sustainable world. We deem humility to be a virtue, and shame and guilt as hugely important, with guilt, according to some scholars, superseding shame due to its greater potential of leading to empathy and sensitivity toward others. Guilt can render healing for perpetrators, victims, and larger society, through remorse, apology, forgiveness, and restorative justice.

Shame and guilt societies have been differentiated (Ruth Benedict, 1887–1948). In a shame society, it is said, I seek to maintain my good name in the eyes of the others, while in a guilt society I have internalized moral norms into my superego and feel guilty when disobeying them. “Face” and “face-saving” are usually associated with Asian culture. Chinese scholars, however, explain that shame and guilt shade into each other, both directing people into self-examination in social situations and motivate people to evaluate their behavior and adapt it.

Guilt can be abused, however, as a tool of social control, because guilty people feel less deserving and are less likely to assert their rights and prerogatives. Some children, as well as some groups, are taught to feel guilty for their very existence or for certain characteristics of their appearance. Such cases represent a pathological occurrence and destructive application of guilt.

To revisit Eve and Adam, Eve is kept in timid subservience not least by feeling guilty. She partly believes Adam’s complaint that she ought to be more docile. Their therapist brings clarity into the normative confusion of the couple. Indeed, in traditional normative contexts of ranked honor, a woman is expected to efface herself. However, times have changed, and subservience no longer represents the same kind of virtue, at least not in cultural contexts influenced by the human rights message. Eve is entitled to develop a more comprehensive and expansive personal space—not arrogantly attacking Adam in retaliation—but applying a spirit of firm and respectful humility. Adam, on the other hand, is no longer required to feel ashamed and guilty for not succeeding in keeping his wife meek and lowly—and he no longer needs to bypass his shame at his failure and cover up with violence. He is entitled to feel proud to be a male who supports a strong woman at his side. He may even come to feel guilty and apologizes to his wife for not having grasped this insight earlier. An exchange of
mutual respect for equal dignity, in a spirit of shared humility, leads to a new and nourishing relationship between Eve and Adam.

To conclude this section, feelings of guilt can prevent people from doing evil. Feelings of guilt for past omissions and transgressions, if acknowledged, remedied by apology and forgiveness, can be a powerful healing force in conflict. What is needed for shame and guilt to be healing forces is the courage to face them and gauge them with candidness, humility, and warmth. If not acknowledged and worked through constructively, if bypassed, feelings of shame and guilt can help maintain destructive conflict. In turn, conflict can impinge on feelings of guilt. Feelings of guilt can be pushed toward violence if conditions inhibit their acknowledgment and healing. Moreover, deliberately creating “pathological guilt” by making opponents in a conflict or negotiation feel guilty. So as to weaken them may rather undermine long-term constructive solutions, successful negotiation or solutions to conflict depend on firm commitments from strong players. Guilt can best be borne to healing, if embedded in respectful restorative justice.

Hope and How It Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict

C. Richard Snyder (2002) developed hope theory. Snyder’s work is related to and overlaps with theories of learned optimism, optimism, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and coping. Snyder reports that higher hope is consistently related to better outcomes in academics, athletics, physical health, psychological adjustment, and psychotherapy.

Interestingly, hope can be learned. Most people lack hope, Snyder points out, because they were not taught appropriately during childhood; many experienced having their nascent hopeful thinking strategies destroyed. Snyder recommends the building of cultural and institutional frames that highlight insights from hope theory “When laws are implemented so as to allow a maximal number of people to pursue goal-directed activities, then citizens should be less likely to become frustrated and act aggressively against each other” (p. 261). As a result, higher hope will lead to better social adjustment with one’s extended family, one’s friends, and larger social networks, and public health and general well-being are likely to increase.

Hope is not to be confused with naïve and unrealistic expectations. On the contrary, this would be a recipe for hopelessness. A strategy of hope entails continuously weighing opportunities (or the lack of opportunities) and strengths (or their failing), and finding optimal solutions. In a conflict situation, in negotiations, setting too high levels for expected outcomes could be disastrous. Hope is not an illusion born out of misguided daydreaming or wishful thinking, but a strategy of successful adaptation.

Let us revisit Eve and Adam. Adam undermines Eve’s social support network. She is to live for him alone. He systematically humiliates her and destroys
whatever confidence is left in her by telling her that nobody but him could love her. She is to be worthless without him and his love. Both believe that this strategy, if only intensified sufficiently, will lead to a happy relationship—however, it brings only violence and tears. Their therapist reformulates their definitions and strategies of hope. Among others, Adam understands that by inducing hopelessness in Eve, both lose. The therapist rekindles Eve’s confidence in herself and Eve’s life begins to flourish. The therapist also helps Adam to gain confidence in his ability to keep a strong woman as a partner and enjoy her fresh zest of life—rather than be frightened by her newly won strength. Both learn to nurture higher hopes for their relationship and work for newly defined, shared goals.

To conclude, we need to learn hope and develop cultures of hope and institutions for hope to support us as we strive for constructive conflict resolution. This means creating more alternative goals, more potential pathways, and more endurance, in us, for us, and in our societies. If we succeed, we will have people gravitating to wider social networks that benefit everyone. Positive emotions will follow. Ironically, pessimists are oblivious of these insights. By lamenting, they indulge in increasing the burden of conflict instead of lessening it and thus risk tipping the situation toward downfall. We have to learn constructive optimism and hope, because only this will render beneficial framings. A cancer patient, if told that she is in deep crisis, might survive if mobilizing maximum hope. She might die if surrounded by pessimists. For the world, we need constructive hope that models emergency and crisis as a challenge and not as the end of the world.

Confidence and Warmth, and How They Affect Conflict and Are Affected by Conflict

What sets worlds in motion is the interplay of differences, their attractions and repulsions. By suppressing differences and peculiarities, by eliminating different civilizations and cultures, progress weakens life and favors death. (Octavio Paz)

As long as we live in isolated, homogenous cultural spheres, we can usually guess correctly what our fellow human beings are trying to tell us with their words and actions. We tend to behave with a certain amount of “confidence,” secure in the certainty of our environment. However, this illusionary definition of “confidence” is not beneficial to us. If we reflect for a moment, we know that even our children and our spouses represent “other cultures.”

What we have to learn is to confidently float in uncertainty rather than cling to assumed certainties. We have to become confident voyagers and not rigid
vindicators, according to David Ricky Matsumoto, Seung Hee Yoo, and Jeffery A. LeRoux (2005):

Those people who cannot control their emotions reinforce and crystallize their pre-existing ethnocentric and stereotypic ways of dealing with the world that are limited. This is a no growth model, and these individuals are not engaged in a journey. This is a model of stagnation, with no growth potential inherent in such a process. We call these people “vindicators,” because their worldviews are established solely to vindicate their pre-existing ethnocentrism and stereotypes, not to challenge them and grow. (p. 18)

We must learn to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity confidently. When we do not understand our counterpart, jumping to conclusions out of a need to “be sure” will produce failure. Guessing what our spouses (or terrorists) “want” and basing our actions on such speculations simply does not work. We have to learn to stay calm while we use frustration creatively, with imagination and inspiration, and for that we need curiosity, courage, and patience (Satoshi Nakagawa, personal communication from Jacqueline Wasilewski, June 25, 2005).

Muneo Yoshikawa (1987) has developed a double-swing model that conceptualizes how individuals, cultures, and intercultural concepts can meet in constructive ways. It relates to what Peter A. Levine (1997) calls pendulation, the swinging back and forth between our own point of view and that of the other that allows us the potential for understanding each other. Successful pendulation can produce solidarity and social integration; without it, we have alienation and lack of social integration. Double-swing pendulation—from you to me, back to you, back to me, and so on—has to be conducted with warmth and respect for all conflict parties. Respect and warmth are the glue that keeps people together while they move back and forth. Respect and warmth do not befall us; they can be learned.

To conclude, to wage good conflict, we must design our efforts in ways that keep the double swing connected. Healthy identity in unity and pendulation are interdependent—neither independent and isolated, nor engulfed. Both parties in conflictual relationships must avoid going too far, walking over the other or allowing the other to walk over them. Adam walked over Eve and Eve allowed him to do so. In therapy, both understand that when all players in a conflict learn to invest respect, warmth, and calmly floating confidence rather than frantic righteousness, conflict can be framed benignly. In the beginning, Eve and Adam threw monologues at each other and tried to prove to the therapist that the respective other was evil. Then, slowly, they began to listen to each other. They tried to grasp the other’s feelings and thoughts. They learned to use both sides of the double swing. Finally, they emerged mutually enriched. Now, they recognize that their conflict was based on solipsistic misperceptions of the other, due to each of them looping in only one side of the double swing. They know,
furthermore, that their conflict continued because of their immature and self-defeating conflict-solving strategies. And finally, they understand that they suffered from a high degree of normative confusion. In a haphazard manner, they had jumbled together the contradictory normative frames of ranked worthiness versus equal dignity, helplessly oscillating between the contradictory emotional scripts that are related to those normative universes. Today, Eve and Adam no longer wish to participate in an order of “higher” and “lesser” beings, but attempt to treat each other as worthy of equal dignity.

Not only Eve and Adam’s conflict, but also community conflicts and global conflicts can be conceptualized along similar lines. Not least, Germany has gained international respect by apologizing to the world and acknowledging that Hitler’s strategy of presenting and viewing himself as a “savior” and responding to perceived humiliation with mayhem was disastrous.

**HOW TO INTERVENE IN CONFLICT, CONTROL NEGATIVE EMOTIONS, AND FOSTER POSITIVE EMOTIONS**

More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginning of all wars. Yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman and thoroughly impractical method of settling the differences between governments. (Winston Churchill)

When will our consciences grow so tender that we will act to prevent human misery rather than avenge it? (Eleanor Roosevelt)

Earlier, we discussed that our mental short-term “go” system might be counterproductive when we are trying to achieve broad, long-term objectives. For complex long-term problems, we need to entertain superordinate regulatory loops in our higher brain structures. We need to slow down our thinking processes so we can critically assess them. We need to get in touch with deeper feelings, thoughts, and factors outside of our dominant mental and sensory models. We have to tap into the largely unconscious, automatic, parallel-distributed processes that supply us with creativity. It is wise to recognize that everybody has “hot buttons” that, if triggered, will stir up strong emotions such as anxiety, anger, rage, fear, depression, or withdrawal. It is valuable to know the other’s hot buttons so as to avoid pressing them and it is important to know one’s own hot buttons and how we tend to react when they are pressed, so that we can control our reactions in that event.

How do we slow down and cool down? Let us assume, you have just quarreled and are “out of your mind” (the old brain has taken over). Modern brain imaging yields evidence of the effectiveness of meditation techniques. Buddhists claim that destructive emotions can be greatly reduced, in contrast to the common Western assumption that our biological programming for emotions is fixed.
Some Tibetan Buddhists think it is possible and advisable to overcome, even eliminate emotions such as anger or hostility, which Western philosophers see as “natural and immutable.” Buddhist concepts such as *mindfulness* and the concept of *sukha* (“a deep sense of serenity and fulfillment that arises from an exceptionally healthy mind”) are related.

We find similar approaches in many disciplines. Victor Frankl’s concept of *self-observation* in the framework of logotherapy is comparable. In a more general way, Erving Goffman, an “ethnographer of the self,” has described how people negotiate and validate identities in face-to-face meetings and establish *frames* within which they evaluate the meaning of their encounters. To return to Eve and Adam’s therapist, she offers a wide panoply of “cooling” approaches—from relaxation techniques to dream journeys or taking in the shortness of life and the futility of petty goals.

Let us assume that you have slowed down and gained distance by using any approach that suits you. Now, you are ready for the next step. You have to constructively channel and manage your negative emotions of anger, fear, and distress because they are the “gatekeepers” of any communicative effectiveness. “If we cannot put our inevitable negative emotions in check, it is impossible to engage in what is clearly higher order thinking . . .” say Matsumoto, Yoo, and LeRoux (2005, p. 9). They explain that four main ingredients to personal growth are key to successful handling of conflict, namely Emotion Regulation (ER), Critical Thinking (CT), Openness (OP), and Flexibility (FL). These psychological processes are the *psychological engine* of adaptation and adjustment.

A host of tools is available that helps regulate negative emotions. Earlier, we discussed hope. Maintaining high hope means engaging in very specific strategies of approaching the world. One such strategy, for example, is the “glass-is-half-full” approach. Lamenting over whatever is “missing” or whatever is yet unaccomplished only drains energy. Lamenting makes it more difficult to conceptualize what is missing as challenge, as a next step, that has to be approached with enthusiasm, motivation, and courage in a joint effort. Eve and Adam have to go beyond wallowing in pain and filling their lifetime with decrying their misfortune—they have to envisage with excitement the experiences of growth that lie ahead of them.

We should not conclude, however, that negative emotions are altogether maladaptive and ought to be avoided. The premise of “keep smiling” would not do. It is rather a question of avoiding too much and too little. Negative emotions can be functional, not only in emergency situations, but also for effective learning. Successful conflict resolution often requires a certain amount of conceptual change for which negative emotions can be instrumental. Too much positive emotion may hinder effective learning. Studies did not find a clear relation between positive affect and conceptual change. More so, rather than avoiding conflict, “blissful ignorance” may even create it.
Let us assume you have managed to dampen your negative feelings to constructive levels. Now you can embark on nurturing positive emotions. Barbara L. Fredrickson and Robert W. Levenson (1998) study positive emotions. They offer an interesting new theoretical perspective, which they call the *broaden-and-build model*. This model questions common assumptions of contemporary emotion theory, namely, that emotions must necessarily entail action tendencies and lead to physical action. Rather than action, positive emotions seem to facilitate changes in cognitive activity. What negative emotions are to threat, positive emotions are to opportunity. As we have seen, traditional action-oriented models for negative emotions indicate that negative emotions *narrow* a person’s momentary thought-action repertoire, an effect that is adaptive in life-threatening situations that require quick action. In contrast, positive emotions *broaden* a person’s momentary thought-action repertoire. Positive affects and emotions promote intuitive-holistic (right hemisphere, RH) mental strategies, while negative affects and emotions further analytic-serial (left hemisphere, LH) mental strategies. It has been shown that coping and resilience are associated with positive emotions even under the chronic stress of, for example, caregiving and bereavement. For Eve and Adam, panicky actionism, fueled by pain, has to give way for calm reflection and firm resolve in an atmosphere of hope and courage.

Suppose you have now calmed down, calibrated negative emotions so that they inform you but do not overwhelm you, and fostered positive emotions. What else can we draw upon? Earlier we discussed the benefits of mature mutual love, of anger harnessed in constructive resolve, of humility and hope, of the confidence of a voyager and the warmth that we need to connect us all. There are many other insights we can employ. For example, the benefits of cooperation have to be made known widely. In his “Crude Law of Social Relations,” Morton Deutsch (1999) stipulates that “cooperation induces and is induced by a perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, a readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and de-emphasis of opposed interests, an orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences, and so on” (pp. 19–20). In contrast, unhelpful competition induces and is induced by coercion, threats, deception, suspicion, self-serving biases, poor communication, and attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other.

Matsumoto’s voyager needs what W. Barnett Pearce (2005) calls *cosmopolitan communicative virtuosity*. For a *cosmopolitan communicator*, disagreement is an opportunity for learning and constructing new realities. Disagreements—rather than catastrophe—are a dilemma that calls for further exploration to find creative solutions, rather than catastrophes. *Virtuosity* means (a) a “grand passion” for what we are doing; (b) an ability to make insightful distinctions; and (c) the ability to engage in skilled performance.
So, what we need for a world that engages constructively in conflict is “grand passion,” passion for developing new forms of communication that entail a careful and skilled balance between what we discussed earlier, namely the broaden-and-build capacity of positive emotions and the conceptual-change capacity of negative emotions.

In order to achieve communicative virtuosity, it is necessary to unlearn some unhelpful beliefs about intelligence and learning. Intelligence is not fixed, it is malleable (the incremental theory of intelligence). People who believe intelligence is fixed develop an ego-oriented performance orientation. They wish to satisfy expectations of others, avoid mistakes, and look smart. They are “façade-polishers,” who endanger others, for example, when they cover up for hazardous mistakes. Those with task-oriented learning-mastery goals, on the other hand, desire to learn new things, even if they might get confused, make mistakes, and not look smart. Research shows that people with mastery goals are basically more successful. In extension, conflict benefits from being approached with a task-oriented mastery orientation: we learn together from our mistakes. (See Chapter Fourteen of this book.)

We might draw on what has been called a third factor of strength and faith, such as closeness to divinity, appreciation of compassion, or faith in shared humanity. Kaethe Weingarten (2003) recommends compassionate witnessing. Compassionate witnessing helps us acknowledge and reinstate our sense of shared humanity, and stop dehumanizing others. Concepts such as personhood, dignity, rights, character, autonomy, integrity, shame, humility, oppression, and empowerment are all intertwined here. We have a duty for self-respect. We cannot be moral citizens if we violate our own dignity. Finally, Aaron Lazare (2004) asserts: “One of the most profound human interactions is the offering and accepting of apologies. Apologies have the power to heal humiliations and grudges; remove the desire for vengeance, and generate forgiveness on the part of the offended parties. For the offender, they can diminish the fear of retaliation and relieve the guilt and shame that can grip the mind with a persistence and tenacity that are hard to ignore. The result of the apology process, ideally, is the reconciliation and restoration of broken relationships” (p. 1).

To conclude this section, it is important that we know what our “hot buttons” are and, if pressed, find a way to “slow down and cool down” so that we can think and act in a manner that will foster a positive emotional rather than a negative emotional climate for resolving the conflict. It is important to be aware that negative emotions have to be managed particularly cautiously because the ability to constructively channel and manage negative emotion is the “gatekeeper” to communicative effectiveness. It is desirable to dampen strong negative emotions and use their energy to foster constructive positive emotions. Meditation is but one way among others to “slow down and cool down.” With regard to opponents, it is advisable not to hit the others’ “hot buttons” but to attempt
developing a mutually respectful, caring, and cooperative relationship that is characterized by “cosmopolitan communication virtuosity.”

Let us revisit Eve and Adam to round up their case. Eve and Adam gradually learn that there are other definitions of love and happiness around, not just love defined as mutual dependence in submission/domination. Adam originally believed that only a weak partner would need him, so he kept Eve weak. And Eve tried her best to fit in. Now, both learn that love can flourish between two confident and strong partners who mutually enrich each other. It is a long learning process for Eve and Adam. It is like mastering a totally new language. All their hypotheses about “what works” and “what does not work” must be redefined. Time and again they “fall back.” However, they do not give up.

CONCLUSION

This chapter concludes with highlighting the challenges we face at the current historic juncture. Newly recognized global ecological and social problems require global cooperation for their resolution. Is humankind prepared? Conflict and emotions are at the core of both the problems and the solutions. Social emotions at the global level are no longer defined and channeled by a few diplomats. They are felt and responded to by millions of people and become salient for conflicts in the “global village” in unprecedented ways. Global terrorism is one outfall, an atrocious one and psychology is bound to gain significant importance in the field of political science.

Two problems stand out, globalization and the human rights revolution. The coming together of humankind (globalization) increases anxiety and the risk for misunderstandings. This danger needs to be tackled in ways that safeguard cooperation and avoid new divisions. Traditional ingroup/outgroup demarcations hurt more than before. Ingroup pride, if built on outgroup disparagement, is no longer constructive. Concurrent with the ingathering of humankind, another unprecedented social phenomenon radically questions old norms: the continuous human rights revolution. This revolution (or transformation or movement or trend) affect our relationship with our children, spouses, and boss as much as world politics. The human rights revolution is fueled by feelings of humiliation, and it fuels feelings of humiliation in the global public arena as much as at home. Formerly legitimate humbling is turned into illegitimate humiliation. Feelings of humiliation cross-cut other explanations of violence. Conditions such as poverty, inequality, or conflict of interest can all be tackled constructively by cooperation: enabling environments can be built jointly; scarce resources can be shared. It is when feelings of humiliation emerge that rifts are created and trust destroyed. If feelings of humiliation are not overcome constructively, at best, cooperation fails; at worst, violence ensues.
All this is occurring at a time when humankind remains blind to the fact that it is emotionally unprepared. Many believe that Mandela’s maturity cannot be learned and that he is simply extraordinarily gifted. This might partly be true. But, we still have to try. We need to learn, for example, that we no longer can continue to hope that domination/submission will bring peace, justice, and love—at home or abroad. Rather than bringing peace and cooperation, an adversarial culture with combative communication styles triggers the fight-and-flight avoidance system and deepens rifts. We have to learn to swing back and forth, get into the others’ perspectives and feelings, and then move back into our own perspective, not faltering in the face of contradictions, but using them courageously and constructively. We have to learn to stay calm while using frustration creatively, with imagination and inspiration. For that we need to nurture in ourselves and in others the qualities of curiosity, courage, and patience. We need to learn to use firm respect and warmth to build feasible relationships rather than unfeasible fences, both at home and in the world.

We must learn to nurture positive emotions, particularly in conflict situations, because they broaden our problem-solving capacity. This is a daunting challenge, but we can achieve it if we train to attend to our negative emotions first, knowing that they are the gatekeepers to our deeper, more positive capacities. We must learn to tolerate a certain amount of negative feelings, respecting that negative emotion is a necessary—if unpleasant—component of conceptual change. “Positive thinking” can be overdone—we do not want to descend into “blissful ignorance.” We need to learn how to foster positive feelings that are firm and take from negative feelings only what is constructive, without letting them dictate us.

We need, in the final analysis, to learn to “wage good conflict” through mutual empowerment and cooperative problem solving. This chapter represents a guideline. We need to change our mind-sets deeply if we are to prevent and solve conflict at home and in the world. It is not a question of some experts having a collection of smart techniques. We have to forge new practices and institutions locally and globally. The shortest “hands-on” guideline for managing emotions in conflict would go as follows: cool down—youself and others. Down-regulate negative feelings—far enough to avoid tunnel vision, yet not too far; avoid “blissful ignorance.” Up-regulate positive feelings by invoking a positive long-term vision—ask what kind of world do we wish our children to live in? Urge a joint learning orientation for humankind. Forge new, mature, Mandela-inspired emotion scripts that connect us in cooperation even when circumstances are difficult and humiliation hurts. At the global level, promote a decent global village in the spirit of Avishai Margalit’s call for “The Decent Society” with decent institutions that do not have humiliating effects. Craft global cultural practices and institutions for the stewardship of our planet as a joint task based on Article 1 of the Human Rights Declaration, which states that every human being is born with equal dignity.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Self-Regulation in the Service of Conflict Resolution

Walter Mischel
Aaron L. DeSmet
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Some of the most frustrating conflicts are those that people fight within their own heads, as they struggle with the dilemmas and temptations they encounter and create, as has been chronicled ever since Adam was tempted by Eve and Paradise was lost forever. In everyday life, we experience these internal wars when, after resolving to skip the dessert, we are faced with the pastry tray, or when the tobacco addict, choking with emphysema, battles with himself not to light the next cigarette. Such conflicts are omnipresent as people try to pursue a difficult achievement goal, or follow through on a health regimen (adhering to diets, exercise schedules, medications), or maintain a close relationship—efforts that require more than habit and routine to stay on course as conflict becomes inevitable and the difficulty and frustration of the effort escalates.

In this chapter, we consider some of the main findings from psychology that address these internal battles. We do so on the assumption that understanding what makes intrapsychic conflict easier to negotiate constructively is also relevant to the diverse types of conflict that characterize the human condition at every level from the interpersonal to the international. Our primary goal is to capture what psychological research and theory tell us about willpower and to examine the potential implications for conflict resolution.
UNDERSTANDING “WILLPOWER”

The facet of willpower that is of particular concern here is the ability to inhibit impulsive, automatic, “hot” emotional responses that conflict with and threaten to undo the more valued but distant future goals one is trying to pursue (trying to bypass the pastry, or continue studying for an exam rather than turn on the TV, or forgo alcohol, or save for retirement rather than buy the sports car, or settle a long-standing border dispute with one’s neighbor).

A Prototypic Conflict Within the Self: 
The Marshmallow Dilemma

The “delay of gratification” paradigm (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1989) is more widely known as the “marshmallow test” in media versions and best-selling advice volumes. Popularization notwithstanding (Goleman, 1995), in psychological research this method has been a prototype for the study of willpower in pursuit of difficult goals and a cornerstone for the concept of emotional intelligence (EQ). It has been researched extensively, both in experiments and in longitudinal studies that follow the same individuals for many years. (For reviews, see Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Ayduk, 2004; and Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1989).

In this method, a young child is presented with some consumable that she desires, for example a food treat. A dilemma is then posed: wait until the experimenter returns and get two of the desired treats, or ring a bell and the experimenter returns immediately but the child gets only one treat. The child clearly prefers the larger outcome and commits herself to wait for it. Soon, though, the delay becomes very difficult as waiting for the chosen goal drags on in the face of conflict, frustration, and temptation to ring the bell and take the immediately available treat. Though simple in its structure, this method has been shown to tap the type of skills and self-regulatory strategies that are fundamental for impulse control and for sustaining willpower in the face of temptation and frustration.

A choice conflict between either waiting for two marshmallows or settling for one now may seem artificial and far from the choices adults confront in their worlds. But for the young child this type of problem, when carefully structured in age-appropriate ways, creates a genuine conflict as involving to her as many dilemmas of life are to adults. It provides a route to study the processes underlying willpower systematically. Early studies of the delay situation revealed large individual differences in children’s willingness and ability to delay. Years later, the time spent waiting for two marshmallows later versus one now proved to be remarkably indicative of important outcomes in later life (Ayduk and others,
As examples, the number of seconds a preschooler is willing to wait for the bigger treats, rather than settling for the lesser one available immediately, significantly predicts diverse adaptive cognitive and social outcomes decades later, notably SAT scores (Mischel, 1996) and cognitive control ability (Eigsti and others, forthcoming).

Given that behavior in this situation is not of trivial interest, it becomes important to understand what is happening psychologically that makes some children ring quickly and others wait for what seems like forever. This problem has driven an extensive research program (Mischel, 1996; Mischel and Ayduk, 2004), addressing the question if humans initially are driven by impulses, pressing for immediate release, ruled by a pleasure principle, and largely indifferent to reason—as has long been assumed—how do they become able to control their actions and feelings, overcoming the power of stimuli to elicit automatic reactions and exerting the self-control strategies or willpower essential for executing their difficult-to-achieve intentions?

It is tempting to interpret the marshmallow-test results to support the view that how people manage to persist and exert self-control reflects basic character traits such as ego control or conscientiousness, traits that may already be visible quite early in life. Such constructs can be useful in characterizing broad individual differences in the predisposition to self-control and ability to negotiate difficult conflicts without losing the long-term goal that one seeks, but at best they offer incomplete explanations. They overlook, for example, the finding that the same preschooler who was unable to wait even a minute under some conditions was able to wait twenty minutes when the situation was represented or framed in other terms or when the conditions changed in even seemingly minor ways. So we need to understand what people can do when they try to persist in goal pursuit, to deal effectively with conflict without succumbing impulsively to the immediate temptations and impulses to quit.

**Essential Preliminaries for Self-Regulation**

Beginning in the early years of life, ineffective self-regulation predicts many adverse outcomes: subsequent school failures, poor academic and social competence, conduct disorders, and various forms of addictive and antisocial behavior. (For review, see Mischel and Ayduk, 2004.) Conversely, individuals who can effectively self-regulate and cope with conflict in pursuing their goals can at least partially shape their lives and futures in constructive directions. It is therefore important to understand the processes that enable self-regulation and willpower in the service of constructive conflict resolution.

Over the course of the past four decades, research has gone beyond folk wisdom and speculation to demystify the concept of willpower. The findings speak to why at least some people under some circumstances are able to turn their good intentions into effective behavior as they cope with the conflicts most
important to them. Much of this research focuses on the psychological processes involved in self-regulation that make it extremely difficult—or relatively easy—for people to deal effectively with seemingly mundane but potentially life-threatening conflicts.

Effective self-regulation or its failure depends on a sequence of closely connected and interacting cognitive and emotional processes. These include (a) how the individual encodes or construes the situation in which self-regulation is attempted, (b) the expectancies and beliefs that become activated, (c) the feelings and emotions triggered and experienced, and (d) the goals and values engaged. Although these are essential preliminaries for even attempting to exert effortful control, sustaining effort depends on the self-control skills and strategic competencies that are employed in trying to pursue them.

**Encodings.** The motivation to self-regulate tends to increase to the extent that the activity or situation is encoded as personally meaningful and self-relevant. New mothers, for example, cope better with the often exhausting and conflict-provoking chores and routines of parenting an infant if they view those tasks as fulfilling important self-obligations rather than as taking time away from other modes of self-fulfillment, such as a career. Even if events and situations are perceived as highly self-relevant, however, the person does not necessarily consciously attempt to self-regulate. On the contrary, such situations often easily and automatically trigger the enduring behavior patterns that characterize an individual’s personality and function to undermine self-regulation. One example of such an automatic reaction is the anger and abusiveness readily triggered in rejection-sensitive men who are quick to perceive rejection from a romantic partner even if it has not occurred. Their maladaptive reaction pattern of uncontrolled hostility may be essentially reflexive, bypassing conscious control and preventing purposeful self-intervention effort. In such a case, the person encodes the situation as personally relevant even if it is not and maintains this representation regardless of contradictory evidence. The ironic and often tragic result is that the outcome the man most fears and expects—rejection by the romantic partner—is precipitated by his own behavior in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, and Khouri, 1998).

**Expectancies.** Expectancy and belief that one is able to exert control and successfully execute necessary action is also an essential prerequisite for self-regulation. It supports one’s efforts and guides whether, where, when, and how one attempts to self-regulate (Mischel, Cantor, and Feldman, 1996). To even try purposeful self-regulation requires a representation of the self as a causal agent capable of executing an intended action. Perceived self-efficacy—the belief that “I can do it”—is a foundation for successfully pursuing a difficult goal or for changing and improving one’s situation or oneself (Bandura, 1986). Its psychological
opposite, perceived helplessness, is the route to giving up, apathy, and depression (Dweck, 1986; Seligman, 1975). Even when the self-regulatory task is something aversive that has to be endured and cannot be controlled—say, a painful dental procedure or hostile interaction—the belief that one can predict or control the stress is an important ingredient for coping. Generally, most people tend to become less upset if they think they can predict and control stressful or painful events, even if the perception is illusory (Averill, 1973; Miller, 1979; Rodin, 1987; Taylor, Lichtman, and Wood, 1984; Thompson, 1981).

Affect. Whereas expectations of efficacy and control enhance the potential for self-control and goal pursuit, anxious feelings and self-preoccupying thoughts undermine such efforts. The thought, “I’m no good at this; I’ll never be able to do it” in the test-anxious person competes and interferes with task-relevant thoughts (for example, “Now I have to recheck my answers”). Interference from self-preoccupying thoughts tends to be greatest when the task to be done is complex and requires many competing responses, as is always the case when the problem and conflict to be solved are complex and difficult. As the motivation to do well increases (as when success on the task is especially important), anxiety and the tendency to catastrophize become particularly maladaptive, interfering with attention to the task and concentration on how to master it effectively.

Motivation and Persistence in Goal Pursuit. Encodings, affect, and expectancies notwithstanding, equally important for facilitating adaptive self-regulation is that the individual be motivated to self-regulate. If the person presented with a delicious-looking piece of chocolate cake does not care about losing weight, then it is unlikely that the person will refrain from taking a bite. Assuming that the individual is in fact motivated to self-regulate, their persistence in goal pursuit will be bolstered or undermined by their outcome expectancies about the likelihood that the effort, cost, and time spent on the task will or will not actually result in the desired outcome. People base outcome expectations both on information in the current situation and on expectations generalized from previous similar situations. In short, expectancy has a substantial impact on self-regulatory choices and motivation: people are likely to choose to perform an action that requires effort if they believe that they can perform the action (they have high self-efficacy expectancy) and expect it to lead to favorable consequences.

Hot Reactions and the Emotional Brain
The situations in which people most need and want to self-regulate and control their impulses as they struggle to resolve conflict tend to be those in which it is most difficult for them to do so. These are the situations that elicit hot emotional reactions such as intense fear and anxiety or strong appetites or craving. In such situations, the person may be subject to what is called stimulus control—namely,
situations in which the stimulus triggers a virtually uncontrolable automatic response. The central challenge for the individual is to overcome such reflexive, automatic stimulus control with reflective self-control.

Consider, for example, the dilemma of the addict who is trying to quit but is tempted with heroin, or the starving dieter faced with the ultimate chocolate cake, or the test-anxious student facing an important examination. This kind of hot situation tends to automatically trigger a hot reaction, rapidly generating the associated feelings of fear or desire and the urge to respond impulsively, bypassing self-regulatory controls just when it is most important to have them. Such hot, reflexive reactions may be part of the overall arousal state that helps initiate quick adaptive action, as in an emergency response to a fire alarm or sudden danger that mobilizes the body’s resources. However, the arousal state makes thoughtful self-regulation and planful action and reflection most difficult (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).

Crucially important in emotional reactions, particularly fear, is a small almond-shaped region in the brain, called the amygdala (“almond” in Latin). This brain structure reacts almost instantly to stimuli that individuals perceive as threatening (Adolphs and others, 1999; LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Phelps and others, 2001; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, and Dolan, 2002), immediately cueing behavioral, physiological (autonomic), and endocrine responses. It mobilizes the body for action, readying it to fight or flight in response to a perceived threat. This reflexive emergency reaction is useful for adaptation: there is evolutionary survival value in reacting automatically to a snake in the grass without taking time to reflect on it or to fight an opponent who is ready to strike when flight is not possible. But these automatic reactions are only a quick fix and can become destructive if they persist (Ledoux, 1996, 2000). When activated indiscriminately, in response to stimuli that are not threatening, they can lead to negative consequences for the self.

Unlike lower animals in the evolutionary ladder, human beings have the capacity to eventually take control with high-level brain centers (the prefrontal cortex) and to start thinking and planning their way through perceived threats that the amygdala responds to automatically. In this vein, findings on the neural basis of emotion regulation indicate that the amygdala does not operate in isolation in response to perceived threats. Instead, it projects to and interacts with a number of prefrontal brain regions (among other areas) that support high-level executive functions that are believed to play a critical role in the cognitive control of emotion. (For review, see Ochsner and Gross, 2005.) For example, studies of peoples’ ability to down-regulate negative emotional responses have shown that instructing people to cognitively reappraise the meaning of threat-arousing stimuli to perceive them as less aversive (for example, imagine that the blood on a corpse is ketchup) leads to concomitant decreases in autonomic responses, amygdala activation, and self-report negative affect (Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson,
and Davidson, 2000; Levesque and others, 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, and Grabrieli, 2002; Ochsner, and others, 2004). Thus, the trick in achieving effective self-regulation is to move from the automatic, hot, emotional response that can quickly become maladaptive to a cooler, more reasoned, and reflective action that makes use of the vast cognitive resources that give humans their advantage (Mischel, and others, 1989).

**FROM HOT TO COOL: ENABLING WILLPOWER**

To understand the processes that enable willpower in executing one’s intentions, two closely interacting systems have been proposed: a “hot” system and a “cool” one (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). The cool system is a “know” system: it is cognitive, complex, contemplative, slow, rational, strategic, integrated, coherent, and emotionally neutral—it is the basis of self-regulation and self-control. In this theory, it consists of a network of informational cool nodes that are elaborately interconnected to each other and generate rational, reflective, and strategic behavior. In contrast, the hot one is a “go” system: emotional, simple, reflexive, and fast. It consists of relatively few representations, or hot spots, which, when activated by trigger stimuli, elicit virtually reflexive avoidance and approach reactions. The hot system develops early in life and is dominant in the first few years. It is tuned biologically to be responsive to innate releasing stimuli, both negative and positive, that elicit automatic, aversive, fear-and-flight reactions, or appetitive and sexual approach reactions. Impulsive and reflexive, the hot system is the basis of emotionality, fears as well as passions; it undermines rational attempts at self-control.

The hot/cool model assumes that cognition and affect operate in continuous interaction with one another. (For similar opponent process models, see Epstein, 1994; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, and Trope, 2002.) Specifically, hot spots and cool nodes are directly connected to one another and thus link the two systems (Metcalfe and Jacobs, 1996, 1998; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Hot spots can be evoked by activation of corresponding cool nodes; alternatively, hot representations can be cooled through intersystem connections to the corresponding cool nodes. Willpower becomes possible to the extent that the cooling strategies generated by the cognitive cool system circumvent hot system activation through such intersystem connections that link hot spots to cool nodes. Thus, consequential for self-control are the conditions under which hot spots do not have access to corresponding cool representations, because these conditions are the ones that undermine or prevent cool system regulation of hot impulses.

Analysis of the interactions between hot and cool systems allows prediction and explanation of diverse findings on the nature of willpower from decades of research. Although the processes involved in these interactions are quite complex,
the implications for conflict management are straightforward. Namely, the essential ingredient for effective self-regulation is to strategically cool the hot system and its impulsive reaction tendencies—reactions that are readily activated in conflict situations—and instead mobilize the cool system in pursuit of long-term goals.

The balance between the hot and cool systems depends on several factors, the first of which is the developmental level of the individual. The hot system develops and dominates early in life, whereas the cool system develops later (by age four) and becomes increasingly dominant over the course of development. Consequently, early in development the baby is primarily responsive to the pushes and pulls of hot stimuli in the external world as many of the hot spots do not have corresponding cool nodes that can regulate and inhibit hot system processing. These developmental differences are consistent with evidence on the differential rates of development of the relevant brain areas for these two systems. (For reviews, see Eisenberger, Smith, Sadovsky, and Spinrad, 2004; Rothbart, Ellis, and Posner, 2004.)

Empirical evidence from the delay of gratification studies supports these expectations. For example, whereas delay of gratification is virtually impossible for children younger than four years of age (Mischel, 1974), by age twelve almost 60 percent of children in some studies were able to wait the duration of the period to receive the awaited reward (25 minutes maximum; Ayduk and others, 2000, Study 2). As the cool system develops over time, however, it becomes increasingly possible for children to generate cooling strategies (such as self-distraction, inventing mental games to make the delay less aversive), to be less controlled by their temptations (Mischel and others, 1989).

In the context of conflict resolution, the most important determinant of hot-system, cool-system balance is stress. At high levels, stress deactivates the cool system and creates hot-system dominance. At lower levels of stress, complex thinking, planning, and remembering are possible. When stress levels jump from low to very high, as in life-threatening emergency conditions (escape the approaching perpetrator or die, get the food or starve), responding tends to be reflexive and automatic—hardly the time for cognitive complexity and reflection. Under conditions in which an animal’s life is threatened, quick responses driven by innately determined stimuli may be essential. At the same time, such automatic reactions undo rational efforts at constructive conflict resolution for the types of dilemmas that typically characterize everyday human conflicts.

The effects of chronic stress are evident even at a physical level. For example, exposure to prolonged stress has correlated with decreases in the volume of the hippocampus (Sapolsky, 1996), a brain structure that is basic for the functioning of the cool system. Other studies indicate that rats exposed to repeated stress demonstrate dendritic spine loss in medial prefrontal cortex (Brown, Henning, and Wellman, 2005; Radley and others, 2004; Radley, 2005)—a cellular feature of stress-related psychiatric disorders in which the prefrontal cortex...
is impaired—and dendritic spine growth in the amygdala (Mitra, Jadhav, McEwen, Vyas, and Chattarji, 2005; Vyas, Bernal, and Chattarji, 2003)—a neuronal event that is thought to facilitate increased emotionality. In humans, severe and chronic stress (as in war and terror conditions) may result in dominant activation of the hot system as opposed to the cool system in ways that become relatively stable and difficult to reverse. In short, conflict and stress are intimately linked and feed each other so as to easily and automatically undermine rational problem solving and escalate irrational and self-defeating hot behavior. In this cycle, stress increases the potential for conflict, which in turn escalates the level of stress, producing a pernicious cascade of impulsive hot-system responses and consequences that further undermine any chance for rational and effective conflict resolution. Fortunately, diverse strands of research from several fields converge that speak directly to this dilemma and point to new directions—or at least metaphors—for dealing constructively with conflict.

Consider again the marshmallow test. For this situation, delay of gratification and frustration tolerance are enhanced if the person can transform the aversive waiting period into a pleasant, nonwaiting situation. There are two primary ways that this can be done. One way is by diverting attention and thoughts away from the frustrative components of delay of gratification and thinking instead about other, pleasant things. Such distractions can be achieved by engaging in activities, overtly or mentally, during the delay period that help to suppress or decrease the aversiveness of waiting for the desired outcome, while retaining the goal and continuing to persist for it. Distraction tactics such as these often are seen in everyday conflict situations in the form of “time-outs,” which allow people to take a break from building disputes to focus attention elsewhere in order to calm down, regain composure, and have a fresh look.

Second, the aversiveness of the delay period also can be neutralized by changing the way people mentally represent the outcomes they are waiting or working for. For example, in a number of studies, Mischel and colleagues have shown that cueing children to think about the rewards in terms of their concrete, motivating, “hot” features (that is, you can think about how gooey and yummy marshmallows taste) undermines children’s ability to delay gratification. In contrast, a focus on the more abstract, informational, “cool” features of desired treats (that is, you can think about how round and puffy marshmallows are, like cotton balls or clouds) has the opposite effect, functioning to enhance delay ability. (For review, see Mischel and others, 1989.) In short, voluntary delay of reward can be aided by activities that serve as distracters from the reward and thus from the aversiveness of wanting it but not having it, or by mentally re-representing the reward more abstractly and less concretely. Through such distraction and mental re-representation, it is possible to convert the frustrating delay-of-reward situation into a psychologically less aversive condition. Thus, rather than trying to maintain an aversive activity through an act of will or focused attention, effective self-control
is helped by transforming the difficult into the easy, the aversive into the pleasant, and the boring into the interesting, while still maintaining the task-required activity on which the ultimate reward depends.

Doing this effectively when the task is complex may require extensive rehearsal and planning for implementing the necessary action when it is needed (Gollwitzer, 1996; Mischel and Patterson, 1976). In effective delay of gratification, the child tunes out the hot properties of the reward stimulus while strategically cooling through self-distraction to sustain waiting behavior. Similarly, distracting and relaxation-induced activity, such as listening to music, reduces anxiety in the face of uncontrollable shocks and helps people cope with chronic pain (such as from rheumatoid arthritis, and even with severe life crises). Cooling strategies generally can help one transform potentially stressful situations to make them less aversive. For example, if surgical patients are encouraged to reconstrue their hospital stay as a vacation from the stresses of daily life, they show better postoperative adjustment, just as chronically ill patients who reinterpret their conditions positively also show better adjustment.

When considering how people can be helped to self-regulate adaptively, there is an important caveat: in the real world, situations that require individuals to exert self-control often involve both strategic cooling processes that enable people to remain calm and reflective in the face of temptation, as well as strategic heating processes to maintain commitment to pursuing the goals rather than quitting. For example, Peake, Hebl, and Mischel (2002) investigated second-by-second attention deployment during efforts at sustained delay of gratification. Self-regulation depended not just on cooling strategies, but on flexible attention deployment as well—delay in working situations was facilitated most when attention was intermittently shifted to the rewards, as if the children tried to enhance their motivation to remain by reminding themselves about the rewards, but then quickly shifted away to prevent excessive arousal (Peake and others, 2002). Such flexibility in attention deployment is consistent with the idea that it is the balanced interactions between the hot and cool systems that sustain delay of gratification, as they exert their motivating and cooling effects in tandem. (See also Mischel and others, 1989.)

**INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT**

The findings just described have direct implications for analyzing interpersonal conflicts.

**Self-Regulatory Failure in Interpersonal Conflict**

Interpersonal conflict often involves complex, mixed-motive situations, in which the relationship between one’s own set of goals and another’s are simultaneously
positively interdependent and negatively interdependent. (See Chapter One of this book) Sayings such as “You always hurt the ones you love” indicate the common wisdom that the interdependence coming from interpersonal closeness creates the very situation in which emotions are strong and the tendency to react impulsively in hurtful, damaging ways is greatest. Although people may attempt to control the hot, emotional responses that intensify conflict and damage relationships, they often find that their good intentions are not enough to refrain from blowing up, making personal attacks, or otherwise doing what they later regret.

Regulating expression of negative feelings is difficult in the heat of conflict. The conflict situation itself creates a general level of stress that readily shifts the balance from cool-system to hot-system dominance. Under high stress, specific things are often said and done during conflict that push specific psychological buttons, which in turn trigger hot, emotional reactions. Failure to exert self-control over such reactions can instigate similarly hot responses from the other party, thus intensifying the conflict, further undermining efforts at self-control, and making cool, collaborative responses even more difficult. High stress also tends to decrease one’s ability to solve complex problems. So people who argue when they are stressed and fatigued often find that they lack the self-control they might otherwise have. Their problem-solving ability is also impaired, so stress doubly undermines any attempt to resolve the conflict constructively.

Given the negative implications associated with stress for successfully resolving conflicts, it is not surprising that managing stress plays an important role in conflict resolution. Managing and reducing stress improves not only self-cooling and self-control, but also one’s ability to generate and assess possible solutions to the conflict. Because a high level of stress can shift the balance from cool-system dominance to hot, managing stress effectively can mean the difference between suppressing hot impulses and lashing out uncontrollably. In this vein, Gottman and colleagues, working with married couples experiencing serious relationship-threatening conflicts, has found that stress management strategies, including exercise, mediation, and self-soothing rituals for unwinding or decompressing at the end of the day, can help improve conflict resolution and marital satisfaction. (For review, see Gottman and Silver, 2000).

In addition to stress, there are countless other reasons why people fail to self-regulate during conflict (for review, see Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice, 1993), among them ambivalence or lack of firm resolve (that is, motivation) to accomplish a particular goal. As mentioned earlier, one’s motivation to self-regulate increases if the situation or activity in question is considered personally relevant and meaningful. Because self-regulation and self-control require a certain amount of psychological and physiological energy, it comes as no surprise that when people are emotionally stressed, mentally drained, distracted, busy with other things, or just plain tired,
they find it all the more difficult to overcome a powerful emotional impulse (Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996).

Anxiety, rumination, and preoccupation may undermine self-regulation as well, particularly if the conflict is a complex one that requires abundant mental resources for successful resolution (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). As the perceived stakes increase, however, the anxiety level and the propensity to catastrophize also tends to increase, interfering with the ability to self-control and solve a complex problem. The very nature of a conflict situation—emotional and stress-inducing—thus undermines self-control and suggests the common-sense advice to try to avoid dealing with potential conflict situations when one is busy, anxious, stressed, or physically exhausted—advice that is easy to give but difficult to execute given the “hot” conditions in which real-life conflicts generally are confronted, whether battling for the parking space or taxi on the way home or dealing with sudden world crises.

**Escalating Spirals in Conflict**

Often, one little step crosses an imaginary line, leading to more frequent and severe transgression and the collapse of the good intentions. The dieter who cheats a little for a special occasion, the ex-smoker who sneaks just one little cigarette to help calm the nerves, or the alcoholic who takes one tiny sip to feel more at ease at the annual holiday party—these are the first steps to an unhappy ending; hence such idioms as “falling off the wagon.” Such snowballing, of course, occurs not just in internal conflicts, as in dieting struggles within the self, but also in interpersonal conflicts.

Altercations that readily become violent typically begin with relatively innocuous acts, followed by an escalating spiral of reciprocal provocation. The initial aggressive act may seem at the time essentially harmless, but elicits a hostile response that seems to justify an even more aggressive countermove, and so on, eventually snowballing into violence (for example, Zillman, 1994), and the cycle of emotional arousal, impulsive automatic responding, and aggression continues to escalate. It is evident, for example, in the divorced couple who simply cannot be in the same room together without the slightest provocation triggering a series of aggressive reactions that quickly spiral out of control. Such habitual escalating reactions between parties in a protracted conflict follow some of the same rules as all kinds of habitual responses. To illustrate, consider Pavlov’s dogs, who were exposed to food that made them salivate. The food was repeatedly paired with a distinctive bell, so that when the bell rang, food was shown, and the dogs salivated. Eventually, the dogs learned to anticipate food whenever they heard a bell and would salivate merely at the sound of the bell, regardless of whether food was ever presented. In human relations, the trigger for the original angry response is the other’s behavior and its perceived harmful consequences. (See Allred, 2000.) Over time in these escalating cycles, however,
the anger and hostility may become such strong conditioned responses that the presence of the other person, physically or in thought, may be sufficient to trigger them automatically unless cooling strategic interventions are introduced.

**Cooling Strategies and Techniques**

Between six and eighteen months of age, infants begin to learn to regulate their emotions. Six-month-olds approached by a stranger tend to cope with their fear and anxiety by averting their eyes and “fussing.” Twelve- and eighteen-month-olds, on the other hand, use other strategies, such as self-distractiion and self-soothing, to deal with an anxiety-producing stranger. These more sophisticated cooling strategies allow children to effectively cope with their hot fear and anxiety reactions. Because conflict elicits similar fight-or-flight emotional responses, self-distractiion, self-calming, and other cooling strategies are equally important skills for adults.

**Time-Out**

People who have stressful jobs are able to reduce conflict and improve their family relationships by taking brief time-outs after returning home from work. Without a time-out, going straight from a stressful workday to a family interaction often leads to argument and dispute. But spending part of an hour by themselves enables these stressed-out wage earners to calm down prior to dealing with their families, and subsequent family interactions are therefore much more pleasant.

In the middle of a conflict, calling for a time-out or even just stopping and counting to ten, can allow people the extra time they need to calm down and cool off. If people take an extended time-out, they should take care not to engage in other arousing or anxiety-producing activities and avoid “silent seething” (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice, 1993) in which the time-out is used to nurse the angry feelings and plot the next counterattack. Engaging in such silent seething, in which people focus specifically on the hot, concrete emotion-arousing aspects of the conflict (for example, “I can’t believe she said that . . .” or “he’s being so stubborn . . .”) is likely to perpetuate hot responses by leading to rumination that further increases negative arousal and hostility (Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel, 2005; Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Instead, people can use time-outs constructively to engage in behaviors that calm them down, reducing their arousal levels so that they can later rejoin hostile negotiations and contribute to them meaningfully, in ways that lead to adaptive resolutions. The specific behaviors that facilitate this will likely vary across people and depend on a host of factors including the individual’s personality, the type of conflict involved, as well as its intensity. Regardless of the specific behavior that people choose, however, the objective of a time-out remains the same—to pause and
calm down, not to pause and reload, nor as a way of avoiding dealing with the conflict and abandoning the efforts to resolve it.

Reflection
One way to facilitate more constructive conflict resolution is to become more self-aware. Stopping to reflect, comparing one’s behavior to important goals and standards, and trying to take the other person’s perspective can be helpful. People who stop to focus attention on themselves and succeed in adaptively reflecting on their current thoughts, feeling, goals, and behaviors are more likely to see themselves accurately, to act consistently with goals and standards, and to be faithful to shared standards such as societal norms or agreed ground rules of the relationship (for example, Carver and Scheier, 1981; Wicklund, 1979). However, efforts to constructively analyze feelings can also easily become hazardous by entangling people in rumination that further increases negative affect (for example, Ayduk, Downey, and Mischel, 2002; Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Given these conflicting findings, a key need is to understand how people can adaptively reflect rather than ruminate about their feelings.

According to the hot/cool model, whether a person ends up ruminating or reflecting depends critically on two mechanisms: the individual’s arousal level and the individual’s construals of their experience (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). As noted earlier, at high levels of arousal hot-system processing is accentuated while cool system processing is attenuated. Consequently, when a person experiences high negative arousal, as is often the case during conflict, it is assumed that efforts to rationally analyze negative feelings will be impaired. Instead of fostering abstract thinking and reasoning, such efforts are expected to lead individuals to construe negative experiences in predominantly concrete, descriptive terms (that is, focusing specifically on what one is feeling and what happened to them), which, in turn, feeds back and serves to further increase negative arousal. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical example. Imagine that Joanne is in the midst of a frustrating negotiation with John. She finds herself becoming increasingly upset and is motivated to figure out why she is feeling so hostile in order to prevent the negotiation from blowing up. She takes a time-out and asks herself, “Why am I so angry at John?” In response, she tells herself, “because he’s arrogant and a control freak and his proposal is unfair.” Thus, although Joanne is motivated to understand her feelings, her attempts to do so do not lead to insightful understanding. Instead, they lead her to focus specifically on what it is about John and the situation that is upsetting her, causing her to become increasingly upset. In order to prevent this kind of ruminative response and enable adaptive reflection, the hot/cool model suggests that specific strategies are needed to reduce arousal while attention is directed to a more abstract and less concrete analysis of one’s feelings.
Recent studies by Kross and colleagues (2005) have begun to shed light on the psychological operations that enable such cool, reflective processing. In their research they demonstrate that two strategies play a critical role in enabling people to adaptively reflect, rather than ruminate, over negative feelings. One is the adoption of a self-distanced perspective, in which the individual becomes an observer of himself and the experience (rather than maintaining the usual self-immersed perspective). The other is a “why” focus on the specific reasons underlying one’s negative feelings (rather than a “what” focus on the specific felt emotions experienced). Findings from a series of studies indicate that the combination of these strategies (that is, why-focus engaged in from a self-distanced perspective or “distanced-why” strategy) enables people to analyze negative experiences and emotions in relatively cool, cognitive terms, making sense of them without overwhelming them with their aversiveness and refueling the problem. For example, Kross and colleagues (2005) have shown that instructing people to focus on the reasons underlying their negative feelings surrounding interpersonal conflicts (why focus) from self-distanced perspectives leads them to experience less anger, assessed both implicitly (indirectly) and explicitly (through self-report), and to construe their experiences less concretely (that is, “I can’t believe she said that to me . . .” or “he’s so unreasonable . . .”) and more abstractly (such as, “I realize that she felt threatened by my presence . . .”; “looking back on it now, I could have responded differently by . . .”) relative to individuals who focus on the reasons underlying their emotions without adopting a self-distanced perspective.

The distanced-why strategy thus appears to offer one route for facilitating reflection and constructive problem solving. Theoretically, a number of techniques may be similarly useful so long as they function to attenuate arousal levels while leading people to construe their experiences more abstractly and less concretely. In this vein, time-outs, third-party mediators, and writing interventions may all prove useful to the extent that they fulfill these enabling conditions.

**SELF-REGULATORY PLANS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES**

Implementation strategies connect general goals (“Resolve conflict constructively”) to a specific implementation intention (“If she says I’m rude, I’ll ask her to cite specific examples; I won’t lose my temper and start calling her names”). Creating a specific contingency (IF _____) that becomes connected to a specific planned response (THEN _____) helps ensure implementation of the plan by tying a hot trigger event to the intended response rather than the habitual response. For instance, translating the goal of “health and physical fitness”
into an intention to “exercise regularly” is not an effective plan of action because it is too broad. An effective plan of action specifies the how, when, and where rather than just the what of the action steps needed to accomplish the goal (Gollwitzer, 1996). A better plan for the person seeking a healthier lifestyle might be “I’ll go to the park and jog two miles every weekday evening as soon as I get home from work.” This is a better plan because it specifies the exact action (jogging two miles), when and where it happens (every weekday in the park), and the situation that triggers the action (as soon as I get home from work). A similarly detailed plan of action can help ensure that specific conflict resolution strategies are initiated at the right time and place and with the appropriate people.

**MODELING/ROLE PLAY/REHEARSAL**

People do not learn new response patterns just through direct experience. They can also learn adaptive responses to conflict from observing others. Aggressive children and adolescents, in particular, can profit immensely from training interventions that teach them nonviolent techniques for handling interpersonal conflicts. Observing skilled models deal effectively with difficult situations allows the observer to achieve greater freedom in coping with current and future problems of all sorts (Bandura, 1986).

In modeling, appropriate and effective responses are repeatedly modeled by competent individuals in a variety of problem-provoking situations (Bandura, 1969, 1986). Generally, the modeling begins with observation of effective behaviors in relatively easy situations and, when learners have mastered them, moves gradually to those that are increasingly difficult. In participant modeling, in addition to observing, learners also have guided opportunities to try the modeled behavior and receive the necessary guidance along with ample opportunity to practice the new behavior until they can respond to similar problem situations skillfully and generalization is achieved.

Live or videotaped modeling demonstrations can be an excellent way to communicate appropriate behaviors in a variety of realistic situations and contexts. Voice-over narration can direct attention to key features and explicate the underlying action plan of which the model is merely an example. On an instructional video, voice-overs can be used to represent what people are thinking to themselves and the cognitive-affective strategies they are using to help manage themselves during the conflict and can point to non obvious behaviors such as body language. Demonstration can be used to contrast good and poor performance, and to show the positive outcomes associated with good performance and the potential negative consequences of poor performance. Demonstration can also be used to symbolically model internal processes of self-control by
showing what people are thinking and feeling. By having people talk out loud and explain what they are thinking and feeling, one can use demonstration to model internal dynamics as well as observable behavior.

CONCLUSION

Intense conflicts, whether internal within the individual or external between individuals and groups, typically generate strong, “hot” emotional arousal that easily triggers automatic, virtually reflexive reactions, such as avoidance and flight or aggression and fight. Often, these impulsive reactions are exactly the ones that lead to disadvantageous long-term consequences for all concerned. Shifting from hot, emotion-driven, impulsive reactions to cooler, more effective modes of cognitive problem solving is facilitated by a variety of cooling strategies that were illustrated, such as selective attention and reappraisal. A variety of techniques, including time-outs, reflection, exposure to effective models, planning/rehearsal, and role play can help individuals readily use such strategies when they are most needed—and, ironically, most difficult to access spontaneously—in efforts at effective conflict resolution.

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PART THREE

PERSONAL DIFFERENCES
Prejudice is at the root of many intractable conflicts. Whether prejudice was born out of the dispute or existed before and contributed to the dispute, exaggerated beliefs about the character and motives of the other party often make reconciliation extremely difficult to achieve.

In this chapter, we argue that this relationship between prejudice and intractable conflicts may have its roots in people’s theories about the malleability of human qualities. In our work, we have identified two theories that people can hold about the nature of human qualities. Those who hold an entity theory believe that human qualities—such as goodness or intelligence—are fixed. They are internal entities that people simply do or do not possess. Those who subscribe to this theory not only believe that people have immutable traits, but also that the goal of knowing others is best accomplished by identifying which set of fixed traits they possess. This, as you will see, is the view that leads to stereotyping of others.

The other view, which we have called an incremental theory, instead posits that human qualities are malleable and can be developed. This theory does not imply that everyone will change, but rather that everyone has the ability to grow with education and effort. For people who hold this more dynamic view of human nature, the goal of knowing others is best accomplished, not through judging their fixed traits, but through understanding their psychology—their needs and goals, their thought processes, and their culture.
Throughout the chapter, we show how the entity theory lends itself to rather rapid and rigid judgments of others—both of other individuals and other groups—as well as an inability to detect change or progress in others. We go on to show how the policies and practices that follow from this can pose serious obstacles to effective conflict resolution. In contrast, we show how the incremental theory leads to more tentative and flexible initial assessments, ones that are subject to revision as others change. We go on to show how this view provides more opportunities for finding common ground and bringing conflicts to successful resolutions even while recognizing that others have shortcomings.

In order to understand an opponent and find a way to resolve conflict, one must also be willing to admit potential fault—to acknowledge that one’s own view is not the only correct view and that there might be more to be learned about the situation. We review research that explores how an entity theory often leads to more defensive, self-esteem boosting behavior at the expense of problem solving. An incremental theory, in contrast, tends to lead to a more open, challenge-seeking, and learning-oriented stance, which is typically necessary to confront and resolve difficult conflicts.

Fortunately, the view that traits are fixed is itself changeable. In the final section, we review research demonstrating that changing people’s implicit theories (by teaching them an incremental view) results in a clear reduction in people’s tendency to label and stereotype, a clear increase in their sensitivity to progress and change, and a clear upswing in their desire to learn.

MEASURING PEOPLE’S THEORIES

In our studies, we measure peoples’ theories by asking participants to rate their agreement with statements such as “Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that” or “People can always substantially change the kind of person they are.” On average, approximately 40 percent of participants agree with statements indicating that people are fixed and 40 percent agree with statements indicating that people are changeable. The remaining 20 percent do not clearly demonstrate one of these two perspectives.

One might ask which theory is correct. Is the basic type of person you are something fixed or something that can be improved? There is no straightforward answer to this question, and individual traits likely differ in the degree to which they are changeable. That said, psychotherapy is founded, in part, upon the notion that individuals are able to change important aspects of their personality. Further, psychologists are increasingly adopting the view that even intelligence, an aspect of the self that some consider quite stable, is indeed modifiable (Brown and Campione, 1996; Perkins, 1995; Resnick, 1983; Sternberg, 1985).
Our own focus, however, is on what people believe and on the powerful impact of that belief.

**Pinning Labels on People**

People holding an entity theory demonstrate a willingness to label others as good or bad, or as moral or immoral, on the basis of little evidence (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu, 1997; Erdley and Dweck, 1993). For example, in a study by Chiu and colleagues (1997), entity theorists were far more likely to report that even insignificant behaviors (such as whether people made their bed in the morning) were a good basis for judging moral character. Beyond that, entity theorists were more willing to decide that a man was guilty of murder based on his appearance (Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck, 1999). In this study, participants were asked to read a transcript of a murder trial. In one condition, the defendant was described as wearing a black leather jacket with multiple zippers and as sporting an earring on the day of the murder. In the other condition, he was described as wearing a business suit and carrying an attaché case. Entity theorists were unaffected by differences in the strength of the evidence and, instead, based their judgments of guilt and innocence on these descriptions of the way the defendant was dressed. They rated the defendant as less moral and were more likely to convict him if he wore a leather jacket and an earring. In contrast, participants with an incremental theory were unaffected by the defendant’s apparel and were swayed only by strength of the evidence.

If entity theorists can condemn others based on relatively inconsequential behavior such as bed making or apparel choice, then we can legitimately expect them to assign even stronger and more rigid negative traits to people they view as a threat or as having done real harm to them. If conflict resolution involves stepping into the other’s shoes and finding a way to compromise, then seeing the other as unalterably immoral (or incompetent) will surely be an obstacle to this.

**Pinning Labels on Groups**

Often, conflict is not between individuals but between groups—each composed of many and varied individuals. No nation, for example, consists of all evil people or all incompetent people. Yet group stereotypes tend to portray an entire group as suffering from the same deficiency. One group is called untrustworthy, another lazy, another greedy, another intellectually inferior. Is it entity theorists who are more likely to rely upon these group stereotypes?

Just as entity theorists brand individuals with labels more quickly, they also seem more ready to characterize groups in sweeping terms both in studies with children (Levy and Dweck, 1999) and college students (Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck, 1998). In both populations, entity and incremental theorists learned about groups of people that they had not encountered before. For children, the groups consisted of students from another school; for the college students,
the groups consisted of social clubs at another university. In some cases, they were told about a group in which a majority behaved in a negative way (for example, borrowing something and not giving it back or cutting in front of someone in line). In other cases, they were told about a group in which a majority of the members acted in a positive way (for example, did something generous, helpful, or thoughtful).

Those who held an entity theory formed more sweeping stereotypes of both the positive and the negative groups. They also saw the groups as being highly homogeneous, even though an appreciable number of the group members did not perform the stereotyped behavior. Finally, when asked about an unknown group member, entity theorists just assumed he would be bad or good like the rest of the group. Thus, it appears that, once entity theorists form a group impression, few who belong to that group are considered free from the stereotype. Instead, the group is seen as uniformly untrustworthy, greedy, lazy, or unintelligent—including members who did nothing wrong.

Labels Dehumanize

Unfortunately, pinning a label on the whole group has the effect of dehumanizing the group members. In research by Levy and Dweck (1999), children who had an entity theory decided that they had little in common with the group members once they decided that a group was bad. No longer were the group members regular children with the usual needs and preferences. Instead, entity theorists believed that the children in that group did not like the same toys and games that they themselves did and did not share the same worries and concerns. In other words, those children now belonged to a separate (and inferior) class of people—one with which they had no desire to interact.

In contrast, the children who held an incremental theory did not see the group as all bad, even though they were certainly not pleased with the children who acted in negative ways. Moreover, they still assumed that the group members were similar to them in many ways—preferring the same toys and games and sharing the same worries and concerns. The incremental theorists were still willing to meet and get to know the kids.

The tendency on the part of entity theorists to treat individuals as walking embodiments of a group’s stereotypes leads them to behave in ways likely to bring out the negative behavior they expect. We saw this clearly in a study by Levy, Freitas, and Dweck (1996) in which college students participated in a prisoners’ dilemma-type game. In this game, participants have a choice between cooperating and competing with another person. If a participant cooperates and the other person decides to compete, nearly all of the resource goes to that other person. Both entity theorists and incremental theorists tended to cooperate when they knew nothing about the other party. When students were
told that their opponent was a law student, however, we saw a large shift in the behavior of entity theorists (but not incremental theorists). Succumbing to the stereotype of lawyers and law students as competitive, entity theorists overwhelmingly chose to compete with them. Presumably, they were cutting off the law students’ opportunity to get the better of them. At the same time, they were minimizing the opportunity for a mutually beneficial outcome.

It is not difficult to see how tarring a whole group with the same brush might stand in the way of resolving intergroup conflicts. The prisoner’s dilemma game is meant to be a proxy for the sorts of conflicts that we see in the real world. Entity theorists are likely to approach interactions with individuals about whom they hold negative stereotypes with an air of mistrust and, as a consequence, to behave so as to guard against bad actions by the other party. In so doing, they are more likely to elicit the very behavior they expect than they are to find a way to resolve conflict. Incremental theorists who are less likely to act toward individuals on the basis of group stereotypes are more likely to find ways to cooperate with the other and resolve existing conflicts.

Indelible Labels

The tendency for entity theorists to base consequential decisions on rapidly formed judgments is particularly problematic because, once formed, entity theorists are less likely to revise their judgments even in the face of substantial contrary evidence. Across a number of studies, participants with an entity theory were far less likely to change their initial view of a person’s competence or character, even when the person gave clear evidence of changing. This phenomenon has been shown for managers toward employees (Heslin, Latham, and VandeWalle, 2005), teachers toward students (Butler, 2000), and students toward other students (Erdley and Dweck, 1993; Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, and Sherman, 2001). In contrast, incremental theorists updated their impressions in step with the information they were receiving (Erdley and Dweck, 1993; Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, and Sherman, 2001; compare Hong and others, 2004). In fact, incremental theorists sought to hold accurate views about others, as evidenced by their heightened sensitivity to both positive and negative changes in people’s behavior (Butler, 2000; Heslin, Latham, and VandeWalle, 2005).

Entity theorists do not merely fail to seek out information that might disconfirm their views. Instead, Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, and Sherman (2001) found that entity theorists went so far as to block out evidence that contradicted their initial impression. In several studies, these researchers monitored the attention of the participants as they received evidence that confirmed or disconfirmed their view of an individual’s intelligence or character. While incremental theorists paid special attention to information that challenged their existing view (and that perhaps provided them with a more nuanced and accurate view),
entity theorists diverted their attention in ways that minimized their receipt of this information.

A reluctance to revise impressions of others, once formed, makes conflict resolution particularly difficult because misunderstanding the other plays such a large role in inciting and exacerbating conflict. This is why those who seek to reduce conflict strive to bring members of both sides together, to educate each side about the others’ cultures and histories, and to combat stereotypes and prejudice between groups. As Moshe Davan said, “If you want to make peace, you don’t talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies.” Through this process, mistaken impressions are often dissolved and each party gains a better understanding of the other side’s perspective. Past research suggests that having even one out-group friend can reduce prejudice toward the other group (for review, see Brown and Hewstone, 2005), even among groups embroiled in intractable conflict such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, and Neins, 2004). The openness that incremental theorists demonstrate toward new information is particularly conducive to promoting understanding between parties and resolving conflict. In contrast, the rigidity that entity theorists tend to demonstrate can leave these methods ineffective and, ultimately, can hinder reconciliation.

Are Incremental Theorists Always Open and Accurate?

Are incremental theorists infallible information processors, always open to new information? Do they not have vulnerabilities as well? Plaks, Grant, and Dweck (2005) addressed this question and found that there are some kinds of information that incremental theorists do not like. Although incremental theorists are open to seeing evidence of performance decline (Heslin, Latham, and VandeWalle, 2005), they are not very open to evidence that contradicts their belief that people are capable of change. They are, in fact, threatened by such evidence (Plaks, Grant, and Dweck, 2005).

This suggests that incremental theorists might be too ready to forgive and compromise with people who look as though they are trying to change, even if true and lasting change is not forthcoming. In such cases, incremental theorists may too readily agree to a resolution that does not turn out to be in their interest.

STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

We have also directly examined how people with different theories about human qualities deal with conflict. Our participants have either told us about important conflicts in their lives and how they dealt with them, or we have posed
conflicts and asked them how they would deal with them. The differences are interesting and instructive.

**Voicing Conflict—Focusing on Information and Discussion**

Kammrath and Dweck (forthcoming) looked at conflicts within close relationships. We asked people who were in serious relationships to tell us about a major conflict they had had with their partner in the last few months. They were told to focus on the one conflict that made them the most upset and then to report their strategies for conflict resolution. Entity and incremental theorists did not differ in how serious they thought the conflict was or in how upset they were following the conflict. However, they did differ in how they handled the conflict. Participants who held an incremental theory of personality (that is, who believed their partners were capable of change) were significantly more likely to voice their feelings. Relative to entity theorists, they gave higher endorsements to statements such as “I openly discussed the situation with my partner,” “I tried to work with my partner to find a solution to the problem,” and “I tried to bring my concerns out into the open so that the issue could be resolved in the best possible way.”

Entity theorists, not believing in change, were more likely to swallow their feelings and showed little motivation to work toward a solution. They gave stronger endorsements to items such as “I accepted his faults and didn’t try to change him,” “I tried to accept the situation and move on,” and “I learned to live with it.”

In a follow-up study, people kept records of their daily experiences in their relationship for two weeks. Each day they were asked to report on their conflict experiences and to tell us the strategies they used to cope with them. As in the prior study, people’s theories were not related to the number of conflict experiences they reported, the magnitude of the conflict, or the negative emotion they experienced. Nevertheless, when we looked at the strategies used to address the conflicts, differences again emerged. The differences, by the way, were not apparent for minor conflicts, but as the conflicts heated up, incremental theorists became more likely to speak up and try to work through the issues, while entity theorists became more angry, yet less likely to voice their anger. Again, if their partner could not change, serious conflict could not be discussed. However, this time entity theorists were not just quietly loyal. When conflict occurred, they were significantly more likely than incremental theorists to think about leaving the relationship. So for them the choice seemed to be either to remain quietly loyal or to exit. Once again, if you see your partner as incapable of change, it is a “take it or leave it” situation: you either live with your partner “as is” or you find a new one. There is little room for negotiation and growth.

Interestingly, analogous findings were obtained in a very different context. Wood, Phillips, and Tabernero (2002), over a series of sessions, gave small
groups of people a difficult managerial task to master. Some groups were composed of entity theorists (in this case, people who believed that managerial skills were a fixed ability), whereas other groups were composed of incremental theorists (those who believed that managerial expertise could be developed). Wood and his colleagues, assessing the groups over sessions, found that in the incremental groups there was a fuller discussion of the incoming information, presumably resulting from the belief that everyone could learn the most from an open and complete exchange. Among entity theorists, who believe that “you have it or you don’t,” such full and open exchange was curtailed.

This sort of discussion can serve two purposes. First, as mentioned, sharing of information can help parties to learn about each other and to dispel misunderstandings regarding the other party’s nature and intentions. Therefore, by adopting a strategy of discussing the issues, incremental theorists naturally engage in a behavior that helps to resolve conflict. Second, conflicts are often assumed to be zero-sum, in that each gain for one party represents a loss of equal value to the other party. However, different groups have differing goals. As such, conflict can be minimized by identifying resources that are unimportant but abundant for one group but highly valued and scarce for another. Yet, it would be quite difficult to identify whether or not such solutions exist without opening the lines of communication. Incremental theorists are more likely to share the information necessary to discover when differences in goals exist and to take advantage of these differences to resolve conflict. Because entity theorists do not engage in this discussion, they likely miss out on opportunities for reconciliation.

**Punishment Versus Negotiation and Education**

What do people do when they are betrayed or when a contract is broken? One possibility is to try to punish or harm the guilty parties. Another is to try to negotiate with, influence, or educate them. In our research, entity theorists are often inclined toward the former: bad people should be punished or harmed. In contrast, incremental theorists lean toward the latter: people should be worked with to reach an acceptable solution.

In research by Chiu and associates (1997), college students were confronted with a situation in which a professor had provided a grading scheme at the beginning of the semester. However, too many students had earned As by the end of the semester, so he changed the grading scheme to make it more stringent. As a result, many students who had earned and expected As were now going to receive Bs. Plainly, a conflict had arisen. What did students say they would do?

Entity theorists, not believing in personal change, said they would try to get back at the professor—reporting him to a higher authority or finding ways to harass or harm him. In contrast, incremental theorists more often said they
would try to talk to the professor, explain to him that he had violated a moral principle, and try to get him to restore a fair state of affairs. One approach to the conflict was to inflict pain and suffering while the other was to solve the problem through education and negotiation.

In the same set of studies, Chiu and associates (1997) asked participants to assume the role of a teacher dealing with children who had not fulfilled their classroom obligations. As before, entity theorists were more likely than incremental theorists to say they would mete out punishment. Incremental theorists were more likely to try to reach a solution through mutual negotiation—by questioning the children about the reasons for their lapse (learning their point of view) and by discussing remedies for the situation.

We have all seen instances of both approaches to conflict, both the approach in which people attempt to harm or destroy the bad guy or group and the approach in which people attempt to negotiate with the opposing party to reach a mutually acceptable solution. One can easily see how these approaches might be tied to beliefs about the potential for change in real-world conflicts. When people believe that their opponents or those in positions of power are changeable, it makes sense to adopt a moderate strategy—one of working within the system to persuade others and bring about real change. When, however, people believe others to be fixed and unchangeable, a moderate policy makes little sense and more extreme measures are likely to be adopted. If people do not believe in the capacity of the other party to change, yet believe change necessary, the only solution they may see is to marginalize, subjugate, or even eliminate the other people.

Thus far we have been looking at the consequences of implicit theories for how we view and treat others. When we see them as having fixed traits, we are more likely to stereotype them and to ignore or reject information that refutes the stereotype. When we see others as fixed and conflict arises, we skirt the issue, tending to give up on them or even to punish or harm them. When, instead, we see others as having malleable qualities, we are more likely to try to understand their psychology, to see evidence of progress or change, and, when conflict arises, to favor negotiation and education.

**Self-Theories**

The theories people have about themselves can also play a key role in how they deal with conflict. Our research shows that people who have an entity theory, believing that their traits are fixed, have recurrent concerns about proving those traits. They devote considerable attention to showing that they are the intelligent ones or the good guys (Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Erdley and others, 1997; compare Robins and Pals, 2002), and they worry about revealing errors or deficiencies that may call their adequacy into question (Hong and others, 1999; compare Mueller and Dweck, 1998). This concern with how they will be judged
can interfere with the conflict resolution process, since resolving conflicts often involves both sides admitting error and working together toward a solution.

A striking example of entity theorists’ unwillingness to admit deficiencies comes from a study by Hong and associates (1999), performed at the University of Hong Kong, a premier institution in Hong Kong. In order to do well there, students need to be fluent in English, because all the classes, papers, and tests are in English. However, many of the students arrive there with poor proficiency in English. Hong and colleagues approached freshman shortly after they arrived, told them that the faculty were considering offering a remedial English course, and asked them about their interest in this course. We actually knew their scores on their English proficiency test, so we knew who was proficient and who was not. Among students who were not proficient, those who held an incremental theory were eager for such a course, but those who held an entity theory were not. It appeared that they were not willing to expose their deficiency in order to remedy it. Instead, they seemed to prefer to put their college career in jeopardy.

In a series of recent studies, Nussbaum and Dweck (2004) also examined the way in which entity and incremental theorists cope with a deficiency, a deficiency that was a blow to their self-esteem. It was found, once again, that incremental theorists repaired their self-esteem by confronting their deficiency directly and learning the skills that they were lacking. But entity theorists repaired their self-esteem by finding people who were worse off than they were and comparing themselves with them. Similarly, Ehrlinger and Dweck (2006) found that entity theorists focused their attention away from the skills they lacked and toward the skills they already possessed, leaving them overconfident. Entity theorists were not willing to admit and confront their deficits head on. Needing to appear flawless or blameless (and therefore looking for flaws and blame somewhere else) is a recipe for trouble in any relationship, let alone relationships that are already fraught with conflict.

**Changing People’s Theories**

In this section, we show that implicit theories, although relatively stable when left to themselves, can be changed through intervention. We also show that when people are taught an incremental theory, they show decreased stereotyping, greater attunement to others’ progress and change, decreased defensiveness, and greater openness to learning—all things that should foster more effective conflict resolution.

Levy and colleagues (Levy and Dweck, 1999; Levy Stroessner, and Dweck, 1998) demonstrated that entity theorists were more prone to forming stereotypes, to seeing groups as overly homogeneous, and to seeing negatively stereotyped groups as completely distinct from themselves, but also showed that teaching participants an incremental theory reversed these tendencies. Participants who
learned an incremental theory (by means of a scientific article that described the incremental theory and supported the idea that people can change) became more moderate in their assignment of labels, recognized the heterogeneity within groups, and saw the common ground that other groups shared with them.

In a management setting, Heslin, Latham, and VandeWalle (2005) taught managers an incremental theory by means of an article, film, and self-persuasion exercises. After going through this training, these managers were significantly more sensitive to improvement in their employees’ performance than were managers in the control group. Moreover, this change persisted over the six-week period of the study. Thus, encouraging an incremental theory seems to make people more open to positive changes in others—a factor that, as we have noted, is important for resolving conflicts. If we can recognize true progress in the other party, then we will be willing to reciprocate in ways that will facilitate further progress.

Changing people’s theories about themselves also brings about changes in outlook that can lead to more effective conflict resolution. In the Nussbaum and Dweck (2004) studies, teaching an incremental theory of ability made participants more willing to admit and address their flaws and less likely to look for flaws in others to bolster their egos. Finally, Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (forthcoming) conducted an intervention to teach adolescent students an incremental theory of intelligence. Following the intervention, teachers reported an upsurge in their students’ desire to learn and in the willingness to invest effort, particularly on the part of many students who had previously been apathetic and defensive. This renewed openness to learning has been replicated in two other intervention studies that taught students the incremental theory: a study by Good, Aronson, and Inzlicht (2003), also with junior high school students, and a study by Aronson, Fried, and Good (2002), with college students.

CONCLUSION

In summary, implicit theories create powerful frameworks that people use to organize and interpret their worlds. We have shown how implicit theories affect three main areas that are important to conflict resolution:

1. The rapidity and rigidity with which people label others as well as the ways in which these labels distance and dehumanize others.

2. The conflict resolution strategies people use and the effectiveness of these strategies for bringing about successful solutions.

3. The willingness of people to reveal deficiencies and admit fault in order to solve problems and learn.
We have also shown that these theories can be changed and, that when people are taught an incremental theory, they organize and interpret their worlds in ways that are more conducive to effective negotiation and to rapprochement. We look forward to future work on the role that implicit theories can play in conflict resolution among individuals, groups, and nations.

References


Throughout literary history, many novelists and playwrights have defined personality as “destiny,” poignantly illustrating the “inevitability” of their protagonist’s fate as a consequence of character traits that relentlessly determine his or her choices in life. But even as naïve observers, if we look deeply enough within ourselves we are often surprised by the extent to which we are ruled by needs and strivings that defy common sense logic. Although many social scientists agree with the fiction writers on the power of personality to shape the course of our lives, scientists focus on predictability rather than inevitability. The task of science is to observe and document any reliable association between specific character traits and the likelihood of varying life choices, patterns of behavior, and consequences of the behavior for oneself and others.

Parties involved in a conflict they are attempting to resolve constructively must strive to understand each other despite any difference in ethnic and gender identities, family and life experiences, and cultural perspectives. Although conflict resolution practitioners and theorists recognize the potentially important effects that individual differences have on the negotiation process and its outcome, research in this area has been piecemeal and few guidelines exist for practical application. At this stage, a synthesis of cross-discipline information concerning personality can offer additional tools to benefit practitioners and prove useful to theorists wishing to conduct future investigation in this area. Awareness of how personal characteristics predispose an individual to respond within the negotiation setting...
equips all parties more effectively to (1) uncover and understand the psychological as well as substantive interests underlying conflict—particularly those interests that would normally remain unrecognized or unarticulated if personality is not considered, (2) respond so as to facilitate a constructive resolution process avoiding escalation and deadlock, and (3) generate a satisfying solution to meet the priority needs of both parties.

The first section of this chapter reviews some of the ideas relevant to conflict from several major theoretical approaches to personality: psychodynamic theory, need theory, social-learning theory, and situation-person interaction theory. Our review of these theories is not intended to be comprehensive. It is limited to selecting several ideas from each theory that are useful to understanding personal reaction and behavior in a conflict situation. In the second section, we discuss the trait approach to personality and assessment. First, we briefly indicate some of the individual traits thought to be related to conflict behavior and then discuss some of the limitations of this approach. Next, we discuss more fully a multiple-trait approach, as well as a method for assessing personal conflict orientations that seem to have considerable promise for evaluating personality style, reaction, and behavior as they relate to conflict. In the final section, we discuss how one can use personality theory and assessment to enhance conflict resolution in practice.

REPRESENTATIVE MODELS OF PERSONALITY

There are two major approaches to the study of personality: *idiographic*, the belief that human behavior cannot be broken down into its constituent parts; and *nomothetic*, the view that some general dimension of behavior can be used to describe most people of a general age group (Martin, 1988, p. 10). To illustrate, let us begin by noting that one of the most influential models of personality, the psychodynamic, relies on idiographic use of case history studies to reach conclusions about human nature.

Psychodynamic Theories

The work of Sigmund Freud, during the period from the late 1880s to the late 1930s, marks the beginning of the psychodynamic study of human personality. His intellectual descendants are numerous: Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, Harry S. Sullivan, Melanie Klein, W.R.D. Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, Heinz Hartmann, Jacques Lacan, and Heinz Kohut.

Inevitably, Freud’s descendants have modified, revised, extended, and in other ways changed his original ideas. The changes have mainly been to place greater emphasis on the social (cultural, class, gender, familial, and experiential)
determinants of psychodynamic processes, to develop detailed characterization of the structural components involved in the dynamic intrapsychic processes, and to seek adequate conceptualization of the cognitive and self-processes that are central to the individual’s relation to reality. Despite the changes, there are some key elements that characterize most of the psychodynamic approaches.

**An Active Unconscious.** People actively seek to remain unaware (unconscious) of those of their impulses, thoughts, and actions that make them feel very disturbing emotions (for example, anxiety, guilt, or shame).

**Internal Conflict.** People may have internal conflict between desires and conscience, desires and fears, and what the “good” self wants and what the “bad” self wants; the conflict may occur outside of consciousness.

**Control and Defense Mechanisms.** People develop tactics and strategies to control their impulses, thoughts, actions, and realities so that they will not feel anxious, guilty, or ashamed. If their controls are ineffective, they develop defense mechanisms to keep from feeling these disturbing emotions.

**Stages of Development.** From birth to old age, people go through stages of development. Most current psychodynamic theorists accept the view that the developmental stages reflect both biological and social determinants, even though they may differ in their weighting of the two, their labeling of the stages, and how they specifically characterize them. Freudian theory focuses mainly on the three earliest stages of development—the oral, anal, and phallic—because it was believed that the main features of personality development were set early in childhood. Freud employed these anatomical terms to characterize the early stages because he thought these bodily zones were successively infused with libidinal energy.

Later psychoanalysts were apt to characterize them psychosocially in terms of the social situation confronting the developing child. In the oral stage, infants are primarily concerned with receiving feeding and care from a parenting figure; in the anal stage, they are faced with the need to develop control over their excretions as well as other forms of self-control; and in the phallic stage, they face the need to establish a sexual identity as a boy or girl and to repress their sexual striving toward the parent of the opposite sex. Associated with these stages are normal frustrations, a development crisis, and typical defense mechanisms. However, certain forms of psychopathology are likely to develop if severe frustration and crisis face the child during a particular stage, with the result that the child becomes “fixated” at that stage; in addition, some adult character traits are thought to originate in each given stage.
Table 15.1 presents, in summary form, some of the features that Freud and the earlier psychoanalysts associated with the three early stages.

The Layered Personality. How someone has gone through the stages of development determines current personality. One can presumably discover the residue of earlier stages of development in current personality and behavior. Thus, a paranoid/schizoid adult personality supposedly reflects a basic fault in the earliest stage of development in which the infant did not experience the minimal love, care, and nurturance that would enable him to feel basic trust in the world. The concept of layered personality does not imply that earlier faults cannot be repaired. However, it does imply that an adult personality with a repaired fault is not the same as one that did not need repair. Under severe frustration or anxiety, such a personality is apt to regress to an earlier stage. Also, the concept of layered personality does not imply that an unimpaired adult personality is able to completely resist becoming temporarily or permanently suspicious and paranoid if the current social environment is sufficiently dire and hostile for a prolonged period. It is natural and adaptive to become hyper-vigilant and suspicious if one is immersed in a dangerous hostile environment.

In this section, we discuss several important ideas, deriving from the work of psychodynamic theorists that are particularly relevant to the conflict practitioner. Undoubtedly, many more ideas could be expressed in a detailed and comprehensive exposition of psychodynamic viewpoints than we attempt to present in this chapter.

Conflict with Another Can Lead to Intrapsychic Conflict and Anxiety. People may feel anxious because they sense they are unable to control their destructive or evil impulses toward the other in a heated conflict. Or the conflict may lead to a sense of helplessness and vulnerability if they feel overwhelmed by the power and strength of the other. Freud called the first type of internal conflict id-superego conflict (between a primitive impulse and conscience) and the second type an ego-reality conflict (between an immature self and a threatening reality). Later psychoanalysts used somewhat different language, speaking of a conflict among “internal objects” or between internalized images of self and of significant adults (as between an evil self and a harsh or punitive parent or a weak self and an overwhelming, controlling parent).

If the anxiety aroused by the conflict with another is intense, the individual may rely on unconscious defense mechanisms to screen it out in an attempt to reduce the anxiety. Anxiety is most apt to be aroused if one’s basic security, self-conception, self-worth, or social identity is threatened. Defense mechanisms are pathological or ineffective if they create the conditions that produce anxiety, thus requiring continued use of the defense. For example, a student who may be anxious about his intellectual abilities avoids studying and as a consequence does poorly in his course work. He rationalizes his poor grades are due
Table 15.1. Normal Frustrations, Typical Defense Mechanisms, Developmental Crises, Psychopathology, and Adult Character Traits with Several Early Stages of Psychosexual Development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of Development</th>
<th>Normal Frustrations</th>
<th>Developmental Crisis</th>
<th>Defense Mechanisms</th>
<th>Psychopathology</th>
<th>Adult Character Traits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Oral (0 to 18 months)</td>
<td>Lack of continuous availability of caretaker to satisfy infant’s needs</td>
<td>Trust versus mistrust</td>
<td>Apathy, withdrawal, denial, introjection, hallucinatory gratification</td>
<td>Schizophrenia, manic-depression, depressive states, schizoid personality</td>
<td>Passivity, dependence, restlessness, receptivity, curiosity, generosity, compliance, optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Oral erotic period (from birth to about 6 months)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Oral sadistic (from about 6 to 18 months)</td>
<td>Teething, weaning, and the birth of a new sibling</td>
<td>Withdrawal, denial, introjection, projection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Anal (8 to 48 months)</td>
<td>Onset of toilet training and other demands for self-control</td>
<td>Autonomy versus shame and guilt</td>
<td>Projection</td>
<td>Paranoia, psychopathy, sadomasochism, obsessive-compulsive disorders</td>
<td>Bossiness, hostility, disorderliness, irresponsibility, dirtiness, assertiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Anal-erotic (from about 8 to 24 months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Anal-sadistic (from about 12 to 48 months)</td>
<td>Toilet training and other demands for self-control</td>
<td>Reaction-formation, undoing, intellectualization, rationalization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Phallic (2 to 6 years)</td>
<td>Transformation of the pregenital child into a “boy” or “girl” with internalization of key values concerning future adult and sex roles, with renunciation of the opposite-sex parent as an object of sexual strivings</td>
<td>Initiative versus guilt</td>
<td>Repression, displacement, conversion, histrionics</td>
<td>Histrionic personality, amnesia, anxiety states, phobias</td>
<td>Stubbornness, parsimony, punctuality, cautiousness, pedantry, righteousness, indecision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors.
to lack of motivation and effort. His grades further his anxiety about his ability, which in turn fuel his defenses of avoidance and rationalization. The defenses would not be pathological if, in fact, external circumstances prevented him from studying and, given the opportunity, he put much effort into his studies.

The defense mechanisms that people use are determined in part by their layered personality, which may have given rise to a characterological tendency to employ certain defense mechanisms rather than others, and also in part by the situation they confront. Psychoanalysts have identified many defense mechanisms; they are usually discussed in relation to intrapsychic conflict. We believe that they are also applicable in interpersonal and other external conflict. We have space to discuss only a number of the important ones for understanding conflict with others. (See Fenichel, 1945, and Freud, 1937, for fuller discussions.)

Denial occurs when it is too disturbing to recognize the existence of a conflict (as between husband and wife about their affection toward one another, so they deny it—repressing it so that it remains unconscious, or suppressing it so they do not think about it).

Avoidance involves not facing the conflict, even when you are fully aware of it. To support avoidance, you develop ever-changing rationalizations for not facing the conflict (“I’m too tired,” “This is not the right timing,” “She’s not ready,” “It won’t do any good”).

Projection allows denial of faults in yourself. It involves projecting or attributing your own faults to the other (“You’re too hostile,” “You don’t trust me,” “You’re to blame, not me,” “I’m attacking to prevent you from attacking me”). Suspicion, hostility, vulnerability, hypervigilance, and helplessness, as well as attacking or withdrawing from the potential attack of the other, are often associated with this defense.

Reaction formation involves taking on the attributes and characteristics of the other with whom you are in conflict. The conflict is masked by agreement with or submission to the other, by flattering and ingratiating yourself with the other. A child who likes to be messy but is very anxious about her mother’s angry reactions may become excessively neat and finicky in a way that is annoying to her mother.

Displacement involves changing the topic of the conflict or changing the party with whom you engage in conflict. Thus, if it is too painful to express openly your hurt and anger toward your spouse because he is not sufficiently affectionate, you may constantly attack him as being too stingy with money. If it is too dangerous to express your anger toward your exploitative boss, you may direct it at a subordinate who annoys you.

Counterphobic defenses entail denial of anxiety about conflict by aggressively seeking it out—by being confrontational, challenging, or “having a chip on your shoulder.”

Escalation of the importance of the conflict is a complex mechanism that entails narcissistic self-focus on your own needs with inattention to the other’s,
histrionic intensity of emotional expressiveness and calling attention to yourself, and demanding needfulness. The needs involved in the conflict become life-or-death issues, the emotions expressed are very intense, and the other person must give in. The function of this defense is to get the other to feel that your urgent needs must have highest priority.

In intellectualization and minimization of the importance of the conflict, you do not feel the intensity of your needs intellectually, but instead experience the conflict with little emotion. You focus on details and side issues, making the central issue from your perspective in the conflict seem unimportant to yourself and the other.

The psychoanalytical emphasis on intrapsychic conflict, anxiety, and defense mechanisms highlights the importance of understanding the interplay between internal conflict and the external conflict with another. Thus, if an external conflict elicits anxiety and defensiveness, the anxious party is apt to project onto, transfer, or attribute to the other characteristics similar to those of internalized significant others who, in the past, elicited similar anxiety in unresolved earlier conflict. Similarly, the anxious party may unconsciously attribute to himself the characteristics he had in the earlier conflict. Thus, if you are made very anxious by a conflict with a supervisor (you feel your basic security is threatened), you may distort your perception of the supervisor and what she is saying so that you unconsciously experience the conflict as similar to unresolved conflict between your mother and yourself as a child.

If you or the other is acting defensively, it is important to understand what is making you or her anxious, what threat is being experienced. The sense of threat, anxiety, and defensiveness hamper developing a productive and cooperative problem-solving orientation toward the conflict. Similarly, transference reactions—for example, reacting to the other as though she were similar to your parent—produces a distorted perception of the other and interferes with realistic, effective problem solving. You can sometimes tell when the other is projecting a false image onto you by your own countertransference reaction: you feel that she is attempting to induce you to enact a role that feels inappropriate in your interactions with her. You can sometimes become aware of projecting a false image onto the other by recognizing that other people do not see her this way or that you are defensive and anxious in your response to her with no apparent justification.

Summary and Critique of the Psychodynamic Approach. In the preceding pages, we do not attempt to present an exposition of the specific theories of the many contributors to the development of psychoanalytical theory, from Freud to the present day. Rather, we seek to abstract from these theories some of the major ideas that are useful to a conflict practitioner and that can be briefly presented. Psychoanalysis has been criticized—particularly the earlier Freudian.
version, which no longer seems appropriate in light of the changes made by later theorists: it is too biologically deterministic, too sexist, too pessimistic, and too focused on sex and aggression as the motives of behavior, as well as not oriented at all to positive motivations, to the learning and development of cognitive functions, or to the broader societal and cultural determinants of personality development. Nevertheless, it is a useful framework for understanding issues that we all confront during development (security, control and power, sexual identity, transformation from childhood to adulthood) and the problems and personality residues that may result from inadequate care and harsh circumstances during our early years.

Psychoanalysis is not a scientific theory that was developed and tested in a scientific laboratory, as is the case for most of the theories presented elsewhere in this book. Rather, it is a mosaic of subtheories mainly developed in clinically treating psychopathology. Many of its concepts are not defined so as to indicate how they can be observed and measured. It is instead an encompassing intellectual framework for thinking about personality and its development, one that has given rise to a variety of useful subtheories and ideas, many of which are testable and indeed have been tested in research.

Need Theories

Under this heading, we consider some of the ideas of Henry A. Murray and Abraham Maslow, the most influential of the need theorists.

**Murray’s Need Theory of Personality.** Murray’s approach to personality was much influenced by the work of Jung, Freud, and their successors, and he was one of the first psychologists to translate psychodynamic concepts and ideas into testable hypotheses. Unlike their concern with the abnormal, Murray’s focus was on the normal personality. The most distinctive feature of his theory is its complex system of motivational concepts. In his theory, needs arise not only from internal processes, but also from environmental forces.

Murray’s most influential contribution to personality theory is the concept of the individual as a striving, seeking being; his orientation reflects primarily a motivational psychology. As he states it, “the most important thing to discover about an individual . . . is the superordinate directionality (or directionalities) of his activities, whether mental, verbal, or physical” (1951, p. 276). This concern with directionality led him to develop the most complete taxonomy of needs ever created.

Need is a force in the brain region that organizes perception, thought, and action so as to change an existing unsatisfactory condition. Needs can be evoked by environmental as well as internal processes. They vary in strength from person to person and from situation to situation. Murray hypothesized the existence of about two dozen needs and characterized them in some detail. He
insisted that adequate understanding of human motivation must incorporate a sufficiently large number of variables to reflect, at least in part, the tremendous complexity of human motives.

Working from Murray’s theory, McClelland and his colleagues (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell, 1953; McClelland, 1971) did extensive research on four basic needs: achievement, affiliation, power, and autonomy. Those high in need of achievement are concerned with improving their performance, do best on a moderately challenging task, prefer personal responsibility, and seek performance feedback. Persons rated high in the need for affiliation are concerned with maintaining or repairing relationships, are rewarded by being with friends, and seek approval from friends and strangers. Those in need of power are concerned with their reputation and find themselves motivated in a situation presenting hierarchical conditions. In their desire to attain prestige, they are likely to engage in competition more than the other types do. Finally, those having high autonomy needs want to be independent, unattached, and free of restraint.

Murray’s theory is a rich and complex view of personality. It can help practitioners become aware of the diversity of human needs and their expression as well as the external circumstances that tend to evoke them and the childhood experiences that lead individuals to varied life striving. Its major deficiency is the lack of a well-defined learning and developmental theory of what determines the acquisition and strength of an individual’s needs.

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Although Maslow, early in his professional career, coauthored an excellent textbook on abnormal psychology with a psychoanalyst, he came to feel that a psychology based on the study of the abnormal was bound to give a pessimistic, limited view of the human personality and not take into account altruism, love, joy, truth, justice, beauty, and other positive features of human life. Maslow was one of the founders of the humanistic school of psychology, which emphasizes the positive aspects of human nature.

Maslow is best known for his postulation of a hierarchy of human needs; our discussion in this chapter is limited to this area of his work. In order of priority, he identified these types of needs:

- **Physiological needs**: for air, water, and food, and the need to maintain equilibrium in the blood and body tissues in relation to various substances and the type of cell. Frustration of these needs leads to apathy, illness, disability, and death.

- **Safety needs**: for security, freedom from fear and anxiety, shelter, protection from danger, order, and predictable satisfaction of one’s basic needs. Here, frustration leads to fear, anxiety, rage, and psychosis.

- **Belongingness and love needs**: to be part of a group (a family, a circle of friends), to feel cared for, to care for someone, to be intimate with
someone, and so forth. Frustration produces alienation, loneliness, and various forms of neurosis.

- **Esteem needs**: for self-esteem (self-confidence, mastery, worth, strength, and the like) and social esteem (respect, dignity, appreciation, and so on). Feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, helplessness, incompetence, shame, guilt, and the like are associated with frustration of these needs.

- **Self-actualization needs**: to become the kind of person one is most suited to become; to realize one’s full potential in relation to others, in developing talents and in participating in one’s community. The need for self-actualization also includes such metaneeds as truth, curiosity, justice, beauty, aliveness, playfulness, and the like.

Maslow considered the first four in this list to be deficiency needs, arising from a lack of what is needed. Once these basic needs are all reasonably satisfied, we get in touch with our needs for self-realization and pursue their satisfaction. Although Maslow initially postulated needs as hierarchically ordered, he later accepted the view that in reality some people violate the hierarchy—say, putting themselves in danger and going hungry to protect someone they love or a group with whom they identify.

Maslow’s theory, or a variation of it, is the foundation of the “human needs” theory of John Burton (1990) and his colleagues and students. The fundamental thesis of this approach is that a conflict is not resolved constructively unless the parties’ basic human needs are brought out and dealt with to the satisfaction of each party. The application of this idea to conflict is called the “problem-solving workshop.” Burton initially developed it while he was serving as a consultant in the Cypress conflict between the Greeks and Turks; subsequently, it was systematically developed by Kelman (1986) and his colleagues. It entails creating conditions that enable the participants to express their real needs openly and honestly, and then try to work out a resolution that meets the basic needs of both sides. (See also mention of this in Chapter Eight.)

**Social Learning Theory**

In Bandura’s interactionist approach to personality (Bandura, 1986), the individual is a thinking person who can impose some direction on the forces from within and the pressures from the external environment. Bandura asserts that behavior is a function of a person in her environment; cognition, other personal traits, and the environment mutually influence one another. People learn by observing the behavior of others and the differential consequences attending these behaviors. Learning requires that the person be aware of appropriate responses and value the consequences of the behavior in question.

Unlike a number of other theorists, Bandura does not believe that aggression is innate. Through imitation of social models, people learn aggression,
altruism, and other forms of social behavior as well as constructive and destructive ways of dealing with conflict. The ability to imitate another’s behavior depends on the characteristics of the model (whether or not the model makes his behavior unambiguous and clearly observable), the attention of the observer (whether or not the observer is sharply focused on the model’s behavior), memory processes (whether or not the observer is intelligent and able to recall what has been observed), and behavioral capabilities (whether or not the observer has the physical and intellectual capability to reproduce the behavior observed).

Assuming that one has the capability, readiness to reproduce the behavior of the model is determined by factors such as whether the model has been perceived to obtain positive or negative consequences as a result of behavior, the attractiveness and power of the model, the vividness of the behavior, and the intrinsic attractiveness of the behavior that has been modeled. Thus, a boy may be predisposed to engage in aggressive behavior (using a handgun to threaten a rival) if he has seen a prestigious older figure (his father, older brother, a group leader, a movie star) engage in such behavior and feel good about doing so. He is capable of doing so (as well as predisposed) if he has access to a handgun.

Developing a sense of self-efficacy or confidence in these competencies requires one to (1) use these skills to master tasks and overcome the obstacles posed by the environment, (2) cultivate belief in the capacity to use one’s competencies effectively, and (3) identify realistic goals and opportunities to use one’s skills effectively. Realistic encouragement to achieve an ambitious but attainable goal promotes successful experience, which in turn, aids developing the sense of self-efficacy; social prodding to achieve unattainable goals often produces a sense of failure and undermines self-efficacy.

We selectively emphasize Bandura’s concepts of observational learning and self-efficacy because of their relevance to conflict. Given that most people acquire their knowledge, attitudes, and skills in managing conflict through observational learning, some people have inadequate knowledge, inappropriate attitudes, and poor skills for resolving their conflicts constructively while others are better prepared to do so. It is very much a function of the models they have been exposed to in their families, schools, communities, and the media. It is our impression that many people have been exposed to poor models. Change in how they deal with conflict requires much relearning.

Relearning involves helping people become fully aware of how they currently behave in conflict situations, exposing them to models of constructive behavior and extending repeated opportunities in various situations to enact and be rewarded for constructive behavior. In the course of relearning, people should become uncomfortable and dissatisfied with their old, ineffective ways of managing conflict and also develop a sense of self-efficacy in new, constructive methods of conflict resolution.
Social Situations and Psychological Orientations

Although Deutsch is not classified as a personality theorist, his concept of situationally linked psychological orientations is a useful and somewhat different perspective. He employs the term psychological orientation to refer to a more-or-less consistent complex of cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations to a given situation that serve to guide one’s behavior and response in that situation. He assumes that the causal arrow between psychological orientation and social situation is bidirectional; a given psychological orientation can lead to a given type of social relation or be induced by that type of social relation (Deutsch, 1982, 1985). With Wish and Kaplan (Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan, 1976), he identified five basic dimensions of interpersonal relations:

1. **Cooperation-competition.** Social relations such as “close friends,” “teammates,” and “coworkers” are usually on the cooperative side of this dimension, while “enemies,” “political opponents,” and “rivals” are usually on the competitive side. See Chapter One for further discussion.

2. **Power distribution (equal versus unequal).** “Business partners,” “business rivals,” and “close friends” are typically on the equal side, while “parent and child,” “teacher and student,” and “boss and employee” are on the unequal side. See Chapter Five for further discussion.

3. **Task-oriented versus social-emotional.** Interpersonal relations such as “lovers” and “close friends” are social-emotional, while “task force,” “negotiators,” and “business rivals” are task-oriented.

4. **Formal versus informal.** Relations within a bureaucracy tend to be formal and regulated by externally determined social rules and conventions, while the relationship norms between intimates are informally determined by the participants involved.

5. **Intensity and importance.** This dimension has to do with the intensity or superficiality of the relationship. Important relationships, as between parent and child or between lovers, are on the important side, while unimportant relationships, as between casual acquaintances or between salesperson and customer, are on the superficial side.

The character of a given social relationship can be identified by locating it on all the dimensions. Thus, an intimate relationship between lovers is typically characterized in the United States as relatively cooperative, equal, social-emotional, informal, and intense. Similarly, a sadomasochistic relationship between a bully and his victim is usually identified as competitive, unequal, social-emotional, informal, and intense. Deutsch indicates that a distinctive psychological orientation is associated with the particular location of a social relationship along the
five dimensions. Positing that there are three components of a psychological orientation that are mutually consistent, he describes them as follows.

**Cognitive orientation** consists of structured expectation about oneself, the social environment, and the people involved. This makes it possible for one to interpret and respond quickly to what is going on in a specific situation. If your expectation leads to inappropriate interpretation and response, then the expectation is likely to be revised. Or, if the circumstances confronting you are sufficiently malleable, your interpretation and response to them may help to shape their form. Thus, what you expect to happen in a situation involving negotiations about your salary with your boss is apt to be quite different from what you expect in a situation in which you and your spouse are making love.

**Motivational orientation** alerts one to the possibility that in the situation certain types of need may be gratified or frustrated. It orients you to questions such as what do I want here, and how do I get it? What is to be valued or feared in this relationship? In a business negotiation, you are oriented to satisfaction of financial needs, not affection; in a love relationship, the opposite is true.

**Moral orientation** focuses on the mutual obligations, rights, and entitlements of the people involved in the relationship. It implies that in a relationship you and the other(s) mutually perceive the obligations you have to one another and mutually respect the framework of social norms that define what is fair or unfair in the interactions and outcomes of everyone involved.

To illustrate Deutsch’s ideas, we contrast the psychological orientations in two relations: friend-friend and police officer–thief. For practical purposes, we limit our discussion to the cooperative-competitive, power, and task-oriented versus social-emotional dimensions.

Friends have a cooperative cognitive orientation of “We are for one another”; the motivational orientation is of affection, affiliation, and trust, and the moral orientation is one of mutual benevolence, respect, and equality. In contrast, the police officer and thief have a competitive cognitive orientation (what’s good for the other is bad for me); the motivational orientation is of hostility, suspicion, and aggressiveness or defensiveness; the moral orientation involved is that of a win-lose struggle to be conducted either under fair rules or a no-holds-barred one in which any means to defeat the other can be employed.

Friends are of equal power and employ their power cooperatively. Their cognitive orientation to power and influence relies on its positive forms (persuasion, benefit, legitimate power); their motivational orientation supports mutual esteem, respect, and status for both parties; their moral orientation is that of egalitarianism. In contrast, the police officer and thief are of unequal power. The officer is cognitively oriented toward using negative forms of power (coercion and harm), with a motivational orientation to dominate, command, and control. Morally, the officer feels superior and ready to exclude the thief from the former’s moral community (those who are entitled to care and justice).
cognitive response to the low-power position, the thief either tries to improve power relative to the police officer or submits to the role as one who is under the officer’s control. Thus, the thief’s motivational orientation may be rebellious and resistant (expressing the need for autonomy and inferiority avoidance) or passive and submissive (expressing the need for abasement). This moral orientation is either to exclude the officer from the thief’s own moral community or to “identify with the aggressor” (Freud, 1937), adopting the moral authority of the more powerful for oneself.

The friends have a social-emotional orientation, while the police officer and thief have a task-oriented relationship to one another. In the latter, one is cognitively oriented to making decisions about which means are most efficient in achieving one’s ends; the task-oriented relationship requires an analytical attitude to compare the effectiveness of various means. One is oriented to the other impersonally as an instrument to achieve one’s ends. The motivational orientation evoked by a task-oriented situation is that of achievement, and the moral orientation toward the other is utilitarian. In contrast, friends have a cognitive orientation in which the unique personal qualities and identity of the other are of paramount importance. Motivations characteristic of such relations include affiliation, affection, esteem, play, and nurturance-succorance. The moral obligation to a friend is to esteem the other as a person and to help when the other is in need.

Deutsch’s view of the relation between social situation and psychological orientation is not only that a particular situation induces a particular psychological orientation, but also that individuals vary in their psychological orientation and personality. Based on their life experiences, some people tend to be cooperative, egalitarian, and social-emotional in their orientation, while others tend to be competitive, power seeking, and task-oriented. For example, in many cultures, compared to men, women tend to have relatively strong orientations of the former type (cooperative and so on), while men have relatively stronger orientations of the latter (competitive) type.

Personality disposition influences the choice of social situation and the social relations that one seeks out or avoids. Given the opportunity, people select social relations and situations that are most compatible with their dominant psychological orientations. They also seek to alter or leave a social relation or situation if it is incompatible with their disposition. If this is impossible, they employ the alternative, latent psychological orientations within themselves that are compatible with the social situation.

Knowledge of the dimensions of social relation can be helpful to a conflict practitioner in analyzing both the characteristics of a situation as well as the psychological orientations the parties are apt to display in the circumstances. It is also useful in characterizing individuals in terms of their dominant psychological orientations to social situations. It should be noted, however, that
Deutsch’s ideas are not well specified about what happens if the individual’s disposition and the situational requirements are incompatible.

**TRAIT APPROACHES**

The second major approach to the study of personality is the nomothetic, exemplified by “trait” research and its application to behavior. Traits can be defined as words summarizing a set of behaviors or describing a consistent response to relationships and situations as measured through an assessment instrument (Martin, 1988). It is assumed that, in well-designed and tested assessment instruments, many individuals can validly report social-emotional responses and behaviors that are broadly consistent across situations (some characteristics are less stable across situations than others). Measurement of individual characteristics is widespread and has proven to be quite useful in a number of situations, as when a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist diagnoses a patient and prescribes treatment based on the results of a battery of trait-assessment instruments in addition to a diagnostic interview. Research studies frequently use personality measures to predict behavior under designated situational constraints. Personality assessment may also be extremely useful in placing children or adults in the most effective educational settings or in identifying a cognitive mediator that affects behavior, such as an individual’s attribution of intentionality as a reaction to imagined hostility from another.

Because our interests center on multitrait measurement, we briefly mention single-trait approaches and refer the reader to other sources for in-depth discussion.

**Single Traits**

Here, we describe the single-trait approach to studying conflict process and outcome. This approach, which seeks to understand social behavior in terms of relatively stable traits or dispositions residing within the individual, is now considered to have limited usefulness. The trait approach typically focuses on one or more enduring predispositions of specific types: motivational tendencies (aggression, power, pride, fear), character traits (authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, locus of control, dogmatism), cognitive tendencies (cognitive simplicity versus complexity, open versus closed mind), values and ideologies, self-conceptions and bases of self-esteem, and learned habits and skills of coping. (See Bell and Blakeney, 1977; Neale and Bazerman, 1983; Rotter, 1980; and Stevens, Bavetta, and Gist, 1993, for discussions of some single-trait measures.)

The now-dominant approach to explaining social behavior is one that seeks to understand its regularity in terms of the interacting and reciprocally
influencing contribution of both situational and dispositional determinants. There are several well-supported propositions in this approach:

1. Individuals vary considerably in terms of whether they manifest consistency of personality in their social behavior across situations—for example, those who monitor and regulate their behavioral choices on the basis of situational information show relatively little consistency (Snyder and Ickes, 1993).

2. Some situations have “strong” characteristics, in which little individual variation in behavior occurs despite differences in individual traits (Mischel, 1977).

3. A situation can evoke dispositions because of their apparent relevance to it; subsequently, the situation becomes salient as a guide to behavior and permits modes of behaving that are differentially responsive to individual differences (Bem and Lenney, 1976).

4. A situation can evoke self-focusing tendencies that make predispositions salient to the self, and as a consequence, these predispositions can also become influential determinants of behavior in situations where such a self-focus is not evoked.

5. There is a tendency for congruence between personal disposition and situational characteristics (Deutsch, 1982, 1985) such that someone with a given disposition tends to seek out the type of social situation that fits the disposition; people tend to mold their dispositions to fit a situation that they find difficult to leave or alter. That is, the causal arrow goes both ways between situational characteristics and personality disposition.

Multitrait Measures of Personality and Conflict

Given the importance of creating clearer definitions and comprehensive measures of personality, a number of researchers over the past two decades have worked to develop reliable multidimensional personality assessment instruments. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present an overview of these instruments; however, we describe what has become a fundamental model of personality (Antonioni, 1998; Digman, 1990).

The Five-Factor Model. In an attempt to describe personality more completely than is afforded by individual traits, Costa and McCrae (1985) developed a five-factor model (FFM) of personality, composed of five independent dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness.

Neuroticism is a tendency to experience unpleasant emotions. It encompasses six subscales: anxiety, hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness,
and vulnerability (for example, panic in emergencies). People with strong
neurotic tendencies are thought to be less able to control their emotions and
cope effectively with stress (Costa and McCrae, 1985). With respect to inter-
personal conflict, individuals high in levels of angry hostility, depression, vul-
nerability, and self-consciousness might find conflict threatening, prompting
them to avoid conflict situations or to use contentious tactics as a reaction to
the threat. On the other hand, people with low neurotic tendencies would be
less likely to interpret the situation in terms of their own emotional distortion
and perhaps utilize more constructive strategies.

Differences in the desire for social activity are incorporated in the extraver-
sion scale, which includes interpersonal traits such as warmth, gregariousness,
assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotions. Because
extraverts tend to view their actions as positive and effective, enjoying social
interactions, an extravert would be expected to deal directly with conflict situ-
ations. An individual scoring low on extraversion facets such as warmth and
assertiveness would be less secure in interpersonal relations and, therefore,
might avoid a conflict situation.

Openness to experience denotes receptiveness to ideas and experiences, with
subcales of openness to fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values.
Openness is thought to involve intellectual activity, originality, a need for vari-
ety and novel experiences, and cognitive complexity. With respect to conflict
situations, one would expect open individuals to prefer strategies that involve
flexibility, generation of alternatives, and consideration of the other’s view,
strategies utilized in direct, constructive negotiation. On the other hand, closed
individuals tend to emphasize order and conformity, and need closure. They are
less flexible and would have more difficulty understanding others’ points of
view. Closed individuals would find unresolved conflict upsetting, and would
prefer an efficient, quick solution, perhaps being more likely to impose their
own resolution.

The dimension of conscientiousness refers to achievement striving, compe-
tence, and self-discipline. Those low on this scale may be disorganized or lazy,
negligent, and prone to quitting rather than persevering. Those on the high end
of this dimension are well prepared, well organized, and strive for excellence.
Given these characteristics, those high in conscientiousness would be expected
to prefer dealing with conflict directly, where low scorers might be expected to
either use attacking strategies or avoid conflict situations altogether.

Agreeableness refers to persons who are trusting, generous, lenient, and good
natured. High agreeableness in individuals leads them to have sympathy and
concern for others, but also may inhibit assertiveness or cause them to defer to
others. In a conflict situation, this may result in decisions that fail to meet their
own best interests. Overall, those who score high on such facets as trust,
altruism, and compliance would be expected to use constructive strategies such
as negotiation. Low scorers are suspicious, antagonistic, critical, irritable, and self-centered. These individuals are prone to express anger in conflict situations, to be guarded in expressing their own feelings, and to compete rather than cooperate with other people.

The FFM dimensions have been reliably demonstrated to occur in an impressive number of groups, including children, women and men, non-White and White respondents, and in people from such varied lingual and cultural backgrounds as Dutch, German, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino. Furthermore, the personality trait constructs of the FFM reflect many of the personality categories used in psychotherapy, the difference being that the FFM dimensions are more testable in research and cover a broader range of human behavior than the attributes of personality emerging from the study of psychopathology.

We focus here on the five-factor trait model to offer information for conflict resolution because it is:

- More comprehensive than other trait models of personality in incorporating a wide range of human response and behavior—most other inventories can be subsumed within its dimensions.
- Inclusive of normal behaviors as well as the extremes to be found in personality disorders.
- A robust measure of personality that has been validated in a variety of languages and cultures.
- A personality approach that is straightforward, fairly easily understood, and one of the most dominant models of personality used in current research (Antonioni, 1998; Jensen-Campbell, Gleason, Adams, and Malcolm, 2003; Moberg, 2001).

Obviously, nonpersonality factors such as cognitive distortion, dysfunctional belief, personal evaluation, intelligence, and situational demands need to be examined along with the five personality factors to fully account for behavior. However, dismissing the multitrait approach would be to lose sight of its merit for use by laypersons without an advanced degree in personality psychology or psychotherapy. In methodologically appropriate use, the FFM appears to offer valuable information about the conflict resolution process for practitioners, as we discuss below.

**Measures of Conflict Style.** A number of similar approaches to measuring individual styles of managing conflict have been developed (Blake and Mouton, 1964; Kilmann and Thomas, 1977; Rahim, 1986; Thomas, 1988). Although the early model of Kilmann and Thomas was named “the MODE,” these models are now commonly called “dual concern models” (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). They have
their origins in Blake and Mouton's two-dimensional "managerial grid," in which a manager's style was characterized in terms of the two separate dimensions of having a "concern for people" and a "concern for production of results."

The dual-concern model of conflict style also has two dimensions: "concern about other's outcomes" and "concern about own outcomes." High concern for the other as well as oneself is linked to a collaborative problem-solving style. High concern for self and low concern for the other is connected with a contending, competitive approach. High concern for the other and low concern for self is associated with yielding or submission. Low concern for both self and the other is associated.

There has not yet been much research on the measures of conflict style. However, there is reason to believe that conflict behavior is determined by both situational and dispositional influences. Thus, research by Rahim (1986) indicates that a manager in conflict with a supervisor resorts to yielding, while with peers the manager employs compromising and with subordinates problem solving.

**Personality and Conflict Resolution Strategies.** In recent research conducted by Sandy and Boardman (2006), 237 graduate students, with no conflict resolution training experience were asked to fill out the NEO-PI-R five-factor model questionnaire (Costa and McCrae, 1985; Costa, McCrae, and Dye, 1991). Following this, subjects were asked to select three conflicts they had experienced during the previous three months. Each week for three successive weeks, they were given a comprehensive questionnaire and asked to describe one conflict (open-ended question) and report the strategies they used to handle it (using both open-ended questions and the Kilmann and Thomas [1977] dual concerns model instrument). They also characterized their relationship with the other person in the conflict and, using five-point rating scales, indicated the size and importance of the conflict. In addition, they reported whether or not the conflict was resolved and whether the conflict strengthened or weakened their relationship.

The types of conflict reported included relationship issues (13 percent), another person's failure to meet one's own expectations (18 percent), discourteous or annoying behavior (16 percent), disagreements about what should be done (31 percent), one's own failure to meet another's expectations (6 percent), being offended by what another person said (14 percent), and displaced anger (15 percent). Conflicts were with relatives (17 percent), significant others (17 percent), friends (36 percent), acquaintances (12 percent), and people in the workplace, for example with bosses or subordinates (16 percent).

Factor and reliability analyses of the dual concerns instrument indicated that these subjects used four strategies for handling conflict, which we have labeled
negotiation, contending, avoidance, and attack. Negotiation consisted of strategies such as “I sought a mutually beneficial solution” and “I tried to understand him or her.” Contending strategies included “I used threats” and “I was sarcastic in my sense of humor.” Avoidance covered items such as “I tried to change the subject” and “I denied that there was any problem in the conflict.” Finally, Attack included “I criticized an aspect of his or her personality” and “I blamed him or her for causing the conflict.”

Negotiation Strategy. Personality facet scales from the FFM dimensions formed “predictive clusters” of individual characteristics that tended to be associated with the dominant strategy used in the conflict reported. For example, those who used Negotiation strategies scored high on Agreeableness facets (Trust, Altruism, and Compliance); Extraversion facets (Warmth, Gregariousness, Assertiveness, Activity, and Positive Emotions) and Fantasy from the Openness scale. Conversely, individuals who used negotiation strategies scored low on Neuroticism facets such as Angry Hostility, Depression, Self-Consciousness, and Vulnerability.

Contending Strategy. Personality facets influencing choice of the Contending conflict resolution strategy include low scores on Competence, Duty, Self-Discipline, and Deliberation of the Conscientiousness domain; low scores on the Straightforwardness, Trust, Altruism, Compliance, and Modesty subscales of the Agreeableness domain; and low scores on Ideas and Values on the Openness domain. Low scores on the Warmth facet of Extraversion domain also are related to the use of the Contending strategy. Higher scores on all the facets of the Neuroticism domain are related to the choice of Contending as a conflict resolution strategy.

Avoidance Strategy. Low scores on facets of the Conscientiousness domain (Competence, Self-Discipline, and Order), Altruism of the Agreeableness domain, and several facets of the Extraversion domain (Warmth, Gregariousness, Assertiveness) are associated with people who use the Avoidance strategy for conflict. Avoidance is also used when individuals have higher scores on the Angry Hostility, Depression, Self-Consciousness, and Vulnerability facets of the Neuroticism domain.

Attack Strategy. Low scores on the Conscientiousness domain (Competence, Duty, and Self-Discipline) are associated with the use of attacking behavior in conflict situations. The same is true for the Agreeableness domain (Straightforwardness, Trust, Compliance, and Tenderness) and the Actions facet of the Openness domain. High scores on facets of the Neuroticism domain (Anxiety, Angry Hostility, Depression, Self-Consciousness, and Vulnerability) also are associated with the use of attacking to resolve conflict.
Situation Versus Personality
Using a repeated measures analysis, we examined the influence of personality on consistency of conflict resolution strategy across situations or different conflicts described. Conflict resolution strategies were significantly different across situations, indicating that situational constraints were more influential in determining conflict handling approach.

Influences on Whether the Conflict IsResolved or Not
Importance of the Issue. The importance of the conflict to the disputants played a significant role in whether or not the conflict was resolved. The more important the conflict to the disputants, the less likely it was to be resolved.

Personality. Individuals scoring higher on Deliberation (Conscientiousness), Self-Consciousness and Angry Hostility (Neuroticism), and Feelings (Openness) were less likely to have resolved their conflicts than those scoring in the lower group. Those scoring higher on Warmth and Assertiveness (Extraversion) and Actions (Openness) were more likely to report their conflicts were resolved.

Preferred Conflict Resolution Strategy
Those scoring higher on strategies such as Attack, Avoidance, and Contending were less likely to have resolved the conflicts they described in the study. On the other hand, Negotiation strategy was significantly associated with resolved conflicts.

We note that the findings reported here are all statistically significant even though the correlations between personality facets and conflict behavior are low (mostly that the ability to predict an individual’s conflict behavior from his personality measures is quite low). However, in the section that follows, we suggest that there are “difficult” or “extreme” personalities (which are relatively rare in the graduate student population that participated in this research) who are more apt to be consistent in their conflict behaviors in different situations.

Negotiating with Difficult Personalities
All too often, individuals have to negotiate with difficult people. For example, people who are hostile, overly aggressive, or who explode; people who avoid conflict, avoid discussions, or who resist by using passive-aggressive techniques; individuals who complain incessantly or blame others, but never try to do anything about the conflict or situation; people who appear very agreeable, but who do not produce or follow through on what they propose; enervating, negative people who sap energy from others, claiming nothing will work and that there are no solutions; “superior” people who believe they know everything and are only too eager to tell you they do; or people who cannot make decisions, who stall and are indecisive (Bramson, 1981).
Drawing from past work on personality and conflict (Bramson, 1981; Heitler, 1990; Ury, 1993) as well as our own research, we offer some suggestions for coping with difficult people. As we discussed previously, the use of contentious tactics and blame is more often associated with people low in conscientiousness (for example, self-discipline, deliberation, and competence), low in agreeableness (for example, straightforwardness, trust, and altruism), and high in neuroticism (for example, anxiety, angry hostility, depression, and impulsivity). Such angry, hostile people require special handling. First, it is useful to not react immediately to an attack: give them time to run down and regain emotional control. This is a critical first step, as well as difficult, as one’s natural tendency is to defend oneself. William Ury (1993) calls this “going to the balcony,” or choosing not to react. He describes imagining negotiating on stage and then climbing to the balcony overlooking the stage. The balcony is a metaphor for achieving a state of mental detachment necessary to arriving at constructive problem solving and regaining equilibrium. It is not useful to argue with someone who is attacking because they cannot “hear” you anyway and it only adds fuel to the fire. If the attack does not subside, it is helpful to say (or shout) a neutral word like “stop!” to break into their tantrum or to take a break from the negotiation. Once the other has calmed down a bit, it is useful to state your opinions and perceptions calmly, facilitating the discussion by not arguing with them, but as Ury calls it, “stepping to their side.” This means listening to them, acknowledging their feelings, and agreeing with them whenever possible to disarm them. Some hostile people, called “snipers” by Bramson, are slightly more subtle in their attacking behavior: they take pot shots at you, make cutting remarks, or give you not-so-subtle digs. A helpful strategy in dealing with these people is to surface the attack; that is, do a process intervention by commenting on an observed behavior.

With respect to avoiding conflict, we found this strategy to be most often associated with low conscientiousness, low agreeableness, low extraversion, and high neuroticism. When trying to engage another who is avoiding conflict, a good strategy is to use open-ended questions and wait as calmly as you can for an answer. Many people rush to fill silences with conversation. Try to resist the temptation. If the person continues to avoid or remain silent, comment on what you are observing and end your comment with another open-ended question. If necessary, remind the other party of your resolve to solve the conflict to mutual satisfaction, and try to pursue additional opportunities to engage in conversation.

Ury (1993) talks about “building a golden bridge” to help draw the other party in the direction you want them to move. This process involves several steps: involving the other party in drafting the agreement; looking beyond obvious interests, such as money, to take into account more intangible needs, such as recognition or autonomy; helping the other save face as she backs away from
an initial position. The latter could involve showing how circumstances may have changed since the beginning of the negotiation or using an agreed-upon standard of fairness. You may want to proceed slowly and remember that it is important to note that addressing more intangible psychological needs is critical to the process of building a bridge.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have presented several different approaches to understanding how personality may affect conflict behavior: one’s own behavior as well as that of the other with whom one is in conflict.

In brief, the psychodynamic theories stress the view that conflict might induce anxiety which, in turn, is likely to lead to various forms of defensive behavior, which can disrupt the constructive resolution of conflict. This approach suggests that in a conflict, it is important to know: (1) what makes you anxious (your “hot spots”); (2) when you are experiencing anxiety (your symptoms of anxiety); and (3) the defensive behaviors you tend to engage in when you are anxious. Such knowledge will help you to control your anxiety and to inhibit destructive, defensive behavior during a conflict. Also, this approach suggests that you understand that the other has “hot spots,” which you want to avoid and, that, if the other seems defensive, you might try to reduce his anxiety level by behavior on your part that makes the other feel more secure.

The need theories indicate that it is important to know what needs of yourself and the other are in the conflict. Your needs as well as the needs of the other in a conflict may not be well-represented in the “positions” that are expressed. Learning how to understand the needs of the other as well as of oneself is an important conflict resolution skill that can be acquired. (See Chapter One and Chapter Two of this book.) If the needs of the other, as well as one’s own, are not respected and addressed in a conflict agreement, the agreement is not likely to last.

The trait theories indicate that people who differ in personality traits also may differ in their approach to conflict and their behavior during a conflict. For most people, situational factors (the social context, the power relation, and so on) are at least as important as personality traits in determining one’s conflict behavior. However, there appear to be some rigid, extreme personalities that are relatively inflexible in their response to conflict. It is valuable to be aware of one’s personality-driven behavior tendencies so that one can control and modify them when they are inappropriate in a given conflict situation. While there has been, as yet, little systematic research on how to cope with “difficult” personalities in a conflict, it seems evident that it is useful to know the kinds of problems to expect from different types of difficult personalities.
References


CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Development of Conflict Resolution Skills

Preschool to Adulthood

Sandra V. Sandy

Anna Hall considered manners more important than feelings, and beauty most important of all. From the beginning, she made Eleanor feel homely and unloved, always outside the closed circle that embraced her two younger brothers. Anna mocked her daughter’s appearance and chided her manner, calling her “Granny” because she was so serious, even at the age of two. Before company Eleanor was embarrassed to hear her mother explain that she was a shy and solemn child. And Eleanor wrote, “I never smiled.”

—Cook (1992)

In early childhood, feelings and emotions are the primary intellectual puzzles that children are required to solve before they can successfully maneuver through the complicated cognitive tasks of later development. If the emotional components of learning are improperly laid in the brain’s pathways, a variety of problems may result. Although Eleanor Roosevelt managed, through a loving father, caring teachers, and a privileged social position, to overcome her mother’s put-downs and lead an extraordinarily productive life, she suffered emotional pain and struggled against feelings of insecurity most of her life. Consistent, small put-downs often have sizable negative emotional and motivational consequences for young children, who, during this period of their lives, need to be acquiring confidence in their own ability to influence the environment.

In this revised version of the earlier chapter I wrote on developmental issues in conflict resolution, I have added a section on adult development. Prior to the 1970s, the study of development tended to end in adolescence when the individual is presumed to have substantially “developed” into the adult they will remain for the next fifty or sixty years, with some minor variation. There are also current theorists and researchers who see development as highly stable after the age of thirty (McCrae and Costa, 1990; Block, 1977). Others consider
adulthood not as an end state but as a continuation of development occurring over the life span (Erikson, 1963; Kegan, 1994).

**THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL LEARNING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

Poor grades and dropping out of school can frequently be traced to lack of social-emotional skills. Social competence and appropriate behavior are strong and consistent predictors of academic outcomes, and the social climate of the classroom appears to be a powerful motivator of academic as well as cooperative classroom behavior. In fact, social and emotional variables predict achievement as well as or better than intellectual ability, sensory deficits, or neurological factors (Horn and Packard, 1985). Recent research shows a strong link among social-emotional and conflict resolution skills, traditional intellectual skills (reading, writing, and math), and success in the adult workplace (Deutsch, 1993; Gardner, 1993; Goleman, 1998; Gottman, 1997; Jensen, 1998; Shore, 1997). Social-emotional and conflict resolution skills are based on cooperation, communication, sense of community, appreciation of diversity and values, empathy, perspective taking, self-control, concentration, self-efficacy, creativity, and problem solving (Jensen, 2003; Sylwester, 2000).

As described in this chapter, the pedagogical approach to social-emotional learning emanates from a multidisciplinary perspective that integrates the most compelling findings from the fields of neuroscience, education, and psychology concerning developmental, cognitive, and individual personality traits. One conclusion, however, clearly stands out from the converging evidence on social-emotional skills development: early childhood is the time when the building blocks for all later development and intellectual growth are set in place. Most conflict resolution programs for children concentrate on middle childhood or adolescence because conflict, bullying, and other forms of violence occur more frequently at these ages (Warner, Weist, and Krulak, 1999). I will emphasize early childhood and the need for a broader and different instructional perspective for children at this stage of development.

In this chapter, the rationale for developing social-emotional skills in children will be presented within the framework of conflict resolution training, a social skill of particular importance for children and adults. Conflict is a desirable opportunity for learning in a classroom because its effective resolution requires successfully acquiring all the skills usually defined within the social-emotional learning lexicon. How we learn to handle conflict determines the positive or negative role it has in constructing our feelings, our intellect, and our personality.
Although there are many ways to settle a conflict (litigation, arbitration, distributive bargaining, integrative negotiation, and the like), I refer to constructive or principled negotiation throughout this chapter. This reflects our view that this type of conflict interaction best promotes emotional and cognitive growth in children and adolescents.

Most people are well aware of the general differences among preschoolers, elementary school-age children, and adolescents; however, not everyone has a solid understanding of all the important cognitive, emotional, and physical capabilities that differentiate these groups. In addition to our discussion of early childhood, I also briefly cover developmental issues and conflict management in middle childhood (ages six to twelve) and adolescence (ages twelve or thirteen to approximately twenty-one), and adulthood. The discussion at each level focuses on how developmental differences should guide our approach to teaching children age-appropriate skills.

In most sections, conflict resolution programs that are useful for the relevant age group are discussed. The final section assesses how well we are doing currently in our efforts to reach children and adults effectively and suggests future directions in conflict resolution programs as well as improvements to be made in terms of curricula and systematic evaluation.

**EARLY CHILDHOOD**

First, the representative developmental theorists (Piaget, Kohlberg, Selman, and Erikson) will guide us through the classic stage theories concerning social cognition and emotional development. Although recent research suggests that children may know more than they tell us and that some stages may appear earlier or show more inconsistency than previously thought, there is still much that is useful in these theories. Second, we cover comparatively recent work on neo-Piagetian theories: minor modification of Piaget’s theory (De Vries and Zan, 1994; Flavell, 1990); major modification of Piaget’s stages in the form of social-emotional competence domains (Elias and others, 1997); and biosocial-behavioral shift, a move from set stages to developmental advancement allowing the characteristics of various stages to coexist (Fischer, Bullock, Rotenberg, and Raya, 1993). Other important influences include theoretical perspectives concerning social context (Ceci, 1990), social cognition (Mize, 1995; Siegler, 1991), and neuroscientific discoveries regarding synaptic connections in the brain (Jensen, 1998; Shore, 1997).

There are other theorists and researchers who have influenced the design of our curriculum activities, for example, Vygotsky and Bronfenbrenner, but we mention them only briefly because of space limitations. These post-classic theorists add significantly to knowledge about the fundamental elements of school readiness and conflict management: innate temperament and individuality, emotional
control, role taking, empathy, perspective taking, moral reasoning, problem solving, and the interconnection between social-emotional learning and academic achievement.

Both classic and post-classic theorists have been of great help in creating the Peaceful Kids Educating Communities in Social-Emotional Learning (ECSEL) Program at the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Teachers College, Columbia University, in 1998. For example, our research supports a fluid sequence in cognition and learning; we find that stagelike changes in early childhood are rarely straightforward. The context and emotional state of children at particular times determine whether they act according to a new stage or reflect characteristics of an earlier one. This fluidity appears to be true at later developmental stages as well. Finally, a brief outline of the latest neurological discoveries regarding the brain’s functioning offers information about the critical timing and most effective methods of learning during early childhood.

Stage Theories of Early Childhood Development

Kohlberg called early childhood the stage of heteronomous morality, a time referred to by Piaget as the preoperational stage of development, or morality of constraint. (See Tables 16.1 and 16.2.) Children in this stage are subject to externally imposed rules and adhere unquestioningly to rules and the directives of powerful adults. Their motives and those of other children and adults are disregarded; only outcomes are important.

Developing a “Self.” In a Piagetian and neo-Piagetian constructivist approach (De Vries and Zan, 1994), a critical developmental task for a young child is decentering; that is, constructing a self separate from others and developing the capacity to think in terms of other people’s attitudes toward oneself. Within this theoretical framework, as in others, well-managed conflict is one of the most important factors in overcoming egocentrism and acquiring new knowledge about oneself and others. Naturally occurring conflict is an opportunity for children to develop social, emotional, intellectual, and moral skills by working through their disagreements.

The Influence of Friends. Contrary to what was previously believed, peer relationships in early childhood are now seen as an important factor in promoting perspective taking (the ability to analyze a situation in terms of emotions, intentions, and reasons from both sides of an issue) and moral development. Equal peer relationships give children a chance to experience reciprocity, which greatly assists them in perspective taking and problem solving.

Friends influence children through their attitudes, behavior, and personal characteristics. The quality of the friendship is important: positive, mutually supportive, and cooperative relationships are, not surprisingly, more constructive
than those characterized by put-downs and hostile rivalry. Friendships positively affect a child’s school adjustment in three ways:

1. Attitude toward classes (cooperative students value classes, teachers, and what they are learning)
2. Classroom behavior (cooperative students are rarely disruptive)
3. Academic achievement (cooperative students learn what is taught and receive high grades and test scores)

**Role of Conflict.** During early childhood, the parent often pleads, “How do I change my child’s behavior so that she is more agreeable?” The answer is to recognize that oppositional, conflict-provoking behavior usually represents an
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<tr>
<th>Kohlberg: Moral Stages</th>
<th>Damon: Justice in Dividing Resources</th>
<th>Selman: Perspective Taking</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1: Preconventional</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Early childhood (heteronomous morality)</td>
<td>Level 0-A (4 and under)</td>
<td>Egocentric impulsive level (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 1 (End of early childhood to beginning of middle childhood)</td>
<td>Justice is getting what one wishes: “I should go because I want to.”</td>
<td>Negotiation through unreflective physical means (fight or flight); shared experience through unreflective imitation</td>
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<td>The morality of obedience: adherence to rules backed by punishment</td>
<td>Level 0-B (ages 4 to 5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justifications are based on external factors such as size and gender: “I should get more because I’m bigger.”</td>
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<td><strong>Middle childhood</strong> (instrumental morality)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 2 (ages 7 to 10 or 11)</td>
<td>Level 1-A (ages 5 to 7)</td>
<td>Unilateral one-way level (1)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Justice is seen as an exchange system: you give as much as others give you.</td>
<td>Justice is always strict equality, everyone gets the same.</td>
<td>Negotiations through one-way commands or orders or through automatic obedience</td>
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<td>Level 1-B (ages 6 to 9)</td>
<td>A notion of reciprocity develops: people should be paid back in kind for doing good or bad things.</td>
<td>Shared experience through expressive enthusiasm without concern for reciprocity</td>
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<th>Kohlberg: Moral Stages</th>
<th>Damon: Justice in Dividing Resources</th>
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<tr>
<td>Level II: Conventional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 3 Social-relational morality (10 or 11 to beginning of adolescence)</td>
<td>Level 2-A (ages 8 to 10)</td>
<td>Reciprocal reflective level (2) (ages 7 to 12)</td>
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<td>Children believe that shared feelings and agreements are more important than self-interest.</td>
<td>Moral relativity—learning how different persons can have different yet equally valid claims for justice</td>
<td>Negotiation through cooperation using persuasion or deference; shared experience through mutual reflection on similar perceptions and experiences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adolescence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 4 Law and order</td>
<td>Level 2-B (ages 10 and up)</td>
<td>Mutual third-person level (3) (Beginning in adolescence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laws govern what is right.</td>
<td>Choices take account of two or more people’s (as well as situational) demands. There is feeling that all persons should be given their due (does not necessarily mean equality in treatment).</td>
<td>Negotiation through strategies integrating needs of self and other: Shared experience through empathic reflective process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III: Principled</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stages 5 and 6 (Adolescence to adulthood) Principled, postconventional understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td>Societal perspective taking level (4) (Late adolescence to adulthood)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Individuals are capable of taking a generalized perspective of morality.</td>
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Sources: Adapted from Kohlberg, 1976; Damon, 1980; Selman, 1980. Damon contests the idea of stages as an invariant sequence because children regress in level and show inconsistent levels of performance from one testing time to the next.

*Recent research suggests that preschoolers may know more than they can tell us and so this level may need revision.*
important developmental step. What needs to be changed is how the child’s behavior is viewed and in particular how it is handled by the parent.

Conflict serves different purposes according to the level of early childhood development. During the second and third years, it corresponds with children’s developing autonomy. The increasing assertiveness of the child is to be desired rather than socialized into compliance with parental demands. Between the ages of three and seven, constructive conflict management helps to coordinate play. According to the theorists in Table 16.2, there is, in early childhood, little full-scale perspective taking. However, incipient perspective taking is readily apparent in the child’s empathic response to others, and a number of current theorists believe young children are more capable of perspective taking than classic stage theories allowed. (See the later section “Empathy and Perspective Taking.”) Children are often seen comforting friends who are upset or mirroring the emotion of others around them. Skills training in recognizing emotion in self and others encourages development of empathy, a precursor to perspective taking.

Selman (see Table 16.2) refers to the “egocentric, impulsive stage” of development as representing the primitive foundation of social perspective taking. According to this view, young children may recognize that other children display different preferences, but they lack the capacity to distinguish between their own perception of an event or person and that of another child. Neither do preschoolers see the cause-effect relationship in other people between thinking and behaving. This often leads to confusion over cause-effect relationships, such as whether punishment following misbehavior is the effect of misbehavior or its cause. Without guidance, children are likely to feel that they did something wrong because they are punished but fail to understand precisely what they did wrong. (Note that some modern theorists feel young children are more capable of perspective taking than just stated.)

The egocentric stage of social perspective taking corresponds to Kohlberg’s level 1 (preconventional heteronomous morality) and Damon’s level 0-A (justice is getting what one wishes) and level 0-B (justifications are based on external factors such as size or gender). Children at stage 0 view a conflict situation as being an event where one cannot do what one wants because of how the other person is behaving. Conflict resolution thus consists of fight (“Hit her!”) or flight (“Go play with another toy or do something else”).

As can be seen in Table 16.3, Kegan (1994), a neo-Piagetian “constructive-developmentalist,” frames different developmental periods in an individual’s life in terms of orders of consciousness. Kegan’s approach includes cognitive, affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal development throughout the life span. The first order of consciousness encompasses children under the ages of seven or eight whose cognitive capabilities allow a socially egocentric construction of the world. In this world, they believe that others share the minds and views they do and enjoy a moment-to-moment relationship to their desires, preferences, and abilities. At young ages, children are unable to delay gratification for any
length of time. Today does not remember yesterday’s failures. Self-esteem is largely kept intact because one’s abilities are reconstituted continually from one moment to the next.

**Developmental Abilities and Neural Activity**

Recent research in neuroscience has made significant progress in mapping how a child’s mind develops and learning takes place (Jensen, 1998; Shore, 1997). There is no longer any question about the fundamental role of nurture in learning. Children get smarter as they interact with their environment; stimulation from important others promotes essential brain activity. The interplay between neural activity and learning builds personality and temperament. Negative patterns can be interrupted during the brain’s high-activity stage in early childhood, and patterns promoting the child’s emotional, social, and cognitive well-being can be “automatized” by learning and frequent practice. Neuroscientific research shows that:

- The first forty-eight months of a child’s life are more important to brain development than previously thought. In fact, much of the brain’s infrastructure is in place by age four. By this age, children have already

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orders of Consciousness</th>
<th>Appropriate Audience</th>
<th>Cognitive Operation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Order</strong></td>
<td>Early childhood: Roughly Fantasy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Socially egocentric</td>
<td>2 to 6 years</td>
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<td><strong>Second Order</strong></td>
<td>Middle childhood: Grades 1–3 Data</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durable categories</td>
<td>(a stretch), grades 4–6 (elaborating an emerging capacity)</td>
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<td><strong>Third Order</strong></td>
<td>Adolescents: Middle school Inference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-categorical</td>
<td>students (a stretch), high school students (elaborating an emerging capacity)</td>
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<td>structures</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fourth Order</strong></td>
<td>Adults: Any higher education Formulation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex systems</td>
<td>setting (a stretch for many)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fifth Order</strong></td>
<td>Any higher education setting Reflection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trans-system structures</td>
<td>(a stretch for most); graduate programs and practicing within the field itself (a stretch for many)</td>
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*Source: Adapted from Kegan (1994).*
mapped out, through repetition, significant aspects of their cognitive and behavioral repertoire.

- Early experience at home and school critically influences the ability to learn and the capacity to regulate emotion.
- Across all ethnic groups, the human brain benefits significantly from good experience and teaching, particularly during the first four years.
- Children learn in the context of important relationships. Caregiving and stimulation help children develop capacity for empathy, perspective taking, emotional regulation, behavioral control, problem solving, and optimal cognitive functioning.
- There are key emotional milestones that children must pass at specific developmental points, particularly in early childhood.

Regarding this last point, those children who do not pass the milestones appropriately are at risk of retaining such negative traits as impulsivity, immature emotional functioning, behavioral problems, and even propensity to violence. Instruction in early childhood must be flexible to take into account a wide range of individual differences in temperament, personality, environment, interests, and variation across developmental levels.

**Individual Differences That Affect Social-Emotional Competence**

Every child is born with a certain temperament, or characteristic way of responding emotionally to the world. It is important to accept temperament for what it is and to focus the skills development involved in conflict resolution toward helping each child make the most effective use of his innate characteristics.

**Temperament.** Conflict resolution is often helpful for so-called difficult children; however, a child with a serious behavior or emotional problem may often require an intensive, therapeutic approach to manage the difficulty. In any case, labeling a child (for example, as a troublemaker or a pushover) is to be strictly avoided because the label may stick and be difficult to change even if the child learns to cope with the temperamental traits that cause trouble. Another factor to consider is the considerable difference in significance of a temperamental trait depending on the age level. A child’s so-called negative traits at one developmental stage (for example, hyperactivity) may turn into positive characteristics at a later stage (such as a high energy level in adulthood). The critical point is to accept the child’s temperament as it is, without labeling it or being judgmental, while working to help the child to grow and develop in a positive direction.

Temperamental differences are seen in traits such as activity level; fearfulness; persistence; shyness; positive or negative mood; regularity of eating and
sleeping; sensitivity to bright light, loud noises, or touch; adaptability to new situations; distractibility; irritability and anger level; and impulsivity.

**Emotion.** Emotion influences most of our behavior. A threatening situation (a hostile look from a classmate) may trigger intense emotion, which creates action that occurs without thinking. This is why students need to be taught emotion-management strategies (stop and think before responding, for example) repetitively, so they can become automatic responses. Achieving social-emotional competence requires children to develop awareness of both their own emotional states and those of others. The key to developing this awareness is acquiring the communication skills involved in clearly expressing one’s own emotions as well as in effective listening and attending to the other’s verbal and nonverbal emotional expression. Such skills are fostered by constructive conflict experiences.

Although emotion in Western cultures has often been considered irrational in relation to cognition, neuroscientists now believe that emotions provide information in much the same way logic does. Emotions also direct attention and create meaning using their own memory pathways. In addition to music, games, drama, or storytelling, there are other ways to engage emotion in learning, such as ritual clapping, cheers, chants, or songs to mark the beginning or completion of a project. It is important for adults to model a love of learning, letting children share the ideas and activities that excite them. It is also important for students to show and discuss their work with one another and tell what they like and dislike about it. Whenever emotions are involved following a learning experience, there is greater recall and accuracy about the information learned (McGaugh and others, 1995).

**Empathy and Perspective Taking.** As rage fuels aggression, so empathy inspires understanding, sharing, helping, and cooperation. Empathy first begins in infancy, when even a two-week-old child may cry upon hearing another child cry. Many believe empathy at this stage is an innate reflex. The second stage in developing empathy is comforting behavior, which occurs during the second year of life. At this age, children begin to understand that it is the other person who is distressed; this understanding may lead them to engage in efforts to comfort. Because a two-year-old is not skilled at recognizing the other person’s point of view, the child’s attempt usually reflects what he himself finds comforting, such as giving Mommy a toy or his blankie if he sees that his mother is distressed. The third stage occurs roughly at three to five years of age: at this age, a child shows more empathy to the distress of a friend than to another (Farver and Branstetter, 1994). Also at this age, increasing language skills enable children not only to empathize with people in stories, pictures, or film, but also to take into account differences between their level of knowledge and that of
younger children. This indicates less egocentrism than presumed by Piaget. In fact, current knowledge of children’s competencies in early childhood leads us to suspect that they are far more capable of perspective taking than they have been given credit. Developmental capabilities appear to have a much wider age variation than previously thought.

Two important ways to promote social-emotional learning of empathy and perspective taking as well as other prosocial behaviors include explicit modeling by adults and induction. Modeling refers to adults behaving in ways they desire the child to imitate. Induction refers to parents and teachers giving explanations that appeal to the child’s pride, desire to be grown up, and concern for others.

**Motivation and Personality**

Dweck (1996) has demonstrated that major patterns of adaptive or maladaptive behavior (such as a mastery orientation or a helplessness orientation to tasks) are affected by children’s implicit theories or self-conceptions about their ability. For example, some children believe their intelligence is a fixed entity; others believe it can be increased by effort. Those holding an entity theory are orientated toward proving the adequacy of their performance in order to win approval of their intelligence. The latter group, adhering to an incremental theory, is more interested in pursuing learning goals whereby they can increase their ability. These latter children, who focus on controllable factors such as effort, are likely to persist when experiencing setback or failure. (For further discussion, see Chapter Thirteen.) Implicit motivational theories do not exist only in the intellectual realm; as we have already mentioned, they are paralleled in social interaction as well. School adjustment depends on both social and academic goals and abilities: having prosocial goals and successful peer relationships are critical factors in promoting interest and achievement in school.

In addition to implicit theories about ability, several other factors influence the choice of a goal: its importance, the interpretation of an event (attribution), knowledge of strategies for reaching the goal, and environmental variables. For example, aggressive children are bound by the importance of control and dominance. They have more confidence than other children that they can master events involving aggression. In social situations, they interpret the actions of their peers, even when accidental or ambiguous, as being hostile; thus, the behavior of others becomes provocative and inspires a need for retaliation. Frequently, these children lack strategies for interacting successfully with peers. They do not know that it is important to show interest in what a peer is doing or that they need to cooperate with other people in playtime activities. Similarly, children who fear or experience rejection by others are caught up in the importance of avoiding rejection. These children are handicapped by lack of group entry skills, such as knowing how to express interest
in others’ activities and to suggest cooperative ways of joining the ongoing group process. Environmental variables refer primarily to the atmosphere established in the home or classroom and whether it promotes adaptive or maladaptive behavior.

Parents, teachers, and other adults play a major role in determining what kind of theories children develop about their personality characteristics. They do this mainly in two ways. One is the implicit theories and explicit explanations that adults offer for their own behavior and personality; children imitate adults and internalize these explanations for their own personality and behavior. The second way is to explain the child’s behavior and personality characteristics. Thus, a parent who explains the child’s behavior by presumably fixed characteristics such as genes, ability, or temperament rather than malleable characteristics such as knowledge, effort, or mood often stimulates the child to use similar explanations. As we have already stated, the type of theory that children develop about their personality and behavior greatly affects their academic learning and emotional development.

Adults also need to consider the environmental or context variables that may be changed to help children, especially those who are socially isolated or aggressive. An effective way of doing this involves decreasing competition among children and promoting cooperative learning activities (Johnson and Johnson, 1991). In the classroom, having children work cooperatively in small groups promotes common achievement goals and enhances the motivation to learn through group acceptance and support. Children require coaching in the various strategies that can be used to achieve their goals. Teaching these strategies is a step-by-step process that involves instruction and many practice sessions.

**Self-Control.** Self-control is a critical skill that enables a child to inhibit his initial impulses; an example mentioned earlier is to stop and think before acting. (See also Chapter Thirteen.) Basically, there are four forms of inhibition to be mastered (Maccoby, 1980):

- **Movement.** Prior to age six or seven, children have difficulty in stopping an action already in progress.
- **Emotions.** Before age four, young children have little control over the intensity of their emotions.
- **Reflection.** Before age six or so, children commonly fail to engage in the reflection necessary to perform well.
- **Gratification.** Children under twelve often have difficulty in refusing immediate gratification to wait for a better choice later.

**Summary.** Differentiating cause and effect, empathy, and perspective taking, along with self-regulation and problem solving, are among the key elements of positive conflict management. Modern theorists and researchers find the young
child to be far more capable of learning these skills than did their classic pre-
decessors. However, children do not learn skills merely by observation; they 
require instruction in cause-and-effect sequences before they can separate right 
from wrong or unintentional from intended harm. Equally important, children 
must learn empathy and perspective taking before they can become aware of 
the effects their actions have on others. These lessons need to be conveyed 
through gentleness and kindness; turning an amoral child into a moral one need 
ot include inducing lifelong guilt. The most effective, long-lasting, and perva-
sive acquisition of these skills occurs in early childhood, a time when the brain 
is most receptive to learning (that is, from birth until the child is four or so).

The ECSEL Program

In the Early Childhood Social-Emotional Learning (ECSEL) curriculum, the 
emphasis is on achieving emotional, social, and intellectual growth through an 
tegrated approach involving parents, preschool staff, and children in a shared 
learning venture.

The ECSEL staff does extensive role modeling and assists parents and teach-
ers in doing the same at home and in the classroom. We encourage parents and 
teachers to set rules and discuss them with children before actual implementa-
tion. We also help them plan cooperative discipline techniques that, in the long 
run, are far more effective than angry yelling or rote punishment. Cooperative 
discipline is based on mutual affection and trust between teachers, parents, and 
children. The accent is on helping the child understand both her own and the 
other person’s feelings and perspective, as well as the consequences of her 
action, rather than simply getting the child to obey.

The goal is to help parents and teachers promote the child’s internalization 
of standards of right and wrong. Internalization depends on consistency about 
clearly stated rules, consistent and appropriate praise for following rules, and 
consistent, appropriate discipline when rules are broken. Most important, inter-
nalization depends on loving parents who are loved in turn by the child; 
discipline has a much greater positive effect from a loving parent than from a 
distant or unloving one. If a child is motivated through love to adopt his par-
ents’ standards, he is likely to remember the rules prior to potential misbehav-
ior and, anticipating his parents’ disappointment if he breaks the rules, resist 
engaging in that behavior. But if punishment is used as the primary deterrent 
to misbehavior, the child learns that the objective is not to get caught.

When stressful methods of discipline (arguing, yelling, and overly harsh pun-
ishment) are used with preschoolers, the brain becomes rewired so as to make 
children prone to impulsiveness, overarousal, and aggressiveness. Children 
exposed to such harsh methods are often especially in need of remedial help to 
acquire the emotional literacy skills necessary to understand the nonverbal 
behavior of others correctly (Jensen, 2003).
Although children appear to have innate capacity for certain social-emotional responses, such as empathy and perspective taking, these are frequently hit-or-miss skills unless the child is effectively tutored by an adult. Since interpersonal understanding is influenced more by experience than by age, a three-year-old can be at a higher developmental level than a six-year-old. Accordingly, the ECSEL program uses a spiraling effect to review or teach older preschoolers what the younger preschoolers are taught in their basic program. We never finish a topic, but revisit it at other levels of complexity according to the child’s ability to understand. Scaffold (a process whereby an adult creates a supportive guideline for thinking about problems through a series of questions) is a process we model and encourage parents and teaching staff to use at every possible opportunity in real-life problem solving and conflict resolution.

In ECSEL, we introduce preschoolers to vocabulary related to feelings, cooperation, and problem solving. This vocabulary is amplified and extended to various situations and emotional contexts. It begins with four basic emotions: sad, angry, scared, and happy. Children learn to sense and label these emotions in themselves through pantomime, stories, puppet shows, discussions about situations in which these emotions occur, and role-plays involving both adults and children. Simultaneously, children learn to understand both verbal and non-verbal cues as to how other people feel in various situations.

The four basic emotions are later amplified to include complex feelings such as disappointment, embarrassment, joy, and excitement. Parents are encouraged to read extensively to their children; the program provides stories, games, and word exercises as take-home activities for parents to enjoy with their children. We also talk with parents about turning storybook time into an expanded emotional and cognitive learning experience for their children, for example, by questioning the child about the feelings of the character in the book, what the character may be thinking, other actions the character might have taken, and how to evaluate actions and their consequences.

One particularly popular scaffolding activity involves using three sets of picture cards (large ones in the classroom and a smaller version for take-home use) illustrating a situation. The sets involve and are labeled as feelings, consequences, and problem solving. As with other activities and learning tasks, the picture cards are designed for relevance to the children’s interests and experiences, because this facilitates the brain’s making a connection with existing neural sites, thus maintaining the information efficiently in memory.

Children learn about cooperative skills through motor tasks such as creating group drawings, building structures together with materials such as Lego® blocks and building blocks, and problem-solving activities involving balance (two children carrying a small object on a board or using sticks to lift a small box into a larger one). As frequently as possible, we engage the teaching staff in
leading small groups of children in such activities as communication go-rounds, pantomime, puppetry, and structure role-plays and skits to build children’s group skills and support prosocial, cooperative behaviors such as listening, sharing, and taking turns. Teacher-facilitated group work also provides modeling and skill development that can help aggressive or shy children learn and practice strategies for group entry and constructive play.

Problem solving is presented in our SOAR model: Stop and think, Open up and tell how you feel, Ask what we can do, and Resolve the situation. Puppet scenarios are enacted to show ways of achieving a goal, demonstrating positive and negative behavior. As examples, aggressive behavior such as that of two children fighting may lead to both of them failing to achieve their goals. Shy or fearful behavior could end in the child’s failing to even attempt to achieve a goal. The best approach is to assertively ask for or work toward one’s goals. If this fails, then it is time to think of another way to attain what is wanted or needed. Including negative consequences is essential because children do not intuitively know which actions are likely to lead to a negative outcome. However, in modeling or demonstrating negative behaviors, it is important to assume a quiet, understated manner, since children are often attracted to loud, rude behavior and will imitate it. Positive behavior is best shown in a lively, celebratory way, since children are drawn to noisy, action-filled events.

To get and maintain the attention of the preschooler, we create strong, frequent contrasts in activity. Sustaining continuous high-level attention for more than ten minutes is difficult even for adults. Knowledge of children’s capacity for concentration must guide an expectation for sustaining attention in early childhood: a rough guideline is to involve preschoolers in four to six minutes of direct instruction at any one time (Jensen, 1998). Following this, they need time to create meaning, which is accomplished through internal rather than external attention. Internal attention is largely carried out unconsciously while the child is playing or engaged in an apparently mindless activity. External attention is the direct listening that occurs during instruction. Last but not least, time is required for the learning to “take.” Activities and practice sessions are repeated with the children in a variety of situations and over many weeks for enduring internalization of these lessons. Obviously, parental support and assistance in conducting at-home practice sessions is an integral component of this process. Because stress is deleterious to learning, we consciously work with our teachers and parents to reduce stress for children. The outcome of stress is activation of defense mechanisms, which may be useful for surviving a physical danger but interfere with learning. Stressors range from a rude classmate to a tense parent overreacting to the child’s behavior or a teacher who, perhaps unwittingly, embarrasses a student in front of peers.

The aim of ECSEL is to help each child not only succeed in school (and eventually the workplace) but also to have a fulfilling personal life characterized by
respected communication, creative problem solving, and regard for the feelings of others—and unburdened by thoughtless put-downs or other avoidable, limiting experiences. The teachers and families across the country who have participated in this evidence-based program over the past eight years unequivocally affirm its usefulness in directing preschoolers toward these ultimate goals.

Involving parents along with children and preschool staff produces the greatest increase in children’s social-emotional learning. For example, in comparison to classrooms where only teaching staff were engaged in skills development, we found that parent involvement resulted in significant gains in children’s assertiveness, cooperation, and self-control. Children in the parent-involvement groups also showed a significant decline in externalizing (aggressive) and internalizing (withdrawn, moody) behaviors. In classrooms with parent participation, preschool staff and parents were in agreement concerning the positive effects for the children. Preschool staff was also likely to integrate the ECSEL curriculum throughout the day’s activities. Parents increased in authoritative (as opposed to authoritarian) parenting practices; they remained in control while respecting their children and recognizing that the youngsters, too, were entitled to a number of rights. Parents explained rules and decisions to children, while also considering the child’s point of view—whether or not that view was accepted in the end result. Authoritarian practices (obedience to strict rules) and permissive practices (low control over children) also diminished among parents in the ECSEL program.

MIDDLE CHILDHOOD

Although early childhood is the optimal time to begin teaching the skills described in the first section of this chapter, learning must continue through the later developmental periods. Motivations, interests, and influences change dramatically from early childhood to middle childhood, adolescence, and, later, adulthood. Each developmental age has its own external influences and unique problems, which require their own type and level of instruction to sustain skills. A lesson learned within the context of one age must be revisited and revised to meet the needs of another.

Entering Middle Childhood

One of the major differences between early childhood and middle childhood is that children dramatically reduce the amount of time they spend with parents and other adults and increase the time they spend with peers. As a consequence of decreased adult supervision, children find themselves with greater personal responsibility for their behavior and often need to work out disputes for themselves. These conflict management experiences are an opportunity for children to master new cognitive and social skills. Other differences include expanded
social context in which to function and increased responsibility for participation in their own education.

Stage Theories of Middle Childhood

Piaget observed that from age seven or eight to approximately nine to eleven, the imaginary play of early childhood gives way to play with largely unquestioned rules. Rule-based games are an opportunity for the child to experience the give-and-take of negotiation, settling disagreements, and making and enforcing rules. In this way, the child comes to understand that social rules provide a structure for cooperating with others. (See Selman’s reciprocal reflective level in Table 16.2.) Erikson viewed this time of life as the period when children confront the task of learning to be competent at activities valued by adults and peers; success in this endeavor creates a sense of industry, and failure results in a sense of inferiority. (See Table 16.4.) Successful conflict management in middle childhood helps children create and maintain peer friendships, thus promoting a sense of competence and industry.

According to Kegan, the second order of consciousness begins approximately between the ages of seven and ten when children are able to construct “durable categories.” The mental organization that characterizes durable categories means changing physical objects from being principally about one’s momentary perceptions of them to being about their having ongoing rules about what elements may be properties regardless of the individual’s perceptions. Children develop the ability to see that the phenomenon being considered (thing, other, self) has its own properties, which are elements of a class or category, and that all classes have durable rules regulating both the concept of class membership as well as membership itself. For example, “self” is a class that has as members the properties of preference, habit, and ability, and these properties are aspects of the person in an ongoing way rather than a momentary desire. Having durable categories means seeing other people as having property-bearing selves that are distinct from self. A child’s desires change from being primarily about her current impulses to being about ongoing, time-enduring needs or preferences, which may contain current wishes.

Sense of Self. The sense of self acquired in early childhood must now be further developed or revised to fit the new context. In addition to spending more time with many other children and with far fewer adults involved, the child in the elementary classroom is primarily engaged in structured learning tasks. The change from an adult-centered to a peer-centered environment requires the child to reconcile the sense of self-identity acquired within the family context with the new self-concepts being formed as a consequence of different relationships. The child’s relationship with parents also changes as the parents begin to rely on discussion and explanation of cause and consequence to influence the child’s behavior.
Table 16.4. Erikson’s Psychosocial Stages in Development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Development Themes and Challenges</th>
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</table>
| First year                | “Trust versus mistrust”  
Infants learn to trust or mistrust others to care for their basic needs.                           |
| Second year               | “Autonomy versus shame and doubt”  
Two-year-olds learn to exercise their will and to control themselves. Otherwise, they become unsure of themselves, doubting that they can do things for themselves. |
| Third to sixth year       | “Initiative versus guilt”  
Children learn to initiate their own activities, to become purposeful, and to enjoy their accomplishments. When they are frustrated by adults in their attempts to initiate activities, they feel guilty for their attempts to become independent. |
| Seventh year through puberty | “Industry versus inferiority”  
Children are learning to be competent at activities valued by adults and peers; when they do not, they feel inferior. |
| Adolescence               | “Identity versus role confusion”  
The primary task of adolescence is to establish a sense of personal identity as part of a social group. Failure to do this results in confusion about who they are and what they want to do in life. |
| Young adult               | “Intimacy versus isolation”  
The young adult develops the ability to give and receive love and to make long-term commitments to relationships. |
| Middle adulthood          | “Generativity versus stagnation”  
At this stage of life, the adult takes an interest in guiding the development of the next generation. |
| Older adulthood           | “Ego integrity versus despair”  
The older adult develops a sense of acceptance toward life as it was lived and the importance of the relationships that were part of the individual’s life. |

Source: Adapted from Erikson, 1950.

Bingham and Stryker (1995) suggest that the stages of social-emotional development for girls may differ somewhat from boys. They describe five stages of development for girls that parallel those posed by Erikson, but differ in emphasis at sensitive time points. Through age eight, girls have the task of developing
the hardy personality. Accomplishing this task means feeling in control of one’s own life, being committed to specific activities, and looking forward to challenging growth activities. Stage 2 finds the nine- through twelve-year-old forming an identity as an achiever. This involves developing a durable core of oneself as a person who is capable of accomplishment in a number of areas, such as intellectual, social, and so on. The stage of skill building for self-esteem occurs between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. Girls develop feelings of being worthy, entitled to assert their needs and wants, and confidence concerning the ability to cope with life. From ages seventeen to twenty-two, the task becomes creating strategies for self-sufficiency, both emotional and financial. Here, girls take on responsibility for taking care of themselves based on a sense of autonomy. The adult task is finding satisfaction in work and love and being content with personal accomplishments and social or personal relationships.

**Influence of Friends.** Around age ten or eleven, children change to a “social-relational moral perspective” (see Table 16.2), wherein shared feelings and harmony with people close to them are more important than individual self-interest. This perspective marks growth of the inclination and the ability to interact with other children without adult supervision. One problem with this growing ability is that children now depend more on peers to define right and wrong and less on such authorities as parents and teachers.

**Self-Esteem.** Social acceptance is an important goal of middle childhood. At this age, children become aware of their relative status among peers and have concerns about rejection. They also use gossip as a means of finding out about the group’s norms; once they know what their friends value and approve, they can shape their own behavior to achieve peer acceptance. Children already competent in group-entry skills achieve peer acceptance easily and are likely to resist unwelcome pressure from the group.

There is evidence that social comparison affects a child’s self-evaluation more strongly with increasing age. This fits well with the decreasing self-esteem that occurs during middle childhood, as children begin to compare their performance with that of their peers and to define themselves accordingly. They also begin to think of the interpersonal implications of their own characteristics (“I always do my homework and know the answers in class, so other kids call me nerdy”).

Children of all ages whose friendships have positive, cooperative features are high in self-esteem and prosocial behavior, are popular with peers, have few emotional problems, are well behaved, and experience good academic adjustment, including positive attitudes toward school. Despite greater reliance in middle childhood on peer opinion and values, parents remain an important influence on the child. In fact, high self-esteem has been linked to authoritative parenting. This approach to parenting includes a close affectionate relationship, which makes the child feel important; clearly defined limits and
consequences for transgression, to give the child the sense that norms are real and significant; and respect for individuality, because the child needs to express individuality. Parents show respect for their children by reasoning with them and taking their point of view into account. The key to a child’s high self-esteem is the feeling, transmitted in large part by the family and valued teachers, that she has the ability to control her own future by controlling both herself and her environment.

Conversely, a child with negative friendship relationships (characterized by rivalries and put-downs) is likely to be a low achiever both academically and socially. He also displays disruptive behavior and may suffer depression and anxiety. In contrast to a child with high self-esteem, this child is more likely to have had authoritarian or permissive parents and less parental acceptance, fewer clearly defined limits, and less respect for individuality. Low self-esteem may also result if a preadolescent fails at attempted tasks. Unlike younger children, a preadolescent is prone to attribute her failure to innate ability and not to situational factors such as effort. This failure experience results in reduced expectations for success, negative feelings, and low persistence (Dweck, 1996).

**Perspective Taking.** With rule-based games, children must keep in mind an overall set of task conditions as well as engage in social perspective taking. Thus, they must take into consideration the wishes, thoughts, and actions of other children along with their own. At this age, children make inferences about the perspectives of other people and are aware that other people can do the same about them. But they often have difficulty in simultaneously focusing on their own perspective while trying to assume the perspective of another. As a result, they frequently adhere to the correctness of either their own view or that of an authority (adult or older child seen as an authority). Becoming skilled in negotiating conflictful social interaction with peers while playing a game depends on a child’s growing ability to understand how others think (social perspective taking) and feel (social-emotional competence).

**Cooperation.** In middle childhood, children begin wrestling with such issues as morality and rules of fairness. (See Table 16.2.) According to Kohlberg (1976), children around the age of seven or eight enter the stage of development called “instrumental morality,” or self-regulation, which includes cooperative behavior. In this sense, cooperating means working toward a common goal while coordinating one’s own feelings and perspective with another’s. The motive for cooperation is mutual affection and trust, which develops into the ability to take the perspective of another. Given that children may show characteristics of earlier stages of development depending on the circumstance, middle childhood youngsters may still have a somewhat egocentric point of view, in which they have difficulty distinguishing between their own interests and those of other children.
Middle childhood also sees emerging belief in equity: if a group member works harder and contributes more to a project, that member deserves more of the rewards. This is justice as an exchange system, in which you should receive as much as you give. Sometimes the temptation of an appealing reward, however, causes even older children to attempt to get as much as they can from the outcome without regard to how much they contribute (Damon, 1977).

Self-Control. To encourage a child’s self-regulation, the goal of the adult (parent or teacher) should be to increasingly appeal to the child’s cooperation rather than obedience. Although adult-child relationships are not equal in power, an adult who respects the child’s thoughts, opinions, and endeavors can permit and encourage the child to think about and question causes, potential outcomes, and general explanations.

The Role of Conflict
If a relationship is threatened (on the playground, for example), preadolescents engage in fewer conflicts with friends than with acquaintances. However, in the classroom or places where continued interaction is not at risk, the preadolescent disagrees more with friends than nonfriends. The type of conflict most commonly occurring depends on gender: boys’ disagreements often involve power issues, whereas for girls the subject of disagreement is usually interpersonal matters. Children who are aggressive also engage in conflicts that differ according to gender: boys have goals of instrumentality (getting what they want, whether it be a material object or a privileged position) and dominance, whereas girls are likely to engage in relationship aggression; they are displaying behavior intended to damage another child’s friendship or feeling of inclusion by the peer group.

Preadolescents commonly believe that one person is responsible for any given conflict, and they feel that resolution should come from that person. Thus, it becomes important for adults to engage both (or all) participants in a dispute in what Shure and Spivack (1978) refer to as problem-solving dialoguing—a form of questioning, similar to scaffolding, that helps a child develop an alternative solution and consequential thinking. This process results in clearly defining the problem, searching for the original problem (one child’s version of the conflict may not include the first action that occurred), and emphasizing the child’s ability (not the adult’s) to solve the problem.

The Creative Response to Conflict Program. A well-respected conflict resolution program widely used with children in middle childhood is the program developed by Creative Response to Conflict (CRC) in Nyack, New York. CRC employs age-appropriate classroom activities in five thematic areas: affirmation, communication, cooperation, problem solving, and bias awareness. In addition,
CRC emphasizes the importance of actively training and involving school staff, parents, and other community members as part of a holistic approach to changing culture and climate.

For middle-years children, advances in development allow for the use of more complex and collaborative approaches to skill development—for instance, asking students to respond to a conflict scenario by brainstorming and problem solving in cooperative groups. Unlike young children, who have trouble getting outside their own identities, middle-years children can engage easily and independently in role-plays, which require them to separate their own thoughts and actions from those of the characters they play.

This movement away from egocentrism also makes the middle years a time when children can be introduced to mediation. CRC trains children beginning in the third grade to be peer mediators who help other children work out conflicts on the playground. Solutions to conflict are not imposed; rather, mediators help disputants work out their own agreements. This approach, which further promotes perspective-taking and problem-solving skills, is particularly successful with middle-years students because it meshes with their growing reliance on peers for affirmation and their need for autonomy and self-direction.

**ADOLESCENCE**

The defining developmental task of adolescence is identity formation. (See Table 16.3.) Rapid and dramatic changes, physical and psychosocial, occur in almost all aspects of adolescent life. Consequently, adolescents too are confronted with the stressful necessity of reworking earlier developmental tasks to respond to their new problems and needs. Building an identity requires integrating sexual drives and social demands into a healthy personality.

**Stage Theories of Adolescence**

According to Erikson’s psychosocial stages in development (see Table 16.3), the transition from childhood to adulthood requires a return to earlier developmental issues that emerge with age-related complexity:

- Adolescents revisit the attachment phase of infancy as they search for trust, as with trustworthy and admirable friends. In early adolescence, this task focuses on same-sex friends; later, it turns toward finding partners of the opposite sex. As they begin to function as members of society rather than only family, classroom, or other small groups, adolescents seek to establish trust through political and social causes and trustworthy leaders.

- Expression of autonomy begins with the two-year-old’s insistence on “doing it myself.” In adolescence, autonomy refers to learning to make
one’s own decisions and choices in life rather than accepting those of parents or friends.

- In early childhood, initiative was demonstrated through pretend play. Its counterpart in adolescence is establishing one’s own goals rather than simply accepting what others plan.

- Industry in middle childhood focuses on tasks set by the teacher or parent. In adolescence, industry means taking responsibility for one’s own ambitions and the quality of work produced.

The third order of consciousness (Kegan, 1994), “cross-categorical” knowing, begins in adolescence. Experience is constructed out of a principle that subordinates durable categories to a higher-order principle. This entails subordinating the adolescent’s own point of view to the relationship between his point of view and that of another person’s. The primary idea is that one’s approach to relationships changes so that not only is what happens to the individual important but also what happens to the connection to the other person as a consequence of behavior or activity. Thinking reflectively, inferentially, or thematically requires that a durable category becomes an element of the principle of knowing rather than the principle of knowing itself. Adolescents develop the capacity to subordinate durable categories to the interaction between them, which makes their thinking abstract, their feelings self-reflective emotion, and their social relations capable of commitment and bonding to a community of people or ideas larger than the self. Evolving the cross-categorical way of knowing moves the adolescent from being the subject of his experience to being the object of his experience.

**Friends and Self-Esteem.** In adolescence, high school students spend an average of twenty-two nonschool hours a week with their peers, approximately twice as much time as with adults (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1984). Despite the importance of peers in an adolescent’s life, the amount of time spent with peers is influenced by how parents respond to the child’s developmental changes. The adolescent frequently responds to strict, authoritarian behavior from parents by turning to peers for support and behavioral guidance. Authoritative parents accept their child’s growing up, continue to include her in family decision making, support her self-expression, and monitor her behavior (ask her to call when she will be late coming in at night). As a consequence, adolescents of authoritative parents become competent in school and are less likely to cause trouble. Their friends also enjoy the indirect benefits of improved school performance and behavior (Steinberg and Darling, 1994).

For adolescents, friendship goes beyond reciprocal action and is viewed within the context of a long-term series of interactions. Conflict is seen as a natural occurrence within this relationship. The adolescent also realizes that
working through and resolving a conflict usually strengthens a relationship if the conflict is constructively managed.

Although the extent to which friends may negatively influence the adolescent appears to be exaggerated, friends have considerable influence because of the need for social approval. Praise from friends rewards specific behaviors and makes it likely they will occur again. Friends seek to be like their friends for two reasons: (1) friends have characteristics the individual wishes to have (intrinsic motivation), and (2) the individual judges her own competence by comparing her performance with that of classmates (social comparison). Prosocial and responsible classroom behavior has been related directly to classroom grades and test scores even when the effects of academic behavior, teacher preference among students, IQ, family structure, sex, ethnicity, and days absent from school were taken into account (Wentzel, 1993).

Loyalty and intimacy are valued and expected in adolescent friendships; the self-disclosing conversations that occur between close friends, especially among girls, help teenagers shape their identity. However, by the late teen years, the adolescent is capable of tolerating friends with different likes, dislikes, values, and beliefs. Selman’s Levels 3 and 4 illustrate this change. (See Table 16.2). Boys between the ages of fourteen and sixteen usually form relationships with a group, and it helps them assert their independence from authority figures. For boys, validation of worth occurs through action rather than personal disclosure between friends. Like attachment in infancy, adolescent boys and girls use friends to make sense of ambiguous or anxiety-provoking situations. Among both boys and girls in some countries, a clique (a peer group of adolescents small enough to allow regular interaction) becomes part of the social environment.

**Friendship and Cooperation.** Conformity to peer pressure increases between ages nine and fifteen but decreases thereafter. It is likely that middle adolescence is when conventional standards of behavior are least followed. On the whole, adolescents are perceived to engage in high levels of behavior that poses risks to their health, safety, and well-being. However, antisocial behavior is more common among boys than girls and is much higher when peer groups are organized around competition, as with gangs. Contrary to common belief, adolescents are no more likely than other age groups to feel invulnerable (Quadrel, Fischoff, and Davis, 1993). Sensation seeking, or the need for novel experiences, has also been found wanting as a viable hypothesis for this behavior. At present, there exists no generally accepted explanation for risk-taking behavior in adolescence.

Students often establish borders between their group and other groups during early adolescence. Students of other races are frequently seen as possessing different values and orientations. Teachers and other adults too often fail to pay attention to the effect of peer group dynamics in forming students’ attitudes
about others. This may be due, in part, to the fact that adolescents are likely to keep their activities unobserved by parents and other adults in authority.

**Perspective Taking.** Erikson’s model of the identity crisis of adolescence fits well with Piaget’s ideas of formal operational thought as well as empirical studies exploring the development of self-understanding in adolescents. Adolescents’ thinking about themselves grows more abstract and self-reflective. They also work to integrate their past selves with the self they hope to achieve in the future (Selman, 1980).

Younger adolescents (approximately nine to fifteen) develop friendships for intimacy and support. Because the adolescent at this age is capable of stepping outside the interaction and taking the perspective of a third party, friendships survive run-of-the-mill conflict. However, adolescent relationships at this age are frequently tinged with possessiveness and jealousy.

Although still recognizing the need for the support and sense of identity provided by friends, older adolescents (approximately age twelve to adulthood) are capable of accepting their friends’ needs to have other relationships as well. They are able to view events from the perspective of the law, morality, and society as a whole.

**The Role of Conflict**

The adolescent is able to see parties in a conflict from a generalized third-person perspective, that is, to step outside the conflict as a neutral third person and simultaneously consider both his own perspective and the other’s. He can view the conflict interaction from the vantage point of the disinterested average spectator.

Conflict in adolescence occurs more frequently with parents than siblings or peers—presumably because individual autonomy has become the developmental issue at this age. The most common conflict issues between parents and adolescents are authority, autonomy, and responsibility (Smetana, 1989). Adolescents report an average of seven disagreements daily (Collins and Laursen, 1992). However, the parent’s response to differences of opinion with the adolescent can help the young person’s developing sense of identity, ego formation, and social-cognitive skills. The most helpful parental response takes the form of a supportive but challenging discussion about the issue. Adolescents from families that openly and constructively express their conflict are significantly better able to resolve conflict with their peers than those whose parents cut off disagreement unilaterally. As at younger ages, conflict in adolescence is likely to occur in close relationships. Conflict with same-sex friends declines in later adolescence but increases with romantic partners.

**Naïve Conflict Resolution Strategies.** Without specific skills development in conflict resolution, the resolution strategies the adolescent uses with friends commonly involve submission (one person gives in to the other’s demands),
compromise (both parties make concessions), third-party intervention (parties accept a resolution suggested by an uninvolved person), standoff (parties change the topic or divert their attention to a different activity), and withdrawal (one person refuses to continue the conflict exchange). More than 50 percent of adolescent conflicts are resolved by standoff or withdrawal. Unilateral power assertion is used more frequently than negotiation, which is the least used method of resolution (Vuchinich, 1990).

The San Francisco Community Board Program. An example of a conflict resolution program that is responsive to adolescent developmental needs is the curriculum prepared by the San Francisco Community Board (Sadalla, Henriquez, and Holmberg, 1987). The Community Board Program (CBP) develops problem-solving skills, such as negotiation, in students who normally would avoid conflict and those who become aggressive to get what they want in a conflict situation. Like ECSEL, the CBP works to ensure development of age-appropriate skills; it takes both natural physical development as well as effective nurturing to create children who become emotionally and academically proficient.

Unlike programs like ECSEL for young children, the CBP must take into account students who have well-established negative patterns of conflict resolution. Unlearning old habits can be a long and difficult process, particularly once a student gains a reputation for a particular behavior or characteristics. (Peers make it difficult for a student to change a negative reputation even as early as the middle school years.) The CBP also builds on the adolescent’s greater capacity for dealing with complex cognitive issues, greater independence from parental constraint, and a growing sense of evolving self that is largely absent in the preschooler and underdeveloped in the preadolescent.

Adulthood

When adults spent their time in taking care of basic family needs, adulthood was seen as a static state with no systematic changes until old age. With the Malthusian explosion of modern conveniences and time savers, adults now have the time and opportunity for exploring their own growth potential. This change has meant that researchers are beginning to investigate the “stages” or levels of adulthood. For example, Bernice Neugarten (1973) focuses on the “three” times which, interacting simultaneously, are important influences in adult development: the biological time table (for example, gray hair, menopause, reduced activity); social time (go to school, raise a family, retire); and historic time (war, recession, resurgence of religion). In a study of men’s (1978) and women’s (1996) lives, Daniel Levinson divided the life span into three eras: early, middle, and late adulthood. Transitionary periods lasting for some years divide the life eras. Roughly, these transitions occur around age 30, early 40s, 50s, and so
on. These transitions can be difficult or smooth; however, one's life commitments often change from the beginning and end of such periods. Stable periods lead to enriched work and family choices; transition periods result in a reappraisal of work and family, leading to changes in the following stable period.

Kegan does not consider the fourth and fifth orders of consciousness to reflect greater maturity than the third order, but he believes that the latter is simply inadequate in meeting the social demands of American middle class adulthood in the twenty-first century. (Note that Table 16.3 reflects the cognitive area of consciousness.) Modern culture requires a well-defined fourth-order transformation of consciousness in the cognitive, affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal realms. Because support systems such as tradition, local culture, and religion are often lacking, an adaptive individual must develop a highly focused sense of self to connect the interiority of consciousness with the challenges of the external world. As Kegan says, "I would put it this way: the mental burden of modern life may be nothing less than the extraordinary cultural demand that each person, in adulthood, creates internally, an order of consciousness comparable to that which ordinarily would be found only at the level of a community's collective intelligence" (1994, p. 134).

Each constructivist cycle becomes a part of an alternating rhythm between self-assertiveness and the inclusion of the self within enduring social relationships, institutions, and normative ideologies. For example, the second-order sense of self-possession changes to the commitment and relationship of cross-categorical consciousness. The fourth order turns back toward self-possessiveness with the identification of a distinctive self, yet that self is contextualized within the roles and social commitments that resulted from the third-order consciousness.

Kegan’s work provides a road map to assist adults in making the required transitions to respond to modern society. According to Kegan, today’s parents are expected to take charge of the family, to institute a vision that will serve the family, to promote the development of the children, and to develop an overall set of values by which the family functions. These tasks require parents to operate within a fourth order of consciousness. He provides the example of a woman’s young daughter asking her mother whether she has had intimate relationships since her divorce. The mother’s third-order consciousness would provoke guilt if she lied and said, “No.” A fourth-order consciousness would emphasize the ability of the mother to place her child’s best interests in the forefront of her decision making. In this case, a higher-order value system would dictate that the mother keep burdensome information from her child. In this way, the mother has strengthened her family through her leadership role and autonomous decision making.

The highlighting of the autonomous self in Kegan’s work may be criticized as a bias toward male development. He replies that both the desire for autonomy
and (as elaborated by many gender studies concerning women’s ways of knowing) connectedness are inherent in both the third- and the fourth-order consciousness. Autonomy is not meant to be defined as separateness. Kegan views autonomy and connectedness as stylistic differences in the fourth order of consciousness: autonomy emerges through committed relationship, which requires individualization of role identity to remain vital.

Fifth-order consciousness, postmodernism, may be illustrated in the differences between two couples. The fourth-order couple respects each other as complicated persons who make important and different contributions, often complementary, to the relationship. They look at each other’s “culture” to discover and honor the terms by which the other is creating meaning and value.

Conversely, the fifth-order couple sets aside any belief that the source of their closeness resides in the cooperation of psychologically whole and distinct selves. They are suspicious of any tendency to feel identified with one side of any opposite and to identify the other with the other side of that opposite. The fifth-order couple refuses to see themselves sharing a single system or form. Their relationship allows them to interact in ways that celebrate their “multipleness” and the fact that many forms of each self are encouraged to emerge.

The Role of Conflict

Kegan’s view of the role of conflict may best be illustrated through the ways in which the fourth- and fifth-order couples approach conflict. The fourth-order couple views conflicting parties as each being whole and distinct. They promote the willingness and ability of each party to understand and respect the position of the other. The transformation of the relationship really involves the transformation of attitudes that each party holds concerning the other person’s ability to respect his or her position, not the positions themselves. The changes that are brought about involve greater understanding of both positions by both parties, altered attitudes about the other’s understanding of one’s own position, and new possibilities in different problem-solving approaches. This represents integrated negotiation as it is usually practiced. The fifth-order couple would seek to use conflict to transform one’s own attitudes and positions and one’s need to “win.” There is a mutual suspicion that one’s own and the other’s integrity is also ideology, which translates to partiality. The post-modern approach to conflict suggests that the protracted nature of conflict means that it may be important that the other side remains in the conflict. One or both of the conflicting parties has most likely revealed a partial position. The conflict reveals the incompleteness of the parties who have the conflict in order to recover their true complexity.

Simply put, the postmodern view of conflict would have disputants (1) consider the protracted conflict as a sign that one or both parties have become identified with the polar ends of the issue; (2) reflect that the disputing relationship is not due to opposing views but an expression of incompleteness; (3) view the
relationship, as cantankerous as it may be, as an opportunity to reveal your multiplicity; and (4) concentrate on ways to let the conflicting relationship “transform” the parties rather than focusing on resolution of the conflict. Resolving conflicts through transforming the conflicting parties is difficult because postmodern conflict resolution requires people to organize experience at a level beyond the fourth order, something few people can do (Argyris, 1993). This approach requires a trans-systemic or cross-theoretical epistemological organization.

**CONCLUSION**

The theory and practice of conflict resolution is a young but active field. New developments occur as we establish rigor and discipline in our approaches to this area. It is encouraging that we now have a fully evaluated program available for preschoolers, a group previously ignored or given only cursory service. As many theorists and practitioners have said, it is extremely important that conflict resolution skills be taught as early as possible. Early skills become old habits; we need to teach very young children good habits, ones that help them develop fulfilling lives. Instruction does not stop with preschoolers, though; it must be continued to help children resolve the problems and levels of complexity that occur with developmental advancement.

There are several directions for research to improve our practice. One involves investigating the effects of conflict-resolution skills development in children from preschool to older adulthood. We need to quantify the amount of training that is necessary for most effective skills development. Second, we need to explore how personal traits and characteristics affect our methods of instruction and training. Does one approach work for all? Obviously not, since some children lack assertiveness and require a great amount of work in this area, while others have impulsive or self-control issues that may increase their level of aggression in a conflict situation. Research investigating the adult’s ability to achieve a “transformation” of self in the sense of fifth-order conscious would be immensely valuable given the protracted conflicts we face in this new century. Finally, we need to be policy minded and work hard to influence society’s decision makers. Development in conflict resolution and social-emotional learning skills is so critical to the education of our children that we must actively support infusion of this instruction throughout each child’s educational experience, both in school and at home.

**Note**

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References


PART FOUR

CREATIVITY

AND CHANGE
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Creativity and Conflict Resolution

*The Role of Point of View*

Howard E. Gruber

First conundrum: educators often view conflict as the problem child, the practitioner’s task as elimination of conflict. On the other hand, students of creativity often view conflict as its necessary companion: (1) novelty engenders conflict and/or (2) creativity requires conflict.

Second conundrum: conflict resolution requires collaboration, if not as the goal then at least as the means. Creative work has been treated, by and large, as an individual effort, sometimes painfully isolated.

As an undergraduate at Brooklyn College, I learned from Solomon Asch, my teacher, about two interesting lines of research: his work on group pressures and his work with Witkin on frames of reference. Both of these bear on the issue of point of view, which is the major focus of this chapter. It has become clear to me, as to others, that an essential and almost omnipresent aspect of creative work is posing good questions. In studying Darwin’s notebooks and correspondence (Gruber, 1981) one sees that he gloried in discovering questions. He wrote many letters to scientists and naturalists around
the world, posing challenging questions. His contemporaries were often mystified: Where did his questions come from? As a student, I adopted the position that having a novel point of view is the main thing. After all, among the contemporaries in question, then as now, were many good problem solvers—but where do their problems come from? Novel problems stem from a novel point of view. Then the central question becomes: How is a novel point of view constructed?

In his 1996 book, *Human Judgment and Social Policy*, Kenneth Hammond distinguishes between theories of truth, which center on the correspondence of ideas with facts, and theories that look inward for coherence of ideas with other ideas. The latter, coherence theories, do not offer definite procedures for making judgments and consequently must rely on wisdom and intuition. Correspondence theories do so provide, but in a world teeming with uncertainties there is a triple price to be paid—which Hammond (1996) sums up beautifully in the subtitle of his book: *Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice*. In both existing and historically experienced circumstances, this view casts a pretty dark shadow. My chosen topic, however, is not judgment but its necessary prelude, discovering or inventing the alternatives to be judged and among which to choose. Here, what is needed is not so much accuracy or logic but creative imagination and construction.

In this chapter, I give a brief account of the evolving systems approach to creative work, with special emphasis on point of view and social aspects of creativity. In addition, I explore some possible relations between creativity and conflict resolution, presenting experimental work with a "shadow box" designed to illuminate collaborative synthesis of disparate points of view.

**Evolving Systems Approach**

This approach is predicated on the uniqueness of each creative person as he or she moves through a series of commitments, problems, solutions, and transformations. These aspects of the creative process are not fixed, and they are not universal. Rather, they constantly evolve, and they differ from one creator to another. The system as a whole is composed of subsystems that are loosely coupled with each other. This looseness provokes the emergence of disequilibrium and the finding of new questions; consequently, it opens the way to unpredictable innovation.

Our task is to describe how a given creator actually works. It is not our task to measure the amount of creativity or to find factors that apply in the same way to all creators. What is necessary for one creative person confronting a problem may be unnecessary or even ill-advised for another.
The creative individual described here, interested in creativity in the moral domain, is only a first approximation. People who take responsibility want to make something happen. For this, they need allies, who must be persuaded, recruited, trained, and supported. Moreover, a full expression of morality would bring together moral thought, moral feeling, and moral action. Beyond these components, there must be creative integration. Although this last is rarely discussed, Donna Chirico has made an interesting effort in her integrative article, “Where Is the Wisdom? The Challenge of Moral Creativity at the Millennium” (forthcoming). And of course, Erich Fromm’s whole oeuvre is a reflection on such a synthesis. (See Fromm, 1962, for example.)

In her case study of Niebuhr, Chirico shows how the quest for integration of thought, feeling, and action can lead to surprising results, can even go astray. She shows how Niebuhr achieved such an integration, but at a price. As he grew in influence, he gained new opportunities to move to the plane of moral action. But this brought him into collaborative interaction with a largely conservative establishment. In a series of such contacts, he became more conservative. Chirico (forthcoming) writes, “As Niebuhr became involved increasingly in the political power structure as an insider, his radical views about the role of government shifted toward those of the authority figures he had previously denounced. Niebuhr moved from speaking as an independent thinker, whose ideology was informed by the Christian message, to acting as an advocate for the prevailing opinions of the United States government.”

Chirico stresses the difficulty, the need for the hard and steady work required, if we want to contribute to social transformation. She writes, “In a postmodern world where all is relative anyway, it is easier to accept inequity in the guise of personal or cultural differences than to take a moral stand... without moral creativity there can be no attempt. This involves self-sacrifice so that a community of concerned selves can come together and provoke change. It starts with taking a moral stand.”

Each creative case presents different aspects for study. These evolving opportunities may be grouped under three major headings: knowledge, purpose, and affect. All of them apply in the first instance to the creative individual at work. In addition, there are aspects that apply to the creator as a social being: social origins and development; relations with colleagues, mentorships, and so on.

Since each creative person is unique, if collaboration is needed it must be collaboration among people who differ (in style, background, ability profile, and the like). Collaboration and similar relationships may take many forms: working together on a shared project where both members of a pair do work that is essentially the same (as Picasso and Braque did in inventing cubism); working together in a teamlike setting where participants complement each other (as in the production of a film, an opera, or a ballet); and sharing ideas either face-to-face or in written correspondence (as Vincent van Gogh and his brother, Theo,
did through the medium of thousands of letters mostly about Vincent’s actual work, his plans for future work, and his sensuous experiences).

**Networks of Enterprise**

It is well established that creative work evolves over long periods of time. Some writers even speak of the ten-year rule. Whether this duration is two years or twenty or simply highly variable, it is certainly a far cry from the millisecond flashes vaunted by the devotees of sudden insight and mysterious intuition as the essence of creative effort.

If creative work takes so long, we must have an approach to motivation that recognizes the time it takes. I have found that one important aspect of creative work is the way each creator organizes a life so that diverse projects do not become obstacles to each other. I use the term *enterprise* to make room for the typical situation in which a person who completes one project does not abandon the line of work it entailed but picks up another that is part of the same set of concerns. I use the term *network* to accommodate the finding that creators are often simultaneously involved in several projects and enterprises linked to each other in complex ways.

**Time and Irreality.** One of the most persistent myths about creative work is the allegation that novelty comes about through lightninglike flashes of insight. On the contrary, serious studies reveal accounts in which the time taken is on the order of years and decades. Even when a moment of sudden transformation occurs, it is the hard-won result of a long developmental process.

Engagement and commitment for such long periods of steady work require appropriate organization of the task space. One the one hand, the creator must fashion a network of enterprise that can withstand the challenges of distraction, fatigue, and failure. On the other hand, one of the chief instruments of creative persistence is a well-developed fantasy life: what cannot be done (yet) on the plane of reality is attainable in the world of dreams, fantasy, half-baked notebooks (Darwin) and private discussions (Einstein). Play becomes the midwife of creative change.

**Play Ethic.** We teach and preach the work ethic, but from time to time the play ethic rears its head, especially among creators. But there is no inescapable conflict between work and play. There is fusion of work and play as well, as transformation of activity from playlike to worklike and vice versa, in an endless cycle.

Once we take account of this constructive, collective, perdurably patient character of creative work, it follows that some of the miasmal mystery surrounding thought about creativity can evaporate. To work together, people must communicate. For this they must share a common language, which sometimes
means that one must teach others the language to be shared. A striking example of this process is how the physicist Freeman Dyson deliberately set about working with Richard Feynman, bent on learning to understand “Feynman diagrams” so that he could teach the wider community of physicists to do likewise. (See Schweber, 1994.)

Extraordinary Moral Responsibility and Creativity in the Moral Domain

These are closely linked ideas. For the most part, research on moral development has been limited to the plane of judgment. When all that is required of the subject is to make a moral judgment, he or she is free to choose any position, from the mundane to the fanciful, from the craven to the courageous. But if morally guided conduct must follow from judgment, many if not most subjects disappear into the cracks. Indeed, these judgmental interstices are seen as normal and necessary for maintaining an orderly society. “Who will bell the cat?” is experienced as a threatening question.

The expression:

\[ \text{Ought} \rightarrow \text{Can} \rightarrow \text{Create} \]

is shorthand for a somewhat complex idea, to wit, that one “ought” to do some particular thing, or that there “ought to be a law” only makes sense if the predicated “ought” is possible. So “ought” implies “can.” But situations occur in which it is urgent to make the passage from “cannot” to “can” and where this can only be done by discovering and taking some new, unexplored path. This is when creative work becomes the moral imperative.

THE SHADOW BOX EXPERIMENTS

In Plato’s parable of the cave, the prisoners are chained to a single station and see nothing but shadows on the wall. They have no way of distancing or decentering themselves from this one limited view of the world. Limited and distorted as it may be, it is their reality. Plato’s point is that this is the normal situation of ordinary mortals, leaving them vulnerable to the distortions of group pressure. Sherif’s work on the formation of social norms and Asch’s work on group pressures have important points in common with the prisoners in Plato’s cave. The subjects in the experiments of both researchers are all looking at the scene to be judged in essentially the same way and from the same point of view. Thus, a difference in reports of what is seen must mean a disagreement. There is no opportunity for dialogue among the observers. The subjects are limited to looking and listening; they have no chance for an active exploratory or manipulative approach. Finally, the situation invites only judgment on a single variable, not the construction of a complex idea or object.
Under such conditions, intersubjective differences become disagreements that can be solved only by yielding, domination, and compromise—all of which occur.

In contrast, it is possible to imagine conditions in which observers have different information about the same reality but no need to disagree with each other. They may even be able to transcend their individual limitations and together arrive at a deeper grasp of the reality in question than would be possible for each alone. Our research grew out of the conviction that people can be vigorously truthful.

We have embodied this possibility in the microcosm of a shadow box. (See Figure 17.1.) In this arrangement, an object concealed in a box casts two differing shadows on two screens at right angles to each other. The subjects’ task is to discover the shape of the hidden object by discussing and synthesizing the two shadows of which each sees only one. Although our main interest was the process of collaboration of subjects with different viewpoints, to study that
we also looked at the performance of single subjects shuttling back and forth between two screens.

Cooperative synthesis of such disparate points of view in the shadow box situation is not a simple matter. Each subject is asked to make an *a priori* assumption that the other participant’s observations represent the same entity. Each participant must convey what he or she sees clearly and correctly to the other. This may require inventing a suitable scheme for representing the information in question. When difficulties of communication arise, the problem of trusting the other must be dealt with. Often, too, the subjects must overcome a common tendency to ignore or underemphasize the other person’s contribution and to center attention on one’s own point of view.

When we compare one person shuttling between two station points with a pair of people, each of whom sees only one screen, sometimes the single person is superior, and sometimes the pair. Over a wide range of situations, the individual perceptual apparatus is admirably organized for synthesizing disparate inputs: binocular vision, the kinetic depth effect, and all sorts of intermodal phenomena testify to the capability. On the other hand, there are at least some situations in which two heads are better than one.

From a practical point of view, the question of one head or two may not always be germane. There are real-world situations in which shuttling back and forth between station points is not feasible, so there must be an observer at each point. In negotiating situations, the number of heads is determined by sociopolitical realities. Going beyond the shadow box, the processes involved in cooperative synthesis of points of view are interesting in their own right.

**Experiment One: Interaction of Social and Cognitive Factors**

The subjects were first shown how the setup worked: two lamps, two screens, and a stalk on which to mount the object. (See Figure 17.1.) They were shown how two shadows could be generated, one on each screen, and it was suggested to them that they could figure out what the object was by talking to each other or drawing pictures (material supplied). We compared subjects working in pairs with subjects working alone. In the pair situation, they were asked not to look at the other person’s screen. The subjects were children (ages seven to nine), adolescents (fourteen to sixteen), and adults (twenty to fifty-three). The pairs were asked to communicate with each other about what they saw, and to work together to come to an agreement as to the shape of the concealed object that would account for the two shadows. Each single subject or each pair of subjects worked on two Lego® objects and two geometrical objects, as shown in Figure 17.2.

The subjects almost invariably found the task challenging and interesting and worked on it for as long as an hour. Among children, the majority failed to solve (correctly synthesize) any of the objects, and among the adolescents and adults there were a few who failed completely.
The main difference between adolescents and adults was that the latter often hit spontaneously on the idea that there might be more than one solution to a problem, sometimes even recognizing the possibility of an unlimited number of solutions. To our surprise, in a number of experiments, there was little difference in problem-solving success between singles and pairs. In only one respect was the pair condition clearly superior to the single: frequency of multiple solutions. This superiority was more pronounced in adult pairs than in adolescents.

**Experiment Two: Comparison of Cooperative and Individualistic Orientations**

Our goal was to examine the effect of social orientations within pairs on the synthesis of points of view. We used three kinds of instruction to the pairs. The cooperative instruction encouraged the pair to work together throughout the
experiment, indicating that their performance would be evaluated as a pair compared with other pairs. The individualistic instruction asked the subjects to exchange information as to their respective shadows and then to work alone in solving the problem, indicating that their performance would be evaluated as individuals. The neutral instruction did not specify any mode of working together and did not mention evaluation. The subjects were twenty-four pairs of adolescents (ages fourteen to sixteen) and twenty-four pairs of adults (twenty-three to fifty-eight). There were no consistent or striking differences between the sexes, so that variable is ignored in this discussion.

Each pair was given a single problem, a tetrahedron fixed on an edge in such a position that each subject saw a triangular shadow, one with apex up, the other with apex down (see Figure 17.1). We chose this rather difficult task to avoid the possibility that most subjects would solve the problem easily and to keep the subjects working long enough for us to make the observations we were interested in.

The resulting patterns of social behavior could be classified as individualistic, cooperative, or competitive. Subjects by no means followed the instructions we gave them. Surprisingly, among the adults the predominant behavior was cooperative, even when the instructions were neutral. Furthermore, even in the group given individualistic instructions, almost half the subjects were cooperative. It seemed as though the structure of the shadow box situation, presenting two perspectives bearing on a single object, naturally evoked cooperation as the appropriate response mode.

Most of the successful adult pairs were ones in which both members were cooperative. Moreover, in six of eight such pairs, the partners had different problem-solving strategies, one working mainly by adding planes and the other by constructing volumes. In exchanging information, the adults were more precise and detailed than the adolescents, giving information not only about shape but also about orientation, size, and position on the screen. The adults gave equal weight to both shadows, while the adolescents tended to focus on their own viewpoint. Adults were attentive to their partner’s suggestion, and they duly profited from their differences by improving the quality of their solutions and their comprehension of the tasks. The adolescents were less interested in the other’s ideas. They were also more concerned about whose solution was correct, as if only one were possible.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF POINT OF VIEW**

The importance of point of view emerges explicitly in many settings: Plato’s cave, the anthropologist’s relativism (which need not be despairingly total), postmodern nihilism, and so forth. Under conditions in which subjects are not
able to explore and communicate freely, intersubjective differences become disagreements that are difficult to resolve. Techniques of conflict resolution that are successful under some conditions may lead only to fiasco in other circumstances, such as change in scale or change of mood. For example, sharing the commons requires civility and negotiation, and such conditions may sometimes be unattainable.

From our work with the shadow box, it becomes clear experimentally that under certain conditions taking the point of view of the other (POVO) is essential for collaborative work and that some problems absolutely require the synthesis of disparate points of view (POVOSYN). But such synthesis, like all creative work, is a delicate plant and may fail if conditions change.

The classic studies of conformity by Sherif (1936) and by Asch (1952) stemmed from rather different perspectives about the truth value of beliefs. Sherif thought that the development of social norms could be readily studied in a highly ambiguous stimulus situation, notably the autokinetic effect, and that this ambiguity corresponds well to real-world conditions. Asch objected to this image of human nature as passively yielding to group pressures; he believed that if confronted with clearly discriminable and unambiguous stimuli, observers would resist conformity.

Does the epistemology of the shadow box, especially recognizing multiple solutions, mean that anything goes, that we are no further than when we started in our quest for paths to truth? I think not. Even though there are multiple solutions, at least some are always excluded. The existence of multiple solutions does not open the way to unregulated relativism. To take only one example, a stationary cube can cast a variety of shadows, depending on its orientation, but it can never cast a circular shadow. By the same token, a stationary sphere can never cast a square shadow.

The importance of point of view is concisely expressed in a remark often attributed to Isaac Newton: “If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” (reported by Catherine Drinker Bowen in Merton, 1985). Merton’s book-length exploration of this aphorism is a pleasure to read. When all is said and done, a stationary sphere can never cast a square shadow.

The References


In his stimulating essay on creativity and conflict resolution in Chapter Seventeen, Howard Gruber raises a number of important questions, which we discuss briefly before presenting some guidelines to creative conflict resolution.

CREATIVITY RESULTING FROM CONFLICT

The first question is If “creativity requires conflict,” under what conditions of conflict is creativity likely to emerge?

One of the creative functions of conflict resides in its ability to arouse motivation to solve a problem that might otherwise go unattended. A scholar who exposes his theories and research to the scrutiny of his peers may be stimulated to a deeper analysis if a colleague confronts him with conflicting data and theoretical analysis. Similarly, individuals and groups who have authority and power and who are satisfied with the status quo may be aroused to recognize problems and be motivated to work on them, as opposition from the dissatisfied makes the customary relations and arrangements unworkable and unrewarding, or as they are helped to perceive the possibility of more satisfying relations and arrangements. Accepting the necessity for change in the status quo (rather than rigid, defensive adherence to previously existing positions) is most likely, however, when the circumstances arousing new motivation suggest
courses of action that pose minimal threat to the social or self-esteem of those
who must change.

Thus, although acute dissatisfaction with things as they are and motivation to
recognize and work at problems are necessary for creative solutions, these
things are not sufficient. The circumstances conducive to creatively breaking
through impasses are varied, but they have in common that “they provide the
individual with an environment in which he does not feel threatened and in
which he does not feel under pressure. He is relaxed but alert” (Stein, 1968).
Threat induces defensiveness and reduces both tolerance of ambiguity and
openness to the new and unfamiliar; excessive tension leads to primitization
and stereotyping of thought processes. As Rokeach (1960) has pointed out,
threat and excessive tension lead to the closed rather than open mind. To enter-
tain novel ideas that may at first seem wild and implausible, to question initial
assumptions of the framework within which the problem or conflict occurs, the
individual needs the freedom or courage to express herself without fear of cen-
sure. Much research (see, for example, Carnevale and Probst, 1998, and Chap-
ter Three of this volume) has demonstrated that a competitive, as opposed to
cooperative, approach to conflict leads to restricted judgment, reduced com-
plexity, inability to consider alternative perspectives, and less creative problem
solving.

**NOVEL POINT OF VIEW**

The second question is: How is a novel point of view developed and
constructed?

Gruber rightly stresses the importance to creativity of a novel point of view
that stimulates new questions. Throughout this handbook, there is stress on the
fact that a novel perspective regarding conflict is to view it as a mutual prob-
lem the conflicting parties can work on together, cooperatively, in an attempt
to discover mutually satisfactory solutions. As Chapter One emphasizes, refram-
ing the conflict so that the conflicting parties see themselves as being in a col-
laborative rather than oppositional relation with regard to resolving their conflict
is crucial to creative resolution. It not only produces an atmosphere conducive
to creativity, but vastly expands the range of potential solutions as well.

Although reframing makes a conflict more amenable to a solution, the ability
to reformulate the reframed mutual problem so that, in turn, one can find a
solution to it depends on the availability of cognitive resources. Ideas are impor-
tant to creative resolution of conflict, and any factors that broaden the range of
ideas and alternatives available to the participants in a conflict are useful. Intelli-
gence, exposure to diverse experiences, interest in ideas, preference for the
novel and complex, receptivity to metaphors and analogies, the capacity to
make remote associations, independence of judgment, and the ability to play with ideas are some of the personal factors that characterize creative problem solvers. The availability of ideas also depends on such social conditions as the opportunity to communicate with and be exposed to other people who may have relevant and unfamiliar ideas (such as experts, impartial outsiders, people facing similar or analogous situations); a social atmosphere that values innovation and originality and encourages exchanging ideas; and a social tradition that fosters the optimistic view that, with effort and time, constructive solutions to problems that initially seem intractable can be discovered or invented.

**TIME AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

The third question is, do creative solutions emerge only after extensive time and effort are focused on the problem, or are there conflicts that permit solution in a relatively short time?

Gruber is surely correct to emphasize that such profound, intellectual problems as those addressed by Darwin and Einstein require extended time and effort. Similarly, one can assume that such complex conflicts as those in the Middle East and the Balkans—or in an embittered dysfunctional family—also involve prolonged creative effort. But not all problems are profound, and not all conflicts are deeply enmeshed in difficult personal, social, economic, and political conditions.

**PLAY AND CREATIVITY**

Fourth, why is play the midwife of creative change?

Almost all students of creativity emphasize the importance of playfulness to the creative process. As Gruber points out, the play ethic permits one to engage in fantasy and to consider fantastic and unreal ideas, which sometimes can be transformed into workable solutions. It also permits fun, humor, and relaxation of internal censors that inhibit expression of challenging, unconventional, far-out ideas. Families, groups, and organizations as well as individuals who have the play ethic are apt to discover novel solutions to the problems and conflicts they experience.

**INDIVIDUAL WORK AND COLLABORATION**

Fifth, what are the differences between creative individual work and creative collaboration?
Gruber’s fascinating experiments bring this question sharply into focus. From his research, as well as that of others, it is evident that an individual is not at a disadvantage, compared to a collaborating pair of people, if she has access to the different perspectives (which are available within the pair) necessary to constructing an appropriate integrated picture of the reality with which she is dealing. However, the individual could reasonably assume that, if she is limited to her own perspective, it would be much more difficult or perhaps impossible to do so. On the other hand, a pair of subjects, each with his or her own perspective concerning the reality being perceived (but with sufficient information between them), is also able to construct a valid picture of the reality if they are cooperative. In fact, they are able to generate more such pictures than the individual problem solver is.

One can generalize by stating that collaborative (as compared to individual) problem solving—when the collaboration is effectively cooperative—usually provides more resources, more diversity in ideas, and more social support for the work involved in creative problem solving. On the other hand, individual as compared to collaborative work does not require the skills and attitudes involved in effective cooperation, which include communication, perspective taking, trust, empathy, control of egocentricity, and the like. (See Chapter One for fuller discussion of the skills and attitudes involved in effective cooperation.) Thus, individual work is apt to be more creative if it is difficult to establish effective cooperation, while collaborative work is apt to be so if there is effective cooperation and the collaborators have more resources available to them than are available to an individual.

**The Egg Drop Exercise**

As Gruber and we have emphasized, constructive resolution of conflict often requires that the disputants be able to see old things in new ways. Here we describe an innovative training experience, developed by Kenneth Sole, for exploring conflict and creativity under conditions of cooperation and competition. We also outline several guidelines for conflict resolvers for use in facilitating a creative process in conflict situations.

This is an exercise in intragroup creative problem solving conducted under conditions of intragroup and intergroup competition and conflict. The participants are put into teams of five to ten individuals and informed of the task. A coat hanger has been hung from the ceiling, and one dozen raw eggs are suspended from it by strands of cotton thread. A ladder leads to the structure. The teams are then instructed that the objective of the activity is to be the first team to build a freestanding “apparatus” that successfully catches and holds a falling raw egg, unbroken, six inches above the floor.

Each team is furnished with an identical kit of “stuff” (string, tape, cupcakes, instant soup, hairpins, and so on), and instructed to build an apparatus to catch
the egg of their choice. The eggs are each numbered sequentially. The teams are informed that they may use only the materials in their kit to build the apparatus.

In addition, each team is asked to select a member of their group to sit on a panel of judges. They are instructed not to consult with any of their prior team members regarding the creative process. In addition to the rules provided, the judges may decide (unilaterally) to impose additional rules for the teams to follow. These rules are delivered to the teams via formal proclamation.

When the judges begin the competition, each team member suits up in garbage bags and rubber gloves and then begins work on designing the apparatus. As soon as a team is ready, one member is required to call “Ready.” At that time they must announce (within fifteen seconds) the number of the egg they wish to catch. From the time the team declares the egg they plan to catch, they have three minutes to position their apparatus for catching the egg. By the end of the three-minute period, one of the team members must cut the thread that holds the chosen egg. Each team is limited to two egg attempts per apparatus.

No member of a team may touch any egg, suspension threads, or hanging structure at any time. A judge noticing violation of any of these rules imposes the penalty of confiscation. The other team(s) confiscate one item from the kit of the offending team. Teams have thirty seconds to select the item they wish to confiscate. If a team member informs the judges (or a judge) of violations, the penalty is doubled. Decisions of the judges are final.

This exercise gives participants a rich (and ridiculous) opportunity to explore creative problem solving under conditions of competition and conflict. The experience can be particularly useful for intact workgroups or for other groups experiencing conflict, because it allows exploration of conflict dynamics under relatively benign circumstances. During the exercise, conflicts typically emerge between the teams, between the panel of judges and the teams, and within a team between individuals with differing ideas and styles of problem solving. All of these conflicts have implications for the creative problem-solving process.

General Guidelines for Creativity and Conflict

The discussions that follow the exercise can cover many of the themes outlined in the guidelines we offer here. The ideas and processes summarized here have been informed by the work of many scholars and practitioners, among them Howard Gruber, Kenneth Sole, John Cleese, Donald Treffinger, Scott Isaksen, Brian Dorval, and Peter Carnevale.

Challenge the Myths about Creativity. Treffinger, Isaksen, and Dorval (1994) identified four common myths that many people hold about creativity:

1. “I’m not a creative person.” (Creativity is a rare and special quality possessed by only a few.)
2. “Creativity is too mysterious to be taught.” (Creativity is a supernatural and uncontrollable phenomenon.)

3. “Creativity equals arts.” (Creativity exists only in relation to artistic endeavors.)

4. “Creativity is madness.” (Creativity is associated with eccentricity and insanity.)

The egg drop exercise often puts people face-to-face with these and other assumptions that they hold about the creative process and their own capacity to be creative. These myths negatively influence people’s approach to problem solving under many conditions, but particularly under conditions of perceived threat that are associated with many conflict situations. Training should support people in exploring these assumptions and in broadening their understanding of the creative process to include how they solve conflicts and other problems in their lives.

Use Time and Space Arrangements to Create an Oasis for Creative Problem Solving. John Cleese, who first found fame in Monty Python’s Flying Circus and has been a consultant to many organizations on creativity, coined the term time-space oasis to depict a situation where the most basic conditions are met for functioning creatively (Cleese, 1991). The condition of time has two dimensions, length and endurance. People must have a sufficient amount of time to open up and see things flexibly and creatively, particularly if working in a conflict situation where they are operating primarily in a critical mode. Thus, the competition to be the first to complete the egg drop apparatus reduces the group’s time and usually stresses their ability to innovate. Once in a creative mode, disputants need ample time to create, but not so much time that they tire and become discouraged. Cleese recommends ninety minutes as a good amount of time for a working session (thirty minutes to open up and sixty minutes to work constructively).

The other component of time is the need for disputants to persist and endure, even after a marginally acceptable solution presents itself. Research has shown that humans tend to be poor decision makers because they often choose the first acceptable solution to a problem that emerges, even if it is far from being the best that could be developed. Truly creative solutions are usually discovered only after persisting in exploring the problem and its potential solutions. Prolonged and deep engagement with a problem can lead not only to a high level of innovation but also to deep and enduring satisfaction among the disputants with the agreement they produce.

The second dimension of the time-space oasis is having access to a different space. It is often useful for disputants to remove themselves from their customary environments to be able to think afresh. The many demands and
distractions of one’s usual environment, whether related to the conflict or not, draw one back into habitual or standard ways of seeing a problem and responding to it. A new environment (particularly a confidential one) can allow disputants some degree of freedom to try out new perspectives, behaviors, or ways of working with a problem. This is a primary reason that exercises such as the egg drop, which are removed from actual work or conflict settings, can be useful in helping disputants explore relational or conflict dynamics.

**Develop a Serious but Playful Atmosphere.** As Howard Gruber indicated, playfulness is often central to a creative process. Humor, play, and a sense of fun can all contribute to releasing tension and opening up one’s view of things, ultimately leading to development of a novel point of view. The egg drop exercise captures this relationship between play and a new perspective. The rules of the exercise are always presented in the most formal of manners, but the task, the uniforms, and the objects involved belie this formality and communicate a high degree of silliness. This climate is experienced by the participants as especially conducive to experimenting, making mistakes, and attempting the uncommon or ridiculous.

But humor, playfulness, and fun are tricky endeavors when working with difficult conflicts. Particularly in escalated conflicts, disputants often approach their problems grimly. Having a conflict resolver introduce humor or play could easily offend or enrage in these situations. If introduced, it must be done with sensitivity and artistry. To establish a climate that allows for humor or play, Cleese (1991) recommends that we separate the idea of seriousness from that of solemnity. He claims that it is rarely useful to be solemn, and that serious topics can often be approached with a touch of humor. Conflict-resolving practitioners could greatly benefit from training to develop the social skills useful in creating a serious but playful problem-solving atmosphere.

**Foster “Optimal” Tension.** Tension is the primary link between conflict and creativity. Conflict signals dissatisfaction with something or someone. This dissatisfaction brings tension into the system. If standard approaches to reducing tension are ineffective, it increases. This increase can eventually motivate people to seek new means of reducing the tension (or to keep hammering away with the old means), which can lead to adaptation or innovation and eventual reduction in tension. However, too much tension in a system can impair people’s capacity to think creatively to envision a new approach.

The egg drop exercise introduces many sources of tension. The intergroup competition over winning, the limited and obscure resources that the teams are asked to work with, the constant evaluation of the judges, and even the request that the members wear trash bags and rubber gloves all increase tension. The tension works to engage the participants, but it also adversely affects their
ability to think creatively, even if there is only minimal intergroup competition. Optimal tension, therefore, is a state in which there is not too little tension regarding the problem being faced in a conflict (where the disputants are not sufficiently motivated to deal with the issues and the conflict remains unresolved) or too much tension (which can lead either to conflict avoidance because it is so threatening or to conflict escalation as the tension limits one to an oversimplified black-and-white perception of the issues).

Thus, it becomes critical for conflict resolvers to develop the skills necessary to assess the level of tension in a conflict system, to diagnose what level is optimal for a given system, and to discover levers for increasing tension (such as through using open confrontation or empowering members of low-power groups) or decreasing it (such as through using humor or temporarily separating disputants from one another).

**Foster Confidence to Take the Risk of Being Outlandish.** Self-confidence is an individual characteristic that can affect a person’s ability to take the risk involved in developing a novel point of view. However, a person’s confidence level can also be significantly affected by the situation and by those in power (or perceived to be so) in the situation. Conflict specialists who emphasize their expertise and knowledge in a problem-solving session tend to elicit dependence and less confidence from the disputants, with the consequence that fewer novel ideas and recommendations are generated by the parties. A conflict specialist who supports and encourages the ideas of the disputants, highlighting those aspects of their ideas that are particularly useful or innovative, is likely to draw out a flow of ideas that expand the menu of perspectives and alternatives. It is important for facilitators to remember that the open flow of ideas and information is a dynamic responsive to the support (and playfulness) of the facilitator.

**Have Appropriately Phased Open (Divergent) and Closed (Convergent) Thinking.** This is the yin and yang of the creative problem-solving process. Creativity is most often associated with openness of ideas, a freeflowing of thoughts, images, symbols, and so on. Decision making, though, is most often associated with moving toward closure: converging on the alternative or set of alternatives that best address the problem. A creative problem-solving approach to conflict requires both. Disputants must have the capacity and opportunity to open up to understand a problem from various perspectives and to generate many, perhaps novel, ideas or solutions. In addition, disputants must have the chance to (eventually) reach closure by taking a good, hard look at those perspectives and ideas, and determine if they are any good and if they will work in a particular situation.

The open and closed modes of experience are in opposition to each other, in that it is difficult to remain open to new alternative possibilities while trying to
close in on a final decision. It is therefore useful to alternate from one mode to another during the problem-solving process. Alternating between the open and closed modes can be useful during various phases of the problem-solving process, such as when defining or redefining the issues, generating solutions, or planning methods of implementation or achieving constituent buy-in. It is useful to defer judgment (delayed evaluation of the alternatives) when in the open mode, and then weigh both the strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives when moving into the closed mode for decision making.

Typically, conflict moves people into the closed mode and produces rigid thinking with restricted judgment, reduced complexity, and narrower range of attention. Exactly why this occurs is unclear, but scholars have speculated that it may be due to a number of factors: the conflict triggering a negative affect such as anxiety, a competitive orientation overloading cognitive functioning and leading to preoccupation with formulating strategies and tactics to prevail in the conflict, or simply providing too much cognitive stimulation. If this occurs, conflict resolvers must find the means to reorient disputants, at least temporarily, into an open mode.

Research by Carnevale and Probst (1998) has identified an important qualifier to the causal chain of “conflict equals tension equals impaired cognitive functioning.” The research found that people’s cognitive functioning does become more rigid and restricted if they either anticipate or engage in competitive conflicts, but not when they expect or engage in cooperative conflict. People in a cooperative experience are better able to combine categories, see commonalities in their positions, and better locate integrative solutions than those in competitive conflicts.

The exact reasons for this difference are as yet unclear, but the implications for practice are important. Conflict resolvers who effectively reframe the conflict as a mutual problem to be solved cooperatively by the parties also open up the disputants’ capacity to think creatively about the problem and the solution.

**Adequately Define the Problem.** Adequate definition is the aspect of creative conflict resolution that is most often shortchanged. The uncomfortable experience of tension associated with many conflicts often moves people to try to solve the problem quickly. This tendency puts them prematurely into the closed mode of decision making around the nature of the problem, before they take the time to open up and examine the problem from alternative perspectives. Ultimately, this can lead to superficial or even incorrect understanding of the problem-at-hand, and much time wasted generating and implementing solutions to the wrong concerns.

Ironically, this approach can take more time than if the problem is examined thoroughly up front. For example, what is the egg drop problem? Is it to build an apparatus quickly? Is it to keep the other teams from building an apparatus?
Or is it to stop the egg six inches from the ground? Each of these definitions of the problem leads to a distinct strategy for solving it. Spending some time exploring the problem, and perhaps identifying the pervasive concerns behind the presenting problem, can lead to satisfying, long-lasting, and even efficient solutions.

**TECHNIQUES FOR STIMULATING NOVEL IDEAS**

It is important to recognize that most creative artists, writers, and scientists produce many ideas before they find a good, novel, creative one. In the preceding guidelines, we discuss some of the conditions fostering openness of the free flow of thought necessary to produce many ideas. *Brainstorming* (see Osborn, 1953) is a technique widely used to generate ideas. In conflict situations, it may be employed to come up with ideas about the problem or conflict, its potential solution, and action to be taken (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). In a brainstorming session, whether as an individual or as a group, one is encouraged to use imagination to come up with as many varied ideas as possible, without censoring or judging them, whether produced by oneself or by another. In a group setting, others are encouraged to free associate with, elaborate, and build on the ideas of others.

To encourage novelty as well as quality in ideas, people are encouraged to use metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) and analogies. (For example, what new ideas might be developed about a conflict between ethnic groups by using the metaphor of a family feud?) Other techniques for stimulating novelty include “synectics,” or joining together opposites (Gordon and Poze, 1977); raising questions about ways of changing the situation (Eberle, 1971); substituting, separating, adding, combining, reducing, magnifying, deleting, or otherwise rearranging elements.

As the chapters on change processes (Chapter Twenty), on intractable conflict (Chapter Twenty-Four), and on large-group methods (Chapter Thirty-Three) indicate, another way of getting out of a rut and creating new ideas is to try imagining a desirable future. Beckhard and Reuben (1987), Blake and Mouton (1984), Boulding (1986), and others have used various terms—“envisioning the desired future state,” “social imaging,” “future search”—to characterize the process by which individuals, groups, or organizations are encouraged to free themselves from the constraints of current reality to develop an image of a better future. In practice, this procedure has been useful in helping people develop awareness of new possibilities and new directions. One could expect such a procedure to be helpful in a conflict situation: the parties are aided in imagining desirable relations in the future and to start the process of thinking how they can get there from the current situation.
A third party, such as a mediator, can bring new thinking into a stuck conflict. He may help the conflicting parties become aware of new possibilities for agreement other than win-lose or lose-lose resolution of their conflict. Thus, as Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) have pointed out, mutually satisfactory agreements may be reached by (1) expanding the pie, so that there is enough for both sides; (2) non-specific compensation, which involves having one party receive its best alternative and compensating the other in some other way; (3) logrolling, by having the parties make mutually beneficial trade-offs among the issues; (4) cost cutting, by reducing or eliminating the costs to the party not getting its way; or (5) bridging, by finding an option that satisfies the interests of both parties (see also the discussion in Chapters Nine and Nineteen).

Also, by making the parties aware of their potentially “creative” differences in what they value, their expectations, their attitude toward risk, their time preferences, and the like (Thompson, 1998), we help them see that their differences can facilitate mutually satisfactory agreement.

**CONCLUSION**

Betty Reardon, a noted peace educator, once said, “The failure to achieve peace is in essence a failure of imagination” (personal communication). Throughout our history, a considerable amount of human and economic resources have been invested in creating new and deadlier means to wage war. The time has come to invest the energy and resources necessary to innovate and create new and livelier means to wage peace.

**References**


CHAPTER NINETEEN

Creativity in the Outcomes of Conflict

Peter J. Carnevale

It were not best that we should all think alike; it is difference of opinion that makes horse races.
—(Mark Twain, “The Tragedy of Pudd’Nhead Wilson,” 1894)

How does creativity play out in social conflict? Just like Mark Twain’s observation about difference of opinion and interesting horse races, it is difference of interest, and how difference is handled, that makes interesting solutions to social conflict. If creativity is applied to the handling of differences, the outcome might very well be a mutually beneficial, integrative agreement; but just as well, creativity can be applied to contentiousness, pursuit of selfish interests, and asymmetric outcomes. In this chapter, my focus is on creativity in the service of developing mutually beneficial, integrative agreements.

Consider the story of the Prophet Mohammad and his idea for settling a dispute that occurred during rebuilding of the Ka’aba in Mecca: when the sacred Black Stone was to be put in place, leaders of several tribes quarreled about who should have the honor to place it. The Prophet’s idea: place the stone on a cloak and the heads of each tribe would take a side of the cloak and together carry it in; thus each could have the honor of putting the stone in place (Satha-Anand, 1998).1 The story points to the characteristics of an outcome, a product, in this case, an agreement that allowed each party to achieve its interest, and it might be judged an especially creative outcome. Indeed, the kind of solution that allows each party to achieve its interests is fundamental and represents a basic

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type of high-value outcome. The key question is what is the structure of creative outcomes of conflict?

The focus on the products of negotiation is one of three basic perspectives on creativity in social conflict. The second perspective is about the person (the negotiator or mediator), and here it could be said that the Prophet Mohammad was creative in his suggestion. What are the characteristics of highly creative negotiators?

The third perspective, on process, is about the set of processes and conditions that connect the person to the product. The key questions are how does a given person, or group of people, in situations with pressures and constraints, limited capacities, strong emotions and motives achieve a creative agreement? What are the key underlying, explanatory processes?²

OVERVIEW: PERSON, PROCESS, AND PRODUCT

The three perspectives on creativity in conflict—person, process, and product—can be seen as guides for the analysis of how people can get to integrative agreements. Simonton (2003, 2004) and Runco (2004) outlined these three perspectives in the study of creativity in scientific achievement. The present paper is an extension of that framework to the study of social conflict and reflects as well other works in the broad study of creativity (for example, Amabile, 1993; Mumford, 2003; Sternberg, 1999). In many ways, the development of integrative agreements in social conflict is a subdomain of group creativity (compare Paulus and Nijstad, 2003).

The perspective on the person includes case studies of famous negotiators and mediators (for example, Kolb, 1997), as well as studies of negotiator personality characteristics (such as Gunthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith, 2002), and studies of basic features of human cognition as they affect negotiation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1995).³ The perspective on the process reflects the social psychological focus on circumstances that evoke motives, incentives, and processes of problem construal and problem solving, a perspective originated by Deutsch (1973, this volume), Druckman (1977), Kelley (1966), Pruitt (1981, 1998, this volume), and developed in recent days by Ross and Ward (1995) and Carnevale and De Dreu (2005; De Dreu and Carnevale, 2003).

The perspective on the product that can emerge from social conflict and its creativity is the least studied and is the focus of this paper. In negotiation, the creative products perspective is founded in Follett’s (1940) descriptive writing as well as Walton and McKersie’s (1965) notion that “. . . bargaining is not just a process of dividing up existing resources but is also a process sometimes used for creating additional values or mutual benefits” (p. 23). An important advance in the creative products perspective was Pruitt’s taxonomy of integrative agreements (1981; see also Pruitt and Carnevale, 1982, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004), which is reflected in theoretical work by
Hopmann (1996) and descriptive work on “deal development” by Lax and Sebenius (1986, 2002).

**Integrative Agreement as Creativity**

Herbert Simon (2001) wrote, “We judge thought to be creative when it produces something that is both novel and interesting and valuable” (p. 208). This multiple component definition is seen in other writing as well; for example, Sternberg and Lubart (1999, p. 3) focus on creativity as being original as well as appropriate, and Smith (2005) emphasizes that a creative idea must have some bearing on reality as defined by “professionals in the domain at issue” (p. 294). In social conflict, creativity is sometimes equated with cooperation and problem solving, that is, as the opposite of competitiveness (Thompson, 2005, p. 174). But creativity can be applied to competitive intent as well, that is, the motives extant in a given situation can drive the form and expression of creativity.

The positions taken on the issues in conflict and negotiation often reflect *underlying interests*, the parties’ values and needs (Burton, 1987; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). The search for underlying interests is one aspect of problem finding and problem solving, which is defined, in negotiation, as “any effort to identify a formula that will satisfy both sides’ aspirations” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 189). As a result, the possible end product of problem solving, an integrative agreement, can be characterized as “efficient,” “optimal,” or “rational” (Smith, 2003), although the interesting question is what are the basic structures of agreement, and their characteristics, that give them value of one form or another.

**Compromise Versus Integrative.** Some agreements are better than others and this is seen in Follett’s (1940) distinction between *compromise* and *integration*, a distinction that has carried through to most major treatises on negotiation and social conflict (for example, Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt, 1981; Walton and McKersie, 1965). A compromise is a superficial treatment of differences that typically has each side give up something, meeting midway between opening positions. Integration “means that a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, that neither side has had to sacrifice anything” (Follett, 1940, p. 32); integrative agreements give greater collective value to the parties and can be seen as the product of a process of creative thinking (Pruitt, 1981).

Of course not all situations have equal *integrative potential*. The conflict between Al Qaeda and the United States has little such potential (see Deutsch, 2006 for a discussion of difficult conflicts). On the other hand, there are conflicts that appear not to allow the possibility of integrative potential but, with creativity, can be resolved constructively. Consider, for example, two siblings who quarrel over the possession of a single family heirloom; they think only one can have it. However, as the example given by Deutsch (Chapter 2 of this book) indicates, there are several creative solutions to such a conflict. Another
well-known example is that of the story of two sisters who quarrel over an orange that they both want: they could reach a compromise by simply cutting the orange in half and each taking half. However, with some openness and search for information, they might discover that one sister wanted the orange for its juice and the other wanted the peel for baking cakes. Clearly the integrative solution of one taking all the juice and the other taking the entire peel is the better solution. In Follett’s words, “Integration involves invention, and the clever thing is to recognize this, and not to let one’s thinking stay within the boundaries of two alternatives which are mutually exclusive” (p. 33). And this raises the question about the relative merits of an integrative agreement over a compromise.

Settlement Versus Resolution. The distinction between compromise and integration is about the differences at hand, about the issues faced at the moment and whether or not they are treated in a superficial manner. An analogous distinction can be made about the broader relationship between the parties in conflict: settlement versus resolution. A settlement is an agreement of the issues at hand and may even be an integrative agreement that ends an extant conflict, but it may leave other issues in the broader relationship between the parties unresolved. Resolution is more substantive: it is an agreement in which most or all issues “are cleared up” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

The Conflict Management System. An optimal state for any relationship is the achievement of a conflict management system, a set of procedures for fostering integrative agreements in the resolution of extant and future differences. Sometimes conflict management systems are devised in an explicit manner, where the parameters are highly structured and negotiated, as when a labor contract has an organizational dispute resolution system that entails a mix of procedures such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration (Bendersky, 2003). At other times, conflict management systems develop informally, even tacitly, and entail adoption of procedures or norms on how future conflicts will be handled in a mutually beneficial manner. Cooperation in establishing such systems has a parallel in instrumental cooperation in social dilemmas, which are efforts by people to increase the likelihood that others will cooperate and share resources and thus foster collective welfare (Yamagishi, 1986).

Conflict Needs Creativity and Creativity Needs Conflict. The potential of constructive conflict is to produce positive personal and social change (Deutsch, this volume). To do so, conflict must be handled in a way that stimulates creative solutions and avoids the negatives of destructive conflict. A main advantage of creative, integrative agreements over compromises is that they foster stability of relationships (Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1981; Thomas, 1976). There are other advantages as well: the larger organization or society will benefit if
the constituent groups and individuals reach high-value agreements (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993); also, unless the agreement is integrative, designed to satisfy the parties’ major interests, there might be no agreement at all.

Conflict is an important element of creativity. Sometimes productive change would not occur without conflict. Follett (1940) told the story of an improvement in a work environment that occurred as a direct result of a conflict, and the improvement would not have occurred had the conflict not occurred. Two groups of workers, dairymen, fought over who would have access to a loading and unloading dock: “If the Dairymen’s League had not fought over the question of precedence, the improved method of unloading would not have been thought of. The conflict in this case was constructive. And this was because, instead of compromising, they sought a way of integrating” (p. 34). Coleman and Deutsch (this volume) make the important point that the “status quo” might favor an unjust system, and conflict provides the impetus for powerful parties, who favor the status quo, to make change.

The idea that conflict—or tolerance of conflict—is a precursor to creativity is well-known and part of several broad theoretical statements in social conflict. The dual-concern model, for example, holds that “concern of own aspirations”—which specifies the degree of personal importance of the issues in conflict—is an important determinant of problem solving and integrative outcomes; it provides the impetus for people to stick it out in conflict and explore various options that will satisfy their own aspirations (Pruitt, 1981). In her concept of integrate, Follett (1940) put it this way: “A friend of mine said to me, ‘Open-mindedness is the whole thing, isn’t it?’ No it isn’t; it needs just as great a respect for your own view as for that of others, and a firm upholding of it until you are convinced. Mushy people are no more good at this than stubborn people” (p. 48).

John Dewey (1922) tells us that, “Conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity” (p. 300). Indeed, there is supporting evidence: conflict can enhance creativity (Nemeth, Personnaz, Personnaz, and Goncalo, 2004) and innovation (Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir, 2001). Beersma and De Dreu (2005) report that the positive effects of conflict on creativity depend on the nature of the task, and De Dreu and Nijstad (2005) suggest that it depends on whether the domain of judgment is in or outside the realm of conflict.

Creative Products: The Structure of Integrative Agreements

The products, or outcomes, of negotiation and social conflict can be creative, meaning that they are—to paraphrase Simon—novel, interesting, valuable, and appropriate in having a bearing on settlement or resolution. Past work by Dean Pruitt identified five basic types of integrative agreements, called expanding the
pie, nonspecific compensation, logrolling, cost cutting, and bridging (see Pruitt, 1981, Chapter 5; see also Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993, p. 198; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). These five can be augmented; indeed, there are three additional types (including compromise) that derive from a close look at the underlying dynamics of integrative agreements.

The nature of integrative, creative conflict outcomes is greatly affected by the type and difficulty of the problem faced by the parties in conflict. Figure 19.1 presents a classification schema called the Agreement Circumplex (Carnevale, forthcoming).

The classification schema provides a starting place for understanding the structure and dynamics of integrative agreements. It has value regarding theory—the underlying dynamics of each type of integrative agreement is distinct—and it has practical value in that it can serve as a checklist for negotiators and mediators interested in reaching creative, integrative, high-value agreements.

Figure 19.1 The Agreement Circumplex.
Source: Author.
The schema proposes that agreements can be categorized as one or another of four main types (each with two subtypes). The key distinction in the schema is that between the parties’ positions and the parties’ underlying interests. The four main agreement types, related to each other as the four quadrants of a circumplex structure, are identified by the main goal that each entails. In a following section, I describe in greater detail the types of products in the Agreement Circumplex.

I: Accommodate the Parties’ Positions. There are two forms of position accommodation wherein the parties’ initial demands on the issues are accommodated: simple compromise and logrolling. Compromise is meeting halfway on the issues, and logrolling is giving up one issue in exchange for getting what one wants on another more important issue.

II: Achieve the Parties’ Positions. In position achievement each party gets exactly what is stated in its initial demand. For example, in a dispute over a resource, if the resource is doubled, the parties each get exactly what they want, that is, their initial demands are met. There are two forms, one driven by an increase in the resource and the other driven by modifying the resource so that it now fits what the parties want.

III: Achieve the Parties’ Underlying Interests. Interest achievement has two forms, bridging and cost cutting. In both cases, the parties’ underlying interests are met. In the former, a novel alternative arises, whereas in the latter, one (or both) parties’ reasons for resistance are met and overcome. Often, some exploration of underlying interests is required; indeed, an analysis of interests that underlie interests may not be sufficient (Pruitt and Kim, 2004): “it will often be necessary to seek the interests underlying these interests, or the interests underlying the interests underlying these interests, and so on” (p. 199). Often there is a hierarchy of interests. For example, in a dispute between a father and son over whether the son can buy a motorcycle, the son wants the motorcycle because he has an underlying interest of wanting to impress the girl next door. The father’s interest in not wanting his son to have a motorcycle is that he does not want to hear the noise. It may be that, at a deeper level, the boy’s interest is self-esteem or other identity-related concern (compare Rothman, 1997); certainly the father has no problem with his son having high self-esteem. Perhaps this self-esteem can be achieved via another means, for example, golf lessons for the son so that winning a golf trophy can impress the neighbor. The point is differences often take on a new character, and the appearance of opposition can diminish at a deeper level of interest. (See Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991, p. 74.)
IV: Substitute the Parties’ Underlying Interests. There are two forms of interest substitution, often bilateral as in superordination, or unilateral as in compensation. In the case of compensation, the one party who is indemnified for acceding to the other’s demand has its interest replaced by the interest manifest in the compensation. In the case of superordination, this happens with both sides—both give up their initial interests in favor of that which is gained in the superordination, and the form of the superordination does not need to be the same for each side. However, disputants often make vicarious comparisons of what is gained by compensation, especially if it comes from a mediator. (See Carnevale, 1986, 2002.)

Person-Based Versus Issue-Based. At the left side of the circumplex, logrolling and compromise entail fitting the parties to the issues under discussion; that is, they involve an element of one side moving toward the other side, simply giving in, either on each issue or with some sense of the priorities among the issues. The term person-based refers to the focus on fitting the persons to the issues and this is done via concessions or issue trades. The change that leads to agreement stems from the person modifying her position on the issues in the conflict.

At the right side of the circumplex, modify and expand entail fitting the issues under discussion, or the resources, to the parties; that is, an element of search for additional resources or investigation into the nature of the issue is required. The term issue-based refers to the focus on fitting the resources or issues to the persons. The change that leads to agreement stems from a change in the issue or resource under discussion. Bridging, cost cutting, superordination, and compensation have elements of both person and issue bases.

Simple Versus Complex. What are the information requirements for that particular type of agreement to occur? Either they are simple, meaning not much, or complex, meaning that the information requirements are extensive. Simple agreements do not require a close look at the concerns that underlie the parties’ positions, concerns that may involve goals, values, principles, or needs. Complex agreements do. Bridging, cost cutting, logrolling, and modifying the resource, in particular, may require extensive conceptual work, skill, expertise, learning about what the parties want or do not want, and bringing this information into the set of agreement alternatives. The parties may be able to do this on their own; often they need the help of a third party. For a logrolling solution, information about the parties’ priorities is useful so that one can trade a concession on one issue for concession on a lower-priority issue. Often it is difficult to get such information, particularly when trust is low. In a solution via cost cutting, information about the costs or reservations felt is useful, and it may take some doing to uncover this. Bridging often needs a deep understanding of both parties’ underlying interests.
This is not to imply that compromise, or searching for more of a resource, or compensation, or superordination can occur without some thought. To the contrary, knowing *when* to compromise is often a delicate skill that if not handled well may cause the other to expect even more (compare Hilty and Carnevale, 1993). Knowing what a person values is key for any compensation scheme. And superordination requires an understanding of the parties’ values and interests apart from the extant set of differences defined in the issues. The information requirements for expanding the pie are small in the sense that all one needs to know is what the other demands. Of course, even here some information is needed; certainly one needs to know what is available in the environment. But the point is these outcomes, which reside more at the surface of interests and positions, are shallow and are more simply achieved than outcomes that reflect hidden interests, needs, values, and desires, which lurk at depths often hidden well below the extant positions.

Complexity in negotiation can be managed via a mental operation called *unlinking* (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Sometimes, differences of interest are a bundle of connected demands, goals, aspirations, and values that are seen as inseparable from other demands, goals, aspirations, and values; it looks like there is just one issue. Unlinking entails breaking the bundle into smaller parts. Hopmann (1996) calls this “disaggregation” and Fisher (1964) calls this process “fractionation.” Lax and Sebenius (1986, p. 108) refer to it as a process of converting “one issue into more than one.” Through unlinking, the smaller parts might then be realigned, or prioritized, and form the basis of tradeoffs, or a new alternative might emerge, as seen in the following examples.

### The Types of Products in the Agreement Circumplex

1. **Compromise.** A compromise is defined as a middle ground on an obvious dimension connecting the parties’ initial offers (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993, p. 16). A compromise is largely viewed as a nonintegrative, noncreative form of agreement, not novel, not interesting, and not all that valuable (but likely valuable as an agreement when none other is available and when agreement is better than no agreement). Compromise serves as a useful baseline to which to judge more integrative options; thus, it will be useful to include compromise in an organizing framework.

2. **Logrolling: Trading High- and Low-Value Issues.** When a conflict involves differences across a set of issues, and the issues differ in their relative importance to the parties, the difference can be traded for one another. This is possible especially if one of the issues is more important than another issue for one party, and the other side has the opposite preference ordering on the issues; thus, as a set, the differences on the issues are complementary. In the trade, each side gets what it wants on its high-priority issue and gives in to the other
on its low-priority issue; this gives greater value in the agreement to each side individually—and to them collectively—than each getting something in the middle on the issues or making no deal at all. Lax and Sebenius (1986) describe this as “the trading of differences.” Suppose Carsten has an apple and a pear, and really loves pears but is just okay on apples. And Esther also has an apple and a pear, and really loves apples but is just okay on pears. Each is better off, and they are better off together, if they exchange a whole apple for a whole pear. The compromise solution, “50/50,” the middle ground would be an exchange of half an apple for half a pear.

3. Modify the Resource Pie. When a conflict is about how a resource is shared or divided, one solution is to figure out a way to modify the resource so that both parties can achieve their objectives. There is a reconfiguration of the existing resource. Follett (1940) gives an example: “A Dairyman’s Co-operative League almost went to pieces last year on the question of precedence in unloading cans at a creamery platform. The men who came down the hill (the creamery was on a down grade) thought they should have precedence; the men who came up the hill thought they should unload first. The thinking of both sides in the controversy was thus confined within the walls of these two possibilities, and this prevented their even trying to find a way of settling the dispute which would avoid these two alternatives. The solution was obviously to change the position of the platform so that both up-hillers and down-hillers could unload at the same time” (pp. 32–33). In this case, it took an element of ingenuity to figure out how the resource, the platform, could be modified so that both sides could have what they wanted.

4. Expand the Resource Pie. When a conflict is about how a resource is shared or divided, a simple but powerful solution is to simply increase the amount of the resource. The resource may be about money, space, time, an object, or any resource. Two units of an organization vie over a limited budget, or two managers both want the nicer corner office, husband and wife have a week of vacation but one prefers going to the beach and the other to the mountains, siblings quarrel over who will inherit the nice antique chair. It is essentially a supply problem, with the supply exceeding the demand. An integrative solution is achieved by simply increasing the resource—get a larger budget, find a second nice office, get two weeks vacation, find a second chair. Each side achieves exactly what it wanted.

Sometimes the increase in the resource, or the idea for modifying the resource, comes from a third party (the “integrator consultant” from Follett, 1940; or the “3-D move” from Lax and Sebenius, 2002). Imagine if the Dairyman’s Co-operative League decided to double the size of the unloading platform. In this case, the supply of the resource (the platform) expands to provide enough for both parties to be satisfied. Each gets what it wants from an influx of resources. Consider the story told by a student: “My sister bought this adorable shirt that I always borrowed without asking; we often get into conflict over
‘sharing’ clothes (I usually just take hers). To solve this situation, my mother intervened and bought me the exact same shirt that my sister had, so that instead of us arguing over the single shirt, we each had our own.”

Modifying the resource pie—or expanding it—can succeed when the difference of interest is about an opportunity cost—the up-hillers were not able to unload when the down-hillers unloaded and vice versa. Increasing the resource or modifying it is not workable if what one side wants will make the other suffer; for example, if one sister could not stand seeing the other sister wear that style shirt, getting another shirt is pointless. In this case, the problem is not a shortage of shirts.

5. Bridge the Interests. Perhaps the most creative form of integrative agreement is that referred to as bridging. In bridging, a new alternative is devised that gives the parties what they want in terms of the interests that underlie their positions. A husband and wife had a one-week vacation, but one wanted to go to the mountains and the other wanted to go to the beach. They talked about the reasons for their preferences, and they learned that that one wanted to do freshwater fishing, and the other wanted to play volleyball in the sand. With a search for new alternatives, they discovered a resort that had both freshwater fishing and sand volleyball. Each gave up their initial demand and became enthusiastic about the new option that gave them both what they really wanted. The interesting feature of the agreement was not that each side gave in, or that they made a trade on low- and high-priority issues, or one side was compensated or had its costs cut, but rather a new alternative emerged, via discussion and exchange of information about underlying interests, and these interests were completely met.

A search model (Simon, 1957) guides the discussion and discovery process. Sometimes a distinction is made between low- and high-priority interests, with the higher getting the weight of the attention in the search (Pruitt, 1981). The important dimension that distinguishes bridging is the focus on the underlying interests or reasons, or concerns, or values that generate demands and positions. If those can be met, the demands and positions are satisfied.

There are several types of bridging formulae, including alternation (Pruitt, 1981). In alternation, the parties take turns, which is especially useful when there is a time constraint. (With only one week of vacation, two people cannot do what they both want—go to the beach as well as go to the mountains—so this year they go to the beach and then next year they will go to the mountains.) Another bridging formula is the contingent agreement, which entails building unknown futures into the agreement, which is especially useful if the parties differ in their expectations about the future. For example, one person thinks that the weather is going to be great at the beach, but the other thinks it will be horrible; so, they build weather in as a contingency, that is, if the weather is good, they go to the beach, but if the weather is bad they head for the mountains.
Lax and Sebenius (2002) give several interesting examples of contingent agreements including the *earnout*, in which a buyer and seller of a company structure the agreement to reflect their different appraisals of future earnings or risk. The more optimistic party gets a future payment contingent on the future income; the less optimistic party is happy with the arrangement because he thinks that the future income will not be so much. “Without the earnout, an otherwise mutually beneficial deal may well languish” (p. 17).

6. **Cut the Costs.** If one party is resistant to agreement because what the other proposes has *costs*, and these costs can be identified and reduced, then agreement is likely. The agreement is integrative not due to a change in position or trade-off on issues, but because one party does not suffer so much. Cost cutting is a form of compensation, but it is *specific* in the sense that the compensation addresses the exact value that formed the basis of resistance. An example was provided by a student: “I had the habit of staying up really late at night to finish assignments for class, and eventually finish my work at around 3 a.m.; but my roommate would go to sleep much earlier than that. I tried very hard to keep the light from my desk shining near my roommate’s bed, but unfortunately she had difficulty sleeping at night and she asked me not to stay up so late. I felt bad for keeping her awake . . . I went out and bought her an eye mask so that the light wouldn’t disturb her as she tried to sleep. She thanked me, used the mask, and was able to sleep through the night while I was still able to continue burning the proverbial midnight oil!”

In their discussion of “dealcrafting,” Lax and Sebenius (2002) give an interesting example of joint cost cutting: two manufacturing companies, in a joint-venture deal, pooled their resources so that each had lower costs; as a result, they made greater profit—individually and together—than they would without such a deal. In Pruitt’s words, joint cost cutting is “reducing the cost to both parties of baking a pie of fixed size.” Sometimes the costs are cut by the parties themselves, and sometimes by third parties. Sometimes the costs are associated with precedents and future implications, in which case those precedents can be decoupled (Pruitt, 1981).

7. **Compensation (Nonspecific).** With nonspecific compensation, one side goes along with what the other wants and does so because it receives something of value. What it receives is outside the extant issues and thus “nonspecific” to the matter at hand. For example, the sister who wants to wear the other’s shirt offers to do all the other’s house chores for a day, and the shirt-wealthy sister agrees; she finds that the compensation overcomes her resistance to loaning out her shirt. Often what one party receives is itself subject to negotiation about what is appropriate compensation. Foa (1971) developed a theory of resources about how suitable one resource is for exchange with another (for example, money, love); the theory posits that resources that are closer to one another conceptually (for example, how tangible they are, such as *money* and
goods versus money and love) are more likely to be exchanged. In any compensation scheme, it is very useful to know what the other values, as well as a way to calibrate appropriate amounts of compensation.

Logrolling can be seen as a form of nonspecific compensation, where one side’s concession on its low-priority issue is compensation for the other side’s concession on the other’s low-priority issue; in this case, the parties stay within the set of issues rather than reach out for new issues or dimensions of value.

8. Superordination. Sometimes agreement is reached when the differences in interest that gave rise to the conflict are superseded or replaced by other interests. The use of compensation, as described, is a form of this but usually applied to just one party to a conflict; the compensated party gives up its resistance because the interest served by the compensation replaces the initial interest that drove its resistance to the other’s demand.

In superordination, both parties drop their initial interests and positions in light of changed circumstances or goals, a revised view of the conflict, or an enticing new opportunity. Consider two children quarreling over a TV show to watch; but then they hear the ice cream truck go by, and they both have a new interest in ice cream that replaces their interest in the TV, and the quarrel about the TV ends. Sometimes a third party affects the change in interest, as when a parent offers the quarreling children a trip to McDonald’s®. Or the couple trying to decide on the location of a vacation—mountain or beach—decides instead to not take a vacation but instead use the week for buying new furniture and redecorating their house. In these cases, new matters arise that replace or supersede the interests that gave rise to the initial differences. Sometimes the added costs in a “hurting stalemate” redirect the parties’ interests away from that which drove their initial positions (Zartman, 2001).

Agreement by superordination has a parallel in the effect discovered by Sherif and Sherif (1969) in their famous field studies of intergroup conflict. Using a summer camp for boys, they created the conditions for groups to compete with one another and saw the competition escalate to overt hostility. They discovered that the escalation reversed when the children had a superordinate goal, that is, they had a common objective that required them to work together cooperatively. One such goal was created when a camp water tower ostensibly collapsed, and the groups of boys, who were thirsty, needed to work together to get it fixed. As a result, the conflict between the groups lessened and the relationships between boys across the groups improved. Considerable evidence points to the multiple effects of superordinate goals; for example, they can help bonds form between people across groups. But an important effect is that the superordinate interests overshadow or supplant the initial interests that led the groups to fight in the first place.

Perhaps the most powerful form of superordinate interest is working together to fend off a common enemy. Third parties often know this and use this in the
effort to foster cooperation, as Kissinger mentioned to Israeli and Egyptian leaders that a real threat in the Middle East was intervention by the Soviet Union (Rubin, 1981). Another form of superordination is the common enticing opportunity: the possibility of a higher standard of living, better hospitals, cleaner water, access to international capital for better roads, and so on might supplant some of the concerns that gave rise to the initial differences in a conflict. The new matters become so important that they eclipse the original matters, and the result is cooperation and agreement because people make gains on other, important dimensions of value.

**Creative Products from Creative Persons in a Creative Process**

Much of the behavioral research in social conflict and negotiation is about delineating the relationship between characteristics of the people involved, the processes that occur, and the outcome (the products) (compare Simonton, 2003, p. 490; 2004). Social psychologists who study negotiation and social conflict tend to emphasize how people interact in and are affected by context and environmental constraints, for example, negotiating as a group or alone or negotiating under high time pressure. (See chapters by Deutsch, Coleman, Pruitt, Dweck, Krauss, Thompson, and others, all in this volume.) Much of this work is designed to understand the conditions or circumstances that either (a) move people from the pursuit of destructive aims in conflict, from contentious, win-lose pursuit of asymmetric outcomes, to problem-solving processes and balanced agreement, or (b) move people from pursuit of simple compromise agreements to the more creative, integrative forms of agreement. But there is a third set of questions, not at all well-addressed in the empirical literature, and this is about the conditions or circumstances that move people to pursue one form of integrative agreement over another. This is a matter of predicting the type of integrative agreement that will emerge, given that one will emerge in the first place.

**Flexible Thinking and Idea Generation.** One set of processes that is likely to encourage the more information-rich, complex forms of integrative agreement is related to the notion of flexible thinking. Lewin (1951) wrote that conflict can produce a “freezing” of cognition, and subsequent evidence supports this. For example, Carnevale and Probst (1998) had people expect to enter a cooperative or contentious negotiation; just before doing this, they evaluated material that assessed cognitive organization, for example, a “functional fixedness” task and a task that had them rate category exemplars. The fixedness task required, for a creative solution, that people separate two concepts normally fixed, for example, the concept “box of tacks” is separated so that the box can be used as a platform to hold a candle, which solves the task. People who expected contentious conflict were less likely to “unfix” the concepts and less likely to see
creative solutions. In the category exemplars task, people rated the goodness of items such as “camel” as examples of the category “vehicle.” People who expected contentiousness rather than cooperative negotiation were less likely to see a camel as an example of the vehicle category. Both effects suggest that expected contentiousness can produce a narrowing of vision and a general change in cognition that extends beyond that associated with the particular items.

Of course, as mentioned earlier, conflict can, under other conditions, enhance creativity (compare Beersma and De Dreu, 2005; De Dreu and Nijstad, 2005), and this suggests that the trick is to manage the process so that positive effects emerge. One way of generating creative alternatives in conflict might stem from “brainstorming” (Osborn, 1957), particularly if assisted by a third-party mediator. A mediator may be able to foster conditions in which people feel comfortable listening to one another and do this in an “active” way (Kressel, this volume; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Sometimes a third party can help uncover information, especially in private meetings with one side, the caucus. The caucus is an effective third-party vehicle for uncovering the parties’ concerns, and there is evidence that problem-solving discussions start in the caucus and then migrate to joint sessions (Welton, Pruitt, and McGillicuddy, 1988). Caucuses may help attenuate biases and assumptions, for example, the assumption that interests are completely opposed, an assumption that so many studies have shown can interfere with the development of integrative agreements (for example, Pruitt and Lewis, 1975).

The Mix. Another set of processes likely to encourage the more information-rich forms of integrative agreement is the mixture of people and strategies on each side of the negotiation table. A good deal of work now points to the notion that mixtures of strategies and mixtures of types of people can be especially effective in negotiation. For example, groups tend to be more contentious in negotiation, more likely to hold onto aspirations, and yet be better at problem solving (Morgan and Tindale, 2002). Moreover, a mixture of hawks and doves on one side is more likely to produce an integrative agreement in between-group negotiation (Jacobson, 1981). A similar effect is seen in the “good-cop/bad-cop” strategy (Hilty and Carnevale, 1993): the tougher partner (the “bad-cop” or the “hawk”) conveys an image of firmness that cannot be exploited, whereas the more cooperative partner (the “good-cop” or the “dove”) conveys an impression that cooperation will succeed, that agreement can be reached. The mix is more effective than either is alone.

But the mix is not always sanguine: sometimes dissent on a negotiation team is an impediment to effective between-group negotiation. Consider the comment made by former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at Camp David in July 2000: “What’s more, in the completely closed environment of Camp David, he did nothing to control the fratricidal
competition in his delegation, effectively giving license to those who were attacking other members who were trying to find ways to bridge the differences” (Ross, 2001). It seems reasonable to suppose that people who try to bridge differences between groups will need leadership support and should as well be protected from the “spoilers” who have a less cooperative agenda. Carnevale (2005) argued that mediators should work to foster within-group cooperation, solving problems within each side, in the effort to facilitate between-group negotiation.

An interesting perspective on the mixture of group process is found in Cronin, Argote, and Kotovsky’s (2002) analysis of partitioning cognition in group problem solving. These authors found that groups were better—had more insight and better insight—when they divided roles among the group members so that one person in the group focused on the design of a problem solution and the others in the group focused on implementing the design. Such partitioning has quite a history in the study of group creativity (March, 1991). The Cronin et al. paper, as well as others in the group creativity area, suggests that the literature in negotiation and social conflict and in group creativity have considerable points of contact and considerable potential for integration.

**Locations for Creativity.** Coleman and Deutsch (Chapter 18, this volume) note that time and space are essential elements of creative problem solving, that people need sufficient time to open up and be creative, as well as a physical space: “A new environment (particularly a confidential one) can allow disputants some degree of freedom to try out new perspectives, behaviors, or ways of working with a problem” (p. 408). The right environment can provide the opportunity for incubation and play. Creativity scholars suggest that incubation is especially helpful for insight problems such as integrative agreements (Simonton, 2003, p. 486). It may be helpful for negotiators to “take a break” and let ideas incubate. If “play becomes the midwife of creative change,” then the problem becomes how to implement play in the heat of conflict. Again, one mechanism for this is the use of the caucus, with a third party holding a private meeting with one side of the dispute.

**Seeing the Other’s Point of View.** The ability to take the point of view of the other is an important element of the collaborative, creative enterprise, and this is seen clearly in the clever experiments developed by Gruber (1990; Chapter 17, this volume). Sometimes, however, the point of view of the other is a detriment: in some cases, too much information about the other can interfere with agreement, particularly when that information underscores large value differences (Rubin, 1980).

**Cooperative and Creative.** There is evidence that some people are more likely to be creative in conflict than others. Pruitt and Lewis (1975, Experiment 2),
found that asking and giving truthful information about the issues were positively related to integrativeness of the agreements but only for negotiators who were high in cognitive complexity (which reflects an individual’s consideration of alternative conceptions of situations and better use of information for decisions). It was interesting that the overall levels of information exchange did not differ between high- and low-complexity negotiators, suggesting that the high-complexity negotiators had a lower threshold for information, that is, they were able to understand more with less. De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) argue that persons who have epistemic motives—a desire to better understand the world—will be especially adept at avoiding biases and being creative in negotiation.

CONCLUSION

The framework developed here (Figure 19.1) is founded in the role that interests play in negotiation and social conflict and how what people say or demand is often an expression of those underlying interests. Follett (1940) originated this important notion; thus, it is fitting to conclude on a point she made about how to approach underlying interests: the game of interest chess. Follett argued that the other’s positions and interests in negotiation and conflict should be anticipated, much like a chess master anticipates moves and countermoves on the chess board. And, like the chess master, this is done prior to taking any action. In other words, a careful playing through of the underlying interests and then managing them can be the key to success. Follett’s example:

A man liked motoring, his wife walking; he anticipated what her response might be to a suggestion that they motor on Sunday afternoon by tiring her out playing tennis in the morning. . . . You integrate the different interests without making all the moves . . . like a game of chess. . . . A good chess player sees the possibilities without playing them out. (Follett, 1940, p. 43)

Is managing interests in such a strategic manner cooperative or contentious? Of course, if the husband’s wife discovered that his interest in playing tennis was to get her to go for a drive, that he had an ulterior motive, the game might change; but then again, to her, a game of tennis followed by an afternoon of motoring might be just fine. And there’s the rub, the creative, silver lining to the dark contentious cloud: the result may be an asymmetric outcome—but this may be just fine with the party who accepts it. Indeed, some laboratory work suggests that strategic misrepresentation does not necessarily interfere with the development of integrative agreements (O’Connor and Carnevale, 1997).

Deutsch (this volume) details the values and norms that underlie constructive conflict resolution and includes reciprocity, human equality, shared
community, fallibility, and nonviolence. I would just add one thing to this impressive list: a **norm of creativity**, with the suggestion that a norm for a creative product may be the missing piece when peace is missing.

**Notes**

1. See [http://al-islam.org/kaaba14/1.htm](http://al-islam.org/kaaba14/1.htm); see also Rubin’s (1981) introductory chapter that describes interesting mediations of disputes in the Bible.

2. As an aside, see Carnevale and De Dreu (2006) for a sense of the wealth of perspectives on methods across many disciplines for addressing these and related questions.

3. Kahneman and Tversky (1995) indicate that a cognitive orientation to one’s own economic interest, often defined as economic rationality, can inhibit an integrative resolution of conflict, whereas an orientation that also takes in the interests of others may reach agreements that are individually and collectively more desirable than the cognitive orientation of individual economic rationality. As they put it: “It would be inappropriate to conclude, however, that departures from rationality always inhibit the resolution of conflict. There are many situations in which less-than-rational agents may reach agreement while perfectly rational agents do not. The prisoner’s dilemma is a classic example in which rationality may not be conducive for achieving the most desirable social solution” (pp. 45–56).

4. Presented here with a tribute to Joe McGrath (see McGrath, 1984).

5. Consider creativity in the pursuit of death and war, which was revealed in comments by Muhammad Dahlan, a leader of the Palestinians in Gaza, while lamenting the assassination of a leader of the Black September terrorist group: “When we lost Abu Iyad, we lost the creativity and ability to shape opinion” (Samuels, 2005).


   ... To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there’s the rub:
   For in that sleep of death what dreams may come, ... .

7. Where, for example, would the outcome in Follett’s motoring example go in the Agreement Circumplex? Do we need a Disagreement Circumplex for asymmetric agreements or for agreements where one party pulled the wool over the eyes of the other? A large issue is how the parties come to know or be aware that they have found a creative, integrative agreement. It may ultimately be a matter of appropriate measurement that takes into consideration objective and subjective factors that are immediate as well as long term.

**References**


CHAPTER TWENTY

Change and Conflict

Motivation, Resistance, and Commitment

Eric C. Marcus

Change means movement. Movement means friction. Only in the frictionless vacuum of a nonexistent abstract world can movement or change occur without that abrasive friction of conflict.

—Alinsky (1971, p. 21)

In this chapter, I consider the relationship between change processes and conflict. If we define conflict as incompatibility—of ideas, beliefs, behaviors, roles, needs, desires, values, and so on—then resolving such incompatibility leads, in some way, to change: in attitude, perception, belief, norms, behavior, roles, relationship, and so forth. I examine how conflict influences change, and vice versa—how change influences the conflict process. Last, I discuss some of the implications these influences have on the practice of training people in skills for productive conflict resolution.

I make the assumption that the process of change is, at its core, a process of conflict resolution. Therefore, one can think of change as an outcome of a constructive or destructive conflict resolution process, and the process of change as a series of conflict resolution activities that lead to some new (changed) end state. Thus, engaging in planned change gives rise to conflict; conversely, conflicts and how they are resolved exert a strong influence on the success of planned change. A second assumption I make is that there is a conceptual similarity in the process of change for individuals, groups, and organizations.

In this chapter, I look at common theoretical notions regarding the process of change and focus on three critical psychological components involved in any change effort: motivation, resistance, and commitment to change. I start by clarifying the types of change to which I am referring. What do I mean by change? I rely on a dictionary definition: “To cause to be different; to give a completely different form or appearance to; transform.” For my purposes, this discussion
centers on change affecting individuals and groups within a social context. By social change, I refer to changes in the social systems of which we are part: a dyad (a marital relationship), small groups we belong to (the fundraising committee of the PTA), and larger groups (the organization in which we work). My interest is in looking at change as it occurs in such social systems, as distinct from changes in weather patterns and other types occurring outside of our individual or social realm.

THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGE PROCESS

Although there are many psychological theories of individual change (notably the psychodynamic and learning theories), few have been applied to understand change as it occurs in social systems. On the other hand, Lewin, Beckhard, Bridges, Burke, Prochaska, and others offer theoretical conceptions to help us understand the process of change occurring in organizations and groups as well as individuals. Lewin provides an overall theoretical framework for understanding the process of change in these types of social systems. Beckhard and Harris, Bridges, Burke, and others apply the concepts to understanding planned change. Prochaska, DiClemente, and Norcross (1992) apply a similar linear notion of behavior change as it applies to individuals. I briefly review some of these conceptualizations and then explore key aspects of each and their related dynamics of motivation, resistance, and commitment during the process of change. Furthermore, observations about how planned change occurs have changed in the last several years. Approaches trying to capture the process of change by using a linear view have embraced views that are less linear, seemingly more chaotic yet patterned and even looked at as successfully coming about through dramatic, sudden episodes driven by subtle, small shifts (for example, Gladwell, 2002). I begin with the more traditional and more time-tested understandings of the process of planned change.

Lewin: The Process of Change

Much of the theorizing on the change process is rooted in Lewin’s original concepts of unfreezing, movement, and refreezing (Lewin, 1947). This is a linear description often applied to understanding change both in individuals and social systems:

Unfreezing $\rightarrow$ Movement $\rightarrow$ Refreezing

**Unfreezing.** In Lewin’s framework, the first step toward change is unfreezing, or developing openness toward something different, a melting of the solidity of the current state. Unfreezing may involve numerous methods, depending on the specific area of change. For example, to enable a group to attain higher-level
productivity, one might use social comparison processes (such as productivity data) to show how other groups are already attaining such levels. In New York City during the 1990s, one of several techniques used to engage precinct commanders in a renewed effort to reduce crime was to employ a process called “CompStat” (Computerized or Comparative Statistics). This involved using key statistical measures, gathered weekly, and reported separately by police precinct. Precinct commanders were able to see how their precincts compared with others. Those at higher and lower ends of the spectrum were singled out in public forums of peers and police “brass.” Moreover, everyone’s data were public to all present. The CompStat process is a form of feedback useful at this stage and to be discussed in greater detail in a later section. This part of the change process has also been referred to as developing awareness of the need for change (Lippitt, Watson, and Westerley, 1958). The critical psychological process involved in unfreezing is concerned with creating the motivation for becoming different.

**Driving and Restraining Forces.** Lewin’s application of force field analysis to characterize human social behavior is relevant to understanding the process of unfreezing. Force field analysis is a useful method for portraying the array of forces acting on a system at any given time, and it serves to illustrate the current state of the system. Among these forces are those that promote the change goal (driving forces) and those working in opposition to it (restraining forces). Further, the forces may differ in strength in facilitating or hindering movement. These driving and restraining forces, along with their relative strengths, together identify a “quasi-stationary equilibrium,” which reflects the current state (albeit always changing in minute ways at any given moment).

Driving forces are those motivations, attitudes, behaviors, or other characteristics of a situation that help move toward the goal or unfreeze from the present situation. In an example of someone trying to get in better physical shape, some of the forces might be tiring easily when climbing stairs, increasing difficulty getting around a tennis court, discomfort in clothes that are getting too tight, or a desire to feel better.

Restraining forces are the opposite: they are the constellation of forces working against change, working to keep the status quo. Again, with the goal of getting in better shape, some examples of restraining forces are low willpower and motivation, enjoyment of eating as a social experience, a preference for sloth, and finding oneself often in the presence of lots of unhealthy food.

To begin the process of change, or unfreezing, the driving forces must be relatively stronger than the resisting forces, and a certain level of tension must be created. Increasing tension is a key factor in unfreezing and creating motivation to change. It is the fuel that powers the beginning of the change process. For the tension to be productive, it must be experienced at an optimal level. If the
A useful construct for understanding a system’s ability to handle tension is tolerance for ambiguity or the unknown. This refers to one’s ability to handle the feelings generated by the tension in a productive way. In fact, tolerance for ambiguity is a construct cited as a core quality associated with creativity and effective leadership, as well as productive conflict resolution and successful change.

As an example, the legal order to break up the Bell system and AT&T to create competition in long-distance phone service created tension in that system (AT&T) to change (Tunstall, 1985). In this case, an external event (a federal court order) stimulated (actually forced) a process of unfreezing from the status quo. A situation that once worked—that was comfortable, successful, and stable—now becomes uncomfortable, does not work so well any longer, and forces people to look at something in a new way.

**Movement.** Once openness or a sufficient state of tension has been achieved, the next step involves transition or movement: taking some action that changes or moves the social system to a new level. Some examples of this movement in our “get-in-shape” example are eating better foods (to lose weight), walking to work rather than taking the bus (to get oneself in shape), and similar activities. Additional examples in other realms are reorganizing employees’ job responsibilities (to increase organizational efficiency) and engaging in acts of civil disobedience (to improve the social, economic, or political conditions of a particular group).

Although these activities signifying movement seem rather straightforward, complex processes are operating that make such movement difficult. Primary among these are restraining forces, described earlier, which are also a form of resistance to change. This resistance is a key psychological component playing a strong role in the transition process. Resistance is mobilization of energy to protect the status quo in the face of a real or perceived threat to it. Resistance may be thought of as behavior intended to protect one from the effect of real or imagined change (Zander, 1950). It is a key factor influencing the intensity of the conflicts that arise during change, and the ability to resolve them productively. Early on, the degree of resistance has an impact on the ease of unfreezing. The stronger the resistance, the greater the effort is needed to unfreeze from the present state.
Refreezing. Refreezing involves establishing actions or processes that support the new level of behavior and lead to resilience against those resistant forces encouraging old patterns and behaviors. In other words, deliberate steps must be taken to ensure that the new behaviors “stick,” or remain relatively permanent in the system. This is often a process of restabilizing a system to its new or changed level of functioning. For example, a group whose members are trying to embrace a norm of not talking about members behind their backs might adopt a process of frequent group meetings or avoiding discussion of interpersonal issues if all are not present. Refreezing may also be understood in terms of the degree of commitment to the new, changed state that exists in the system.

Commitment is a psychological construct that has received much empirical attention as a predictor of key organizational phenomena such as retention and performance. According to Salancik (1977), commitment is a state in which we become bound by our actions, where our beliefs about those actions keep us doing them. Salancik defines three aspects of committing behavior. It is visible, observable to oneself and others; it is irrevocable and cannot be taken back; and it is behavior undertaken of one’s own volition, or by choice. This is linked to personal responsibility: we usually accept responsibility for behavior we enact by choice.

This last component of commitment, volition, makes evidence for it ambiguous; it is not observable and can only be attributed. It is this element that distinguishes commitment from compliance. Here, I use compliance to refer to behavior whose origin lies outside of oneself and is based on the perceived values of the system. Argyris (1998) refers to compliance as external commitment, where the desired state is one of internal commitment. Many strategies for refreezing a system end up achieving compliance to change because the methods used to bring about change do not offer choice for those whose commitment is needed. On the surface, compliance looks like commitment because both kinds of behavior are public, or visible, and may be irrevocable.

There are often many opportunities that “tempt” the system to move back to behaviors associated with the prechange state. This process has been referred to as commitment testing (Marcus, 1994). It occurs when we are faced with the choice of reverting to old behaviors. For example, once we change our eating habits to be healthier, commitment testing occurs as we see the pastry carousel at the local diner, or smell butter cookies baking in the kitchen, or are invited to have a piece of seven-layer cake at a birthday party. Or, referring back to the situation where we are trying to change a group norm, we are often seduced by the invitation from colleague when they ask some variation of “can I tell you something about Chris that just happened? . . . but you have to PROMISE not to tell anyone else.” Our response to these situations is an opportunity to test as well as renew our commitment to our new behavior.
Often, commitment testing engenders conflict. In the dietary examples, one conflict is intrapersonal, the other interpersonal. The desire to support the changed state is incompatible with the desire to revert to old habits. The resolution of this conflict affects the level of success of the change. To the extent that these conflicts are resolved in support of the changed state (looking away from the carousel, leaving the kitchen, or not agreeing to the colleague’s secrecy deal), the change is likely to be successful. That is, the refrozen state is likely to stay frozen.

Beckhard: Managing Planned Change

Beckhard and Harris (1987) and others (such as Bridges, 1980, 1986) have applied these concepts to understand and manage planned organization change; they use slightly different terms when applying Lewin's concepts. Beckhard’s model can be represented as follows:

\[
\text{Current state} \rightarrow \text{Transition state} \rightarrow \text{Desired future state}
\]

When this model is applied to organization change, it often helps members develop a deeper understanding of the process and phases of planned change. Though linear looking, Beckhard suggests beginning with the end. The first step for those involved is to envision a desired future state. This helps to establish a goal for the change and serves the purpose of beginning the process of unfreezing, by creating an openness to something different. Similarly, it has been found that starting with what people desire in the future generates energy, enthusiasm, motivation, and commitment to the plan and its implementation (Lindaman and Lippitt, 1979). Once this is undertaken, the next step is to move backward and assess the current state of the organization or entity—its current capabilities, capacities, and so forth. With the envisioned future and assessment of current state, the next phase is to create a transition state. This is based, in part, on the gaps between the current state and the desired future state. These gaps (like feedback) create tension, which serve as a motivating force in the transition state. The larger the gap, or discrepancy, the greater the tension. The transition state is a way for a system to balance or modulate its own need for stability with its need for change.

Although this model is most often used in large, complex organization change, the concepts are applicable on both the individual and small group levels. Indeed, the model has been used successfully in managing many types of change, such as future search (Weisbord, 1992; on future search, see also Chapter Thirty-Three). This is a methodology for gathering all key stakeholders of a group or organization to identify and plan a desired future together. It takes place over a relatively short period of time (several days) and is intended to generate motivation, overcome resistance, and strengthen commitment to the agreed-on change plan.
Lewin’s and Beckhard’s models are presented as linear conceptions of a sequential process of change. The models imply a logic and ordering of the phases one goes through in the change process. In practice, these models of change rarely feel as though they move in a linear fashion (see Burke, 2002). Rather Burke, Prochaska, and others refer to planned change more as a spiral than a line. There are many unanticipated, unintended consequences that affect and are affected by the intended, planned change effort. Further, there is little empirical work examining the factors that may facilitate or hinder moving from one stage to the next. For example, what might be some of the conditions conducive to unfreezing? In other words, what conditions motivate unfreezing? How can resistance be weakened or overcome without inducing compliance? What factors make refreezing difficult? How is commitment to change maintained? We turn now to a discussion of these and related questions.

Motivation and Unfreezing
Whenever a change is contemplated in any social system, a key question that is often raised among the leaders of planned change is, how can we get people to “buy in” to a new state of affairs? The key psychological process these leaders are grappling with concerns generating the motivation to change, to unfreeze from the current state.

Creation of conflict is inherent in the process of unfreezing. The nature of the conflict, though differing with the situation, may be expressed as follows: “Our desire to do things as we’ve been doing them is incompatible with our need and desire to do things differently in the future.” In other words, the present state is incompatible with the desired or necessary future state. The prospect of change spurs this conflict. Beckhard’s model brings out this conflict in identifying gaps between the current state and the desired future. Bartunek (1993) refers to this as a conflict of cognitive schemas—our beliefs and expectations about ourselves and our environment. The original schema is no longer adequate and a new schema is not yet apparent. The experience of this conflict often gives rise to resistance, those forces working to protect the status quo.

Conflict creates the tension or motivating forces that call into question the status quo; it contributes to the process of unfreezing from the current state. Therefore, a curious question to consider is how to create conflict that increases the level of tension to unfreeze from the current state to move out of one’s “comfort zone.” I briefly focus on two areas: feedback and social support.

As mentioned earlier, a common method used to generate motivation centers on providing feedback to the system. This can occur in many forms. The intent is to identify and make salient discrepancies between the current state and the desired or ideal state. Feedback, or information obtained about a system from outside of the system, is a common way to increase people’s understanding of the need for change. Information constituting feedback is intended to stimulate
the kind of conflict that motivates change. Nonetheless, the conflict that might be generated by the feedback can be handled in a variety of ways, sometimes, but not always, in ways that increase the motivation to change.

There is often ample feedback available from our social environment. Unfortunately, though, such social feedback is rarely unambiguous; that is, it can be interpreted in multiple ways. Further, our interpretation (on the receiving end) is strongly influenced by factors such as our own needs and experiences, the context and timing of when it occurs, the sender or source of the feedback, and so on. Meaningful, accurate feedback can be most useful as a motivator of change when it occurs in a context of support, is nonevaluative, nonjudgmental, and builds on existing strengths of the group, community, or organization.

Earlier, I described the process of unfreezing as generating the energy to change and tolerating the ambiguity that unfreezing can foster. What contributes to the ability of an individual or group to tolerate ambiguity? One element concerns the perception that one possesses or has access to the resources needed to manage the unknown. Social support is often cited as one of those critical resources in managing significant personal change. Approaches using a “twelve-step” model (for example, Alcoholics Anonymous) rely on social support as a way to strengthen people’s tolerance for the stressful, anxious state that accompanies ambiguity during change. Social support can derive from many sources. In these programs, it comes from working in a group with individuals who share a common personal goal and who often have had similar personal experiences outside of the context of the twelve-step meetings. Social support may also stem from benevolent leadership or when those in authority contribute to the social climate in a way conducive to individuals’ being able to tolerate the ambiguity of change. Behaviors by those in authority that may enhance people’s ability to tolerate ambiguity include doing things to contribute to feelings of safety, keeping some aspects of the social environment stable and predictable, highlighting opportunities for members to support each other, and so forth.

The CompStat process (2005), as mentioned earlier, is a feedback method that was successfully used to unfreeze the New York City Police Department from the status quo. The “public” forum in which comparisons were presented created a certain degree of tension among precinct commanders responsible for their neighborhoods to improve their crime statistics.

Using formal and informal feedback methods to create motivation for change is common in organizational life: in skill training, for example when we are practicing our public presentation skills, videotaping practice sessions can be useful in enhancing the trainee’s understanding of the potential gaps between where they see themselves on the tape and where they want to be as a presenter. Another practice in many organizational contexts is the use of multirater
feedback to an individual in order to generate a level of productive tension by revealing a discrepancy between the idealized self and the way others see the individual.

**Movement and Resistance**

I stated earlier that resistance serves a protective function in any change. At the same time, resistance is cited as a key factor working against successful change. This presents a curious paradox: resistance is a necessary part of change yet can be its undoing. Our interest is in looking at two aspects of resistance: how to identify and diagnose resistance when it emerges and how to find ways to weaken it rather than strengthen it. Is change possible without resistance? Is the goal of a successful change effort to prevent forces of resistance from emerging? What factors weaken or strengthen resistance to change?

Many common practices surrounding planned change efforts view resistance similarly to conflict. That is, it is something to get rid of, stamp out, push down, and in any other manner treat as an undesirable force that needs to be eradicated. Or it may be seen merely as a nuisance that one must “get past.” If the resistant forces are linked to specific people or groups (with such language as “troublemakers,” “naysayers,” “malcontents”), a common tactic used by the larger part of the system is to try to weaken or get rid of those people—and by implication any resistance.

This orientation may sometimes lead to successful change, but it overlooks the potentially constructive role that resistance plays in the change process. In other words, resistance is a naturally emerging part of the change process or any movement away from the status quo (Connor, 1992). As Klein notes, “a necessary prerequisite of successful change is the mobilization of forces against it” (1966, p. 502). Change without resistance is akin to premature conflict resolution; the parties involved manage to avoid those necessary parts of the process that lead to real change (or real resolution).

It is likely that the conflict expressed by individuals or groups labeled as “resisters” is a type of misattributed conflict, in which the true conflict is about the planned change. In other words, conflict that emerges as expression of resistance is between the wrong parties and, in turn, over the wrong issues. Such conflicts can be viewed as a manifestation of the central conflict in any change—between what we want to be (a desired future) and what we are (the current state). Thus, in using Beckhard’s model, we uncover this central conflict early on, when we highlight the gaps between where we are and where we want to be.

It is useful to consider the observation that resistance to change may be manifested in an infinite number of creative ways (K. Sole, personal communication). Often, though, it is difficult to understand how particular behaviors or actions manifest resistance.
As an example, consider a patient’s decision to change therapists just as he is about to make significant progress in his therapeutic situation. This can be understood as a legitimate desire for the patient to seek better therapy. Another possibility is to view this as a form of resistance to the patient’s movement toward greater psychological health. The therapist can handle this situation in a variety of ways. The most constructive might be for the therapist to support the patient at this stage. This may involve reminding him that therapeutic progress is sometimes very difficult. Or it may mean suggesting to the patient that he is here by his own choice, and if he feels he would be better served by another therapist he should do so. Properly diagnosing and taking subsequent actions takes great skill on the part of the therapist. Furthermore, it contributes to the strength of the patient.

**Resistance and Conflict.** A system cannot change without experiencing conflict. How it is handled profoundly determines the success of the effort to change. Furthermore, there is a strong similarity between the process involved in successful change efforts and that involved in constructive conflict resolution.

The goal of planned change efforts is not necessarily to prevent forces of resistance from emerging, but rather to manage them productively, to weaken rather than strengthen them. Doing so is a complex and fascinating challenge. Further, there is a reciprocal relationship between handling resistance appropriately (in ways that weaken it) and the process of constructive conflict resolution. The same process used to weaken forces of resistance may also promote constructive conflict resolution. Conversely, if inappropriate strategies are used in handling resistance, it is likely that destructive processes will be used to deal with the emerging conflicts.

With this in mind, what factors might serve to strengthen or weaken resistance? Though little empirical work exists in this area, some common theoretical notions are available. One of the key variables influencing the strength of resistance occurs among those most affected by change. It concerns increasing this group’s understanding of the need for change and participation in its planning. To the extent that there is little understanding of the need for change and little participation in planning among those affected by it, the stronger the forces of resistance are likely to be (Zander, 1950). Conversely, if there is a high degree of understanding of and participation in the planned change, the resisting forces become weaker (Coch and French, 1948).

It can be hypothesized that the strongest forces of resistance are expressed by those with the greatest interest in preserving the status quo. Furthermore, resistance is aggravated and hence strengthened as more energy is directed to eradicating it. The more we try to push against the forces of resistance (through persuasion, logic, coercion) in an attempt to weaken or abolish them, the stronger they become, and the more likely they are to manifest themselves in a
multitude of ways. Zander (1950) and Deutsch (1973) identify several other factors likely to increase resistance:

- Basing the logic for the change on personal reasons rather than objective reasons
- Disregarding already established group or organizational norms
- Lack of uniformity or agreement in the rationale for the change
- Using illegitimate techniques that fall outside of the boundaries and norms of interaction
- Negative sanctions such as punishments and threats
- Sanctions that are inappropriate in kind (such as reward of money for agreeing to support a group's strategic direction)
- Influence that is excessive in magnitude

Efforts to diminish resistant forces through coercion or other means of force may lead to temporary compliance rather than lasting change (Deci, 1995).

Consider a decision to close down a plant manufacturing a product that is no longer profitable. This action has varying impact depending on how the resistance is handled. A common way of handling this type of change is to anticipate the resistant reactions of those most affected and respond to them with persuasive, convincing, well-thought-out, rehearsed, logical statements about such things as the financial need to take the action. Similarly, another approach occurs when those responsible for the decisions make every attempt to avoid the employees most affected—to lay low, disappear, or hide after the announcement is made. If those affected are denied the opportunity to express their feelings and thoughts (especially feelings of loss), strong negative attitudes are likely to emerge, along with the potential to sabotage the best interests of the organization. In other words, these actions often strengthen the forces of resistance.

Constructively Handling Resistance. We identify several factors that may strengthen resistance. What, though, are some of the conditions that may weaken resistance and foster a constructive resolution process? Some of them are a smaller change, keeping parts of the system stable; giving all parties a chance to mourn the loss that any change entails; making abundant resources available during change; and involvement by those most affected in planning their own fate. Let us consider each of these in some detail.

The first condition is a smaller change (or amount of deviation from the status quo). It is not necessary, though, to assume that only small conflicts can be resolved productively and thereby yield small change. It is useful to apply Roger Fisher's notions on fractionating conflict (1964). His methodology
suggests that we first look at any conflict and break it down into manageable pieces. While he applied these notions to large international conflicts, they can be applied to conflicts of even the smallest magnitude. Once fractionated, or broken down, Fisher suggests to work on resolving the smaller pieces first. This allows parties to experience constructive resolution. This can enhance the parties’ confidence as they progress to working on resolving larger issues, which thereby may produce greater change. This same notion of fractionating has been applied to organization change as well. In the work of Schaffer and Siegel, (2005), the creation of smaller change goals and subsequent efforts to meet those goals were more likely to produce desired change than attempting to focus primarily on a larger (more distant, amorphous) change goal whose outcomes were more difficult to see and feel by those expected to bring them about.

Another condition for weakening resistance involves keeping parts of the system stable. This is related to issues concerning the size of the change. Here, though, it is important to pay attention to the balance between stability and change. If there is too much change going on (simultaneously moving to a new house, becoming a parent, switching jobs), this may generate a level of tension that is too high for change to be productive. Keeping parts of the system stable can reduce the level of stress and tension the parties experience and therefore foster constructive resolution.

Giving parties the chance to mourn the loss that any change entails is another critical influence that may serve to weaken forces of resistance. As Levinson (1976) and Bridges (1986) have written, in any change, there is loss. If parties are able to recognize and express feelings of loss associated with change, they can move forward in the change process. Many cultures, including our own, have elaborate rituals for mourning the death of a person. Such rituals enable the mourners to accept the loss and move on. Similarly, in any change process opportunities to mourn the loss of the past play a valuable role in helping people move toward a desired future. An example that I often think about is from a company that was being acquired by a larger institution and before doing so had given employees a “tribute package,” which included a kind of yearbook with pictures and artifacts from the history of the organization. Included in this “yearbook” were spaces for employees to have colleagues sign and write in their notes and reflections, and include their own memorabilia about their years with the organization (Brooks, 1998).

Moreover, these opportunities may allow the parties to move on in more productive ways than when such opportunities are denied. One difficulty in this concerns our natural tendency to avoid thinking about the past as we move toward a desired future. This is often apparent in many planned organization change efforts. There is often a taboo against speaking about or holding on to symbols of the past. A primitive assumption implies that the past is bad,
negative, to be forgotten, and all of the hopes and dreams become bound up in the desired future. Thus, it is important to examine our assumptions about the past in order to successfully move toward the future. I am reminded here of an executive, relatively new to a recently merged financial institution, walking into the office of an “old-timer,” someone who had been with the institution over several mergers. Upon seeing mementos of past events and celebrations containing old company logos, she casually and rather lightheartedly mentioned to him that he ought to remove them from his shelf. While she did not mean to be demeaning or insulting in any way, I heard this as symbolic of these notions that what no longer exists should be erased from our identity, so that a new collective identity can more easily emerge.

It appears that one ingredient that might lower resistance is abundant availability of resources (time, money, people) to support change. However, there is a paradox here as well. Abundant resources, under some conditions, may serve to undermine the change by lowering the necessary degree of tension and therefore weaken the motivation needed to change. (For further relevant discussion, see Chapter Eighteen).

One last factor, written about extensively in the field of organization development, is to involve those most affected by change in its planning and implementation (see, for example, Burke, 1987, 2002). Participation in planning one’s future can have beneficial effects on one’s future! Involving people affected by change in planning and implementation serves to increase their commitment to any change.

With reference to handling a plant closing, I suggest that one alternative strategy is stronger presence by the leaders of the change effort among those most affected by it. The leaders of the operation could meet with employees and encourage them to express their reactions and concerns. This type of action, though understandably difficult, may serve to weaken the resistant forces productively. Further, having a chance to candidly express attitudes, conflicts, concerns, and biases in a setting where they can be heard by those with power to change the situation (regardless of whether they do change it) often serves to weaken those forces. There are many possibilities other than simply closing the plant and making immediate mass layoffs. However, it should be noted, that participation itself, though it may lower resistance, does not insure a cooperative process of resolving the inevitable conflicts that emerge in such a situation. In many ways, it increases the likelihood that conflicts will emerge and be brought to the table. This can be a sign of healthy movement to yield lasting change!

An alternative perspective on these notions of resistance comes from Gladwell’s ideas from his book *The Tipping Point* (2002). He likens change (no matter how well planned) to the spread of a virus, or “rage,” that sweeps across and engrosses
the majority of a social system. However, this does not happen from a “big bang” or by overwhelming the system, but rather through three characteristics:

- Contagiousness, or word-of-mouth spreading of an idea, product, event, desired future
- Stickiness, or the idea that small incidents or messages can have big effects and eventually will tip the balance in a particular direction, which becomes almost impossible to reverse
- The idea that change happens suddenly once a critical mass is reached

He argues that this type of change happens due to three kinds of people who have strong influence in a social system: *salespeople* who persuade, relate well, and empathize with those they are trying to influence; *connectors*—those who are part of the relevant social networks and have strong influence in those networks; and *mavens*—those individuals or groups who are collectors of information, driven to know much about a particular issue or phenomenon or product. Ultimately, these ideas have as their basis the assumption that peer pressure has more power to create change than those in formal authority. The dynamics of motivation, resistance, and commitment are bound up in Gladwell’s notions.

### Gaining Commitment

Commitment by a critical mass of people is the sufficient condition needed to sustain any change. It is the force that refreezes a system to its new, changed state. There are methods that may serve to increase the level of commitment to a new, changed state. Several strategies are similar to those methods useful for weakening forces of resistance. As just discussed, it is widely accepted that meaningful participation and involvement enable those affected to commit to the change; participation leads to commitment.

In a conflict situation, several types of action may lead to increased commitment to bring about constructive changes: recognizing that both parties are engaged by choice; acknowledging that either can walk away at any time; making unilateral statements of one’s own commitment to a mutually productive resolution; and placing oneself in a situation where avoidance of the conflict is less likely.

We can influence our own and others’ level of commitment by telling the party we are in conflict about our commitment to constructive resolution during the early stages of the conflict: “I’m determined to work this out in a way that we can both be satisfied with” or “I’ll persist until we’re both comfortable.” Such statements are public, cannot be taken back, and intend to give both parties an opportunity to commit to engaging in constructive conflict-handling skills.

Another type of action is to place oneself in a situation where avoidance of the conflict is less likely. By voluntarily doing so, we force ourselves to take action that we might not otherwise take. If I’m angry at a colleague for some action
he took but concerned about letting him know I’m angry, I might avoid contact with him and therefore the prospect of telling him about my feelings. If, though, I voluntarily place myself in closer proximity to him, I increase the likelihood that we will work on the conflict, and present a greater possibility for productive benefit than continued avoidance.

It is important to further differentiate processes that might increase commitment from those that increase compliance. From the preceding discussion we can understand that it is difficult to discern when a group or individual is complying with someone else’s wishes and when the behavior reflects true change. In any system where there is a power hierarchy, gaining commitment to change becomes especially tricky. Although the outcome (committing to change versus complying with another’s wishes) looks the same on the surface, understanding the methods used is one way to see which outcome we are headed for. That is, when those higher in the authority structure use methods of coercion (methods likely to feed forces of resistance), in a context where two-way communication between the hierarchy levels is not supported, the desired behaviors are surely meant to comply with the wishes of those in higher authority. Further, the long-term effect of compliance is that behaviors revert to the prechange state, whenever the people above are not around. As an example, consider efforts of parents to change a particular behavior of a child (burping, for example) that is often considered socially unacceptable among many adults. If those with greater power use methods that diminish forces of resistance (such as relying on high participation and involvement among those lower in the hierarchy—engaging the child in active discussion, active listening, providing opportunities to mourn the loss of what people are giving up), they may see greater commitment to the changes being sought. This is visible as the behaviors “stick” even when no one in higher authority is around to notice them.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

Several implications for training emerge from this discussion. Let us briefly explore how the newly trained conflict resolver may act as a change agent within her own social system. Here I am referring to the issue of finding ways to change the system to which the newly trained conflict resolver returns.

The question I address is how can the trained conflict resolver be an effective change agent? A difficulty that people often experience after receiving training in a particular skill area is how to practice the new skills back in a setting that does not necessarily support developing those skills in the first place. How can we apply what we know about the change process to encourage changing a system to be more supportive of constructive conflict resolution skills?
With this question in mind, we can apply the same three psychological principles involved in change to this application: create the motivation to change systemic conflict resolution skills, overcome people’s resistance to changing those skills, and generate commitment to constructive conflict resolution skills in future conflicts in the system.

Thus, the person who enhances their conflict resolution skills through training can be seen as a representative of the system whose conflict skills need strengthening. The person’s role is twofold: first, to acquire productive conflict skills and, second, to transfer those skills to the system that offered the resources for the individual to attend the training. This second role involves becoming a change agent.

### Generating Motivation

To become a change agent after conflict training, one needs to identify where the system is in relation to strengthening its conflict resolution skills. We can assume that the act of undertaking training in this area is a sign of unfreezing from the current state. However, we must not confuse this sign with the system’s motivation to change. It is seductive to believe that by providing training to members an organization will, upon completion of the training, believe that it has become skilled in the area of training. We must also consider how to change the system that endorses the training. To begin this process, it is useful for the change agent to reflect on the nature of her own changes—how she may have moved closer to a desired future state with regard to conflict-handling skills.

Further, the skilled conflict resolver must work at making salient to the system some desired future state, or change goal. This can be done by reflecting on the initial reasons for undertaking the training. These may include, for example, the desire to reduce divisiveness between professional staff and support staff. A way to create tension, then, would be to highlight the gaps between the current state of divisiveness and the desired future state, say, by articulating a sense of introspection about where the system currently is or posing questions about the current state to groups of stakeholders (perhaps the leadership of the organization, the two groups with a history of divisiveness, or one’s peers). From these activities, it is important to identify a group that, in the change agent’s judgment, demonstrates sufficient readiness for change: people who are most interested in strengthening their own skills in ways that the change agent has done. Stated prescriptively, find where there already exists some motivation and begin efforts there. Using Gladwell’s terminology, we want to find those who are conflict “mavens,” others, similarly inclined, who are strong at connecting appropriate people together, and “salespeople” who can broaden interest in such change.
Identifying and Handling Resistance

Many forces operate to move the individual and the social system back to the pretraining state, among them using the hierarchy and power structure to resolve conflict, leaders’ modeling of poor conflict-handling skills, and using verbal or physical threats or abuse to resolve issues. It is an important first step for the conflict resolver to be aware of (and not overwhelmed by) the power of those forces working to maintain the status quo. Further, it is difficult to anticipate all the manifestations of resistance that may arise. Nonetheless, the key idea to keep in mind is not how to prevent resistance from developing but rather how to recognize and handle it productively.

One idea for doing this is to focus on how the conflict resolver himself is learning and changing, rather than focusing on how the other, or the system, needs to change. Schein (in Coutu, 2002) eloquently discusses the importance of this among change agents: unless they become willing to look at themselves and acknowledge their own anxieties, conflicts, vulnerabilities (and strengths), then any efforts at changing the system will never take place. Second, change agents often devote too much attention and resources to those most resistant to a change, underemphasizing the degree of attention and support needed by those individuals and groups who are least resistant. Another way to look at this is to increase the level of support, attention, and resources to those whose motivation for change is already high. To some, preaching to the converted is redundant or a waste of energy. It can, though, play a valuable role in helping to spread the positive energy for change and thereby lessen the effects of negative forces against change. This embodies the notions that Gladwell speaks of in creating the tipping point, or the point at which the seesaw swings in the desired direction and where the forces to go back are overwhelmed.

Fostering Commitment

Several ideas can be applied to generating commitment to changing a system’s conflict-handling skills. First, the change agent must create opportunities for key members of the system to participate in planning how their skills are to be strengthened. If, for example, the change agent must reduce intergroup conflict, she might engage members of both groups in strategizing effective ways of bringing parties together. Under the guidance of the conflict resolver, this type of session might serve both to model effective conflict-handling skills and to build some of the commitment needed for further strengthening the skills in the system.

A related idea about generating commitment has to do with free choice. Choosing the level of involvement people wish to pursue in the change effort (and making that choice salient to them) contributes to commitment. In many social systems, especially in work settings, we come to believe that we are in an unpleasant situation by force. This is rarely the case. Reminding people about their choice in these matters can be freeing, both reducing resistance and generating commitment. Thus, if people don’t want to participate in strengthening their
conflict skills, the change agent should not mandate or force their participation. Such action merely leads to compliance and other increases in resistance.

CONCLUSION

It was my intent, in this chapter, to look at some of the linkages and interrelationships between conflict processes and change. I have discussed the bidirectional nature of the processes involved in change and conflict. My view is that any change process—at the individual, group, organizational, community, or societal level—finds conflict inherent in the process. Similarly, any conflict resolution process brings about change in some form, between or within the parties in conflict.

I have highlighted three important psychological components of the change process and how they influence the course of conflict. Motivation, resistance, and commitment are by no means the only psychological dynamics involved in change. It is my contention, though, that they are important enough to warrant further theorizing and empirical study as they relate to conflict and change. Furthermore, it would behoove the conflict resolution practitioner to work with these dynamics as they relate to changing a system in which any conflict training takes place. Since the first edition of this handbook, I have noticed through my work with individuals and groups, that there is a small but more frequent interest in, acceptance of, and eagerness to explore the connections between the difficult work of planned change and the productive use of conflict during change. I am encouraged by this and continue to do what I can to fuel this motivation!

References


CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Changing Minds

_Persuasion in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution_

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The focus of this chapter is on persuasion and attitude change in negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. We define _persuasion_ as the principles and processes by which people’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are formed, modified, or resist change in the face of others’ attempts at influence. These attempts are designed to convince targets of persuasion to accept a position on some issue that differs from their current position.

Persuasion is distinct from coercion in that persuasion involves influence designed to change people’s minds, whereas coercion involves influence designed to change people’s behavior (with little regard for whether they have actually changed their minds). For example, in a conflict between labor and management, company employees might attempt to _persuade_ the managers to raise wages by pointing out that higher wages will increase motivation and commitment among workers, thereby benefiting the company as a whole. Or, they might attempt to _coerce_ the managers to raise wages by threatening to strike if their demands are not met. Research on social influence has established that if public compliance is not accompanied by private acceptance (in this case, truly believing that there is good reason to raise wages), the outcomes of influence are typically ephemeral and unstable. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.) Persuasion is therefore an important tool in creating lasting settlements between parties in conflict.

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Although many participants in negotiation bring an impressive amount of implicit knowledge to the conflict resolution setting, an increased understanding of the principles and processes that underlie persuasion can help improve the processes and outcomes of a negotiation. In this chapter, we review major theories and findings in the field of persuasion, summarize related research in negotiation or intergroup settings, and discuss implications for conflict resolution.

AN OVERVIEW OF PERSUASION THEORY AND RESEARCH

Although theory and research on persuasion have been brought to bear on the study of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution, our perusal of recent reviews (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley, 2000; Pruitt, 1998) suggests that conflict researchers may be largely unaware of current advances in understanding persuasion. We begin by illustrating the research paradigm that has guided both historical and contemporary approaches to persuasion. We then discuss a broad theoretical perspective on persuasion that distinguishes between two basic ways in which people think (called a dual-process perspective).

The Paradigmatic Persuasion Experiment

Before we discuss theory and research in persuasion, it is important to understand how research is typically conducted in this area of social psychology and how we can (and cannot) relate the results obtained in such settings to real-world situations such as negotiation. In this section, we describe the prototypical persuasion experiment, highlight key differences between the laboratory and the “real world,” and discuss how persuasion research has addressed this gap.

The prototypical persuasion study takes place in a university laboratory and investigates what effect exposure to persuasive messages has on an audience’s attitudes, beliefs, or behavioral intentions. These studies typically involve a message (information about a given issue), a source (the communicator of the message), and an audience or recipient (the person receiving the persuasive message). Most notably, such studies examine the extent to which message recipients’ attitudes move toward the position advocated in the message. Such messages are designed to convey not only the specific position advocated by the source, but also a series of arguments that support the truth, desirability, or reasonableness of that position. In most studies, a single message, attributable to a single source, is presented to each recipient. Researchers then typically measure recipients’ attitudes toward the issue discussed, perceptions of the source, memory of the arguments presented, and/or freely generated thoughts or ideas about the issue.

The issues addressed in such paradigmatic persuasion studies are wide-ranging, including foreign affairs (for example, should Israel withdraw from the West Bank?), racial issues (affirmative action, policing policies), business and government
proposals (retirement benefits, corporate mergers), and a host of more mundane issues of relevance to targeted audience members’ work, school, or personal lives. The traditional paradigm allows experimenters to study how aspects of the source, the message, and the recipient influence attitude change. For example, research has established that persuasion tends to increase as the perceived trustworthiness, expertise, and likeability of a source increase or as the number and strength of the arguments presented increase. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.)

Despite the range of issues and variables studied in persuasion research, the essential paradigm is somewhat constrained in its portrayal of natural persuasion settings. A one-way, source-to-audience model of persuasion only directly reflects some of the contexts in which social influence occurs. Although it might afford an accurate picture of persuasion through exposure to public media such as television, newspaper, and the Internet, or in public forums such as political rallies, it is unlikely to capture the dynamic aspects of persuasion that occur in the kinds of interpersonal interaction that characterize negotiations.

In contrast to the one-shot, one-way message transmissions used in the persuasion paradigm, conflict and conflict resolution involve dynamic, repeated interactions between sources and targets who together engage in bidirectional, mutual attempts at persuasion. Additionally, attempts at influence may be directed not only at one’s opponent, but also at the groups represented by each party and at any mediators who might be present (and the mediator may meanwhile attempt to influence the negotiators). Moreover, the messages exchanged during negotiations often address multiple, related issues and the relations among them (such as order of priority), rather than single, independent ones. Finally, in negotiations, the parties are interdependent, rather than autonomous: their outcomes depend on one another’s actions (Neal and Bazerman, 1991). These differences between the typical negotiation setting and the typical persuasion paradigm are important to bear in mind as we review the persuasion literature.

Persuasion researchers can and do study persuasion as it relates to complex social settings; they traditionally do so by adding layers of complexity to the basic paradigm described earlier. This involves introducing new variables that capture the essential features of particular settings. For example, researchers have explored the role of multiple sources by varying whether persuasive messages are attributed to a single source or to multiple sources and have examined the effects of direct interpersonal influence by leading study participants to expect an interaction with the message source. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998.)

So, although the prototypical persuasion paradigm serves as the underlying framework for theory and research, it has been treated only as a skeletal framework onto which variables are added to understand more fully the complex processes of persuasion. At the same time, it is clear that the framework represents in some ways a simplification of social influence in real-life contexts, such as those
involving conflict resolution, and it is probably the case that no one experi-
mental paradigm in persuasion can ever address all the inherent complexities
of persuasion in such situations with complete success. Nevertheless, we believe
that the study of persuasion, using variations of its basic paradigm, can inform
us about how attitude change occurs in a wide range of conflict resolution set-
tings. The basic paradigm and its modifications permit us to address a host of
issues manageably. The leap from there to real-world conflict resolution settings
is sizeable but feasible, given good theory about both conflict and persuasion.

The Heuristic-Systematic Model

Theories of persuasion that explain how attitude change occurs as a result of
two qualitatively different modes of processing are called *dual-process theories*.
Dual-process perspectives have been increasingly influential in numerous
domains of social psychology, including prejudice, stereotyping, and decision
making (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999) and have recently been applied in the
negotiation domain as well (see De Dreu, 2004).

Our theoretical perspective, called the *heuristic-systematic model* (Chaiken,
Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Chen and Chaiken, 1999), is one of several dual-
process models proven to be important in contemporary social psychology. We
 treat this model simply as a perspective, borrowing terms and insights from
other dual-process models wherever it is useful to do so. Our goal is to acquaint
the reader with dual-process models in general and exploit the general
perspective these models offer for understanding conflict and negotiation.

**Modes of Information Processing.** Like other dual-process theories, the
heuristic-systematic model proposes two distinct modes of information
processing. *Systematic processing* involves attempts to thoroughly understand
any information encountered through careful attention, deep thinking, and
intensive reasoning about relevant stimuli (such as arguments, sources, and the
causes of sources’ behavior) and to integrate this information as a basis for
subsequent attitudes, judgments, and behaviors. A systematic approach to pro-
cessing information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might entail reading
as many magazine and newspaper reports as possible to learn and develop an
opinion about the “best” course of action for a given party. Not surprisingly,
such systematic information processing entails a great deal of mental effort,
requiring both deliberate attention and allocation of mental resources. Thus,
systematic processing is unlikely to occur unless a person is both *able* and
*motivated* to do it.

Relative to systematic processing, *heuristic processing* is much less demand-
ing in terms of the mental work required and much less dependent on adequate
levels of personal or situational capacity (such as knowledge and time). In fact,
heuristic processing has often been characterized as relatively automatic insofar
as it requires little cognitive effort and capacity (Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Heuristic processing involves focusing on salient and easily comprehended cues, such as a source’s credentials, the group membership of those endorsing an opinion, or the number of arguments presented. These cues activate well-learned decision rules known as heuristics. Examples include “experts know best,” “in-group but not out-group sources can be trusted,” and “argument length implies argument strength.” These simple associative rules allow judgments, attitudes, and intentions to be formed quickly and efficiently, with little additional cognitive processing. A heuristic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might involve simply adopting the opinion of a noted Middle-East political expert. Put simply, heuristics are the *ifs* in an if-then rule structure, and judgments are the *thens* (“If expert, then agree”).

**Cognitive Consequences of Processing Modes.** Although heuristic processing is more superficial, and systematic processing involves greater depth of detail, neither mode is necessarily more or less rational. Nonoptimal, poor, or biased judgments can ensue from either mode. In the case of heuristic processing, many of the mental rules of thumb that people use to make judgments have proven useful and reliable in the past and should presumably remain so in the present. Moreover, in a world that offers abundant information but too little time or opportunity to think in a detailed, systematic way about every decision, heuristic processing can be highly functional.

However, heuristic processing is obviously fallible. Experts can sometimes be wrong, one’s own group is not always right, and numerous reasons are not always good reasons. Thus, although heuristic processing can and often does produce reasonable judgments that people hold with relatively high confidence, it can sometimes produce judgments that are different—and subjectively poorer—than those people would reach if they processed information more systematically. This is because systematic processing of persuasive appeals can increase both the breadth and depth of a person’s issue-relevant knowledge in ways that heuristic processing cannot.

Systematic processing involves sustained attention and information search. This can increase the depth of understanding about a particular issue, or at least about a particular point of view. Moreover, when driven by a need for accuracy, systematic processing can involve more objective and evenhanded thinking than heuristic processing, which tends to be biased in favor of prior judgments and habitual responses. Controlled, objective, systematic thought can increase the breadth of knowledge about a given issue and, more importantly, about alternative perspectives from which it can be understood.

For example, systematic processing driven by accuracy motivation can lead to complex thought patterns that involve examining issues from multiple viewpoints and weighing the pros and cons of opposing perspectives. Research on cognitive complexity has established that a number of advantages are
associated with this kind of reasoning, including diminished susceptibility to overconfidence, and superior performance in group problem solving (Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993; Tetlock, 1992). Of special relevance to conflict settings, cognitive complexity has been associated with increasing tolerance for alternative viewpoints, facilitating compromise, and identifying integrative solutions to conflict (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Tetlock, Armor, and Peterson, 1994). Hence, individuals who process information in cognitively complex ways are often more effective in conflict and decision-making settings.

Importantly, systematic processing is more likely than heuristic processing to lead to deep, pervasive cognitive restructuring. This means that the cognitive changes that occur as a consequence of systematic processing are likely to persist and thus affect future judgments and behavior, relative to the changes that accompany heuristic processing. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998.) Hence, in the long run, systematic processing may well produce more optimal judgments than heuristic processing.

Sources of Bias. Although enduring, systematic processing is far from foolproof. This is because the cognitive effort associated with systematic processing does not necessarily mean that all possible information will be sought out and weighed in an evenhanded manner. In fact, sometimes systematic processing simply strengthens prior convictions. Systematic processing can be biased both by “cool” cognitive factors (such as a message recipient’s existing attitudes and knowledge structures) and, as discussed later, “hotter” motivational factors (such as a recipient’s goals or ideological commitments).

People’s attitudes can exert a selective effect at virtually all stages of information processing. Existing attitudes bias our attention to information in the environment (we tend to selectively seek and attend to information that confirms our existing attitudes), our interpretation of this information (for example, how extreme we judge a statement to be that is dissimilar to our existing attitudes), and our memory for attitude-relevant information (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). The way our minds organize information often makes it easier for us to process information that is congenial to our own attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, 1998). Thus, through the cool, cognitive process of critically thinking about a source’s arguments, perceivers may find themselves genuinely swayed by arguments that fit their preexisting beliefs and attitudes.

Importantly, even if perceivers engage in modest to high amounts of systematic processing, heuristics can provide one such source of cognitive bias. For example, consider the possible impact of listening to a Democratic senator versus a Republican senator argue for a new law designed to provide a compromise between prolife and prochoice positions on abortion in the United States. Perhaps you are a Democrat and share a social identity with the Democratic senator. Before hearing the speaker, and without necessarily consciously
thinking about it, you are likely to have already formed the tentative, heuristic-based expectation that a Democrat’s arguments will be more compelling and valid than a Republican’s. This may guide systematic processing in a way that verifies your initial expectation. As you attend to a Democrat’s arguments, you may perceive them to be compelling, and you may elaborate them in ways that make them even more convincing (“This will not only help decrease the number of poor women resorting to unsafe abortions, but also focus attention on other problem areas”). In contrast, if you instead hear exactly the same arguments put forth by a Republican, you may not perceive them to be very credible and may interpret and elaborate the arguments in ways that make them even less plausible (“. . . and besides, in the long run this will undermine progress toward a woman’s right to choose”).

Motives for Processing

Researchers have identified three types of motives that influence how individuals process information. An accuracy motive is geared toward discovering what is correct. The other two “directional” motives are geared toward validating a particular judgment or stance: defense motivation is self-focused and egoistic, whereas impression motivation is other-focused and relational. (See Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Kunda, 1990.)

The motivation to attain accurate judgments is pervasive in everyday life, because we need to accurately understand the world around us in order to behave effectively. When accuracy motivation is present but not particularly great, people tend to look for heuristic cues that signal accuracy, such as source credibility. Indeed, communicators often seek to enhance others’ perceptions of them as trustworthy experts and likeable individuals, because this provides heuristic information to the recipients about the accuracy of the advocated position. However, if accuracy motivation increases, heuristic processing may be accompanied by systematic processing; if we want to be very confident that a judgment is accurate, we are often uncomfortable making a snap decision based on a simple heuristic.

How much processing occurs, and thus whether heuristic or systematic processing dominates judgment, depends primarily on (1) the extent to which judgment-relevant heuristics are accessible (for example, the “in-group sources can be trusted” heuristic may be particularly salient in conflict situations; see Chen and Chaiken, 1999); (2) the extent to which personal and situational capacity for systematic processing is adequate (in negotiations, anxiety or time constraints could decrease the capacity for systematic processing); (3) the extent to which one believes that systematic processing will indeed confer better judgments; and (4) the level of judgmental confidence a perceiver desires. Assuming the first three factors are in place, our theoretical perspective predicts that people will process as little as possible but as much as necessary: in
general, people want to satisfy their goals as efficiently as possible, without expending unnecessary effort. As the desired level of confidence increases, the minimal amount of processing necessary to reach this “sufficiency threshold” increases as well (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996).

Thus, when accuracy motivation is modest (or when capacity is inadequate), heuristic cues such as source expertise, consensus opinion, and people’s own attitudes and ideologies can exert a powerful influence on judgment—regardless of persuasive arguments or other information that might otherwise temper or reverse the heuristic-based judgment (Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly, 1996; Petty and Wegener, 1998). Ample systematic processing occurs only if accuracy motivation is higher—for example, if the issue is of great personal importance or the perceiver is accountable to others (but bear in mind that accuracy-motivated systematic processing can still be biased by initial heuristics).

Although accuracy motivation is pervasive, other motivations may often supplant or at least compete with it (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996). Defense motivation compels message recipients to process information in ways that protect and validate beliefs, images, and interests that are important to their sense of self. For instance, these beliefs could be about one’s own valued qualities (“I’m intelligent”), one’s fundamental underlying value commitments (“Anyone can achieve success in my society through hard work”), or one’s identity in valued groups (“Being Jewish is important to who I am and what I value”). These self-interests or self-definitional beliefs are defended because the perceiver feels, at least unconsciously, that overall personal integrity and well-being would be threatened if they were challenged.

When defense motivation is present but moderate, desired confidence and therefore the amount of processing are also moderate. Thus, heuristic processing dominates judgment—but defensively, or selectively. In other words, since the goal of processing is to arrive at judgments that protect the self, heuristics are selected to the extent that they serve this goal. For example, a defense-motivated target might invoke the heuristic “experts know best” if the position of an expert source reinforced the target’s cherished values and social identity, but might choose a different heuristic (for example, “out-group sources can’t be trusted”) if the position threatened his social identity. When defense motivation is strong, additional, systematic processing occurs until the target is sufficiently confident in her self-protective judgment. However, defense-motivated systematic processing is biased by one’s favored position. For example, targets tend to counterargue information that threatens their preferred position (Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, and Chaiken, 2001).

The third broad motivational concern addressed by our perspective is impression motivation, which involves considering the interpersonal consequences of expressing a particular judgment in a given social context (such as in an interaction between two negotiators). Here, the target’s goal is to express positions
that are socially acceptable to other people in their environment. As with
defense motivation, impression-motivated processing is not necessarily self-
conscious and is marked by a selective bias.

Impression-motivated heuristic processing entails selective application of
heuristics that ensure a smooth interaction with specific others. For example,
when interacting with a person or group whose views on an issue are unknown
or vague, a perceiver might invoke the heuristic “moderate judgment minimizes
disagreement.” On the other hand, when others’ views are known, a “go along
to get along” heuristic might better serve the same goal.

With sufficient cognitive capacity and higher levels of impression motivation,
people may also process systematically, but selectively. Thus, a negotiator who
is motivated not only to be well-liked by others but also to appear forceful and
expert may systematically process information from other participants so as to
be prepared to counterargue their positions and arguments. Importantly, parties
in conflict resolution are often concerned with the impressions they make on
multiple audiences, and the content of the desired impressions may differ
depending on the audience. For example, a negotiator seeking to resolve an inter-
national conflict may be motivated to look collaborative to the other party, tough
and competent to his constituency, and dignified to the world at large. Which of
these audiences is most salient at a given moment may influence which desired
impression motivates the negotiator’s information processing.

Illustrating the importance of impression-motivated processing, Chen and
Chaiken (1999) reported a study in which participants anticipated a discussion
about a social issue with a partner who allegedly held either a favorable or an
unfavorable opinion on the issue. Before this discussion, participants read
“imagination scenarios” subtly designed to activate (or “prime”) either the
accuracy goal of determining a valid opinion or the impression goal of getting
along with another person. After this task, participants familiarized themselves
with the discussion issue by reading an evaluatively balanced essay concerning
the issue (in this case, whether election returns should be broadcast while polls
are still open). Participants then listed the thoughts that had occurred to them
as they read the essay and indicated their own issue attitudes. Finally, they
learned that there would be no actual discussion and were excused.

Impression-motivated participants expressed attitudes that were much more
congruent with their alleged partners’ attitudes than did accuracy-motivated
participants: when the partner favored one side of the issue, they favored the
same side, whereas when the partner opposed it, they opposed it. Interestingly,
accuracy-motivated and impression-motivated participants exhibited the same
amount of systematic processing (as measured by the number of issue-relevant
thoughts that were listed). However, whereas accuracy-motivated participants’
systematic processing was open-minded and unbiased by their partners’
attitudes, impression-motivated participants exhibited systematic processing that
was biased toward their partners’ attitudes. For example, when the partner favored allowing broadcasts of election returns while the polls were still open, impression-motivated participants listed thoughts that revealed much more favorable thinking about arguments supporting the broadcasting of returns and more unfavorable thinking about arguments opposing it.

Although accuracy motivation, defense motivation, and impression motivation may sometimes operate in isolation from one another, it is likely that multiple motives may be relevant in any given setting. A negotiator, for example, may be motivated both to attain an accurate understanding of the opposing party’s needs and demands and to present an image of himself as tough and assertive. Thus, both heuristic and systematic processing may be influenced by more than a single motivation.

To examine contexts in which multiple motives are operative, Zuckerman and Chaiken (cited in Chen and Chaiken, 1999) conducted an experiment similar to the Chen and Chaiken study described above. Instead of directly activating accuracy versus impression motivation, Zuckerman and Chaiken used a mood manipulation to influence the relative importance of the motivations. Participants were randomly assigned to watch either a comedy routine by Jerry Seinfeld (the “good mood” condition) or a videotape concerning house building (the “neutral mood” condition). Because positive mood generally increases people’s confidence in their own abilities and hence their tolerance for interpersonal conflict, it was hypothesized that placing participants in a good mood would mitigate impression motivation.

Consistent with the idea that impression motivation would drive information processing in a basic get-acquainted discussion with a partner, participants who watched the neutral film engaged in impression-motivated processing, favoring the issue more when their alleged partner did so. In contrast, consistent with the idea that being in a positive mood increases toleration for disagreement or self-confidence in expressing one’s own attitude, positive-mood participants expressed attitudes that were relatively unaffected by their partner’s position. Moreover, they arrived at their attitudes through unbiased, accuracy-motivated systematic processing.

Conclusions Regarding the Two Modes of Cognitive Processing
Although the heuristic-systematic model focuses primarily on the motivational and processing mechanisms that govern recipients’ responses to persuasive communications, it also has important implications for those who seek to persuade. To increase the potential for evenhanded consideration of issues and long-term attitude change, negotiators and mediators should in general seek to facilitate accuracy goals and maximize systematic processing among all parties. Additionally, negotiators should attempt to manage the heuristic cues included in their messages. Negotiators can, for example, demonstrate their knowledge
and authenticity to maximize others’ perceptions that they are expert, trustworthy, and likable. They can also be aware of and try to mitigate factors, such as time pressure and stress, that heighten reliance on heuristic processing by limiting motivation and capacity to process. By facilitating mutual persuasion, participants in conflict resolution can increase the likelihood of identifying win-win solutions and creating long-lasting agreements.

PERSUASION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In recent years, persuasion theory has been increasingly incorporated into research on the processes underlying negotiation and conflict resolution. In this section, we discuss these advances in light of our heuristic-systematic perspective and address other areas of persuasion research that have implications for conflict situations.

Heuristic and Systematic Processing in Negotiation Settings

Recent research exploring heuristic and systematic processing in negotiation simulations has confirmed the utility of the dual-process perspective for understanding information processing in conflict settings. When negotiators have modest levels of motivation (or low cognitive capacity), they often rely on heuristics such as fixed pie assumptions (the perception that a negotiation is a zero-sum game), initial anchor values (for example, first offers, or information about the value of agreements typically reached), and stereotypes about an opponent’s group membership. (See De Dreu, 2004, for a review.) In contrast, when motivation and capacity are relatively high, reliance on these heuristics tends to decrease as systematic processing increases.

Researchers have identified several factors that influence the extent to which people process information in negotiations. (See De Dreu, 2004.) These factors include both stable individual differences and temporary elements of a given situation that influence motivation and/or capacity. For instance, individuals high in the dispositional need for cognitive closure—that is, the desire to reach a judgment quickly and avoid ambiguity (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994)—are more likely to rely solely on heuristics than are those who have a low need for closure.

Temporary, situation-specific factors such as the presence of a highly involving task or process accountability (the need to justify the way in which a decision is made) tend to increase the extent of systematic processing, whereas time pressure and aversive conditions (noise, for instance) tend to decrease such processing. For example, De Dreu (2003) examined the effect of time pressure on fixed-pie perceptions. Business students were placed into pairs and asked to play the role of a buyer or seller in a negotiation over the purchase of a car. The
negotiation task was designed to hold integrative potential: the different issues varied in importance to the two negotiators, so that an integrative solution that capitalized on this variation in priorities would be more beneficial to both negotiators than a 50/50 split based on a fixed-pie assumption. Participants were led to believe that they had either plenty of time in which to complete the negotiation (low time pressure condition) or relatively little time (high time pressure condition). Participants were more likely to revise their fixed-pie assumptions, which led to higher joint outcomes, under low rather than high time pressure. These results suggest that time pressure reduces systematic processing, heightening reliance on heuristic cues such as fixed-pie perceptions and preventing negotiators from capitalizing on integrative potential.

Multiple Motives in Conflict Resolution

Historically, the study of conflict has emphasized the importance of underlying motives in driving behavior. A negotiator may be motivated to further her own party’s interests, to cooperatively explore integrative potential in an effort to expand the pie, to defend her own beliefs and those of her group, and/or to convey a favorable image of herself to her opponent, any third parties, and her constituency. Although the classic definition of the negotiation as a “mixed-motive” situation focuses mainly on negotiators’ conflicting motives of cooperation and competition, conflict settings can be characterized by a wide range of motivations held by a wide range of participants. In the following discussion, we examine the cooperation-competition distinction common in the negotiation field, and then return to our three broad motives of accuracy, defense, and impression, now in the context of conflict resolution.

Social Motivation. The theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1973) and dual-concern theory (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986) suggest that social motives are critical to understanding negotiator behavior. A basic distinction between two broad social motives—motivation to maximize one’s own outcomes (a competitive, egoistic motivation) and motivation to maximize joint outcomes (a cooperative, prosocial motivation)—is frequently utilized in conflict research and has been shown to influence information processing in these settings. (See De Dreu and Carnevale, 2003.)

Social motivation may arise from individual differences (such as social value orientation: the tendency to prefer a certain distribution of outcomes between oneself and another person, see Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975) or from elements of the situation. Situational elements shown to increase prosocial motivation include instructions from trusted authorities to be cooperative (versus competitive), reinforcement for cooperative (versus competitive) behavior, expecting a future interaction with the other party, viewing a task as a cooperative (rather than competitive) enterprise, and focusing on similar (versus
differing) group memberships. (See De Dreu, 2004, for a review.) For example, Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004) found that simply changing the title of a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game from “The Wall Street Game” to “The Community Game” drastically increased cooperative behavior among Stanford undergraduates, presumably by increasing participants’ motivation to cooperate with their partner during the task. Negotiators and mediators can use such techniques to increase prosocial motivation in conflict settings. Changing the terminology associated with a negotiation (for example, calling it “joint problem solving”), emphasizing the ongoing relationship between parties, and highlighting shared group membership could all help to increase cooperative behavior.

Like defense and impression motivation, social motivations can lead to selective processing geared toward fulfilling competitive or cooperative goals. For example, De Dreu and Boles (1998) measured participants’ social value orientation and asked them to read a list of competitive and cooperative heuristics (for example, “your gain equals my loss” and “equal split is fair”) in preparation for a negotiation task. Participants were later given a surprise memory quiz in which they were asked to recall as many of the heuristics on the original list as possible. Prosocial participants recalled more cooperative than competitive heuristics, whereas egoistic participants recalled more competitive than cooperative heuristics. Social motivation thus influenced information processing such that individuals remembered heuristics consistent with their goal to be competitive or cooperative.

Although competitive and cooperative motives are clearly basic elements of conflict situations, we may gain a finer-grained understanding of persuasion in these contexts by linking social motives with the tripartite analysis of motivation discussed earlier. Competitive, or egoistic, motivation is often comparable to defense motivation: both involve concern with protecting the self or the in-group against threats to actual resources or to self- or group esteem. Consistent with this idea, cross-cultural research has shown that members of individualist cultures (typically assumed to be more egoistic) often view themselves as more fair than other people, whereas members of collectivist cultures (typically assumed to be more prosocial) are less likely to exhibit this self-serving bias (Gelfand and others, 2002). Egoistic motivation may therefore involve a desire to defend oneself and one’s group.

In contrast, prosocial motivation may often be associated with accuracy and/or impression motivations. Concern with both parties’ outcomes should give rise to accuracy motivation, because open-minded processing of all available information provides the best route to discovering integrative potential and maximizing joint outcomes. Prosocial motivation may also be associated with impression motivation: the desire to cooperate and the desire to make a good impression seem reciprocally linked. If two countries want to cooperate with each other, their leaders will probably seek to establish and maintain a positive
relationship; conversely, if the leaders are motivated to maintain a positive relationship, they will often seek to cooperate.

Thus, whereas egoistic motivation and defense motivation seem closely intertwined, prosocial motivation may be linked to accuracy and/or impression motivation. We turn now to consider how these three broad motives operate in conflict settings.

**Accuracy Motivation.** Accuracy motivation in conflict situations may be induced by a number of factors, including prosocial motivation as discussed above. Certain kinds of accountability can also give rise to accuracy motivation (see Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). When an individual expects to discuss an issue with, justify a decision to, or be evaluated by an unknown audience, he or she tends to engage in preemptive self-criticism, displaying motivation to arrive at an accurate conclusion (see for example Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger, 1989). Thus, when a negotiator is accountable to an audience whose views are unknown, he is likely to process information in an open-minded fashion. To test this idea in a negotiation context, De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel (2000) randomly assigned business student participants to high-accountability and low-accountability conditions before asking them to engage in a mock negotiation over the purchase of a car. In the high-accountability condition, participants expected that their negotiation strategies and decisions would be reviewed and evaluated several days later by an experienced negotiator and a psychologist. In the low-accountability condition, participants did not receive this information. The results showed that under high accountability, participants were more likely to revise their fixed-pie assumptions and obtain higher joint outcomes. Increasing accuracy motivation therefore increases the likelihood that integrative solutions will be identified and utilized when they exist. In general, accuracy goals seem desirable in conflict situations because they motivate people to seek out and consider information in an open-minded way, which is critical for discovering potential solutions and accepting necessary compromises.

**Defense Motivation.** Unfortunately, we suspect that accuracy motivation is unlikely to naturally dominate in conflict situations, especially in the early stages of a negotiation. Parties often assume that their interests are diametrically opposed, at least in Western cultures (see Morris and Gelfand, 2004), and therefore any gain by an opposing party seems to mean a loss for one’s own. Group or individual identities can also be perceived as zero-sum, in that the validation of one party’s identity and history delegitimizes that of the other (Kelman, 1999). A wife involved in a divorce might assume not only that her husband values the antique dresser as much as she does, but also that any acknowledgment of the validity of his position will undermine the legitimacy of her own. Such perceptions motivate people to defend their resources and
identities and result in selective processing of information to bolster their positions.

Egoistic, competitive motives may also be triggered by aspects of the situation that cue competition in a given culture. For example, Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross (2004) found that exposing participants to objects associated with the business world (such as briefcases and business suits) increased their selfish, competitive behavior in an ultimatum game (a task in which participants proposed a take-it-or-leave-it split of money between themselves and an unknown partner). Simply seeing objects typically associated with competition can therefore lead to competitive behavior and may trigger defense-motivated, selective information processing. Removing such objects from a negotiation context or using a setting associated with cooperation may help limit defense motivation and encourage cooperation between parties.

Accountability to a mediator, arbitrator, or one’s constituents can also activate defense motivation when a negotiator is committed to a certain position. Research shows that although accountability to an unknown audience can increase accuracy motivation, as discussed above, accountability instead results in “defensive bolstering” of an initial viewpoint when a person is highly committed to this position (Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger, 1989). Because opposing parties often enter negotiations highly committed to their opinions, accountability to others may tend to activate defense, rather than accuracy, motivation.

Persuasion research indicates that if systematic processing is activated by defense motivation, parties seek out and attend to information that supports the desire to dismiss, resist, and reject an opponent’s overtures, and they resist attending to information that supports the appropriateness of cooperative responses. When defense motivation is primary, one’s goal in processing is to resist influence, to maintain prior beliefs and commitments, and to look for confirmation of those beliefs in the messages that are processed. This sort of motivated processing leads parties to overestimate the divergence between their positions and can exacerbate conflict (Keltner and Robinson, 1993).

Impression Motivation. In addition to defense motives, impression motives may also operate in the early stages of negotiation, since parties are eager to create a specific impression for various audiences. The actual or imagined presence of others determines the audience toward whom an impression motive is geared. For example, a negotiator may focus on conveying an impression of toughness when face-to-face with an opponent, but might instead play the role of a victim when communicating with a third party to gain sympathy. If both parties are in the room at once, the target of the impression goal may vary depending on the relative salience of the two parties from moment to moment. When the negotiator’s attention is drawn toward one party as opposed to the other, the salient party may become the focus of impression management attempts.
A number of factors may influence impression motivation in negotiation situations. When an individual is accountable to a known audience and has low commitment to a position, impression motivation is triggered and the individual processes information so as to align his own position with that of the target audience (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). If, for example, a mediator is accountable to his superiors and knows that they believe Party A aggressed against Party B, he may process information to selectively support his superiors’ position and therefore come to believe in Party A’s culpability himself.

One’s role as an advisor may also affect impression motivation. Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey (2005) found that participants playing the role of an advisor who made a nonbinding recommendation to a client were more even-handed in their information processing than were the clients. However, when advisors were asked to make a binding decision on behalf of their client, impression motivation was triggered, and information processing was selectively geared toward being able to justify their recommendation to their client. These results suggest that when a representative is negotiating on behalf of a client, asking for a nonbinding recommendation will maximize accuracy motivation, whereas allowing the representative to make a binding decision on behalf of the client can lead to biased processing and suboptimal decisions.

Impression motivation may have both positive and negative effects on information processing in conflict situations. On the one hand, when negotiators wish to project an image of themselves as cooperative, they may be motivated to process information open-mindedly and seek to maximize fairness and joint outcomes. For example, Ohbuchi and Fukushima (1997) found that individuals higher in general impression-management concerns were more cooperative in their responses to an unreasonable request, when capacity and motivation were sufficient. In such instances, impression motivation and cooperative tendencies may be closely associated. On the other hand, when the desired image is more competitive, impression motivation may lead to selective processing toward justifying one’s competitive behavior. If a negotiator wants to appear tough, she may selectively attend to and remember information that allows her to successfully convey and justify a tough image. An impression-motivated negotiator seeking to project a cooperative image should be especially likely to discover integrative potential in a conflict situation; an impression-motivated negotiator who instead wants to project a competitive image may be especially unlikely to question fixed-pie assumptions.

Implications. Parties in conflict often perceive their positions to be opposing and irreconcilable. Initially, negotiators may therefore attempt to coerce the opposition into accepting an outcome that fails to achieve the latter’s own stated position. However, successful conflict resolution requires that opposing parties turn away from their public positions to find compatible issues within their
underlying interests (Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Rouhana and Kelman, 1994). The discussion of underlying needs and interests makes it increasingly possible to persuade one another both that these needs are legitimate and that sacrificing some things of lesser interest may allow each side to gain what is more important to them. It is only through this sort of persuasion—rather than coercion—that successful and lasting resolution can be achieved. This can occur, however, only if opponents are both willing and able not only to transmit but also to receive information. In other words, negotiators must be willing and able to persuade and to be persuaded. Moreover, they must want to search for information that disconfirms, as well as information that confirms, their prior beliefs about their opponents’ interests. If parties in negotiation begin to change one another’s minds about the nature of the conflict, the issues at stake, and the compatibility of underlying interests, then cooperation can ensue.

From a persuasion perspective, then, the key to successful conflict resolution is to move parties toward open-minded, accuracy-motivated processing. Participants should seek to increase the accuracy motivation of all parties, including themselves, and to dampen defense and impression motives that inhibit cognitive flexibility and willingness to consider information that disconfirms prior beliefs.

In the final sections of this chapter, we discuss other factors that may influence the extent of accuracy-driven processing in conflict situations. Awareness of these factors should help negotiation participants craft situations that encourage open-minded processing and identify potential sources of bias in their own and others’ reasoning.

**Self-Affirmation**

Affirming an important aspect of self-image can reduce defense-motivated processing in response to self-relevant threats in other domains. According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), individuals are motivated to maintain a positive image of themselves and respond to threatening information defensively in order to maintain this positive self-concept. However, if the self is positively affirmed in some way, this can buffer the self-concept against a subsequent threat and reduce defensive processing.

To test this idea, Sherman, Nelson, and Steele (2000) asked undergraduates who did or did not drink coffee to read an (actually fictitious) article about the serious health risks posed by caffeine consumption. Beforehand, some participants rated their agreement with ten statements, half of which were associated with a personal value that they had previously ranked as highly important. This manipulation therefore affirmed a central value for each participant. The experimenters then measured participants’ acceptance of the message relating caffeine and health risks. In the absence of self-affirmation, coffee drinkers (for whom the message was personally threatening) showed less acceptance of the
article's conclusions, compared to noncoffee drinkers. Self-affirmation reversed
this effect: coffee drinkers were even more accepting of the message than non-
coffee drinkers, suggesting that affirmation decreased defensive processing and
allowed accuracy motivation to dominate. After self-affirmation, coffee drinkers
were motivated to systematically process the self-relevant information in an
open-minded way.

Further research has confirmed that self-affirmation increases openness to
belief-disconfirming information, buffering against the threat of messages that
counter self-relevant attitudes. When such messages no longer feel threatening,
self-relevance motivates systematic and accuracy-driven processing. (See, for
example, Correll, Spencer, and Zanna, 2004.) Self-affirmation has also been
shown to effectively de-bias processing when identity concerns are high and
can increase concession-making and positive attitudes toward one’s partner in
a negotiation situation (Cohen and others, 2005). The most salient identities
in conflict situations tend to be those most likely to interfere with open-minded
processing of information related to the conflict: an individual is most likely to
think of his identity as a Democrat when debating with a Republican, as a
manager when negotiating with labor, and as a father when arguing with his
son. Research on self-affirmation suggests that affirming the self-concepts of
those involved in conflict resolution can reduce motivation to defend salient
identities and increase accuracy-motivated processing.1

Social Identity

Because social identities tend to be highly activated in conflict situations, it is
important to understand the role that group identification plays in persuasion.
Group identification, or the subjective perception that one belongs to a group,
defines a particular group as an in-group, opposing groups as out-groups, and
irrelevant groups as neutral groups. For example, during the Balkan civil wars,
a Bosnian Serb would probably have considered other Bosnian Serbs part of
their in-group, Bosnian Muslims part of an opposing out-group, and Italians a
neutral group.

Despite the intuitive importance of understanding how group categorizations
affect persuasion, there is relatively little research on the topic. Early theories
of social influence suggested that an in-group can exert considerable impact on
the attitudes and behaviors of its members, either through normative pressure
resulting in public compliance or through providing information about reality, result-
ing in more private, long-term acceptance (for example, Deutsch and Gerard,
1955). Kelman (1958) expanded this dichotomy, proposing three general
processes by which social influence occurs: compliance, or public acceptance
of a group’s stance in response to social incentives for agreement; identification,
or private and relationship-specific acceptance of another’s position in
order to maintain a positive relationship; and internalization, or private and
complete acceptance of another’s position by integrating it into one’s own value system.

In recent years, persuasion researchers have again begun to explore how group membership influences attitude change. The application of dual-process logic and methods has provided new insight into when and how group identification affects persuasion, although much remains to be learned. Here, we summarize findings of particular relevance to conflict resolution.

In general, shared group membership—the perception that the audience and the source belong to the same social category—tends to increase persuasion relative to unshared group membership. Depending on the context, this can occur primarily through heuristic or systematic processing. (See Fleming and Petty, 2000; Mackie and Queller, 2000 for reviews.) When an issue is not particularly relevant to an individual or their in-group (for example, acid rain problems in the northeastern United States are not particularly relevant to university students in California), and when a source’s position is known, individuals tend to rely on an in-group agreement heuristic and accept the position advocated by the in-group member without attention to argument strength. However, when an in-group source’s position is unknown, individuals process systematically in an effort to determine the source’s position, and thus strong arguments lead to greater persuasion compared to weak arguments. Moreover, when an issue is relevant to group members (for example, oil drilling off the California coast is relevant to university students in the area), the attribution of a message to an in-group source may increase both motivation and capacity for systematic processing by making the in-group salient. (See Mackie and Queller, 2000.)

In all of these studies, messages from a neutral group source had no substantial effect on attitudes. There is little research on out-group sources. A message from an opposing group may be subject to the same “ignore” heuristic as messages from a neutral group; on the other hand, because the presence of an out-group source is likely to make in-group identity salient, “ignore” or “don’t trust out-groups” heuristics may combine with more motivated, systematic processing to determine persuasion outcomes.

It is clear, however, that highlighting a common in-group identity between source and target can increase persuasion by providing an important heuristic cue that the message is valid. Negotiators and mediators would therefore do well to make common in-groups salient when conveying information to each other. For example, a mediator might increase the persuasiveness of a proposed agreement by highlighting an identity she shares with each negotiator (such as mother or Muslim). Importantly, a social identity must be salient in order to influence persuasion (Fleming and Petty, 2000). So, a mediator and negotiator’s shared identity as mothers will increase mutual persuasion only so long as they continue to think of themselves as mothers.
Group endorsement of a position can also lead individuals to **selectively** process information. Individuals may be motivated by defense or impression concerns to agree with the in-group and disagree with the out-group and may therefore process information selectively to arrive at these preferred judgments (Fleming and Petty, 2000). For example, Cohen (2003, Study 4) asked liberal undergraduate students to evaluate a proposal for a generous (stereotypically liberal) federally funded job training program. Half the participants learned that Democrats opposed and Republicans supported the program, while half received no information about group endorsement. On average, participants in the latter condition supported the program, in keeping with their ideological beliefs. However, when participants were told that their in-group opposed the program, they showed biased processing of the information presented in the proposal, selectively interpreting ambiguous information and selectively attending to unambiguous information to support the in-group position. As a result, participants in the in-group-oppose condition were more likely to oppose the program themselves, compared to participants in the no-information condition. Moreover, the Democrat participants believed that group endorsement influenced the attitudes of other Democrats and (even more strongly) Republicans, but perceived themselves to be relatively unaffected by this information.

Information about group positions can thus strongly influence attitudes by inducing selective information processing in support of the in-group position, but people may be unaware of this bias in their own judgments. Such effects can hinder conflict resolution: once a group takes a position on an issue, in-group and out-group members will likely diverge in their attitudes regardless of actual issue content, exacerbating conflict. Furthermore, self-serving and group-serving perceptions of bias (“I am more objective than anyone else,” “my group is more objective than the out-group”) make it difficult to convince someone that other opinions may be legitimate or that changing their own opinion may be necessary. On the other hand, there may be a silver lining: if individuals tend to follow their group’s lead in forming opinions about relevant issues, then in-group endorsement of peaceful conflict resolution should be a powerful persuasive tool. Publicizing in-group support for de-escalation, or later in the process for a particular agreement, may help consolidate general support for reconciliation.

**Majority and Minority Sources**

In addition to being delivered by an in-group, neutral group, or out-group, messages can come from numerical majority or minority sources within those groups. Initially, theorists assumed that majority and minority sources always led to fundamentally different modes of processing. Moscovici (1980) proposed that numeric majorities engender relatively superficial information processing, which is focused on the stated position and geared toward aligning oneself with
that position to gain approval and avoid rejection. This, he suggested, leads mainly to short-term public compliance, rather than true change in one’s private attitudes. Minorities, on the other hand, can instigate deeper processing of information as an individual attempts to “see what the minority saw, to understand what it understood” (Moscovici, 1980, p. 214). This should lead to more real, enduring change in an individual’s privately held attitudes. In a similar vein, Nemeth (1986) argued that majority sources focus the perceiver’s attention on the proposed position, resulting in convergent thinking (concentration on information that relates to the position), whereas minority sources focus attention on the existence of alternate positions, resulting in divergent thinking (examination of information that does not necessarily relate to the majority position and detection of novel solutions). In both theories, majorities are associated with more superficial processing and minorities with deeper, more systematic processing.

Subsequent research provided considerable support for these dual-process views. (See Maass and Clark, 1984.) Majority influence was often associated with public conformity, while minority influence tended to cause changes in private judgments. Furthermore, private acceptance of minority positions, but not public conformity to majority positions, was found to be associated with increased systematic processing and increased resistance to counterpersuasion (Martin, Hewstone, and Martin, 2003). Several limiting conditions on minority influence were also identified. For example, a minority source is influential to the extent that it behaves consistently; that arguments are presented flexibly as opposed to rigidly; that the position advocated is becoming more, rather than less, mainstream over time; and that minority and majority differ only in terms of position, not group membership. (See Maass and Clark, 1984.)

Although evidence from numerous studies confirmed that minority influence can lead to private attitude change (see Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone, 1994), other research challenged the notion that minority sources are uniquely associated with systematic processing. For instance, Martin and Hewstone (2003) found that when an advocated position would only moderately affect participants’ self-interest, a minority source led to systematic processing, whereas a majority source did not. However, when the advocated position was linked to a highly negative personal outcome, only majority sources instigated systematic processing.

One way to integrate these findings is to consider how majority and minority sources can influence information processing at a number of distinct steps. First, heuristic associations with majority and minority sources initially suggest to perceivers that the majority is correct and the minority is incorrect. Thus, when capacity or motivation are relatively low, majority positions should be accepted and minority positions rejected with little further processing of information (Moskowitz and Chaiken, 2001). Second, when majority or minority positions are unexpected
(for example, a majority arguing against its own interests or a minority consistently and thoughtfully arguing against the majority), it may lead people to question their initial preconceptions and increase their motivation to accurately understand a given issue. Third, majorities and minorities may influence type of motivation, as well as overall level: a majority source, if present, will probably induce impression motivation, as well as accuracy motivation in some cases (Maass and Clark, 1984); a minority source may instigate accuracy motivation when countering the majority on a low-relevance issue, but defense motivation when countering the majority on a high-relevance issue (Martin and Hewstone, 2003). Thus, although a variety of contextual variables may influence whether majority and/or minority sources lead to systematic processing and attitude change, understanding the effects of these variables at each stage of information processing should allow us to predict whether a persuasion attempt is likely to be successful.

Taken as a whole, the literature on majority and minority influence has a number of implications for conflict resolution. First, it suggests that when seeking to persuade a constituency to adopt a peaceful resolution strategy or a particular agreement, the impact of the appeal may depend upon whether a majority of the public endorses the advocated position. Much of the research on minority influence suggests that minority sources will promote greater systematic processing and longer lasting attitude change, but it may be that if negative personal outcomes are salient (as they may often be in such situations), majority persuasion will induce more extensive processing. In addition, appeals will be more persuasive when support for the advocated change seems to be increasing. (See also Kay, Jimenez, and Jost, 2002.)

Finally, this literature draws attention to the idea that what is unexpected can sometimes induce accuracy-motivated, systematic processing, leading to a revision of assumptions and an open-minded consideration of all available information. Negotiators often assume their opponents to be competitive and self-interested; these assumptions may be revised if negotiators offer unexpected concessions, talk about the other’s interests rather than their own, or focus on gains that the other can accrue from settlement rather than losses that loom if a suboptimal settlement is adopted. Initially, the opposition might meet such tactics with great suspicion, since defense motives are apt to be strong and the belief that communications are motivated by something other than self-interest seems unlikely. Nevertheless, with persistence, this sort of tactic should gradually induce the opposition to adopt more of an accuracy motivation orientation, at which point true persuasion rather than coercion is possible.

**Affect**

Specific emotions and general positive or negative moods permeate our lives across a variety of situations, including those involving conflict. Initially,
dual-process–oriented research suggested that mood influences whether information is predominantly processed in a heuristic or systematic mode. The picture that emerged from a large number of experiments indicated that people in a positive mood rely more heavily on heuristics and show reduced levels of systematic processing, whereas people in a negative mood rely less on heuristics and process more systematically. (For a review, see Mackie and Worth, 1991.) For example, Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser (1994) induced positive mood in a variety of ways, asking some participants to write about a happy event, to contract facial muscles associated with smiling, or to listen to happy music. After the mood manipulation, happy and neutral mood participants took part in an ostensibly unrelated study, in which they were asked to make judgments about the guilt of a student who had been accused of an offense (such as cheating). Half the participants also learned that the student was a member of a group stereotypically associated with that offense. The results showed that participants in a neutral mood did not rely on the stereotype information when making their judgments about the students’ guilt, whereas participants in a happy mood believed it was more likely that the student was guilty when stereotype information was present. In other words, happy mood increased reliance on stereotypes as heuristic cues about the student’s guilt.

Why might positive and negative moods influence reliance on heuristic and systematic processing? Schwarz (1990) has proposed that positive moods signal a safe and satisfactory environment, indicating that effortful processing and problem solving is unnecessary. In contrast, negative moods suggest that something is wrong with the current situation and promote systematic processing in an effort to address the current problem. Other researchers have proposed that individuals are motivated to maintain positive moods and therefore avoid complex thinking that might detract from general elation; meanwhile, negative moods motivate people to change how they feel and therefore process systematically in order to discover what is causing the negative state and how to fix it. (See, for example, Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent, 1973.)

Mood may also function as a heuristic. When motivation and capacity are low, individuals may tend to assume that their moods are related to a persuasive message or source, and form their attitudes accordingly. For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983) asked participants to remember happy or sad events or interviewed them on sunny or rainy days to induce positive or negative moods, respectively. When subsequently asked about their general life satisfaction, happy participants reported higher satisfaction than sad participants. Such results suggest that even when mood is unrelated to the question at hand, people may use their feelings as a heuristic cue in forming their attitudes. Schwarz and Clore (1983) also found that when participants in a
negative mood realized their mood state was unrelated to the current judgment, it ceased to influence their attitudes. Negotiators may therefore lessen the negative effects of a bad mood on their own or others’ attitudes by attributing the mood to an outside source when possible. For instance, acknowledging a rainy day’s influence on one’s mood should decrease one’s tendency to mistakenly attribute a dejected feeling to the proposed agreement at hand.

The general picture emerging from the research just described suggests that positive mood increases heuristic processing, while negative mood increases systematic processing. However, the story is more complex. Alice Isen and her colleagues have demonstrated that positive mood can lead to increased cognitive flexibility and heightened creativity. For example, Carnevale and Isen (1986) explored the effect of positive mood on integrative behavior in a bargaining task. Positive- and neutral-mood dyads negotiated over the purchase price of three commodities in a hypothetical market. In a face-to-face interaction, positive-mood pairs found more creative, integrative solutions than negative-mood pairs. Other research has shown that positive affect can lead people to focus on shared group memberships (Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, and Lowrance, 1995). Thus, whereas a large body of literature would suggest that positive mood should increase reliance on heuristics, such as fixed-pie assumptions and stereotypes, other research indicates that a happy mood can improve integrative outcomes in a bargaining task and increase perceptions of common in-group identity.

Other complexities deserve attention as well. Although dividing affect into the broad categories of positive and negative mood is parsimonious, specific emotions and the intensity of affect are also important to consider. For example, anxiety could be categorized as a negative mood, but further attention to this specific emotion has revealed that its effects on information processing are considerably more complex than the positive-negative mood distinction would imply (see Sengupta and Johar, 2001). Categories besides positive versus negative may also prove useful for understanding the effects of moods. For example, some researchers have distinguished between affect associated with uncertainty (including sadness, anxiety, fear, and so on) and affect associated with certainty (including many positive moods, as well as anger and disgust; see, for example, Tiedens and Linton, 2001).

New theories in the field continue to emerge in an attempt to reconcile and integrate these diverse findings. One particularly promising class of theories suggests that mood influences type of processing: negative moods increase bottom-up, detail-oriented, externally focused processing, whereas positive moods increase top-down, schema-oriented, internally focused information processing (Fiedler, 2001). This distinction is similar to a heuristic-systematic
perspective and helps to integrate many diverse findings. By increasing attention to the concrete, external stimulus details, negative moods facilitate systematic processing based on information in the external environment, with little reliance on internal associations and assumptions about the stimulus. In contrast, positive moods facilitate top-down processing or the application of prior knowledge structures (stereotypes, heuristics, and other associations) to the stimulus. This increases stereotyping and reliance on heuristic cues, but also creative, “big-picture” thinking.

Additionally, individuals may be motivated to seek out positive, pleasant moods and avoid negative, unpleasant moods. They therefore may be motivated by the affective consequences of information processing in certain situations, processing information only when it improves a negative mood or maintains a positive mood (Handley and Lassiter, 2002). These mood regulation effects may apply particularly when mood is an individual’s primary concern at the moment, so that affect is used to assess enjoyment, rather than whether sufficient processing has occurred (Clore and Schnall, 2005).

In general, then, positive moods seem to increase heuristic, associative, and creative processing, whereas negative moods tend to increase systematic, detail-oriented processing. Positive moods are therefore a mixed blessing in conflict resolution: they may increase creative, integrative behavior, but they may also increase stereotyping and hinder systematic processing of persuasive arguments. Optimal mood may vary across different time points in a negotiation. Positive affect is often portrayed as a general panacea for integrative negotiations (for example, Barry, Fulmer, and Van Kleef, 2004) but inducing positive mood at the start of a negotiation may also prevent negotiators from revising their stereotypes about each other. It may be better to induce positive mood later, ideally after stereotypes are revised but before parties begin looking for an integrative solution. More research is obviously necessary to clarify the benefits and drawbacks to introducing certain moods at different time points in the negotiation process.

In summary, affect plays an important role in persuasion and social influence. The recent decades have witnessed large strides in understanding how general moods and, to some extent, specific emotions may influence information processing, yet further research is needed to determine how best to integrate existing findings and explanations, as well as how best to apply these results to negotiation settings. The dual-process perspective has proven integral to the accumulation of knowledge in the field, and the sophistication of current theorizing and research suggests that a clearer and crisper picture of affect may soon emerge. Meanwhile, however, practitioners should be aware of the mixed findings in this area, and generalizations from one context to another should be made carefully and critically.
CONCLUSION

We had two primary goals in this chapter. First, we wanted to give an overview of current psychological research from a dual-process perspective on persuasion. The first part of the chapter thus presented a dual-process theory describing how persuasion results from two types of information processing—one based on heuristics and the other involving systematic processing. Additionally, we argued that there are three classes of motives (accuracy, defense, and impression) that may influence information processing and hence persuasion. Each of these can be associated with both heuristic and systematic processing. As a result, it is the level of motivation, not the specific type, that influences the extent of systematic processing.

The goal in the second part of the chapter was to review theory and research that relates persuasion to conflict situations. Here we described research applying the heuristic-systematic perspective to negotiation settings. Additionally, we discussed research in self-affirmation, social identity, majority and minority influence, and affect, and suggested implications for conflict resolution. We highlighted the need for negotiators to move beyond defense and impression motives to process information in an accuracy-oriented, open-minded fashion, and identified strategies for maximizing accuracy motivation in conflict settings.

Our hope is that the considerations raised by persuasion research can encourage new insights into the process of conflict resolution and how to achieve both integrative and long lasting agreements. By understanding and attending to factors that influence information processing, practitioners can better facilitate open-minded, thoughtful consideration of alternate viewpoints by all parties involved in a conflict, and ultimately, its resolution.

Note

1. Self-affirmation research has yet to be applied to non-Western cultures. In collectivistic cultures, self-affirmation may be more effective when focused on interdependent aspects of self. (See Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, and Suzuki, 2004.)

References


In this chapter, we introduce a framework for learning from experience through reflection, an adaptation of Marsick and Watkins’ model of informal and incidental learning (Cseh, Watkins, and Marsick, 1999; Marsick and Watkins, 1990; Watkins and Marsick, 1993) and relate it to the challenges of conflict resolution. We discuss the roots of the framework in adult learning theory and Action Science, and draw out implications for use of the framework. We then illustrate ways in which a conflict participant could apply these ideas to more effectively achieve his objectives before, during, or after a conflict. Finally, we speak to implications for what a trainer or teacher can do to help a student learn to become a reflective practitioner of conflict before drawing some conclusions about the value and limitations of this model for conflict resolution.

OUR MODEL OF LEARNING THROUGH REFLECTION ON EXPERIENCE

Many models of learning from experience have their roots in the thinking of John Dewey (1938) who examined the way in which past actions guide future actions (Boud, Cohen, and Walker, 1993; Jarvis, 1992; Kolb, 1984; Schön, 1987). Dewey observed that, when people do not get desired results, they attend to the resulting “error” or mismatch between intended and actual outcomes. He described learning as a somewhat informal use of what is known as the scientific
method. People collect and interpret data about their experiences. They develop and test their hunches even though they may not do so in a highly systematic fashion. Dewey summed up learning from experience as follows:

It involves: (1) observation of surrounding conditions; (2) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information, advice, and warning of those who have had a wider experience; and (3) judgment that puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify (Dewey, 1938, p. 69).

People make meaning of situations they encounter by filtering them through impressions they acquire over time from past experiences. They determine whether they can rely on past interpretations or need a new response set. They may need to search for new ideas and information, or reevaluate old ideas and information. Learning takes place as people interpret and reinterpret their experience in light of a growing, cumulative set of insights and then revise their actions to meet their goals. Learning results in new insights and a relatively new set of what Dewey called “habits” of new behavior.

Figure 22.1 depicts a model for learning through experience that Marsick and Watkins (1990) have developed that is based on the work of John Dewey as applied to problem solving. The circle in the center represents the encountering of a new experience. New experiences are always potentially problematic, even though people may simplify them by emphasizing what is familiar, whether or not this is accurate. In the model, people use reflection to become aware of the problematic aspects of the experience, to probe these features, and to learn new ways to understand and address the challenge they encounter.

![Figure 22.1 Marsick and Watkins’ Informal and Incidental Learning Model.](image-url)

Problem-solving steps are located at vertical and horizontal axes, and are labeled (clockwise) as North, East, South, and West. Learning steps are located in between problem-solving steps, and are labeled (beginning clockwise just before North) as North West, North East, South East, and South West.

Problem solving begins when people encounter a new experience (North). They frame the new experience based on what they learned from past experience (North West). They assess similarities or differences and use their interpretation to make sense of the new situation. Often, people make these judgments quickly, without much conscious reflection. Reflection slows down the diagnosis, but it also helps a person to become aware of the complexity of the situation and the assumptions used to judge the new challenge.

After diagnosing a new experience, people learn more about the context of the problem (North East). They find out what other people are thinking and doing. They try to understand the politics of what is going on. They may gather information from other people or social groups that are affected by the problem. They might test their thinking with others or conduct mini-experiments before they choose a course of action. Reflection can play a key role in this phase by opening up lines of thinking that would otherwise have remained unexplored. Interpretation of the context leads to choices around alternative actions that are guided by recollections of past solutions and by one's own search for other potential models for action.

Once a decision has been made about a course of action (East), a person develops or gathers what is needed to implement the decision (South East). Reflection might be anticipatory, and lead to the development of new capabilities in order to implement the solution. Often, reflection occurs while the action is being implemented over time. When people reflect-in-action (Schön, 1987), they typically do so when they are taken by some surprise in the course of action. Because they are learning as they implement, people may make quick judgments based on partial information. They may also seek further information during action.

Once an action is taken (South), people assess consequences and decide whether or not outcomes match their goals (South West). Reflection after the fact allows for a full learning review. It is relatively easy to assess intended consequences when goals are reasonably explicit and data are available to make sound judgments. It is harder to recognize unintended consequences, although reflection can lead one to ask questions from a wide range of people and explore sources of information that might otherwise be ignored. A learning review leads to conclusions about results (West) and lessons learned that can be of help in planning future actions. Reflection at this point brings a person full circle to the new understandings (North West) that are drawn in a new iteration of the cycle.

Reflection is central to every phase of learning from experience, although everyone does not always consciously use reflection to its fullest potential.
Reflection sensitizes people to surprises and mismatches that signal the inadequacy of their prior stock of knowledge. Through reflection-in-action (Schön, 1987), people adjust their course of action and learn while they are carrying out the solution. Reflection after the fact helps to draw out lessons learned that are useful for the next problem-solving cycle.

In situations of conflict, people may be forced into making quick sense of many complex factors that influence how they interpret the context and identify unintended consequences. Studies of informal learning have highlighted the fact that when contexts are highly variable and surprise-rich—as is certainly the case under conditions of conflict—their interpretation assumes larger significance (Cseh, 1998; Cseh, Watkins, and Marsick, 1999; Volpe, Marsick, and Watkins, 1999). Our model calls for refocusing attention on a wide range of contextual factors that influence the way in which people frame what is problematic about a conflict, think about alternative actions, and look for unintended consequences.

At the heart of this model is the dynamic interaction of action—having an experience—and reflection that helps a person to interpret and re-interpret experience. The quality of reflection is central to the way in which a person makes meaning of what is occurring. People are often guided in reflection by internalized social rules, norms, values, and beliefs that have been acquired implicitly and explicitly through socialization. These internalized perspectives can distort one’s interpretation of an experience. To learn deeply from experience, people must critically reflect on the assumptions, values, and beliefs that shape their understanding. To gain insight into how people engage in deep, critical reflection, we turn to work by Jack Mezirow (1991, 1995, 1997) and by Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1974, 1978).

CRITICAL REFLECTION

Adults shape their understanding of new situations by looking through the lens of tacit, often unconscious belief systems that Mezirow (1991, 1995, 1997) calls meaning perspectives (or more recently, habits of mind) and meaning schemas (or more recently, points of view). Mezirow defines meaning perspectives as follows:

... a general frame of reference, set of schemas, worldview, or personal paradigm. A meaning perspective involves a set of psychocultural assumptions, for the most part culturally assimilated but including intentionally learned theories, that serve as one of three sets of codes significantly shaping sensation and delimiting perception and cognition: sociolinguistic (e.g., social norms, cultural and language codes, ideologies, theories), psychological (e.g., repressed parental
Meaning perspectives are broad, guiding frames of mind that influence the development of more focused meaning schemas. Meaning schemas are “the specific set of beliefs, knowledge, judgment, attitude, and feeling which shape a particular interpretation, as when we think of an Irishman, a cathedral, a grandmother, or a conservative or when we express a point of view, an ideal or a way of acting” (Mezirow, 1995, p. 43).

Meaning perspectives or schemas are the containers that shape our experiences. These containers are taken for granted and therefore are hard to see, let alone question. That is why it is so difficult, for example, for a White person to see the ways in which she is racist or a male to understand how his actions could be seen as sexist. In addition, through this questioning a person also challenges the basic assumptions of one’s group and culture. Mezirow’s work points to the need for critical reflection, but he does not give us much practical advice about how to probe deeply into assumptions. Action Science provides these tools.

**ACTION SCIENCE**

Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1974, 1978) developed Action Science to explore the gap between what people say they want to do and what they are actually able to produce. They hypothesize that people are guided by a theory of action, which is cognitive in nature. Argyris and Schön (1978) argued against the behaviorists’ belief that people act somewhat blindly in response to their external environment: “human learning . . . need not be understood in terms of the ‘reinforcement’ or ‘extinction’ of patterns of behavior but as the construction, testing, and restructuring of a certain kind of knowledge” (p. 10).

Theories of action predict that people will act in certain ways under certain conditions, when guided by certain values, in order to achieve desired consequences. Argyris and Schön explain that, when things go wrong, people first change their tactics. They call this single-loop learning. For example, if a peer rejects another employee’s opinion, the employee might decide that he did not phrase his argument in an effective manner. He might try to state the same viewpoint in a different way, or he might gather more information to build a stronger case. If the reasons for resistance do not lie in the format of the argument, these tactical changes will not remedy the mismatch. Instead, the employee must reconsider the way in which he has framed the problem. Argyris
and Schön (1974, 1978) call this deeper level of analysis by the name of double-loop learning about assumptions, values, beliefs, or norms that influence action. In the preceding example, double-loop learning might take place if the employee recognized that his definition of “effective” or of participative decision making was fundamentally different from that of his colleague. Single-loop learning is not, in and of itself, “bad.” Learning to change tactics often yields valuable gains, but such learning may not go far enough.

People often believe that they act according to one set of beliefs (espoused theory); but because of tacitly held assumptions, values, and norms, they actually act in ways that often contradict their espoused theories (theory-in-use). The employee in the preceding example might believe in participatory decision making (his espoused theory), but in this case, he wants to exclude some stakeholder groups that hold highly divergent views (theory-in-use).

Argyris and Schön identified a core set of values that control many of the interactions that they studied. These values underlie what they describe as a behavioral-social world, or a culture, that they call “Model I.” Model I values lead to actions that often engender conflict. These values include the need to exert unilateral control over the interaction, a drive to win at all costs, and a tendency to act as if one is rational even when emotions run high.

Argyris and Schön describe an alternative learning culture that they call Model II. Its values include a commitment to valid information even when this contradicts opinions held by oneself or powerful others; ensuring that agreements are based on free and informed choice; and finding solutions based on internal commitment rather than external persuasion or coercion. Model II cultures cannot be developed without engaging in some double-loop learning. Decisions often take longer because more information is considered and people are encouraged to advocate for their viewpoint while also remaining open to contradictory information. In Model II, people probe for the reasoning that leads others to the conclusions and judgments they reach. Employees are encouraged to raise divergent views even if, by doing so, they generate controversy. Leaders in a Model II culture manage the resulting conflict because they see that this will help them to avoid mistakes and generate innovative thinking.

Model I values lead people to control outcomes toward their own respective goals. In Model II, people value learning about the best solution more than achieving goals that might be incomplete, inaccurate, or inappropriate. Model I cultures encourage blaming because someone has to be right, whereas Model II cultures recognize that problems are complex and cocreated. In a Model II culture, people who subscribe to Action Science take responsibility for finding and correcting behaviors that contribute to results that are not really desired even when others in the situation do not.

A Model I culture may not be supportive of double-loop learning practices, such as willingness to change an opinion if it turns out to be based on faulty
reasoning or interest in generating evidence to support alternative viewpoints that might be superior to one’s own thinking. Individuals can practice double-loop learning in a Model I culture, but when they do so, they are clearly going against norms that they might, or might not, be able to change. Hence, double-loop learners carefully choose when and how to use these skills.

**EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING**

It is seldom possible to probe deeply into our beliefs without confronting many facets of our psychological makeup that we may find difficult to name, face, and change. Others may not want us to think or act differently either, even if the relationship is dysfunctional. For these and other reasons, engaging in critical reflection can evoke powerful feelings that seem at odds with instrumental, rational ways of learning from experience. Ironically, focusing on reflection can lead to an exclusive cognitive emphasis. Some educators rebel against this limited focus. Boud, Cohen, and Walker (1993), for example, describe learning as a holistic process that involves thinking, feeling, and the will to action. They note that in English-speaking cultures, “there is a cultural bias towards the cognitive and conative aspects of learning. The development of the affect is inhibited and instrumental thinking is highly valued” (p. 12).

Boud, Cohen, and Walker (1993) emphasize the affective side of learning from experience. Postle (in Boud, Cohen, and Walker, 1993), for example, draws on the work of John Heron (1992) on multimodal learning. The base of learning is affective, contends John Heron, as does David Kolb (1984). By affective, they both mean that people learn from experience through a direct encounter with life that involves total immersion with all its attendant sensations and feelings. The affective dimension to learning includes emotions and also a deeper, nonrational understanding of the situation.

Boud, Cohen, and Walker (1993) legitimize feelings as grist for the mill of reflection. They do not shrink from feelings as might be so in a Model I world, in which the value placed on rationality can leave people ashamed or embarrassed about emotions.

Some experiential learning theorists, such as Heron (1992), go a step further. Feeling precedes rational explanations and therefore can point the way to fresh insights when people revisit and re-interpret their feeling. For Heron, the affective is the psychological basis for experiential knowledge. He makes a useful distinction between “feeling” and “emotion,” two words often used interchangeably. The affective mode is composed of “feeling” and “emotion.” Heron (p. 16) refers to feeling with a specific usage as the capacity for participating in wider unities of a whole field of experience. This is distinct from emotion, which is defined as the intense, localized affect that arises from the fulfillment
or the frustration of individualized needs and interests. Feeling is a participatory mode of psyche while emotion is an individualizing mode. This distinction is a useful framing when one considers the importance of empathy in resolving conflict. Feeling can be developed as a highly refined capacity for awareness. It is the phenomenological grounding for the meaning that people eventually make of their experience by conceptualization through reflection and the resultant discrimination.

Experiential knowing is a prelinguistic form of knowing gained “through participation in, and resonance with, one or more beings in the unified field of being” (Heron, 1992, p. 162). This is conceptualized by Heron as a deeper formulation of the distinction made by William James between “knowledge of acquaintance” and “knowledge about.” For Heron, experiential learning is preconceptual, “acquiring knowledge of being and beings through empathic resonance felt participation” (p. 224).

Sometimes, experiential educators help learners to get in touch with insights that they normally filter out of their awareness (Davis-Manigaulte, Yorks, and Kasl, 2006; Yorks and Kasl, 2003). In essence, feelings and the experiential knowledge that they hold are brought into awareness through the use of various forms of expression that engage the learner’s imaginal and intuitive processes, which in turn connects these processes to new conceptual possibilities. Feeling can be opened up through anticipatory reflection and learning about future possible states enabling, what Fisher, Rooke, and Torbert (2003; Torbert, 2001; Torbert and others, 2004) refer to as the fourth territory of experience. The first territory of experience is composed of intentional purposes, intuitions, attention, and vision. People are helped to forge new experiences, and to use the feeling and emotion that these situations evoke to challenge prior viewpoints. They are helped to reframe fundamental viewpoints based on new feelings that are triggered by seeing, hearing, touching, or otherwise sensing the world in new ways. They are freed from the bonds of having to name and rationally explain what they may sense but have not yet fully experienced. Paying attention to feelings is important for establishing an empathic zone that can provide insights into the different lived experience of others that often blocks pathways to understanding through rational discussion as parties talk past one another.

**USING REFLECTION AND CRITICAL REFLECTION TO LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE**

Our model in Figure 22.1 integrates reflection and critical reflection. We also recognize that powerful emotions often arise as people learn from experience. We recommend that feeling and emotion be recognized and used to re-assess
mental models and to get in touch with new interpretations of present and future events.

Simple reflection involves a review of attendant thoughts, feeling, and actions without questioning one’s interpretation or meaning of the experience. But people can be misled by their interpretation of experience. They might frame the experience or solutions inaccurately, especially if they miss information or signals about the nature of the new challenge. Prior assumptions and beliefs can lead to a partial, limited, or incorrect assessment of a situation. Simple reflection in our model is stimulated by questions such as the following:

- What did I intend?
- What actions, feeling, emotion, or results surprised me?
- How is this experience alike or different from my prior experiences?
- What does this experience tell me about worldviews other than my own?

Critically reflective questions do more. They probe the context, or the person’s assumptions, and the way this influences their judgments. Such questions look more like the following:

- What else is going on in the environment that I might not have considered but that has an impact on the way I understand the situation?
- In what ways could I be wrong about my hunches?
- How are my own intentions, strategies, and actions contributing to outcomes I want to avoid?
- In what way might I be using inapplicable lessons from my past to frame problems or solutions, and is this framing accurate?
- Are there other ways to interpret the feelings I have in this situation? How can I better gain a pathway into experience of other people that might challenge or change my assumptions?
- What metaphors and stories capture my experience and differentiate it from those of others?

It is not easy to engage in critical reflection during a conflict, although it can be done with practice. Critical reflection demands an open mind and heart, the willingness to question one’s interpretations of the situation, a suspension of blame, as well as the ability to slow things down and probe for alternative viewpoints. Critical reflection is more easily carried out before or after the fact, in the cooler light of day and with time to learn new skills in order to change one’s customary response patterns.
ILLUSTRATING THE MODEL

What would it look like if we were to use this model of learning from experience in working through conflict? We show how a person can do so, with or without assistance from a facilitator, by introducing a hypothetical example that is a composite of situations we have seen in practice.

Let us imagine a normal work conflict that seems exacerbated by perceptions of gender difference. While the focus in this example is around male/female relationships, it is not hard to imagine an analogous situation around race, class, or other dimensions of power. This example is set in a financial services company. Women form about 10 percent of the senior staff. Women often find that they are left out of information loops or that when they come into the room, men will get quiet, ignore them, or tell jokes that they find demeaning of women.

USE OF REFLECTION DURING CONFLICT

Imagine a marketing manager named Sue who has been appointed as the only female on a task force that has been put together to bring certain financial services out to new markets by using data-based delivery systems. Several meetings have already been held. As Sue walks into her third meeting, she has decided to take a lead in pulling things together. She summarizes what she thinks the group has agreed to, identifies where they have disagreements, and makes a suggestion about how to move forward. The roadblock is whether or not they can gain market share with their targeted group of consumers by using the commercial outlet that they have selected. Sue suggests that they use a consulting group, called ThinkRight, to gather more information. One of her team members, Bob, strongly disagrees and accuses Sue of trying to railroad a decision. He half jokes about how Sue is trying to impose her choices on the group. The other men nod in agreement. This seems a no-win situation. Sue cannot easily let their challenge to her pass without feeling like she is giving up the ability to influence the situation; yet any action she might take will appear, she thinks, as even more aggressive.

If Sue engages in single-loop learning about her conflict with Bob, she might reflect on the tactics she used in addressing the roadblock. She might consider that Bob and she are actually aligned around the goal and simply disagree on tactics, for example, whether they needed more data, whether ThinkRight was the best consultant group, or whether there was a better way to check out the group’s assumptions. She might also reimmerse herself in her gut feelings about the experience and check her intuition. She would look at her style of presentation, nonverbal cues about how her peers might perceive her, and a holistic sense of what she thought was taking place.
If Sue engages in double-loop learning, she might wonder if she had framed the problem correctly in the first place; that is, was there a more fundamental disagreement in the group than the choice of the delivery system for financial services? She might probe her level of comfort and skill in managing power dynamics. How was she responding to the situation, what sense did she have of Bob, and how were her emotions influencing her demeanor? She would ask herself whether she was, indeed, railroading a decision. Sue might raise the question of her gender, perhaps in a semijoking manner, as had Bob, but she would not try to ignore this comment. She might throw it back on the group by stating how she felt and asking others how they felt. She might ask people to consider the way their group had been working together and thus open up a discussion of underlying group dynamics that might be affecting their interactions.

If Sue probes into assumptions and beliefs, she would open up further avenues for discussion that others might not have considered or that they might consider to be not discussible. Doing so could open up the group to new ways of thinking about the problem, or it could exacerbate the conflict, depending on how Sue addressed the issues and how others interacted with her in pursuing their analysis.

**USE OF REFLECTION AFTER CONFLICT**

Let us further imagine that Sue had the conversation with her team members that we present in Table 22.1. In this conversation, Bob has challenged Sue. Sue is not happy with the conversation, so she has met with some colleagues who are using Action Science to develop skills in handling conflicts by analyzing their experiences after they happened.

An Action Science consultant would work with Sue in the following manner. She would help Sue to identify her explicit and implicit intentions for this interaction. Sue might first identify her goal as one in which she will try to get the best solution to the roadblock, but eventually she might also become aware of conflicting goals, such as to win in her confrontation with Bob. She might also realize that she values looking good in front of her teammates, especially in light of the gender discrimination at the company, and she wants to be respected as a professional. The consultant would help Sue recognize the mismatch between her intentions and outcomes. This mismatch could stimulate a desire to learn a new way of addressing conflicts.

As they review the conflict, the consultant would draw out explicit assumptions that Sue might be holding about her teammates and her interactions with them in this situation. The consultant would use the ladder of inference to help Sue see how she makes sense of the conflict. The ladder of inference draws out and makes explicit the reasoning that people use in coming to conclusions and
taking actions. Using the ladder of inference, Sue can begin to see how she uses her own meaning schemas (to use Mezirow’s language) to filter and interpret what she sees in the experience. Table 22.2 illustrates hypothetical ladders of inference for Sue and for Bob.

If these ladders bear any relationship to reality, we can see that Bob and Sue are on a collision course. Their respective framing of the situation will make it very difficult to look for common goals. They are each influenced by deeply held beliefs and values that they have not consciously explored and that may also bring out strong feelings that will probably affect their decisions. Their choices may lead them to take actions that actually create the consequences that they say they do not wish to experience. The consultant could help Sue to map the links between her assumptions and the way they shape her actions to see this chain of consequences. Table 22.3 illustrates this kind of mapping. It takes some

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 22.1. Sue’s Dialog with Her Teammates.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What Sue Felt or Thought</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>But Did Not Say</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These guys! We’ve been chewing on this question ever since we began meeting. Someone must know something about this situation that I don’t know.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What’s Bob up to now! This is coming from left field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Here we go again. These guys are trying to make me look like I don’t know what I am doing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do I do with this one? He’s made it look like, if I confront him, he’s right . . . the jerk! He’s not really joking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.
Table 22.2. Dueling Ladders of Inference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps on the Ladder of Inference</th>
<th>Sue’s Ladder of Inference</th>
<th>Bob’s Ladder of Inference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions that I take</td>
<td>I’ll just joke a bit too, so I don’t look foolish, but I’ll be darned if I am going to give this one up . . . I’ll show him I’m right!</td>
<td>I’ll just put Sue in her place here . . . that should stop her from pursuing her agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions that I draw</td>
<td>I’d better get some data out on the table to see what is going on here so I won’t get duped.</td>
<td>Sue is using ThinkRight as a “screen” to cover up her real motives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions that I make</td>
<td>I’ll bet that Bob is just trying to make me look bad.</td>
<td>Sue has a hidden agenda . . . she wants to grab control here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meanings that I add</td>
<td>This seems like a “no brainer” . . . these guys know something that I don’t.</td>
<td>In my life, when women have taken the lead, they don’t let me have any say in the matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data I select from what I observe</td>
<td>This decision shouldn’t be so hard . . . maybe an outside perspective would help us get past this roadblock.</td>
<td>Once again, Sue is in charge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly observable data</td>
<td>I suggest that we hire ThinkRight consultants to . . .</td>
<td>I suggest that we hire ThinkRight consultants to . . .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

Table 22.3. Mapping One Possible Set of Causal Links in Sue’s Case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sue’s Intentions</th>
<th>Sue’s Assumptions</th>
<th>Sue’s Actions</th>
<th>Sue’s Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be taken</td>
<td>Bob is trying to</td>
<td>I’ll stick to my guns and push to hire ThinkRight.</td>
<td>Sue’s teammates thinks she is too wedded to her own solution and thus not professional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seriously as a</td>
<td>make me look</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional</td>
<td>bad.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.
time to map causal links with any degree of accuracy. The consultant has to test that various interpretations actually represent Sue’s viewpoint so that she does not simply project her own meaning schemas on Sue. The consultant could help Sue to see that her interpretations are likely to lead her to the gap she says she wants to avoid between her various stated intentions and the likely outcomes from the interaction.

Underlying beliefs and values—Sue’s, Bob’s, the other teammates,’ and the company’s—are not easily changed even when they might be recognized as unproductive. Using Mezirow’s framework, the consultant could help Sue look in greater depth at the kinds of assumptions that might be influencing her actions. People’s responses often reflect views in the dominant culture. By mapping out responses and discussing them with others, people can identify deeper patterns that cause conflict, and they may be able to produce a change in the cultural patterns that make it difficult to act in new ways.

For example, when Dr. Karen Watkins at the University of Georgia taught a graduate course in Action Science (Marsick and Watkins, 1999), two individuals from different organizations had brought in cases in which sexual harassment was an underlying theme. In the group discussion that ensued, many individuals agreed that this was a significant societal concern. The class mapped these themes from the point of view of common responses, and the way in which these responses would have to change in order to allow greater learning to occur. These maps are shown in Table 22.4. Action Science can help to make public issues that otherwise could not easily be addressed because of potential repercussions.

**ILLUSTRATING THE USE OF REFLECTION BEFORE A NEW CONFLICT**

The consultant can help Sue to create and role-play alternative ways of addressing the situation. Sue will need to practice these alternatives to gain the skills she needs to produce a different way of addressing conflict. Sue will probably find it difficult to act in new ways, given that her current behavior has been shaped by past successes and given the reality of the politics in her company. Getting all the information on the table may mean that Sue has to give up some of her beliefs. For example, other people in the group might have information about the use of ThinkRight that suggests that focus groups are not the right way to test these market assumptions. Or, even though Sue might have the capability to take charge of this situation, the resistance she is experiencing might make it difficult for her to get the same results as would a male executive.

By redesigning and practicing new responses, Sue can learn how to work with conflict more constructively in the future. Redesigns take the format of what Action
Table 22.4. Action Science Map Around Sexual Harassment in the Workplace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Cues</th>
<th>Action Strategies</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>System Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When sexually harassing behavior occurs</td>
<td>I make a joke of it, pretend it didn’t happen, and say nothing</td>
<td>which guarantees that the behavior will escalate</td>
<td>and neither I nor the others affected by the behavior [i.e., perpetrators, managers, and learners] learn how to define limits of acceptable behavior in the workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>System Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When sexually harassing behavior occurs</td>
<td>Managers and others ask victims to “just handle it,” tease and make light of it, and expect victims to confront it alone without upsetting the system</td>
<td>which guarantees that the behavior will escalate</td>
<td>and a sexually harassing culture will be tolerated/encouraged and victims are doubly victimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Learning Alternative</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When sexually harassing behavior occurs</td>
<td>Recognize that I and others are affected and ask that all concerned become involved in remedying the situation</td>
<td>which guarantees that the behavior that is acceptable will be publicly discussed and consensus may emerge about what is and is not acceptable</td>
<td>and the system will either publicly admit that it tolerates this behavior or begin to engage in explicit conversations to help both victims and perpetrators make meaning of &quot;sexually harassing behavior&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scientists label as productive reasoning skills. Sue would be helped to lay out her position clearly, whatever that position might ultimately be and to then talk to the team about her reasoning and the actual data that support it. Sue would then ask the team what they thought of her position and if they had any information that she was missing that ought to be considered. Redesigns usually do not include saying all that is in one’s left-hand column. However, the consultant would encourage Sue to acknowledge and work through the feelings she has about the situation so that she can re-assess and re-integrate them into her view about the action she should take. This will require Sue to practice heightened self-awareness of how she is responding both in thinking ahead to the coming exchange and how she is responding in the moment when engaged in the discussion itself.

An Action Science consultant often helps people to identify signals that cause people to act defensively in a way that creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that may also be self-defeating. Identifying and responding to these signals is both a rational and affective process. How one is “being” in the interaction and awareness of how emotions may be hindering reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983) during a conflict are important implications of Heron’s distinction between feeling and emotion.

Oscar Mink (in Marsick and Watkins, 1990) developed a formula to help people new to Action Science to identify their theory-in-use patterns (Exhibit 22.1). One begins by identifying the undesired consequences that one seems to produce. Patterns begin to emerge that show a person when and how he engages in behavior that produces these consequences. We would add that one needs to be attentive to what these patterns would “feel” like in interaction.

For example, it might be that he acts in a certain way only with authority figures, or when he feels he is not given choices, or when he feels judged. By paying attention to these circumstances, a person can anticipate a likely response and change his behavior accordingly. A theory-in-use proposition for Sue, for example, might look like the following:

When I am confronted with a man who makes light of my contribution, I am afraid that I will not be taken seriously as a professional; so I dig in and hold on to my position even if I was not initially wedded to it, which guarantees that I will not be taken seriously as a professional.

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**Exhibit 22.1. Oscar Mink’s Formula for Constructing Theory-in-Use Propositions.**

When ____________________________ happens, I am afraid that triggering situation ____________________________ will happen, so I what I don’t want to happen which guarantees that what I do what I don’t want to happen will happen.

Theory-in-use propositions often speak to values and beliefs that are particularly significant to a person. This also means that, in conflict situations, people will find it more difficult to set these aside in their negotiations and responses.

**USING THE MODEL TO FACILITATE LEARNING THROUGH REFLECTION**

Facilitators can help people reflect on both the cognitive and noncognitive dimensions of conflict. The challenge may be greatest when conflict emerges unexpectedly. On the one hand, the element of surprise makes working with conflict more challenging. On the other hand, the impact of any such work is greater because need is so apparent and results so immediately tangible. Learning from past experience can help facilitators build skills to better address conflict in the moment.

**FACILITATION OF REFLECTION DURING THE EXPERIENCE OF CONFLICT**

One step that can help people to address conflict in the moment is to put in place a learning review process that becomes routine and that provides a structure to assist in reflection. Learning reviews help people to become more aware of goals, outcomes, contextual factors that influence the way they understand a situation, assumptions that influence actions, and feelings that they cannot articulate but recognize are operative. Facilitators can identify different ways to do such learning reviews, help people gain skills in carrying them out, and encourage people to articulate their viewpoints and discuss them openly with others. They can create a culture where conflict is expected and recognized for the value it will bring to results.

The U.S. Army, for example, developed the After Action Review (AAR) for this purpose (Sullivan and Harper, 1996). AARs are typically held in the middle of a battle, but they are also being used in noncombat situations. A learning review is held that is guided by four questions: What did we intend to happen? What happened? Why did it happen that way? How can we improve what happened? AARs focus attention on goals, which in itself can increase conscious learning. Data are collected to track actions and results so that the discussion can be based on what is called “ground truth,” that is, accurate data-based reports of what took place on the battle ground. “Ground truth” in the Army is collected by using computer-based technology that can provide detailed information on moves that were made. About 75 percent of the time spent in an AAR
involves focused reflection on why things occurred and how people can improve their next actions. Ground rules are set for dialogue and reflection that include freedom to speak up, regardless of one’s rank; a norm of honesty rather than “sugarcoating” or holding back for fear of reprisal; and strict avoidance of “blame.”

After Action Reviews are being adapted by corporations for use in non-combat situations where the enemy may not be as easily identified, the motivation for working together not as clear, and the consequences of a mistake not as obvious. Conflicts in civilian life may also not be resolved by a clear-cut win-loss outcome. The four steps of reflection, however, are similar to steps in our model and show how this framework can be made operational.

Facilitators can also help people attend to the noncognitive dimensions of conflict. Perhaps the most powerful first step for doing so is to make space for naming and working with feeling and emotions. There is often a shame and stigma associated with discussing feeling and showing emotion that is associated with Model I cultural values. Facilitators can help to create a respectful, safe environment for feelings to be expressed. Such an environment can be constructed through encouraging what Torbert (2001) describes as first-person inquiry/practice. First-person inquiry involves paying attention to one’s own reactions and developing a capacity for an attention and self-awareness and how it is “playing out” in a situation. Facilitators may well have to stand tough when others wish to avoid feelings and emotions or, even worse, “punish” a person for showing and discussing them. To do so, he or she often needs to use double-loop learning skills to identify and address underlying values and beliefs that influence cultural norms.

**FACILITATION OF REFLECTION BEFORE OR AFTER CONFLICT**

People are often blind to their own views. Mezirow (1991, 1997) recommends discourse as a way of identifying and considering preferred ways of acting. The conditions for discourse seem ideal at first glance, but Action Science dialogue groups show that they can be created:

... those participating have full information; are free from coercion; have equal opportunity to assume the various roles of discourse (to advance beliefs, challenge, defend, explain, assess evidence, and judge arguments); become critically reflective of assumptions; are empathic and open to other perspectives; are willing to listen and to search for common ground or a synthesis of different points of view; and can make a tentative best judgment to guide action. (Mezirow, 1997, p. 10).
It is easier to help a person to identify, name, and vent powerful feelings before or after a real or perceived threat occurs. The facilitator can more easily create a safe environment in which to extract and address fears, separate real from imagined consequences, and help a person develop both single-loop and double-loop approaches to working with the conflict.

An Action Science consultant facilitates dialogue about a situation, or a “case,” in which a person charts both what was said (in the right column) and what was thought or felt but not said (in the left column). The consultant helps to identify mismatches between intentions and actual consequences. They draw up a ladder of inference, identify assumptions, and map links between assumptions and actions. They role-play alternative actions.

Facilitators can also engage people in anticipatory reflection of alternative worldviews in order to step outside of current mental models that restrict new insights and skill development through the use of expressive ways of tapping into tacit experiential knowing (Davis-Manigaulte, Yorks, and Kasl, 2006; Yorks and Kasl, 2003). Some examples might illustrate this approach. Richard Leachman (1999), for example, uses abstract paintings along with word descriptions to help people create, populate, visit, and experience new worlds. He then invites people to revisit a problem through the lens of experience created by their foray into this new world. Other experiential educators engage people in dance, poetry, metaphor, guided imagery, or painting. Dr. Bruce Copley (1999) designs learning that uses all of the senses. He devises exercises that connect people to their physical worlds and that then enable them to see how this connection opens up new points of view. He helps people to learn from people, animals, plants, and inanimate objects. “Through this ‘whole person’ involvement the mind, the body, the feelings, the spirit, the experience, the idea and the meaning become one” (pp. 4–5). Activities such as these are useful for creating habits of being that are the basis of establishing an empathic zone (Yorks and Kasl, 2002).

CONCLUSION

We have introduced, described, and illustrated a model for learning through reflection on experience that we believe holds potential for those who help others to address and learn from conflict. The value of reflection is that it is available to everyone. At the same time, as Ellen Langer (1989) has observed about a similar capacity for mindfulness, its very availability may make people discount its usefulness or take it for granted. In order to learn from experience, people have to slow down their thinking process so that they can critically assess it. They need to get in touch with deeper feelings, thoughts, and factors that lie outside of their current mental and sensory models for taking in and
interpreting the world they encounter. They have to step outside of the frameworks by which they understand experience, which can be disconcerting and at times difficult to do. Reflection can lead to new insight, but it can also cause frustration because people then have to develop new capabilities for double-loop learning and skillful conversation.

References


PART FIVE

DIFFICULT CONFLICTS
Prompted to think about aggression and violence, we may recall a personal incident, a friend’s trauma, a community incident, or recent news. The vividness of these personal or recent events may overshadow the many kinds of aggression and violence that people experience as individuals, groups, communities, and nations. Some statistics from the World Report on Violence and Health (World Health Organization, 2002) suggest the ubiquity, severity, and extent of aggression and violence.

- As the result of violence, 1.6 million people die each year; countless more suffer physical and psychological injuries.
- In the twentieth century, 191 million people died in wars; more than half were civilians.
- In 2000, 200,000 young people died of violence; twenty to forty times that number had violent injuries requiring hospital treatment.
- For nonfatal violence, boys are more often victims of beatings than girls, while girls are more often victims of infanticide, neglect, and coerced prostitution than boys. In some countries one out of four women are abused by an intimate partner and one third of adolescent girls endure forced sexual initiation.
- Elderly people are at risk of physical, sexual, psychological, and economic violence.
As these statistics indicate, violence has many forms. It can be obvious or hidden, direct or structural, and it can be narrowly focused or pervasive. It can occur at all levels of analysis, from within an individual to between nations. Within these broad classifications, aggression and violence can be:

- **Physical/symbolic.** It is physical in assault and sexual abuse; it is symbolic in verbal, psychological, and emotional abuse.
- **Vigorous/passive.** It is vigorous in attacks; it is passive in the withholding or diverting of needed resources.
- **Means/end.** It is instrumental when it is a means to obtain valued goods or goals; it is an end in itself in sadistic, dominating behavior.
- **Sanctioned/prohibited.** It is sanctioned when it is authorized by public officials to wield, consolidate, and abuse power; it is prohibited when it is unlawful, abhorred, and punished.
- **Self-inflicted/inflicted on others.** It is self-inflicted when it is directed at oneself as injury or suicide; it is often directed at others.
- **Preserving/changing the status quo.** It can protect the political status quo; it can be used to accelerate social change.
- **Prosocial/antisocial.** It can be described as bringing about a better society; it can be described as destructive to people, security, and the physical and social infrastructure.

This chapter invites the reader to think about aggression and violence broadly, as complex constructs, rather than narrowly or stereotypically. Theories and research on aggression and violence offer an understanding of their nature, scope, and role in human experience.

When faced with aggression and violence in our lives or in the news, we may rely on readily available, simple, and stereotypical causal explanations. Theories and research on aggression and violence offer a more complex understanding of the origins of aggression and violence. The first section of this chapter is organized by an ongoing debate on the origins of aggression and violence: do they result from nature or nurture? This section begins with theories emphasizing the biological and dispositional origins of aggression and violence. It then describes theories emphasizing the interaction of nature and nurture, and theories emphasizing nurture or social context. Social context is particularly important because it influences forms that aggression and violence take, and it can ameliorate inborn tendencies.

Research and theory on aggression and violence have primarily focused on their biological, motivational, and cognitive roots, but the influence of morals, norms, and values has received less attention. The chapter’s second section describes moral theories and discusses the importance of norm violations, moral judgment, disengagement of moral controls, moral exclusion, and structural violence.
to an understanding of aggression and violence. The chapter concludes with implications of theory and research for practice, and it describes approaches that seek to reduce aggression and violence.

THEORIES OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: FROM DISPOSITION TO CONTEXT

While aggression does not inevitably lead to violence and violence can occur without aggression (such as in natural disasters) the terms are closely related. In popular usage, aggression can be confused with assertion—the bold, energetic pursuit of one’s goals. The psychological definition of aggression makes clear that it is negative behavior: “any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (Baron, 1977, p. 7). A public health definition of aggression as self-directed violence, interpersonal violence, or collective violence is broader in scope and describes aggression’s biological, social, cultural, and political roots and its enactment (World Health Organization, 2002).

Aggression and violence occur at every societal level. In individuals, they can occur as suicide and self-mutilation; in interpersonal relationships, as rape and deliberately passing on infectious disease; within and between families, communities, regions, ethnic groups, and nations as struggles for political control and liberation. Envisioning these societal levels as points along a linear dimension of increasing size and social complexity does not fully capture the strong influence that large social levels (for example, ethnic, national, or religious communities) exert on such smaller levels. Like handcrafted, wooden Russian matryoshka dolls, smaller units—individuals, families, or communities—are nested within larger communities that are themselves nested within regions and nations. This nested model (see Figure 23.1) captures how culture, expectancies, and socially shared understandings from one level infuse and influence others. Individual aggression is more likely when one’s peer group, family, community, or society encourages or expects it. Although the influence among levels is bidirectional, an individual is usually less able to influence the cultural norms of larger social groups, such as her society, than vice versa. The nested model depicts contextual influences on aggressive and violent behavior, but it is highly simplified. Some levels are “thicker” and more influential than “thinner,” less influential levels. In addition, multiple sources of influence contribute to aggression and violence. Individuals are nested in families as well as other close groups, such as friends and teams. Each context influences beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. These various influences may be congruent or discrepant. As the next section describes, aggression also results from internal as well as social influences.
Evolution, Sociobiology, and Physiology

Evolutionary theories describe the emergence of aggression and violence in conditions that protohumans may have faced. Informed by studies of animals and human groups in pre-industrial societies, these approaches describe aggression and violence as an adaptive, hardwired, physiological predisposition that has evolved over millennia (compare Waller, 2002).

Sociobiological research examines aggressive behavior among insects, fish, birds and, from these observations, extrapolates the meaning of aggression for humans. For animals, aggressive behavior is pragmatic: to obtain food, acquire or maintain leadership, or protect young or the flock. Intraspecific aggression benefits a species when it disperses members and promotes survival during catastrophes or periods of resource scarcity that kill off species members in one locale. But once adaptive behaviors do not invariably remain useful. Even if aggression and violence were adaptive for humans at one time, they may not remain so and should not be viewed as an inevitable product of our evolutionary ancestry (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1974).

Among humans, the physiological predisposition to aggress can be aroused by adverse environmental circumstances. In Shakespeare’s (1595) *Romeo and Juliet*, Benvolio warns Mercutio that on “these hot days, is the mad blood
stirring” (Act 3, Scene 1). Research concurs. Interpersonal and mob violence increase in adverse environmental conditions when hot spells, extremely low temperatures, foul odors, excessive noise, or crowding make life unpleasant. Alcohol and drugs also provoke aggression and are implicated in domestic abuse, vehicular death, and more than half of reported homicides. Adverse environmental conditions, alcohol, and drugs do not inevitably result in violence but they do reduce self-restraint. Reduced restraint along with frustration, misperception, and poor communication can lead to violence. Though there is little doubt that people have inherited the potential for aggression, they have also inherited the potential for altruism, cooperation, and, most important, the potential for thoughtful problem solving for choosing behaviors suitable for attaining desired goals.

**Deviance**

The predisposition for aggressive behavior is associated with a number of abnormal physiological conditions including neurological deficits, abnormal neurotransmitter levels (for example, serotonin and monoamine oxidase [MAO]), hormonal imbalance, birth trauma, brain tumors, exposure to such toxic substances as lead, and various medical disorders. Compared with nonviolent offenders, criminally violent individuals are more likely to have experienced significant head injuries and exhibit neurological impairment. Physiological deviance can cause aggressive behavior, but aggression can also cause physiological deviance. High levels of the male hormone, testosterone, can be a consequence as well as a cause of domineering behavior (American Psychological Association, 1996).

Psychological deviance, such as schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder, are sometimes associated with violent behavior. *Antisocial personality disorder* describes individuals who lack guilt and are grossly selfish, callous, irresponsible, and impulsive—characteristics that can lead to destructive conflict and violence. Some kinds of violence, such as rampage killings, gain wide media coverage although they account for only 0.001 percent of all killings. One hundred cases of rampage violence from 1949 to 1999 examined by the *New York Times* indicate that popular, simplistic explanations (that is, the killer was a disgruntled employee) fail to capture the serious mental health problems associated with this type of killing (Fessenden, 2000). The tragedy of rampage killings is that perpetrators often give ample and specific warnings about their desperate mental state and their murderous intentions beforehand but these warnings go unheeded. Preventative social services and responsive civic services could have prevented some of these rampages.

People with mental illness can be stereotyped as violent, but they are no more likely to be violent than people in the general population. Some people with mental illness behave violently toward themselves and others when they are off medications or when they abuse drugs or alcohol (like people in the
general population), but most do not. And like people in the general population, people with mental illness are sensitive to situational factors that constrain aggressive and violent behavior.

In spite of common stereotypes and fears, deviance does not account for most violence. Many people without physiological or psychological disorders behave violently, as exemplified by Holocaust bureaucrats and slave owners. In their society they were considered normal and were highly regarded because of their loyalty to their family, group, or cause. As the section on morals will discuss, this sense of responsibility and loyalty can itself inspire violence.

**Disposition and Context**

Disposition (also called personality or temperament) influences how an individual perceives and responds to conflict. Some people are unflappable; others are easily irritated. Although a hostile environment might provoke aggressive responses in anyone, people labeled “aggressive” see hostility in ambiguous circumstances, tend to react offensively to minimal provocation, and initiate overt aggression.

The media describes teens who perpetrate multiple murders, such as the 1999 Columbine High School massacre, as harboring pent-up grudges and being explosively angry and at the “point of no return” (Egan, 1998, p. 22). While these descriptions are plausible, they rely on disposition and understate the contribution of context. Attention to social context emphasizes the availability of semiautomatic weapons; an adult culture that ignores or is insensitive to adolescent needs and warning signs; a pop culture of violent rap lyrics, video games, television, and Internet sites (Huesmann, 1986); and a culture in which violence is an easy, attractive, and acceptable option for resolving conflict (Fainaru, 1998; Mifflin, 1999). Clearly, both disposition and context are important. Troubled youths with easy access to weapons, lax supervision, and a violent culture can be a lethal combination.

Dispositional explanations for aggression are not limited to individuals. In intergroup, institutional, interregional, and international conflict, dispositional explanations simplify conflict by depicting an opposing group’s culture as malevolent. This allows conflict participants and bystanders to view an entire political or ethnic group, or even an entire country, as dangerous, unprincipled, or evil.

Dispositional explanations for violence can also focus on individuals and societies. The Third Reich’s policy of genocide was partially the result of Adolf Hitler’s pathological but effective mix of demagogy, charisma, and anti-Semitism and, at the state level, the Third Reich’s elitist, racist, and homophobic ideology. The Third Reich was also effective because it was supported by many ordinary individuals, groups, and institutions. Psychologically, it is easier to view political leaders or parties as causal agents rather than to see the more complex and
larger context with its prevailing and anticipated economic conditions; political institutions; available and scarce resources; conflict resolution practices; laws and legal procedures; and the degree to which the society is open or closed to new groups, traditions, and ideas. This complex understanding of aggression and violence implicates ordinary people who are harder to label as dispositionally evil.

Motivation

Motivational theories describe aggression as resulting from blocked human needs. Biological needs for food, water, and shelter are basic and must be met before higher needs can be satisfied for social attachment, self-esteem, creativity, understanding, self-actualization, and spiritual transcendence (Maslow, 1970). Basic needs are inborn, but family and cultural values shape how they are expressed and met. Though frustrated needs can result in competition, anger, and aggression, frustration also motivates constructive behavior. Frustrated biological or safety needs can mobilize war or community cooperation, and frustrated love needs can prompt self-destructive behavior and stalking or inspire other creative energies. Motivation theory focuses on an individual’s needs, but social groups (for example, families, communities, states) also have basic needs for environmental resources (for example, land or clean water), security, and positive identity. These needs are at the heart of many protracted deadly intranational and international conflicts.

Frustration and Arousal

In 1939, a group of psychologists sparked controversy when they asserted that frustration causes aggression (Dollard and others, 1939). Building on earlier psychoanalytic ideas, they defined frustration as a state that emerges when circumstances interfere with a goal response. Their work spurred considerable research examining the relationship between frustration and aggression. This research found that frustration activates the readiness to aggress, but it does not inevitably result in aggression; frustration can also generate constructive problem solving. Nor does aggression always result from frustration. It also results from competition, greed, and fear. A number of factors, including negative and positive feelings, past events, understandings about the situation (that is, what is happening, who is to blame), and displaced hostility, mediate the effect of frustration on aggression (Berkowitz, 1993).

Context, too, matters. Guns, knives, or axes, have destructive potential in their own right and can be powerful contextual cues that spark violence. As Leonard Berkowitz (1968) quipped, “The finger pulls the trigger, but the trigger may also be pulling the finger” (p. 22). Frustration and arousal can lead to relative deprivation (Crosby, 1982), the sense of injustice that emerges when individuals or groups compare their lot with others. When these comparisons reveal
that one’s own group is disadvantaged compared with similar groups, they can result in shared frustrations and the conviction that fairness has been violated. This can precipitate political unrest and violence (Gurr, 1970).

**Gender**

Both women and men experience intimate violence. In the United States, nearly 5.3 million women ages eighteen and older experience intimate personal violent assaults each year, and 3.2 million men experience such assaults. Many consist of pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, and hitting, but approximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually (Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000). Women are particularly vulnerable to violence in societies characterized by inequalities between men and women, rigid gender roles, and legal and cultural norms that support a man’s right to sex (Levinson, 1989). They are also vulnerable in violent societies when torture-murders of young women reach epidemic proportions but go unchecked by civic authorities (*New York Times*, 2005; Ciudad Juarez also has experienced an epidemic of such murders).

Ninety percent of murderers in the United States are male, but when context, intensity, and type of violence are considered, the relationship between gender and violence is more complex. Women are increasingly charged with offenses against children, but they spend far more time with children than men, and men inflict more severe harm on children. Male-to-female and female-to-male violence assault rates are similar, but females inflict less physical injury unless weapons are used. The decline of intimate partner violence in recent years is primarily the decline of women killing men. This decline coincides with improvements in women’s economic status and the increased availability of protective services for women, including legal advocacy and shelters, indicating how social programs can reduce violence.

Children learn about gender roles in violent conflict by watching adults. In *Bone Black*, bell hooks (1996) describes domestic violence from her perspective as a child:

> Out of nowhere he comes home from work angry. He reaches the porch yelling and screaming at the woman inside—yelling that she is his wife, he can do with her what he wants. They do not understand what is happening. He is pushing, hitting, telling her to shut up. She is pleading—crying... Yelling, screaming, hitting; they stare at the red blood that trickles through the crying mouth. They cannot believe this pleading, crying woman, this woman who does not fight back, is the same person they know. The person they know is strong, gets things done, is a woman of ways and means, a woman of action. They do not know her still, paralyzed, waiting for the next blow, pleading. They do not know their mama afraid (pp. 146–147).

Research identifies some gender differences in aggression style among children. For boys and girls, direct, physical aggression toward peers is common
until age two. Direct aggression then declines as children mature but it remains more common among boys. As direct aggression declines, indirect aggression (such as badmouthing, gossip, smear campaigns, and socially isolating peers, also called relational aggression) becomes more common for boys and girls but remains more common among girls. Indirect aggression can inflict psychological and social damage. Attention to girl-on-girl bullying and aggression in the media (for example, the film Mean Girls) suggests that girls are getting meaner and more violent. This trend, however, has not been substantiated by research (Brown and Chesney-Lind (n.d.)). Researchers are only beginning to explore women’s voice, anger, and resistance to better understand women’s experience with, understanding of, and response to danger and violence (Fine and Weis, 2003).

Behaviorism and Conditioned Responses
From a behavioral perspective, aggression is not a genetically predetermined response. It is a response conditioned by stimuli that have been rewarded. Past reinforcement of aggression by praise, satisfaction, or attention increases the likelihood that an individual will employ aggressive responses; punishment decreases this likelihood. In the most primitive sense this behavior is learned but it is learned behaviorally rather than cognitively.

Criminal justice systems seek to strengthen the link between violence and punishment. The negative reinforcement of punishment is an effective deterrent only under specific circumstances: if the salience and certainty of punishment are high, if it occurs quickly after the offensive behavior, and if it is of considerable magnitude. This was demonstrated in a social experiment in which Minneapolis police officers responded to domestic violence with either on-the-spot arrest or counseling. Their responses were randomly assigned. Arrest, the punitive response, was a more effective deterrent of further domestic abuse even if the arrest was very brief (Sherman and Berk, 1984). While execution is commonly justified as a deterrent to violent crime, it inhibits homicide briefly. Following an execution, homicide rates drop but then rise above previous baseline rates. This suggests that execution advertises killing as a problem-solving strategy more effectively than it deters violence (Phillips and Hensley, 1984).

Social Learning
Social learning theory describes aggression as a way of interacting with others and solving social problems that is learned from watching influential role models enact aggressive behavior. Observation then segues into behavioral imitation (Bandura, 1983; Cairns, 1996; Staub, 1989). Media violence can contribute to social learning. It not only can desensitize viewers to violence and convey norms that justify violence, but it can also teach aggressive scripts for dealing with problems. Social learning is evident in copycat crimes following films or news with grotesque content.
Children learn essential survival skills from adults and older peers. Violence is then acquired as social learning gleaned from the local and wider culture as Geoffrey Canada (1995) describes:

If you wonder how a fourteen-year-old can shoot another child his own age in the head, or how boys can do a “drive-by-shooting” and then go home to dinner, you need to know you don’t get there in a day, or week, or month. It takes years of preparation to be willing to commit murder, to be willing to kill or die for a corner, a color, or a leather jacket. Many of the children of America are conditioned early to kill and, more frighteningly, to die for what to an outsider might seem a trivial cause. (p. 35)

Using nonviolent approaches to conflict, such as discussion and negotiation, in difficult social relations also requires social learning. Unskilled talking can escalate conflict. Constructive talk with an adversary takes communication and interpersonal and conflict resolution skills. These skills are more likely to be acquired, used, and effective if they have been taught and demonstrated at home, at school, in the workplace, in the community, in the media, and in the larger society (Opotow and Deutsch, 1999).

Social Cognition

Our understanding of ourselves is inevitably limited and what we know about others is even less complete. Although we can assume our understanding of a social situation is factual and accurate, it is often based on fragmentary information, inferences, and assumptions that can be biased and self-serving.

Social cognitions help us make sense of ourselves, other people, and our experiences. They include subjective interpretations about what is happening, labels for people and circumstances, and if-then scripts that hypothesize causality. Social cognitions are the way we process information, make decisions, and solve problems (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). From the perspective of social cognition theory, aggression results from hostile thoughts, fantasies, imagery, imagined intentions and from considering a limited rather than a full range of behavioral options. Less violent behavior can result from new ways of thinking about oneself, others, and the context. It can also result from envisioning alternative constructive responses to conflict.

Social cognition research describes social understanding as a sequential process. A person codes a social experience, selects an apt behavioral response, and enacts it based on rules that have been acquired during socialization and past social experience. Cognitive biases, deficiencies, and errors can occur throughout this process, from erroneously encoding cues to inadequately searching for responses, ineptly applying social mores, and bungling selected responses. As the next section describes, flaws in this process can result in two kinds of aggression.
Social Competence

Research on social competence in children differentiates between reactive and proactive aggression (Dodge and Coie, 1987). Reactive aggression is striking back in response to perceived provocation. Its behavioral symptoms include misreading others’ intentions, short-tempered volatility, and overreacting to accidental annoyances or affronts. It can result from chronic exposure to life-threatening dangers, such as domestic or social violence or the death of loved ones. These experiences disrupt a child’s sense of security and can lead to hypervigilance, unwarranted fear responses, and hostile attributions when faced with a minor provocations or ambiguous statements. Treatments include increasing the child’s awareness of situations that trigger aggressive response, increasing the ability to understand others’ behaviors and intentions accurately, anger control training, and exposure to admired role models who handle challenge without resorting to aggression or violence. Close, satisfying relationships characterized by reciprocity, cooperation, and competent communication about feelings can help children use assertive but less aggressive responses to challenges they face.

Proactive aggression is the initiation of verbal and physical aggression. It is such instigating behavior as domineering or bullying. Proactive aggression results from social experiences in which violence is reinforced as the preferred response. Coercive child-rearing practices and repeated observation of aggression in the media, in the community, and at home can give rise to proactive aggression. Proactively aggressive children may be able to accurately perceive others’ behavior and intentions but they respond with a limited repertoire (fight or flee) or evaluate an aggressive response positively (“This will show them that I can take care of myself”). They may also attempt a nonaggressive response but encounter difficulty enacting it and bumble into aggression. Treatment for proactively aggressive children includes learning nonaggressive problem-solving strategies, receiving consistent punishment for aggression and reinforcement for nonaggressive responses, and raising their awareness of long-term negative outcomes of aggression and long-term positive outcomes of nonaggression.

Culture

Culture is the learned behavior of a group of people that includes their shared languages, core beliefs, norms, values, and traditions. Culture is evident in the way people use materials and resources, in their social relationships, and in their political, legal, and economic institutions. Because culture shapes patterns of thought and influences biological propensities by valuing particular kinds of behavior, it influences the form and intensity of aggression and violence.

There is cross-cultural variation in acceptable kinds and levels of aggression. Peaceful societies are characterized by tolerance in child rearing, acceptance of
self-expression, and support for institutionalizing humanistic values. Violent societies are characterized by multiple forms of aggression including homicide, theft, competition at work, strict child-rearing practices, sexual repression of women, and punitive approaches to human behavior at all periods of an individual’s life from infancy to adulthood (Russell, 1972).

In some cultures, aggression is celebrated in entertainment and recreation. Roman gladiator contests are now viewed as depraved and cruel, but contemporary spectator events such as boxing, wrestling, and cock, bull, and dog fighting applaud aggression and violence. In some sports, brawls, playing dirty, and fan violence are part of the thrill. Aggression is also a key ingredient in participatory recreational activities such as hunting and its high-tech analog, laser tag. As a Business Week article states:

Why just daydream about demolishing your competitors? You may find more satisfaction in rubbing out rivals for sport at one of the increasingly popular places where you can wage war games for a modest fee. More and more business managers and employees act out their aggression these days at the country’s 500 laser-tag arenas, where opponents in sci-fi-style gear shoot at each other with laser guns. (Berman, 1998, p. 22)

Nelson Mandela maintains that violent cultures can be turned around by individuals, communities, and governments, as happened in South Africa (World Health Organization, 2002). This transformation depends on changing durable aspects of the culture, including the way that social, legal, political, and economic structures normalize social hierarchies, power arrangements, and access to social and material resources by groups within the culture. Among the many influences exerted by culture, moral influences are potent. They influence obligations in social relations among individuals, groups, and at larger levels of analysis. Morals influence the kinds of aggression that are noticed or ignored, deplored or celebrated, and perceived as fair or unfair.

MORAL THEORIES OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE

Morton Deutsch’s (1982) Theory of Interdependence and Psychological Orientation emphasizes that psychological orientations to social situations have moral as well as cognitive and motivational components. From this standpoint it is apparent that theories of aggression primarily emphasize biology, cognitions, and motives, and neglect aggression’s moral component.

Morals are the norms, rights, entitlements, obligations, responsibilities, and duties that guide our behavior with others and shape our sense of fairness. Morals, conveyed by social learning and culture, are attuned to who is owed
what in particular contexts. Even when morals are unarticulated they can be deeply felt, particularly when people perceive a discrepancy between what should be and what is. Morals can deter aggression and violence when they instruct patience if faced with provocation, but they can provoke aggression and violence when they instruct honor-, reputation-, or status-preserving responses to provocation. Perceived violations of shared social norms can activate a sense of danger and injustice that charge conflict with great intensity.

In aggression and violence, morals, entwine with cognitions and motivations. Morals and cognitions are closely connected. Anger is described as cognitive and physiological, but it is moral too. While it results from cognitions that someone is responsible for one’s suffering—that someone acted in a socially unjustified manner and that a negative occurrence would not have happened otherwise (Berkowitz and Heimer, 1989)—it is also a moral judgment that focuses on responsibility, blame, and violation of social norms. Morals and motives are also closely connected. Blame identifies particular people as responsible for one’s failure to achieve an important goal. It is also based upon a person’s understanding of prevailing moral norms and can prompt a sense of injustice that can be highly motivating and justify aggression.

Moral theories concerning violation of norms, social judgments, disengagement of moral controls, moral exclusion, and structural violence describe the relationship between morals and aggression and violence.

**Norm Violations**

Social norms guide behavioral expectancies about how people should behave toward each other. These norms are assumed to be widely known and shared within a group. Because social norms foster social coordination and communication, violations are disruptive and can be punished by gossip and ostracism. Violations of social norms also can set in motion attributions that emphasize malevolent motives and antagonistic interests, resulting in hostile reactions, conflict escalation, and violence. Norm violations are less likely to trigger this negative cycle if the norm violations are perceived as being transient rather than stable, unintentional rather than intentional, and when parties to a conflict (friends, community groups, or nations) have developed norms of redress. Norms of redress are procedures for bringing about retributive or reparative justice. They can effectively avert conflict escalation if they are in place and well established before norm violations occur (De Ridder and Tripathi, 1992).

**Moral Reasoning and Judgment**

Sociomoral reasoning examines how people judge their own and others’ behavior. Aggression can be normative or norm-violating, depending on prevailing norms in the family, community, and culture. Sociomoral judgments of aggression consider an actor’s intentions; the appropriateness, intensity, and nature of the
aggression; and the harm done. These judgments, which can be accurate or faulty, are influenced by such factors as the perceiver’s gender, age, ideology, and feelings of affinity for the victim or the aggressor (Rule and Nesdale, 1976).

Research on the development of sociomoral reasoning indicates that as children mature, their ability to take multiple perspectives increases. They progress from simple, self-oriented thinking to complex and abstract analyses that take other perspectives into account. Some theorists describe moral development as occurring in an orderly progression of increasingly sophisticated reasoning. Others propose that moral reasoning is reactive to social context. Danger and threat, for example, can cause people capable of sophisticated sociomoral reasoning to revert to simpler egocentric thinking.

Domain theorists point out that moral reasoning can be sidestepped altogether by viewing behavior in nonmoral terms. Social behavior can be construed as occurring (1) in the moral domain, in which fairness, responsibility, and deserving pertain; (2) in the conventional domain, in which social conventions and structures are salient; or (3) in the personal domain, in which personal discretion and privacy are salient. Understanding others’ behavior depends on knowing whether they view their behavior in moral or nonmoral terms. Adolescents, for example, can view smoking or drug use as a moral issue (right or wrong), as socially conventional behavior (hanging out with friends), or as a personal issue (their own preferences) (Berkowitz, Guerra, and Nucci, 1991). Similarly, abortion can be viewed as a moral issue or a matter of personal discretion (Smetana, 1982).

When applied to aggression and violence, domain theory has chilling implications. The moral implications of domestic violence are dismissed by aggressors who claim that their behavior belongs in the personal domain: “This is a family matter. Why do you want to make a big deal of it?” (Quindlen, 1994, p. A21). Hate-crime aggressors, too, invoke prevailing homophobic, misogynistic, or racist norms to describe violence as conventional rather than admit that it violates widely shared moral norms about human rights and dignity.

**Disengagement of Moral Controls**

Norms deterring aggression and violence come from within the individual and from socially shared norms. These norms are weakened during war, strife, and conflict, and gradually can lessen scruples about performing abhorrent acts under these circumstances. Brutal behavior can be condoned when it is construed as serving moral purposes and aimed at targets who are members of social categories that are viewed as without merit (Bandura, 1991). Under these circumstances, injurious behavior can be celebrated as a “moral victory” over the corruption of an adversary. Moral disengagement not only occurs in war. It also occurs in everyday life when it reduces restraints on harming or exploiting certain kinds of people.
Moral Exclusion

Moral considerations guide our behavior with those individuals and groups who are inside our scope of justice or moral community. The scope of justice is the extent to which one’s concepts of justice apply to others (Deutsch, 1985). Moral inclusion means that considerations of fairness apply to others, they are entitled to a share of community resources, and they are entitled to help, even at a cost to oneself. Moral exclusion dispenses with these considerations (Opotow, 1990, 1993). When people view others as morally excluded, they are more likely to derogate them and justify mistreatment they experience (Lerner, 1980; Staub, 1985).

Because it is difficult to see oneself or one’s society as harmful or unjust, research indicates that three kinds of denial perpetuate moral exclusion: first, denying harmful outcomes by minimizing their duration or effects; second, denying others’ entitlement to better outcomes; and third, denying one’s contribution to violence by seeing it as negligible (Opotow and Weiss, 2000).

Those outside the community in which morals, rules, and considerations of fairness apply can be viewed as nonentities who can be exploited (for example, illegal immigrants, slaves), or they can be viewed as hated enemies who deserve brutal treatment and death. Whether people who are targets of violence are ignored as nonentities or hated as enemies, they are seen as less than human and the violence they experience can seem appropriate. In the Third Reich’s Final Solution, the disappearances in Argentina, the genocide in Rwanda, and in too many other places and times, aggressors demonized hated victims while victims were invisible to indifferent bystander states. It is this mix of indifferent and malignant moral exclusion that makes the sustained butchery of genocide possible (Opotow, 2005).

Structural Violence

Structural violence, as distinguished from direct violence (Galtung, 1969), results from societal arrangements that normalize the way things are done, whose voice is heard or ignored, who gets particular resources, and who goes without. It includes unequal access to such social resources as education, quality housing, civic services, safe jobs, and political power. Unlike direct violence, it does not directly maim and kill. However, it does so indirectly by increasing exposure to risk, hardship, and danger. Because blame for structural violence is diffuse, those harmed by it are often suspected of causing their own debilitation. Structural violence flourishes when people who benefit from the status quo preserve their sense of morality by keeping themselves uninformed about the breadth and depth of structural violence and by avoiding questions that would yield answers they would rather not know. As a result, the advantage that race confers on White people at the expense of people of color and the advantage that gender confers on men at the expense of women is invisible, ignored, and disregarded (Opotow, 2001).
This chapter describes aggression and violence at various levels of analysis—within individuals and in small and large social systems. Because individuals live in social settings that influence their attitudes and behavior, effective conflict resolution addresses systemic as well as individual change. Change efforts consist of four steps: (1) accurately diagnose the situation, (2) design strategies, (3) implement solutions, and (4) conduct ongoing evaluations.

**Diagnosis**

Accurate diagnosis of violent conflicts considers issues, parties’ motivations, and cultures. Interventions should be based on fact-finding and research rather than assumptions and anecdotes (World Health Organization, 2002). For example, research indicates that a juvenile justice system can harm girls when it focuses on the girls’ crimes but not abusive conditions they have endured or how their abuse might be related to crimes for which they are charged. This leads to misdiagnoses and inadequate treatment that can begin a vicious cycle of violence and incarceration that drives these girls further into criminal behavior and the criminal justice system (Simkin and Katz, 2002).

Preliminary diagnostic work can identify presenting and underlying issues in aggression and violence, including parties’ basic needs, fears, and interests. It can identify those affected by direct and structural violence, including secondary victims, such as children and elderly aged people, who depend on primary victims for their well-being. Diagnosis also needs to transcend prevailing norms that may render some kinds of people invisible and some kinds of violence acceptable, inevitable, or innocuous (compare Farmer, 1998). Myths such as “Violence is a natural part of life” or “I saw lots of violence as a kid and I turned out okay” deny the way that violence, enacted in relationships, in the culture, and in the media, actively shapes expectancies, perceptions, moral norms, and behavior.

**Design Strategies**

Because aggression and violence often have multiple causes, they can be effectively addressed by ecological models and coordinated multiparty efforts (World Health Organization, 2002). Intervention strategies for domestic violence, for example, can seek to create healthy family environments and provide professional help for distressed families; monitor public venues in which violence can occur; deal with situations with the potential for violence; address practices and attitudes that support gender inequality; and address cultural, social, and economic factors that maintain disparate access to goods, services, and opportunities.

Effective community antiviolence programs are tailored to the issues and resources of the community they serve (Greene, 1998). They listen to community members, including youth, and appreciate their knowledge and coping skills.
They teach participants to recognize warning signs of escalating conflict and to learn nonviolent means to resolve conflict. They utilize psychoeducational approaches including mentoring programs, family cohesion efforts, and counseling. They encourage youth-operated programs that teach young people the dire consequences of violent behavior. Unless youth are involved in conflict resolution interventions as partners, hopes for a future culture of constructive conflict resolution and nonviolence are dim.

Conflict resolution programs that work in conjunction with mental health and community agencies approach aggression and violence with a broad array of resources. Deterring domestic violence, for example, is more effective when representatives from advocacy groups, health and social service agencies, and the justice system cooperate. Conflict resolution efforts at the community, city, state, and national levels can benefit from collaborations that include medical societies, police leadership, elected officials, the media, and school systems (compare Currie, 1998; Hawkins, and others, 1999).

Implementing Solutions

“Fools rush in where angels fear to tread” is especially true for interventions involving violence. Solutions begun without careful diagnosis and design can cause additional harm. Because there are many kinds of violence, many kinds of aggressors, and many contexts in which violence can occur, no one intervention is suitable in every situation. In general, individuals need to recognize how pervasive violence is, how small arguments can precipitate violence, and how available weaponry contributes to violence. Three principles suggested by Morton Deutsch (1993) can guide development of context-specific conflict resolution training:

1. Control your own violence.
2. Do not provoke others.
3. Manage others’ aggressive behavior when it occurs.

Control Your Own Violence. Effective conflict resolution intervention helps individuals reflect on their own conflict resolution style, distinguish between healthy and unhealthy ways of expressing anger, and become aware of the long-term consequences of their violent behavior. Individuals who understand their own conflict resolution style are aware of situations likely to provoke their emotional arousal; they learn to critically examine their justifications for anger, aggression, and violence; and they can realistically assess the gains and losses that result from violence. Individuals are more likely to use healthy ways of expressing anger if they can differentiate between assertive and aggressive responses, and if they can communicate assertive responses effectively.

Recognize What Provokes Others. Effective conflict resolution programs help individuals learn perspective taking to understand and avoid behaviors that
provoke others. Individuals who can take others’ perspectives are likely to think more flexibly, acknowledge rather than deny problems, and approach conflict constructively, with flexibility and creativity that can make full use of available resources. Perspective taking is difficult in the arousal of intense conflict and it can be threatening when it reveals unpleasant truths about oneself or one’s position.

Two antiviolence projects that teach participants what provokes others are Fight for Your Rights: Take a Stand Against Violence, cosponsored by the American Psychological Association and MTV, and the Alternatives to Violence Project, founded by Quakers and prison inmates in 1975. Fight for Your Rights: Take a Stand Against Violence helps youth recognize warning signs for suicide or murderous rage among peers. Youths exposed to incipient violence often lack training to evaluate its seriousness. This program teaches youth to seek out skilled assistance in order to deter violence among peers. The Alternatives to Violence Project encourages peaceful individuals and communities by teaching personal and interpersonal skills to facilitate perspective taking. These include communication, cooperation, trust, self-esteem building, creative approaches to conflictual situations, handling fear and anger without violence, awareness of stereotyping and prejudice, examination of power structures in society, and building the capacity for forgiveness.

Manage Aggression When It Occurs. Because aggression and violence can escalate rapidly, effective conflict resolution programs help individuals detect aggression in its early stages and learn to deescalate conflict. Early detection of incipient violence can nip it in the bud before conflict gains momentum and escalates out of control. At the interpersonal and international levels, human history has illustrated that violence has no limits. Therefore the earlier one faces up to dangerous situations the better.

Ron Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly (1990) propose that intervenors facing violent situations can deescalate conflict stage by stage. At the destructive stage parties try to destroy or subjugate each other. Intervenors act as peacekeepers who forcefully set norms, define unacceptable violence, and isolate parties if necessary to prevent violence from escalating further. At the segregated stage hostility and threats predominate. Intervenors discourage further hostility and help parties examine their conflict dynamics and develop ground rules that can move them toward negotiation. At the polarized stage conflicts undermine trust and respect; distorted perceptions and stereotypes prevail. Intervenors act as consultants who increase mutual tolerance by suggesting that parties scrutinize their assumptions about an adversary’s unworthiness. They help parties identify mutually acceptable processes toward resolution by encouraging information exchanges that can later serve as a basis for negotiation. At the discussion stage perceptions are accurate, commitment to negotiation is stable, and parties believe in the possibility of joint gains. When needed, intervenors facilitate negotiation as mediators to help parties find win-win solutions.
Evaluation

Evaluation is a crucial but underused element of intervention and training. Because few violence intervention programs are rigorously evaluated for their efficacy, the World Health Organization (2002) urges that evaluation has a higher priority in all conflict resolution efforts. (Also see Flaxman, 2001, concerning school antiviolence programs.) Evaluation should not be an afterthought; it should be built into implementation strategies before programs actually begin. There are a number of compelling reasons to utilize formative evaluations (during program implementation) as well as summative evaluations (when a program is completed).

Reality Checks. Social contexts change, and aggression and violence can accelerate this rate of change. Evaluation builds in the opportunity to revisit program implementation plans with new insights and knowledge as they emerge. Diagnosis and design strategies, no matter how careful, can miss key elements and have unintended consequences. Evaluations check that the diagnosis—not only as it was but also as it continues to evolve—is accurate and well matched with design and implementation strategies.

Unintended Outcomes. The physician’s maxim “First do no harm” has particular urgency in violent relationships. Evaluations can offer practitioners data about an intervention’s ability to produce desired outcomes. Evaluative data not only serve research purposes but also offer a practical tool for ensuring that an intervention does, in fact, ameliorate violence and that positive outcomes remain stable over time.

Conflict Residues. Even when an intervention transforms a conflictual relationship into a more cooperative one, conflict residues can remain. These can serve as a kernel that later reproduces destructive conflict. A journalist describing intergroup violence in Indonesia reported, “This round of cruelties has roots deep in the past. And it is but one example of what Indonesia fears most: an explosion of religious and ethnic violence that roars out of control, fed by old hatreds and fresh grievances, defying the peacemaking efforts of local leaders and the restraining presence of armed soldiers” (Mydans, 1999, p. 50). Because conflicts transformed from active to quiescent can simmer underground and erupt later, periodic evaluation of key social indicators can monitor quiescent conflict to detect troubling shifts in social indicators.

Expanding Knowledge. Evaluations give practitioners and scholars a valuable opportunity to learn from interventions. This learning can identify effective processes and outcomes and pitfalls to avoid. This learning is specific to each context; what works in one context may not be effective or suitable for others. Evaluation, therefore, is a chance for the field to grow by accumulating knowledge about positive and negative effects of various kinds of interventions in different contexts.
Ethical Considerations

Interventions in violent systems pose special ethical difficulties. An intervenor in a violent relationship is a witness to past, current, and potential harm. Therefore, intervention has moral as well as practical urgency. Naming a relationship “violent” invokes particular norms, responsibilities, and obligations; remaining silent also has moral implications. Intervenors more comfortable with avoidance than forthrightly addressing violence may be unable to motivate parties to view their relationship realistically and seek help or find safe resolutions to conflicts they face.

Practitioners intervening in violent systems must be skilled at recognizing violence, coercion, and oppression in relationships. Identifying violence can be difficult. Domestic violence is underreported by psychologists conducting marital therapy, teachers and counselors in schools, and emergency room doctors. Research in hospital emergency rooms indicates that sensitivity, courage, and good training are needed to recognize and document domestic violence (Braziel, 1998). When directly asked, victims and batterers admit to violence. When the answer is yes, practitioners who ask the difficult questions need the skill or the mental health and public safety backup that can help parties sort out their options.

CONCLUSION

The adoption of the terms “photo ID,” “HAZMAT,” and “lockdown” in everyday speech after 9/11 (Rosenthal, 2003) demonstrates how violence not only has immediate effects, but also how it continues to ripple out and affect individuals, institutions, cities, and nations. Addressing aggression and violence effectively means addressing it proactively. Its root causes are not only biological, cognitive, motivational, and moral, but they are also systemic. Political, economic, legal, and such social issues as poverty, human rights violations, political repression, and economic privation give rise to aggression and violence. Effective schools, affordable health care, safe housing, full employment, and environmental safety are social investments that also ripple out in society and have long-term benefits to “haves” as well as “have-nots.” Because the expression and intensity of aggression and violence are susceptible to social context, public health initiatives such as gun control, curtailing media violence, and training parents and influential community members (for example, police, school personnel, psychologists, and doctors) to model cooperative conflict resolution processes can reduce the intensity and prevalence of violence.

Although aggression and violence affect all social classes, people with the lowest socioeconomic status are at highest risk. Preventative and protective services must be available to them if violence is to be prevented. The World Health Organization (2002) emphasizes that:

Upstream investment brings downstream results. There is a tendency worldwide for authorities to act only after violence has occurred. But investing in prevention—
especially primary prevention activities that operate “upstream” of problems—may be more cost-effective and have large and long-lasting benefits (p. 35).

Peaceful cultures not only reduce aggression and violence, but also sustain peaceful social relations by emphasizing distributive, procedural, and inclusionary justice (Opotow, 2002). They also address conflict forthrightly and constructively to foster tolerance of diverse perspectives, the free flow of information, and democratic participation (Opotow, Gerson, and Woodside, 2005). Consistent with this activist conception of peace, this chapter has encouraged awareness of the breadth and complexity of aggression and violence and the range of factors that can cause and moderate their expression. The challenge is to utilize this knowledge to foster a culture of social justice, moral inclusion, and peace in the lives of individuals, communities, nations, and the world.

Note
1. In this chapter I use either term, violence or aggression, depending on which is most appropriate to the context.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Intractable Conflict

Peter T. Coleman

When destructive conflicts persist for long periods of time and resist every attempt to resolve them constructively, they can appear to take on a life of their own. We label them as intractable conflicts. They can occur between individuals (as in prolonged marital disputes) and within or between groups (as evidenced in the antiabortion-prochoice conflict) or nations (as seen in the tragic events in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the former Yugoslavia). Over time, they tend to attract the involvement of many parties, become increasingly complicated, and give rise to a threat to basic human needs or values. Typically, they result in negative outcomes for the parties involved, ranging from mutual alienation and contempt to atrocities such as murder, rape, and genocide.

Unfortunately, intractable conflicts are common. Globally, about 40 percent of recent intrastate conflicts persisted for ten years or more, with 25 percent of the wars waged lasting for more than twenty-five years (Smith, 1997). Some conflicts, such as the hostilities in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, have persisted for centuries. Domestically, nations face countless incidents of protracted intergroup conflict over racial, class, and gender inequities, as well as over issues such as abortion rights, the death penalty, and gun control. Similarly, the list of intractable interpersonal disputes, grudges, and feuds among family members, with former friends and personal enemies is substantial.

The objective of this chapter is to provide a practical overview of our current understanding of intractable conflict. It has four sections. It begins with a discussion of the characteristics of intractable conflict, which distinguish
intractable from more manageable conflict. The second section outlines five categories of approaches for addressing these types of conflicts. The third section offers some general guidelines for intervening in such conflicts, emphasizing intervention that is multimodal and multidisciplinary. The chapter concludes with a discussion of implications for training intervenors and disputants.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

Intractable conflicts are essentially conflicts that persist because they appear impossible to resolve. Scholars have used labels such as deeply rooted conflict (Burton, 1987), protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990), moral conflict (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997), and enduring rivalries (Goertz and Diehl, 1993) to depict similar phenomena. Kriesberg (2005) stresses three dimensions that differentiate intractable from tractable conflicts: their persistence, destructiveness, and resistance to resolution. Most intractable conflicts do not begin as such, but become so as escalation, hostile interactions, sentiment, and time change the quality of the conflict. They can be triggered and emerge from a wide variety of factors and events, but often involve important issues such as moral and identity differences, high-stakes resources, and/or struggles for power and self-determination (Burgess and Burgess, 1996). Intractable conflicts are typically associated with cycles of high and low intensity and destructiveness, are often costly in both social and economic terms, and can become pervasive, affecting even mundane aspects of disputants’ lives (Kriesberg, 1998; Coleman, 2003).

Characteristics: Tractable Versus Intractable

But what makes intractable conflicts persist? Scholars have begun to identify a diverse and complex array of interrelated factors that can help us distinguish between tractable and intractable conflicts. Of course, all conflicts are unique and it may not always be useful to compare, say, moral conflicts with intractable conflicts over territory or water rights, or conflicts between a husband and wife in the United States with those between a powerful majority group and members of a low-power group in East Asia. However, despite the many differences that arise in such comparisons, I suggest that intractable conflicts, particularly if they have persisted for some time, share to some degree some or all of the following characteristics related to their context, core issues, relations, processes, and outcomes. (See Table 24.1.)

Context

Legacies of Dominance and Injustice. Intractable conflicts regularly occur in situations where there exists a severe imbalance of power between the parties in which the more powerful exploit, control, or abuse the less powerful. Often,
Table 24.1. Characteristic Differences Between Tractable and Intractable Conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Context</th>
<th>Tractable Conflict</th>
<th>Intractable Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Historical dominance and injustice</td>
<td>History of relative equality; hierarchy attenuating myths; limited episodes of relational dominance or injustice</td>
<td>History of oppression; pervasive cultural and structural dominance, violence, injustice, and victimization; insulated elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Instability and anarchy</td>
<td>Periods of constancy and stable order; balance of power; effective institutions. Strong situations</td>
<td>Periods of rapid, substantial change; compromised norms and institutions; changes in aspirations; power shifts and ambiguity; anarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. Issues</th>
<th>Tractable Conflict</th>
<th>Intractable Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Human and social polarities</td>
<td>Resolvable and finite problems; integrative or distributive potential; negotiated agreements</td>
<td>Dialogic poles; paradoxical dilemmas; unresolved in traditional sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Symbolism and ideology</td>
<td>Isolated, tangible issues; little latent content; disconnected from other issues and narratives</td>
<td>Intricate interconnections of issues; high centrality; truth; meaning embedded within basic assumptions, beliefs, and ideologies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. Relationships</th>
<th>Tractable Conflict</th>
<th>Intractable Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Inescapable, destructive relations</td>
<td>Inclusive structures; escapable; reparable; mixed motives with negotiable core</td>
<td>Exclusive structures; inescapable; destroyed; intense mixed motives with intractable core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Oppositional group identities</td>
<td>Unrelated to conflict; complex, open, adaptive</td>
<td>Polarized collective identities; constructed around arbitrary dimensions of conflict; monolithic and exclusive, frozen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### Table 24.1. Characteristic Differences Between Tractable and Intractable Conflicts. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Internal dynamics</th>
<th>Tractable Conflict</th>
<th>Intractable Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involves conscious needs and motives; groups are unified; agendas are covert and explicit</td>
<td>Involves unconscious needs and defenses; intragroup divisions and factions; hidden agendas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV. Processes**

**A. Intense emotionality**

|                      | Emotions are mainly superficial or peripheral; passing; socially constructed constraint | Humiliation, deprivation, loss, and rage, as well as loyalty and dignity are central; socially constructed volatility |

**B. Malignant social processes**

|                      | Low to moderate intensity; minimal violence or nonviolent encounters; inclusive moral scope | High intensity; escalatory spirals; psychological and structural changes; moral exclusion; violent atrocities |

**C. Pervasiveness and complexity**

|                      | Clear boundaries; low to moderate complexity; few levels and parties; stable | Pervasive; high complexity; multilevel; multiparty; mercurial |

**V. Outcomes**

**A. Protracted trauma**

|                      | Unsettling and anxiety provoking; when traumatic, effectively addressed | Individual and community trauma; fractured trust; repressed or left unaddressed |

**B. Normalization of hostilities**

|                      | Brief time span; sustainable resolutions; constructive norms; shifting commitments | Historical rivalries; enduring cycles of low-to-high-to-low intensity; destructive norms; intergenerational perpetuation; lasting commitments |
the power holders in such settings will use the existence of salient intergroup distinctions (such as ethnicity or class) as a means of maintaining or strengthening their power base (Staub, 2001). Many of these conflicts are rooted in a history of colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, or human rights abuses in the relations between the disputants (Azar, 1990). These legacies manifest in ideologies and practices at the cultural, structural, and relational levels of these conflicts, which act to maintain hierarchical relations and injustices and thereby perpetuate conflict.

**Instability.** When circumstances bring about substantial changes, they can rupture a basic sense of stability and cause great disturbances within a system. This is true whether it is the divorce of two parents, the failure of a state, or the collapse of a superpower. Under these conditions, conflict may surface because of shifts in the balance (or imbalance) of power between disputants or because of increased ambiguity about relative power (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). It can also emerge when a sense of relative deprivation arises out of changes in aspirations, expectations, or achievable outcomes of the parties (Gurr, 1970). Such changes can bring into question the old rules, patterns, and institutions that have failed to meet basic needs, and can decrease the level of trust in fairness-creating and conflict-resolving procedures, laws, and institutions, adversely affecting their capacity to address problems and further destabilizing the situation. Anarchical situations, where there is a lack of an overarching political authority or of the necessary checks and balances that help manage systems, are an extreme example of power vacuums that can foster protracted conflict.

**Issues**

**Human and Social Polarities.** Tractable conflicts by definition involve resolvable problems that can be integrated, divided, or otherwise negotiated to the relative satisfaction of a majority of the parties involved. As such, they have a finite beginning, middle, and end. Intractable conflicts often revolve around some of the more central dilemmas of human and social existence that are not resolvable in the traditional sense. These are polarities (structured contradictions) based on opposing human needs, tendencies, principles, or processes, which have a paradoxical reaction to most attempts to “solve” them. These can include dilemmas over change and stability, interdependence and security, inclusive and efficient decision making, and individual and group rights (Coleman, 2003).

**Symbolism and Ideology.** Intractable conflicts tend to involve issues with a depth of meaning, centrality, and interconnectedness with other issues that give them a pervasive quality (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). The tangible issues
(land, money, water rights, and so on) that trigger hostilities in these settings are largely important because of the symbolic meaning that they carry or that is constructed and assigned to them. For instance, Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in 2000 was seen as a frivolous gesture to some and as a flagrant attack on Islam to others. Or, in Kashmir, much of the mountainous territory in dispute is frozen, uninhabitable wasteland, yet soldiers and civilians die each day to secure it. Such specific issues (resources, actions, and events) become symbols of great emotional importance through social interaction between people and through their connection to existing conflict narratives: stories that define the criteria for what is good, moral, and right in any given conflict setting (Bar-Tal, 2000).

**Relationships**

**Exclusive and Inescapable.** In many intractable conflicts, the relations between the parties develop in settings where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact and isolate the in-group across family, work, and community domains. This lack of contact facilitates the development of abstract, stereotypical images of the other, autistic hostilities, and intergroup violence (Deutsch, 1973; Varshney, 2002). However, the relationships are also typically experienced as inescapable by the parties, where they see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss. This may be due to a variety of constraints including geographical, financial, moral, or psychological factors. When destructive conflicts persist under these conditions, they tend to damage or destroy the trust, faith, and cooperative potential necessary for constructive or tolerant relations. In such relationships, the negative aspects remain salient, and any positive encounters are forgotten or viewed with suspicion and misconstrued as aberrations or attempts at deception.

**Oppositional Group Identities.** As group conflicts escalate, opposing groups become increasingly polarized through in-group discourse and out-group hostilities, resulting in the development of oppositional identities constructed around a negation and disparagement of the out-group (Kelman, 1999). This is particularly likely with collective identities of ascribed statuses (such as family, sex, racial, and national group membership) where there is a long-term emotional attachment to the group that is unalterable and significant. When such group identities are subject to discrimination or oppression (and such treatment is viewed as unjust), protracted conflicts are likely to manifest and persist. These group memberships can provide members with an important sense of mutual respect, a meaningful understanding of the social world, and a sense of collective efficacy and agency. However, deep investments in these polarized identities can become a primary obstacle to constructive forms of conflict engagement and sustainable peace.
Intense Internal Dynamics. Conflict is more likely to be resolvable when it concerns (1) conscious needs and motives, (2) between unified groups or between individuals with little ambivalence regarding resolution, (3) over overt issues which can be explicitly detailed and addressed. As such, the conflictual intrapsychic and intragroup dynamics and hidden agendas associated with intractable conflicts contribute to their difficult nature. They typically consist of both implicit and explicit issues, formal and informal agendas, and deliberate and unconscious processes. In addition, the high degree of threat, harm, and anxiety associated with them leads to a felt need for defensiveness and secrecy, which drives many motives, issues, and actions underground.

Processes

Strong Emotionality. Economically rational models of costs and benefits or positions and interests cannot begin to model the fabric of protracted social conflicts. Typically, these processes have a boiling emotional core, replete with humiliation, frustration, rage, threat, and resentment between groups and deep feelings of pride, esteem, dignity, and identification within groups. In fact, some scholars contend that extreme reactions in conflicts are primarily based in emotional responses (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). In effect, the overall distinction between emotionality and rationality may be rather dubious when it comes to intractable conflicts, where they are often inseparable. Here, indignation, rage, and righteousness are reasons enough for retributive action. However, it is not merely the type and depth of emotions that distinguishes tractable from intractable conflict, but rather differences in the normative structures and processes that imbue them with meaning. Our feelings of raw emotion (hate, rage, pride) are often labeled, understood, and acted on in ways shaped by rules and norms that define what certain emotions mean, whether they are good or bad, and how people should respond to them. Thus, similar emotions may be constructed and acted upon differently in dissimilar families, communities, and cultures. Communities entrenched in an intractable conflict may unwittingly encourage emotional experiences and expressions of the most extreme nature, thereby escalating and sustaining the conflict.

Malignant Social Processes. Over time, a variety of cognitive, moral, and behavioral processes combine to bring protracted conflicts to a level of high intensity and perceived intractability. They include such cognitive processes as stereotyping, ethnocentrism, selective perception (like the discovery of confirming evidence), self-fulfilling prophecies (when negative attitudes and perceptions impact the other’s behavior), and cognitive rigidity. These can fuel processes of deindividuation and dehumanization of the enemy, leading to moral disengagement and moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), that is, the development of rigid moral boundaries between groups, which exclude out-group
members from typical standards of moral treatment. This can result in a variety of antagonistic behaviors such as escalatory spirals (where each aggressive behavior is met with a more aggressive response), autistic hostilities (a cessation of direct communication), and violence. What is unique to intractable conflicts is the pervasiveness and persistence of psychological and physical violence, how it typically leads to counterviolence and some degree of normalization of violent acts, and the extreme level of destruction it typically inflicts. These escalatory processes culminate in the development of malignant social relations, which Deutsch (1985) described as “a stage (of escalation) which is increasingly dangerous and costly and from which the participants see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central to their self-identities or self-esteem” (p. 263).

**Pervasiveness, Complexity, and Flux.** Tractable conflicts have relatively clear boundaries that delineate what they are and are not about, whom they concern and whom they do not, and when and where it is appropriate to engage in the conflict. In intractable situations, the experience of threat associated with the conflict is so basic that the effects of the conflict spread and become pervasive, affecting many aspects of a person’s or a community’s social and political life (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). The existential nature of these conflicts can impact everything from policy making, leadership, education, the arts, and scholarly inquiry down to the most mundane decisions such as whether to shop and eat in public places. The totality of such experiences feels impenetrable. Yet they are systems in a constant state of flux. Thus, the “hot” issues in the conflict, the levels where they manifest, the critical parties involved, the nature of the relationships in the network, the degree of intensity of the conflict, and the level of attention it attracts from bystander communities are all subject to change. This chaotic, mercurial character contributes to their resistance to resolution.

**Outcomes**

**Protracted Trauma.** The experience of prolonged trauma associated with many of these conflicts produces, perhaps, their most troubling consequences. Long-term exposure to atrocities and human suffering, the loss of loved ones, rape, bodily disfigurement, and chronic health problems can destroy people’s spirit and impair their capacity to lead a healthy life. At its core, trauma is a loss of trust in a safe and predictable world. In response, individuals suffer from a variety of symptoms, including recurrent nightmares, suicidal thoughts, demoralization, helplessness, hopelessness, anxiety, depression, somatic illnesses, sleeplessness, and feelings of isolation and meaninglessness. Trauma adversely affects parenting, marriages, essential life choices, and the manner with which authority figures take up leadership roles. It also impairs communities and can hamper everything from the most mundane merchant-client interactions to voting and
governmental functioning (Parakrama, 2001). Thus, the links between trauma and intractability seem to lie in the degree of impairment of individuals and communities and, in particular, in the manner in which trauma is or is not addressed post-conflict.

**Normalization of Hostility and Violence.** In these settings, destructive processes gradually come to be experienced as normative by the parties involved. The biased construction of history, ongoing violent discourse, and intergenerational perpetuation of the conflict contribute to a sense of reality where the hostilities are as natural as the landscape. For example, Israeli and Palestinian youth in the Middle East were found to accept and justify the use of violence and war in conflict significantly more than youth from European settings of nonintractable conflict (Orr, Sagi, and Bar-On, 2000). In addition, they found Israeli and Palestinian youth more reluctant than Europeans to be willing to pay a price for peace. Again, what appeared to matter in this study was how the meaning of violence differed for the youth from these different settings. The violence/war discourse in the Middle East, passed down through the distinct parental and community ideologies of the Israeli and Palestinian communities, depicted violence as an act of self-defense and war as a noble cause. This type of ideology has been found to shield youth from the psychological harm typically associated with exposure to violence. Thus, increased levels of violence had become normalized for the Middle-Eastern youth, and were seen as necessary and useful particularly because of the perception that negotiations were impossibly costly (in terms of the nonnegotiable concessions that would need to be made).

To summarize, intractable conflicts are complex, mercurial, exhausting, and rife with misery. Their persistence can be the result of a wide variety of different causes and processes. Ultimately, however, I suggest that it is the complex interaction of many of these factors across different levels of the conflict (from personal to international) over long periods of time that brings them to an extreme state of hopelessness and intransigence.

**APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING INTRACTABLE CONFLICT: FIVE PARADIGMS**

Over the past several decades, the applied literature on social conflict has put forth a large array of approaches for prevention, intervention, and reconstruction work with protracted social conflicts. These perspectives have emerged from a variety of disciplines such as political science, social psychology, developmental psychology, law, education, communications, anthropology, linguistics,
The Realist Paradigm

Historically, this perspective has been the dominant paradigm for the study of war and peace in history, politics, and international affairs. Essentially a political metaphor, it views protracted conflicts as dangerous, high-stakes games that are won through strategies of domination, control, and countercontrol. (See Schelling, 1960.) Although they vary, approaches of this nature tend to assume that resources and power are always scarce, that human beings are basically flawed (always capable of producing evil) and have a will to dominate, and that one’s opponents in conflict at any point may become aggressive. Consequently, they present an inherently conflictual world with uncertainties regarding the present and future intentions of one’s adversary leading to risk-aversive decision making. Thus, intractable conflicts are thought to result from rational, strategic choices made under the conditions of the “real politics” of hatred, manipulation, dominance, and violence in the world. These conflicts are seen as “real conflicts” of interest and power, which exist objectively due to scarcities in the world and are only exacerbated by such psychological phenomenon as fear, mistrust, and misperception. In this context, power is seen as both paramount and corrupting, and real change is believed to be brought about primarily through power-coercive, command and control strategies.

The realist approach highlights the need for strong actions to provide the protections necessary and requires that we find effective methods for minimizing acts of aggression and for bolstering a sense of social and institutional stability, while at the same time confronting the underlying patterns of intergroup dominance and oppression that are the bedrock of many conflicts. Examples of this approach include the use of direct force, Machiavellian approaches to statesmanship, game
theoretical strategies of collective security and deterrence, and “jujitsu” tactics of community organizing (Alinsky, 1971). They also include acts of stabilization to offset uncertainties, such as establishing clear and fair rules of law, a trustworthy government and judiciary, fair and safe voting practices, and a free press. In some settings they involve activism to offset power imbalances including raising awareness of specific types of injustice within both high-power and low-power communities; helping to organize, support, and empower marginalized groups; and bringing outside pressure to bear on the dominant groups for progressive reforms (Deutsch, 1985).

The Human Relations Paradigm

An alternative to the realist paradigm emerged primarily through the social-psychological study of conflict and stresses the vital role that human social interactions play in triggering, perpetuating, and resolving conflict. Based on a social metaphor, its most basic image of intractable conflict is of destructive relationships in which parties are locked in an increasingly hostile and vicious escalatory spiral and from which there appears to be no escape. With some variation, these approaches view human nature as mixed, with people having essentially equal capacities for good and evil, and stress the importance of different external conditions for eliciting either altruism and cooperation or aggression and violence. This orientation also identifies fear, distrust, misunderstanding, and hostile interactions between disputants and between their respective communities as primary obstacles to constructive engagement. Thus, subjective psychological processes are seen as central as well, significantly influencing disputants’ perceptions, expectations, and behavioral responses and therefore largely determining the course of conflict (see Deutsch, 1973). From this perspective, change is thought to be brought about most effectively through the planful targeting of people, communities, and social conditions, and is best mobilized through normative re-educative processes of influence (Fisher, 1994).

The human relations approach promotes a sense of hope and possibility under difficult circumstances. It stresses that we recognize the central importance of human contact and interaction between members of the various communities for both maintaining and transforming protracted conflicts. Human relations procedures include various methods of integrative negotiation, mediation, constructive controversy, and models of alternative dispute resolution systems design. In addition, scholars have found that establishing integrated social structures—including ethnically integrated business associations, trade unions, professional groups, political parties, and sports clubs—are one of the most effective ways of making intergroup conflict manageable (Varshney, 2002). Other variations include interactive problem-solving workshops (Kelman, 1999), town meeting methodologies, focused social imaging (Boulding, 1986), and anti-bias education.
The Medical Paradigm

This view pictures intractable social conflicts as pathological diseases, as infections or cancers of the body politic that can spread and afflict the system and that therefore need to be correctly diagnosed, treated, and contained. A medical metaphor, it views its patient, the conflict system, as a complicated system made up of various interrelated parts, which exist as an objective reality and thus can be analyzed and understood directly and treated accordingly. These patients are thought to be treated most effectively by outside experts who have the knowledge, training, and distance from the patient necessary to accurately diagnose and address the problem. This perspective views humans and social systems as basically health-oriented entities that, due to certain predispositions, neglect, or exposure to toxins in the environment, can develop pathological illnesses or tendencies that are destructive. Treatment of these pathologies, particularly when severe, is seen as both an art and a science, with many courses of treatment bringing their own negative consequences to the system. Although not as common as the realist and human relations paradigms, the medical model is particularly popular with agencies, community-based organizations, and nongovernmental organizations working in settings of protracted conflict.

A classic example of the medical approach is Volkan’s Tree Model (Volkan, 1998), which recommends working collectively with communities in conflict to unearth the “hidden transcripts” (hidden resistances), “hot” locations (symbolic sites), and the chosen traumas and glories that maintain oppositional group identities. This diagnostic phase is followed by a series of psychopolitical dialogues between influential representatives of relevant groups, who then work toward a “vaccination” campaign to reduce poisonous emotions at the local community, governmental, and societal levels. Other activities aimed at containing the spread of pathologies of violence in communities include strategies of nonviolence and many types of preventative diplomacy (such as early warning systems), crisis diplomacy, peace enforcement (conflict mitigation), and peacekeeping. In addition, this approach is associated with a wide variety of activities for post-conflict reconstruction, including rebuilding damaged infrastructure, currency stabilization, demining, creating legitimate and integrated governments, demilitarizing and demobilizing soldiers, resettling displaced peoples, and establishing awareness of and support for basic human rights (Wessells and Monteiro, 2001).

The Postmodern Paradigm

This perspective portrays intractable conflicts as rooted in the ways we make sense of the world. A communications metaphor, its most basic image is of conflict as a story, a narrative or myth that provides a context for interpretation of actions and events, both past and present, which largely shapes our experience
of ongoing conflicts. Thus, conflict comes from the way parties subjectively define a situation and interact with one another to construct a sense of meaning, responsibility, and value in that setting. Intractable conflicts, then, are less the result of scarce resources, incendiary actions of parties, or struggles for limited positions of power than they are a sense of reality, created and maintained through a long-term process of meaning making through social interaction (Lederach, 1997; Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). This highlights a form of power as meaning control, an insidious, although primary form of power, which is often quietly embedded in the assumptions and beliefs that disputing parties take for granted. It suggests that it is primarily through assumptions about what is unquestionably “right” in a given context that different groups develop and maintain incommensurate worldviews and conflicts persist. Thus, change is believed to be brought about by dragging these assumptions into the light of day through critical reflection, dialogue, and direct confrontation, thus increasing disputant awareness of the complexity of reality, of our almost arbitrary understanding of it, and of the need for change.

The postmodern approach can be operationalized through a variety of channels, including targeting how conflicts are depicted in children’s history texts, challenging the media’s role in shaping and perpetuating conflict, and working at the intragroup level on renegotiating oppositional identities (Kelman, 1999). Many NGOs facilitate small dialogue groups of disputants who come together with the support of carefully structured facilitation to share their memories and experiences of conflicts in the presence of others who hold profoundly different views. These dialogues offer an experience that is distinct from problem solving, mediation, or negotiation in that they discourage persuasion and argumentation and encourage alternative forms of intergroup contact that emphasize learning, openness to sharing, and gathering new information about oneself, the issues, and the other. Other examples of this approach include the reframing of environmental conflicts (see Lewicki, Gray, and Elliot, 2003) and is evident in the work of groups such as the Public Conversations Project, the Public Dialogue Consortium, and the National Issues Forum (see Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997).

**The Systems Paradigm**

In essence, the system’s perspective is based on an image of a simple living cell developing and surviving within its natural environment. A biological metaphor, it views conflicts as living entities made up of a variety of interdependent and interactive elements, nested within other, increasingly complex entities. Thus, a marital conflict is nested within a family, a community, a region, a culture, and so on. The elements of systems are not related to one another in a linear manner, but interact according to a nonlinear, recursive process so that each element influences the others. In other words, a change in any one element in a system does
not necessarily constitute a proportional change in others; such changes cannot be separated from the values of the various other elements that constitute the system. Thus, intractable conflicts are viewed as destructive patterns of social systems, which are the result of a multitude of different hostile elements interacting at different levels over time, culminating in an ongoing state of intractability. (See Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska, forthcoming, Pruitt and Olczak, 1995.) Power and influence in these systems are multiply determined, and substantial change is thought to occur only through transformative shifts in the deep structure or pattern of organization of the system.

Ironically, the systems orientation is one of the most common, and yet least well-developed of the conflict paradigms. Its approach encourages us to see the whole. It presents the political, the relational, the pathological, and the epistemological as simply different elements of the living system of the conflict. Thus, it stresses the interdependent nature of the various objectives in intervention of mutual security, stability, equality, justice, cooperation, humanization of the other, reconciliation, tolerance of difference, containment of tension and violence, compatibility and complexity of meaning, healing, and reconstruction. It suggests that through the weaving and sequencing of such complementary approaches, it may be possible to trigger shifts in the deep structure of systems like Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Middle East, in a manner that may produce a sustained pattern of transformational change. However, a great deal of work must be done for this worldview to become useful at an operational level.

The five paradigms and various associated procedures outlined in this section provide us with an extensive menu of perspectives and options for addressing intractable social conflicts. Each approach is supported to some degree by empirical research, and each offers a unique problématique, or system of questioning, that governs the way we think about intervention in conflicts. Ideally, however, we must develop a capacity to conceptualize and address intractable conflicts that is mindful of the many factors and complex relationships inherent to the phenomenon and of the complementarities of these diverse approaches.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT**

This section offers some general propositions or guidelines for intervention. The set of guidelines given here has been informed by the work of Morton Deutsch, Dean Pruitt, Paul Olczak, Heidi Burgess, Guy Burgess, John Paul Lederach, Herbert Kelman, and Michael Wessells. The guidelines are useful for resolving many types of conflict, but they have particular relevance for addressing intractable conflict. All should be considered important; however, they are presented here in a crude
Guideline 1: Conduct a Thorough Analysis of the Conflict System Prior to Intervention

Generally speaking, there are three phases in approaching such complex conflicts effectively: the problem-analysis phase, the problem-engagement phase, and the problem-resolution phase (Fisher, 1994). They are rarely sequential and are often cyclical in practice, but problem analysis should be carefully thought through so that the resulting initiatives directly address the dynamics of intractability relevant to the case. Given the complexity, character, and interrelatedness of the many causal factors of intractable conflict previously outlined in this chapter, it is paramount that the intervenor take the time to begin with a comprehensive analysis of the situation. Our tendency to act before fully comprehending the system of a conflict often exacerbates it. This type of error was depicted in the John Sayles film *Men with Guns*, in which a physician who desires to alleviate the suffering of mountain peasants victimized by civil war introduces a team of young medical doctors into their villages. This well-meaning act backfires by inciting the suspicion of the government’s army that the doctors are aiding the peasant revolutionaries; the army retaliates, and the result is more harm inflicted on the peasants. Ideally, assessment of an intractable conflict situation should be systemic in scope (considering important elements of the history, context, and dynamics), informed and verified by those directly involved with the conflict, and reassessed over time as important changes occur.

There are an increasing number of analytical frameworks that are useful for analyzing conflict systems (see Coleman, Bui-Wrzosinska, Nowak, and Vallacher, forthcoming; Lederach, 1997). Pruitt and Olczak (1995) offered a simple yet comprehensive framework for use in analyzing and approaching intractable conflict. Their MACBE model is an eclectic, multimodal systems approach to addressing social conflict that traces the source and potential resolution of a conflict to changes in five distinct yet interdependent “subsystems” of the individuals involved: their motivation, affect, cognition, behavior, and surrounding environment. Highly escalated conflicts entail hostile elements in all five components. Motives are to harm or destroy the other; the affect is hostile and rage-filled; cognitions include negative stereotypes, perceptions, and a large measure of distrust; behaviors are violent and destructive; and the environment is usually polarized. The model views these five modes of experience as interactive and working with “circular causality,” affecting and being affected by changes in the other modes. This feeds the escalation of the system through internal conflict spirals. The authors of the model argue that to address “seemingly intractable” conflicts most effectively,
one must understand the interrelationship of these experiences and look to produce changes in several, if not all, of these modes.

Take, for example, a seemingly intractable family dispute between a stepfather and a stepson. The conflict sprang from myriad identity and resource-based issues, persisted for several years, affected the entire family system, and eventually reached a stage where interactions between the disputants alternated between autistic hostility and violence. The family was referred to mediation by the police, and the mediator eventually involved a family therapist. This team of intervenors found it useful to separate those aspects of the conflict that were cognitively based (distrust and stereotypical misperceptions), feeling based (rage and fear), behaviorally based (lack of effective conflict-resolving skills), motivationally based (unwillingness to engage), and environmentally based (schisms among the broader family system). The intervenors found these distinctions, in light of the interrelatedness of these issues, useful in proposing a comprehensive strategy for intervention.

**Guideline 2: Given the Complexity of Intractable Conflict, Analysis and Intervention Must Be Embedded in a Multidisciplinary Framework**

Because of the multidimensionality of intractable conflicts, it is imperative that intervenors understand the system of the conflict from various perspectives and approach it comprehensively. Well-intentioned psychosocial interventions (as well as political or economic interventions) that are ignorant of political, economic, and cultural realities can be ineffective or have disastrous consequences. However, the narrow specialist training in disciplines, the difficulty of employing diverse methods, and the lack of incentive to work across disciplinary boundaries makes a multidisciplinary approach to these conflicts particularly difficult to realize.

A nuanced reading of ongoing conflicts can be facilitated by a process of reframing the conflict through multiple frames (such as systems, realism, human relations, pathology, and postmodernism), organized around the objective of specifying the particular systemic dynamics of a given conflict. Reframing is both schematic and evaluative, as analysts move back and forth through various perspectives to garner the most comprehensive and useful reading of the current situation. However, such a reading must be pragmatic; it must lead to insights for change. As Morgan (1997) writes, “Effective readings are generative. They produce insights and actions that were not there before. They open new action opportunities. They make a difference” (p. 372).

For example, take the conflict erupting on U.S. college campuses between pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli faculty and students. Employing a superordinate frame of systems to begin our analysis orients us to a view of the system as a whole and asks what is the nature of the general patterns emerging on these campuses? It shifts our analysis away from particular actions, encounters, and outcomes, toward an awareness of the internal dynamics and trends unfolding over time on campus and
beyond. Then, the realist frame asks what roles do politics and power play in establishing the state of intractability? Are external political groups instigating tensions to bring attention to their cause? Are internal groups playing up ethnic differences to mobilize altogether different agendas? Changing frames make other aspects salient. The human relations frame asks do particular social conditions contribute to malignant relations between people and groups that are maintaining the problem? Are there other aspects of these relationships, beyond ethnic or political differences, that contribute to attributions of hostility of the other? The postmodernist frame emphasizes meaning construction around the events, suggesting we pay special attention to the stories told of the conflict. It reminds us that each of the stories told are likely to be partial truths, not completely invalid, but biased in their representation of the causes, responsibilities, heroes, and heroines of the past and present. The medical frame might alternatively focus on the often overlooked role that individual and collective trauma play in the unfolding patterns of the conflict. It asks how do past (or recent) experiences of exposure to suffering, the loss of loved ones, and chronic health problems affect responses to the situation?

Multidisciplinary teams of scholar-practitioners are often best suited to operationalize this type of eclecticism, when informed by individuals with direct experience of the conflict and the setting. This allows us to benefit from the many insights of scholarship and practice in divergent areas, as they apply to the understanding of patterns of destructiveness within specific conflicts. However, such teams often require training and leadership to bring their individual perspectives in line with the objectives of a systemic approach. But, by broadening our understanding of the conflict, it becomes possible to increase our range of options for intervention.

**Guideline 3: Initial Concern for the Intervenors Should Be to Foster an Authentic Experience of “Ripeness” Among Disputants or Among Key Representatives of Each of the Groups Involved in an Intractable Conflict**

The MACBE model recommends a sequential method for intervening in intractable conflict that begins by addressing ripeness (a willingness to deescalate). In fact, there is a general sense among scholars and practitioners that one of the first and most critical challenges conflict resolvers face when working with malignant conflict systems is in helping disputants to cross their own social psychological barriers to making peace with their enemy (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995). When destructive and escalatory dynamics have become normalized, ripeness should be viewed as a commitment to a change in the nature of the relations of the parties from a destructive orientation toward a more constructive state of coexistence with potential for mutual gain (Coleman, 1997).

Lewin (1947) developed a model for conceptualizing change in systems that offers important insight into these processes (see also Chapter Twenty). He
wrote that “the study of the conditions for change begins appropriately with an analysis of the conditions for ‘no change,’ that is, for the state of equilibrium” (p. 208). Lewin indicated that a state of “no social change” refers to a state of “quasi-stationary social-equilibrium,” that is, a relatively constant state. Therefore, to better locate and comprehend the various paths to ripeness in a conflict it is valuable to attempt to understand the dynamic forces that keep a conflict in a state of “unripeness.” During the Cold War, for example, the combination of fear, misunderstanding, mutual distrust, propaganda, and investments in military industry between the United States and the USSR acted to contain the conflict at a costly level for a prolonged period of time.

Lewin offered two basic methods for bringing about change in the direction of the status quo of a system: by adding forces in the desired direction of the change or by diminishing the opposing forces that resist the change. Typically, the change forces that can be added to induce ripeness include threats and the use of physical force; the perception of a hurting stalemate (suffering losses in a conflict that cannot be won); the experience of a recent or near catastrophe; and the awareness of an impending catastrophe or deteriorating position (Zartman and Aurik, 1991). Adding change forces to the conflict system induces a state of increased tension that is accompanied by “greater fatigue, higher aggressiveness, higher emotionality, and lower constructiveness” (Lewin, 1947, p. 26). Obviously, this is risky in the already high-tension state of an escalated conflict process. Therefore, it may be beneficial to initially consider the alternative method of removing the resistance forces opposing ripeness, thereby facilitating it while lowering relative tension. As the MACBE model suggests, there are multiple avenues available to achieve this. In fact, even small (but vital) changes in any one of the modes can potentially have a large impact on the system. Thus, a shift in one’s thinking (such as new insights or a change in attitude) can lead to new feelings and behaviors that subsequently change the context. Likewise, a unilateral conciliatory action might affect one’s sense of possibility in an otherwise rigid situation, leading to an increased willingness to consider other risks.

Returning to the family conflict previously described, several key factors contributed to unfreezing both the adolescent’s and the stepfather’s resistance to ripeness and moving them toward resolution of their conflict. The mediation process (to a small degree) and the individual counseling sessions (to a larger degree) allowed both parties the cathartic experience they needed to ventilate their feelings and feel heard and respected by understanding third parties. This helped them both get over their intense blaming of the other and to begin taking some responsibility for their respective situations. These experiences also helped to establish some trust between the parties. The counselors and mediator also modeled and discussed the use of appropriate social skills for dealing with anger and when engaged in conflict. This helped the parties begin to see alternative methods of responding to each other. Finally, the adolescent’s counselor involved other key members in family therapy as a means of educating them to their role
in the conflict and making them part of the solution. These interventions worked in combination to move the parties toward ripeness and resolution.

Through identifying and removing the obstacles (such as distrust, rage, and lack of skills) that act to resist ripeness, it becomes possible to create or enhance a disputant’s commitment to peace without increasing the overall level of tension in the system. Resistance obstacles differ in their amenability to change and in the level of impact they have on the system. Intervenors would benefit from targeting the obstacles that are of high importance and most amenable to change.

**Guideline 4: Initially, Orient Disputants Toward the Primary Objective of Defining a Fair, Constructive Process of Conflict Engagement, and Away from the Objective of Achieving Outcomes That Resolve the Conflict**

The work of Burgess and Burgess (1996) on intractable conflict has identified a subtle but important reframing of the approach to these problems. They contend that, because of the zero-sum nature of most intractable conflicts, confrontation over the core issues at stake is inevitable and comprehensive resolution is unrealistic. However, they argue, the processes need not be destructive. Consequently, they advocate that conflict resolvers working in such a situation emphasize creating a process of confrontation that the disputants find to be both effective (in terms of minimizing the negative costs of the conflict and maximizing the benefits) and fair or just (in terms of broad moral concerns). They suggest that conflict resolvers see this as a shift to an incremental approach to resolving conflict, which has the potential of reducing the damage of the conflict process despite the lack of any ultimate resolution.

To a large extent, this is what emerged with the Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland, where a political process was established (home rule and a power-sharing arrangement between the communities) whose agenda it was to tackle some of the substantive problems associated with the conflict (such as disarming the IRA). I suggest that this emphasis on establishing a constructive process might be a particularly useful strategy in the early phases of a conflict resolution process to create a sense of possibility, but that eventually, if the stakes are high, the disputants will demand a focus on the substance of their concerns.

**Guideline 5: Elicitive Approaches to Conflict Intervention, Particularly When Working Across Cultures, Tend to Be More Respectful of Disputants, and More Empowering and Sustainable Than Prescriptive Approaches**

There is a current concern among scholars and practitioners about whether the models in use in many conflict resolution interventions are implicitly oriented toward Western males and are therefore not sufficiently sensitive and respectful of “differences” (of gender, race, culture, class, and so on) in how conflict is
understood, approached, and ideally resolved. (For additional discussion of the relation between culture and conflict, see the next part of this volume.)

Responding to these concerns, some scholars have recommended an “elicitive” approach to conflict resolution across cultures (Lederach, 1995). They contend that “prescriptive” approaches to intervention, which view the intervenor as the expert and the participants as passive recipients of predetermined knowledge, models, and skills, are often inappropriate. They endorse another type of approach, where the local, cultural expertise of the participants is elicited and emphasized and where the intervenor and the participants together design interventions that are specifically suited to the problems, resources, and constraints of the specific cultural context. An elicitive approach not only corrects for the bias of a prescriptive approach but also is experienced as empowering by the participants in that it respects, embraces, and accommodates the voices of local people. It can also foster great commitment to the peace process by those involved and therefore lead to plans and initiatives with prolonged sustainability.

Guideline 6: Short-Term (Crisis-Management) Interventions Need to Be Coordinated and Mindful of Long-Term Objectives and Interventions

Intractable conflict sometimes brings on an extended period of crisis and intense human suffering. It is often these events that capture the attention of outside parties (such as the police, the media, and the international community). When this occurs, intervenors typically focus their efforts on containing the immediate crisis and stopping the violence. This form of crisis management is, of course, essential. However, it is often carried out with little thought for the implications for the larger conflict system and longer-term peace objectives.

Lederach (1997) describes the various time frames inherent in the aspects of peace work. Short-term crisis intervention work (such as emergency relief and humanitarian aid) orients intervenors to immediate, life-saving tasks that typically occur in a framework of two to six months. Short-range planning (such as preparation and training to reduce the likelihood of recurring violence) requires forward thinking, looking ahead one or two years. The longer-term perspective, which Lederach defines as “generational thinking” or thinking twenty-plus years out, is uncommon in peace work but used by some to visualize peace and social harmony between disputants and to identify the steps necessary to reach such an idealized state. Nested between short-range planning and generational thinking is what Lederach refers to as “decade thinking” (five to ten years), where fundamental social change can be designed and implemented.

Lederach encourages practitioners to see each time frame as nested in the longer-term schemas and to be mindful of the impact of crisis management and short-term planning on long-term objectives. He suggests that thinking in terms of decades can help coordinate peace work in a manner that links the immediate experience of crisis intervention with initiatives toward a better future where
such problems can be prevented. This broad time frame is more realistic when addressing protracted conflicts that have been in existence for several generations and may take that long to resolve effectively.

**Guideline 7: Establish the Conditions, Initiate, and Sustain Constructive, Nonlinear Change**

Change in complex systems of conflict is nonlinear. In other words, a change in any one element of the conflict (like attitudes) does not necessarily constitute a proportional change in others; such changes cannot be separated from the values of the various other elements that constitute the system (Coleman, forthcoming). So, changes in any one member of a distressed family (such as a commitment by the stepfather to remain nonviolent) may or may not impact the other elements of the system (such as the level of family dysfunction), depending on the different attributes of the members, the nature and the degree of the change, and the nature of the relationships between members. Accordingly, complex systems often exhibit spontaneous, novel, and creative activities that are not completely predictable from circumstances, interventions, or previous events. Thus, initiating change in complex systems requires that interveners have humility, for such change is often unpredictable and uncontrollable. Nevertheless, Gersick (1991) suggests that fundamental change in patterns of systems can be brought about through three interrelated processes: establishing the conditions for radical change, initiating the change, and creating the conditions that sustain the change.

Figure 24.1 provides a schematic overview of nine categories of strategies for initiating constructive changes in situations of protracted conflict, organized

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**Figure 24.1** Systemic Change Initiatives

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<th>Episodic</th>
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around two dimensions: type of change initiative and level of intervention. Change initiatives can have three types of effects in social systems: an episodic impact, which is direct and immediate but typically short term or superficial; a developmental impact, which takes time, perhaps years, to unfold in a system but can have substantial affects over time on the quality of the patterns of interaction; and a radical impact, which is often dramatic, altering the pattern of the system. Change initiatives can also differ categorically by the level of the agent of change. Three general levels are: top-down, involving leaders and elite decision makers; middle-out, involving key midlevel leaders and community networks and structures; and bottom-up, relating to grassroots organizations or the masses directly.

Episodic initiatives at all three levels are typically responses to crises associated with conflicts that attempt to quell outbreaks of violence or suffering. These initiatives, such as military or police intervention or direct humanitarian aid, can lessen the intensity of the destructiveness of the conflict but typically do little to interrupt the strong hostile patterns that characterize protracted conflicts. Developmental initiatives can have an eventual impact on the pattern of a conflict, but such effects are typically gradual, particularly when they are initiated at lower levels of the system. A popular midlevel, developmental approach to initiating change in societal conflicts involves working with middle-range leaders through interactive problem-solving workshops. (See Fisher, 1997.) Finally, radical initiatives attempt to trigger fundamental shifts in conflict patterns (from destructive to constructive) through small but important changes. For example, Gersick (1991) argues that such changes can be brought on by the attraction of influential newcomers to a system (typically young or unsocialized outsiders) who are often drawn by a crisis in a system and who are less obligated, constrained, and resistant to change, and thus better able to initiate frame-breaking changes in the mind-sets of stakeholders.

Guideline 8: The General Intervention Strategy Must Integrate Appropriate Approaches for Issues Rooted in the Past, the Present, and the Future

Intractable conflicts tend to revolve around concerns from the past, the present, and the future, but most interventions are oriented toward present concerns. In addition, anthropologists have found that members of distinct cultures often differ in the relative importance that they assign to events of the past, present, or future. For intractable conflict to be resolved effectively, the intervention approach must be respectful of these time orientations and capable of addressing the salient issues from different temporal dimensions.

Working with conflicts rooted in the past can be complicated by such factors as bias in memory recall, blocks in memory retrieval because of trauma,
and the fundamentally different experiences of the past that exist across cultures in terms of the role and importance of ancestors and the effects of the past on one’s present life. There is great need for innovation in developing new (or perhaps embracing old) methods for addressing such problems. Developing expressive and symbolic processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions, town meetings, dialogue sessions, and family and couples counseling to support mediation processes are all attempts along these lines. These processes are often time-consuming, with the focus of such initiatives less on action and more on healing, forgiving, and reconciling. Ultimately, conflict practitioners need to develop enhanced capacity for understanding the power of the past, as well as the patience and tolerance that some of these approaches demand.

There are several methods recently developed for addressing future concerns (see Chapter Thirty-Three for a discussion of Future Search methods). One such practice developed by Elise Boulding (1986) is called focused social imaging. The approach is quite simple. The workshop actively involves participants who are parties to a dispute (such as Arab and Israeli youths). They begin by identifying some of the shared social concerns regarding the conflict (such as reducing community violence or improving community health services). The participants are then asked to temporarily disregard the current realities of the situation and to step into the future. They are asked to put themselves into a future approximately twenty to thirty years from the present, in which their concerns have been effectively dealt with. As the participants begin to develop some sense of the social arrangements and institutions in this idealized future, discussion ensues. Together, they begin to create a vision for a community that has the institutions and relationships necessary to effectively address their shared concerns. Then the participants are asked to move slowly backward in time and to begin identifying the steps that would precede establishment of such institutions and relationships. This is both a creative and a critical process of examining the achievement of their ideal future in the context of the circumstances that are likely to exist between the present and such a future. Ultimately, this process results in both a vision and a plan for making the vision reality. It also can serve to open up the participants’ awareness of options and approaches to the current conflict that they previously found impossible to imagine.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING**

Space does not allow detailed discussion of the needs for training in this area. However, the guidelines and processes I have described outline many of the objectives to be addressed in a comprehensive training program for practitioners working with intractable conflict. In summary, such training should address:
Systems thinking and analysis. An introduction to dynamical systems theory (see Nowak and Vallacher, 1998) offers a conceptual framework for understanding the interrelationships of various elements within systems and their interface with the external environment as they evolve over time. It can also be useful to learn to represent systems in the form of a conflict network through loop analysis. Loop analysis, developed by Maruyama (1963), is a methodology that can be applied for mapping positive and negative feedback processes that escalate, de-escalate, and stabilize destructive conflicts. Participants should also be trained in using a variety of system analytical frameworks for conflict intervention such as those developed by Lederach (1997), Pruitt and Olczak (1995), and Coleman, Bui-Wrozinska, Nowak, and Vallacher (forthcoming).

Coordination of complex activities. Training should develop skills in working with multitask, multimethod approaches that can integrate multidisciplinary perspectives and methodologies to address immediate, short-term, and long-term goals in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion. Training should also emphasize the importance of temporal distinctions of past, present, and future orientations in intervention.

Creating ripeness. Intervenors would benefit from training in understanding and developing strategies and tactics for assessing, fostering, and maintaining authentic commitment to a constructive conflict process among disputants or representatives from disputing groups. Such training should emphasize the distinct effects of introducing change forces in contrast to removing resistance obstacles when fostering ripeness.

Working with crisis and trauma. Conflict resolvers working with disputants in an intractable conflict need to be trained in working with individuals in emotional or physical crisis. Awareness of the symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome and of community-level manifestations of trauma and understanding of how to do crisis intervention when emergencies occur are critical for conducting work in this area.

Facilitating constructive conflict processes. Training in conflict process facilitation should include instruction in collaborative negotiation, mediation, and other forms of third-party intervention (arbitration, med-arb, and so on) as well as in facilitating dialogue sessions, town hall meetings, and problem-solving workshops. Intervenors should also be trained in the skills of working to elicit locally relevant information, in particular when working cross-culturally.

Creativity, innovation, and artistry. There is a substantial need for innovation in this area. Practitioners would benefit greatly from applying a creative problem-solving process to the methods for working with intractable conflict, particularly for working with identity conflict.
CONCLUSION

There are no simple solutions to intractability. Once conflict reaches this level of destructiveness, we can only hope to contain the violence and bloodshed and begin the considerable work of repairing the damage to people, places, and relationships. This is a daunting task, but there is hope. Hope in prevention. Intractable conflicts usually have a long history of escalation prior to reaching crisis and entrenchment. We must find ways to intervene earlier, when disputants can still see the humanity and the validity of the other’s needs. Unfortunately, it is typically the squeaky wheel of crisis that grabs the attention of the media, the international community, and our systems of governance. Therefore, we must be proactive in establishing early warning systems at the community, regional, national, and international levels. Their charge would be to monitor emerging disputes and focus our attention on situations before they become impossible to address. Our greatest hope in working intractable conflicts is to find the means to avert them.

References


A young woman lies in a nursing home kept alive solely by a feeding tube. Her husband advocates for the removal of the feeding tube. It would have been her wish, he argues. Her parents are engaging the courts and the media to prevent such an intervention. They claim such an act is tantamount to murder.

We each face moral dilemmas in our lives. When we confront a moral dilemma, we find ourselves wrestling with seemingly incommensurate values. The intensity of a moral dilemma increases when it moves from a personal, private decision into the public discourse. A moral dilemma becomes a moral conflict when, in the public arena, groups of people represent opposing moral values. Thus, the public debate over the decision to remove Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube was one example of this process. The story dominated the media for weeks and was the impetus for Terri’s Law, giving the governor of Florida the authority to override the personal decision of a patient or family member to withdraw a feeding tube. In another case, the public debate over stem cell research took a personal turn when a senator, a proponent of the legislation, was diagnosed with a condition, the treatment for which was enhanced by stem cell research. The decision to teach intelligent design, essentially a religious view of creation, along with the theory of evolution, brought a private religious issue into the public arena. When a person’s moral dilemma is made into a public issue, one’s personal authority or choice of how to act is threatened.
Public moral conflicts, sometimes termed culture wars, ethnic conflicts, ideological conflicts, and intractable conflicts, are created when people publicly take opposing sides of a values-laden issue.

Allegiance to one side or the other often requires individuals to set aside feelings and beliefs that do not fit easily with the official positions and statements associated with their “side.”... The whole system suffers as valid concerns on both sides are belittled and important values are denigrated. (Paraphrased from Becker and others, 1992)

As Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) suggest, “the greatest problem of all is that each side is compelled by its highest and best motives to act in ways that are repugnant to the other” (p. 7). The challenges of our times are first to find a way to bring people representing seemingly irreconcilable differences together and, second, to create a process in which people are both interested and willing to find a path that allows the acknowledgment and expression of the other’s viewpoint.

In this chapter we will describe what constitutes a moral conflict; look at moral conflict through three overlapping theoretical lenses; examine a model and process for engaging productively with parties involved in moral conflicts; and apply that model and process to some recent work on a moral conflict conducted by the authors.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A MORAL CONFLICT?

A moral conflict is one in which groups in conflict have “incommensurate moral orders... a moral order is the theory by which a group understands its experience and makes judgments about proper and improper actions” (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997, p. 51). Moral conflicts are typically intractable. (See Chapter 24 for a full discussion of such conflicts.) Moral conflicts generally are interminable, morally attenuated, and rhetorically attenuated (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997, p. 68). Interminable refers to having no endpoint or resolution. Morally attenuated refers to the tendency of those who engage in conflict to become just what they are fighting. Rhetorically attenuated refers to the tendency of groups in conflict to speak of the other group in negative terms and to have a limited understanding of the other group’s moral order. The vocabulary of the engagement reinforces polarities of right and wrong with each side unable to imagine the needs of the other side that underlie the positions they take.

Moral differences do not always develop into moral conflicts. Some groups may choose to coexist and live their lives according to their own moral values...
without insisting that the other group conform to their values. In some instances, conflicts that do not start out as moral conflicts may become moralized over time. An example of this may be a resource-based conflict (as in land disputes) that becomes intractable with both sides digging their heels in and taking a stance of morally superior claims to the disputed land (as in the Arab-Israeli conflict).

A moral conflict, framed as a problem, differs from a moral dilemma in that a conflict can be defined, framed, and resolved. A moral dilemma, on the other hand, does not necessarily have a clear-cut resolution. Attempts to resolve a moral dilemma create a seesaw effect. First we lean more to one side and then, in an attempt to achieve balance, we pull back and inadvertently lean more to the other side. The dilemma can be defined and framed and needs to be managed rather than resolved.

THEORIES FOR ANALYZING MORAL CONFLICT

We look at moral conflict using three overlapping theoretical lenses: the first lens views moral conflict as a form of intractable conflict (Coleman, 2003; Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997); the second is the lens of social construction theory, which suggests that we create social meaning in the context of relationships (Gergen and Gergen, 2004); and the third lens takes a communication approach to social construction theory suggesting that we create and perpetuate meaning in our communication processes, the ongoing back-and-forth of social discourse and communication events (Pearce, 1989; Shotter, 1993). All three perspectives share the same intellectual ancestry as well as a few basic assumptions. Many of the forefathers of social psychology such as Hegel, Marx, Weber, Dewey, and Mead anticipated the socially constructed nature of historical reality and the ways in which individual representations and collective representations are dialectically intertwined (Jost and Kruglanski, 2002). The work of Piaget emphasized the way that children develop by constructing a shared reality in the context of social interactions. In addition, classic works in sociology by Goffman (1959) and Berger and Luckmann (1966) highlighted issues of construction and meaning making. Such developments led Markus and Zajonc (1985) to state “the hallmark of the cognitive perspective in social psychology is the constructive nature of social cognition” (pp. 212–213). Thus, meaning from a social constructionist perspective is continuously emerging, is contextually based, and is influenced by and influences the dynamics of the relationship. Moral conflict, from the social constructionist perspective, is a consequence of what and how meaning is created in relationships, whatever the outcome. Throughout our discussion, we ground the definition of moral conflict in examples that frequently surface in the public arena.
A MODEL AND PROCESS FOR WORKING WITH MORAL CONFLICT: CMM

The Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) (Cronen and Pearce, 1982), a practical theory based on a communication approach to social construction theory, is one model that provides specific tools for constructive engagement in moral conflicts. CMM’s concepts and tools help to articulate the assumptions and influences that formulate moral perspectives, thus deepening the understanding between and among groups with very different sets of moral orders. Using this process helps people shift from being their story (first person) to telling about their story (third person) (Wasserman, 2004). Now, we describe the CMM model both in the context of a moral conflict that has dominated the news and also apply it in relationship to a specific group with whom we worked. We conclude by looking at the implications of taking a shared sense-making approach to addressing moral conflicts in our world today with suggestions of how to shift from polarized to constructive engagement.

ENGAGING THE OTHER SIDE

Clearly perceiving views of the opposing side in a moral conflict involves the capacity to see beyond one’s own viewpoint and to correctly represent as well as to respectfully engage with those of the other. Buber (1955) describes this as “experiencing the other side” (p. 96), a quality of being in relationship by being open to the beliefs of the other side while staying true to one’s own beliefs. The capacity to hold seemingly disparate perspectives is quite complex and requires a higher order of consciousness (Kegan, 1994). Kegan describes this higher order of consciousness as first implicitly acknowledging that ours is but one frame of potentially multiple frames of reference that may exist.

Holding seemingly disparate perspectives may be difficult under any circumstances. When we are engaged in moral conflict, we are likely to become more rigid and fixed in our own belief systems, thus making it even more challenging to hold seemingly contradictory perspectives. From a communication perspective, groups in moral conflict maintain undesirable patterns of interactions through their respective commitments to their own moral orders (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). These moral orders are an expression of a set of complex obligations, prohibitions, duties, rights, and aspirations that are triggered when responding to the question what ought I do? This relates to earlier work by Morton Deutsch (1985) that describes moral orders from a psychological orientation with cognitive, motivational, and moral components. From Deutsch’s perspective, how one answers this question depends on the type of relationship
one is in with another. As both groups stay entrenched in their own moral orders or sets of moral values, they do not allow for the existence of multiple and sometimes competing stories or narratives. When they are fixed in their own stories, which describe, illustrate, explain, and justify their moral perspectives, they do not recognize that they really may not be as different or as polarized as they initially thought (Fisher-Yoshida, 2005). By not acknowledging the existence of other ways of seeing the world as portrayed by the other’s stories, they miss opportunities to discover common ground.

Transcending moral conflict requires a shift in the pattern of logic, commitment, and obligations. Oliver (1996) describes the capacity of being able to take the perspective of the other party as systemic eloquence (p. 3). She identifies five qualities that help us break loose from destructive patterns to promote better relational and ethical commitments. These are humility, which includes being sensitive to our impact on others; discernment, an ability to detect the differences in the way we think and say we are conducting ourselves from the actions we actually take; responsibility, which implies a commitment to reflect before making judgments and taking actions, so that these foster mutual respect and openness to others; courage to use incoherence to facilitate connection and connection to facilitate contrast; and generosity toward ourselves and others to do the best with what we have readily available. Each of these qualities nurtures a reflective process that can transcend moral conflict.

Resolving moral conflicts, minimizing moral conflicts, or at least trying to bring polarized parties to the same table to communicate with one another can be difficult. There are so many levels of complexity to consider and the struggle against the negative influences that may want to perpetuate the conflict can be very difficult. In the next section, we propose CMM as one approach that may help bridge differences with those engaged in moral conflict, as well as promote systemic eloquence.

WORKING WITH MORAL CONFLICTS

One of the most critical and challenging steps in addressing moral conflicts is engaging the conflicting parties in a new process. There may seem to be little motivation for these groups to want to suspend their fighting long enough to sit in the same room with others whom they perceive as their enemy. The question is how do we frame the conversation such that the parties will be motivated to participate in a process that might transcend the conflict?

In a study conducted at the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Teachers College, Columbia University, seventeen experienced practitioners working in the United States and internationally in the area of protracted and seemingly intractable conflicts were interviewed. Two main
questions were posed: how do you engage the parties and how do you sustain their engagement? A rich array of responses based on their successful (and not so successful attempts) were collected. Among the responses, there was some consensus on critical factors to consider in determining who should be at the table and how to inspire them to come. Some suggested targeting top and middle-range leaders who are in positions to implement structural changes, while others suggested targeting grassroots leaders and extremists. It was also suggested that providing incentives and support to enable people to attend, such as food, babysitters, and honorariums, enabled the process. Another factor that promoted the process was developing relationships with key opinion leaders among the stakeholders so they can then influence others to participate (Coleman, Hacking, Stover, and Fisher-Yoshida, 2003).

Once people are at the table, using the CMM model is an approach that can help deepen their understanding of themselves, each other, and the situations within which they find themselves. A basic premise of CMM is that meaning emerges in the process of people relating to one another. It is based in a social constructionist perspective that emphasizes that our thoughts, feelings, behaviors and sense-making processes are made in an ongoing stream of social interactions (Gergen, 1991). Meaning is cocreated by the engaged parties and not simply by the statements each make. CMM shifts the focus from what is said to what we are making in the process of communicating (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). While each person may have a message he or she wishes to communicate, meaning is believed to be emerging in the to-and-fro of the process. Each response to what is said, or turn in the conversation, makes new meaning.

Moral conflict is characterized and perpetuated by an unwillingness to accept that there may be other seemingly opposing, valid, moral stories. The communication approach to social constructionism postulates that multiple truths are revealed in the narratives or stories we tell. Attending to these many narratives enhances our understanding of the meaning of our own lives (Jost and Kruglanski, 2002).

There are three foundational concepts in CMM that help us to understand moral conflicts and the particular types of dilemmas the conflict presents. These are coherence, coordination, and mystery (Cronen, Pearce, and Changsheng, 1989–90). Coherence refers to how people interpret their environment and their experience. People make sense of their interactions with others based on how they are integrated with their experiences from the past and the narratives, stories or scripts they have made of those experiences. Coordination is what we do in relationship with others to create shared meaning. Groups with apparently opposing moral orders may be likely to interpret the same event very differently based on different versions of the past. In using CMM, one goal would be to explore these different stories. Coordination does not necessitate having the same story, rather we create it when each of us can find coherence in how we
and others are making sense of something, regardless of whether we agree. One way of illustrating this would be to think of a couple dancing to music. A well-coordinated communication would be that the couple is moving in sync with each other to the same music with the same steps.

The third concept, mystery, reflects the infinite possibilities of what is and what can be. Given the level of complexity inherent in the world today, the degree of complexity that underlies the moral conflicts within which we may be engaged includes overlapping layers of events, people, history, and other elements. There will always be new aspects to discover in any situation. Exploring mysteries opens up alternative ways for contextualizing relationships and thus moral conflicts. The concept of mystery reminds us that what we do not know or understand presents an opportunity for discovery rather than despair, and invites us to be curious and explore the unknown to better understand each other.

We have selected four of the CMM tools to describe ways that the model helps us to see our narrative as one possible version or way of telling the story as we attempt to make sense of the situation. The tools help us to explore our narratives about each other and ourselves in the interest of being able to better coordinate the meaning we make in our relationships. The four reflective tools can be used individually or in combination. Each tool highlights a different perspective within the broader view of the conflict. We use the tools as lenses to see our role and the patterns of our behavior as participants in these conflicts.

The four tools are: the Serpentine Model, the Daisy Model, the LUUUTT Model, and the Hierarchy Model. We will use the Terri Schiavo case, which drew international attention in early 2005, to describe the unique characteristics of each tool and the situations in which we may use them to deepen mutual understanding. First, we will provide a brief description of the case. Then we will introduce each tool to highlight different dimensions of how they individually and collectively make meaning of this situation.

### Four Tools of CMM and Terri Schiavo

Terri Schiavo was a young woman who went into a coma because of a potassium deficit linked to an eating disorder. She remained on life support for close to fifteen years, after which her husband and parents were at odds as to whether to remove her feeding tubes. Her husband was in favor of removing the tubes and allowing Terri to die with dignity. He agreed with medical professionals who determined that she had sustained brain damage, was in a vegetative state, and was not capable of recognizing them or having the quality of life she deserved. Her parents and siblings believed that although she was in a coma, she was still alive, recognized them, and gave them little signs to acknowledge their presence. They felt that removing the feeding tubes would inflict unnecessary pain on her and that she should be allowed to continue living until God decided it was time for her to leave this world.
Terri Schiavo’s situation began as a moral dilemma. Her family members were at odds with each other about what was best for her. Terri clearly could not actively participate in this conversation about her own fate. What started out as an interpersonal conflict over a difference in values soon became a widespread media event with many third-party groups taking a moral stand using Terri as a platform to advance their own agendas. It developed into a moralized conflict where there was less and less of a middle road to take and the extreme positions of live or die became the only alternatives.

How we make sense of this moral issue and how we evaluate the positions of the different family members are influenced by where we begin the story, how the narrative is told, what is emphasized, and what is silenced. How we choose to define the boundaries defines the episode and is consequential to how we define or frame the conflict and the various factors involved. We can begin the episode about Terri Schiavo when she was a little girl growing up and explore her issues of self-esteem related to her weight, or we can begin the episode when she got married, or when she precipitously lost a lot of weight, or when she first went into her coma, or the last ten days of her life when her feeding tubes were removed.

The Serpentine Model describes the flow of a conversation or series of events as a process. Meaning is made in the context of what went before and what follows, rather than being made in isolation. Each event or comment takes on new meaning as subsequent comments and events take place. Responses and reactions define what was said or done and these new actions are also then defined by subsequent comments and actions. Focusing on different places within and between episodes can create multiple meanings.

In the case of Terri Schiavo, the episode of her cardiac arrest and decline takes on different meanings depending on how it is contextualized and when we begin the story. We can only speculate. If the family were involved in this reflection, they might each have different perspectives to offer. Consider for example that Episode A started when Terri suffered a cardiac arrest and was hospitalized. (See Figure 25.1.) This episode includes the questions when did her husband call the ambulance? How could such a young woman suffer a cardiac arrest? Did the medical professionals do all that they could? How did this tragic and unlikely medical occurrence happen to a woman far too young to deserve it?

Episode B might begin when Terri and Michael moved to Florida and Terri began to lose weight. What we do not know is what inspired Terri to lose weight. How did Michael feel about her new appearance? Was Michael concerned about how Terri was losing weight? Did he notice that she was becoming dehydrated, throwing her potassium levels out of balance? Was Michael concerned and, as a consequence, did he try to encourage Terri to eat? His encouragement might have been interpreted as expressions of jealousy as she was now more attractive to other men. Others among her family and friends may
have been pleased to see her finally take off the weight that had troubled her for so long and begin to enjoy her new body.

Episode C may have begun in junior high school when Terri first began to put on weight. What we don’t know is what messages Terri received from her parents, from her friends, and from the culture regarding her weight. What efforts did Terri make to lose weight? What did her size mean to her? What did it mean in her relationship with Michael when they first met? How was Michael’s relationship with Terri’s parents? How did Michael feel about moving to Florida? What story did Terri tell of her relationship with Michael to her parents? Extending the episode expands the questions and the stories that help make sense of a painful situation.

The moral dimensions of the question of whether to remove the feeding tube rested in part on whether people thought Terri was brain dead. The series of events that lead up to her being in a coma, being hospitalized, and having the feeding tube removed could all be depicted as turning points or junctures in the Serpentine Model.

The Daisy Model is a tool used to show the many voices, conversations, or influencing factors that implicitly influence the main issue or event that is taking place in the center of the daisy. (See Figure 25.2.) When we think about a daisy, we see there are several layers of petals. We can think of the top layer of
petals as representing those influences that more strongly impact the center of the daisy, while the petals underneath may have secondary levels of influence. At any time, these petals can shift their composition or change places moving into positions of prominence or receding further into the background.

In the case of Terri Schiavo, the petals might represent the different voices, conversations, and assertions of moral authority that were competing to determine the outcome.

The petals identified in the figure represent the voices and conversations that were heard in the public discourse; the location of the moral debate concerning Terri. If this were a more private decision, the prominent petals might consist of more personal conversations reflecting the intimacy of the relationships.

The LUUUTT Model highlights the many aspects of storytelling that are a part of any situation. (See Figure 25.3.) LUUUTT is an acronym that stands for stories Lived, stories Untold, stories Unheard, stories Unknown, stories Told, and story Telling (Pearce and Pearce, 1998). Story Telling is performed in accordance with certain patterns or rules. There are the stories that are Lived together and the stories Told by those involved, which might differ from the stories Told by those not directly involved. Conflicts may emerge in the space of discrepancy between Lived stories and Told stories. We may believe the stories we are Telling are true depictions of the stories we are Living or we may Tell a certain version of a story as a way of convincing others and ourselves. There may be a habit of story Telling that fits into patterns of complaining. A rule might be that stories must be polite regardless of any feelings that may accompany them.
The process of story telling itself influences stories that are told, as well as stories that are untold. Some stories go unheard while others are amplified and privileged. Stories may be privileged because they are part of the dominant discourse. Stories that represent and perpetuate the dominant discourse have explicit and implicit permission to be told. The unheard stories may have been cries for help, sources of frustration, or destructive actions. Unknown stories might be related to what Terri wanted for herself. The process of coming together and identifying these unknown, untold, and unheard stories may then transform them into stories that are known, told, and heard.

There are many stories unknown about and untold by Terri herself since she was in a coma. Her close family members and friends were trying to represent her voice and in the process contradicted each other. We might also wonder how she suffered silently for so many years being self-conscious about her...
weight. Her story may have been unheard in her cries for acceptance that led her to want to change her physical body image to such a degree.

The Hierarchy Model depicts how stories contain multiple levels of context. (See Figure 25.4.) Stories can be personal, about relationships, laden with content, about groups, about culture, to name a few. Who is telling the story and the nature of the storytelling amplifies one level and nests other levels within and around it. The labels we use to show these different layers of context may also change depending upon the unique factors of any given situation.

The contexts might include:

- The *speech act*, which is what is said, the content, the event or the interaction
- The story we tell about our *self* in relationship with others
- The *relationship(s)* or the scripts for what might be expected and the latitude within which we might act
- The *episode* or the frame in which the interaction occurred
- The *group* in which the self and relationship are embedded
- The *culture* and the larger system

In the case of Terri, those representing the different sides of the case contextualized the situation in different ways. Both sides could put the removal of the feeding tubes as the *speech act* and then the elevation of Terri, *self*, as taking precedence over other contexts. However, how each side contextualizes the self would differ. For her husband, Michael, a series of contexts and the accompanying stories could be that the *speech act* is embedded in the *self* because Terri needs
to die a dignified death. Then there would be the relationship in that he was her loving husband and, as her closest kin, had the authority to make decisions concerning her condition. The episode may be punctuated at the beginning of her ordeal when she lapsed into a coma 15 years ago. He might appeal to the group of husbands and wives who may also have been or are currently in similar situations of having to make these same tough choices and then the larger culture that enforces individual rights.

Terri’s parents and siblings might tell a very different story around the event in the center. They may put culture next to represent the religious beliefs of the larger moral culture they belong to and that condones leaving the tubes. After the event and culture, they might place episode, as for her parents the episode may be her whole life as she is their daughter and is still living. The next level of context may be relationship as they are her closest family, have known her the longest, and should, therefore, be entrusted to make these difficult decisions concerning her life or death. Perhaps they would put religious beliefs next claiming that nothing should stand in the way of preserving life. The connection the Schindlers felt with other families in similar situations provides another context to empathize and sympathize with them in their plight. This is but one set of stories deriving from contexts that we have arranged. The change in placement of any one of these context levels would change the story.

**Figure 25.5** Terri’s husband, Michael’s, version of the LUUUTT Model

**Figure 25.6** Terri Schiavo’s family, the Schindler’s, version of the LUUUTT Model
CMM emphasizes process over content and emergent meaning over fixed truth. The communication and social construction approaches open us up to the possibility that our view is but one view among many. The possibility of other perspectives and alternative meanings invites us to explore the mystery.

The opportunity to bring people holding different perspectives together to reflect on their respective stands and the influences that hold them there has the potential to foster new perspectives. These sets of tools help foster coherence for ourselves and coordination with others and potentially demystify what may otherwise be a stalemate. Taking a communication perspective using CMM tools may deepen people’s capacity to see each other’s perspectives and as a result create new narratives.

The next section describes how the CMM tools were used to foster shared meaning in a group engaged in dialogue across differences.

**Case Story: In Dialogue About Israelis and Arabs**

In the fall of 2004, a documentary, *Columbia Unbecoming*, was shown at Columbia University. The documentary alleges discrimination and harassment of an anti-Semitic nature at the University by some of the professors in the Middle Eastern Asian Languages and Culture (MEALAC) department. The documentary is a twenty-five-minute film made by a pro-Israeli Boston-based group, The David Project. The film sparked wide-ranging debate and criticism, including what some viewed as the inadequacy of the university’s response to the allegations. A bigger issue to some was that of academic freedom on the college campus.

For two of the student groups, namely LionPac, Columbia’s pro-Israeli political action group and Turath, Columbia’s Arab Student Organization, this series of incidents sparked them into action faster than they had originally planned. They began holding a series of dialogues with the goal of getting students from at least these two different backgrounds to foster deeper understanding of each other. When the sessions convened, they realized that each of them knew little about the other’s culture and history. They decided to spend the few weeks left in the semester sharing key points in each other’s history.

We had been following the events at Columbia and identified some of their issues as characteristic of a moralized conflict. What started out as issues of academic freedom also drew attention to perceptions of discrimination based on ethnic background. We contacted the leaders of the two groups and others leading the way for these Arab-Israeli dialogues and offered to facilitate their dialogue and development of a shared, mutual understanding using the CMM model as a process. This was agreeable to the leaders of both organizations who felt that in order to really move the members of their groups forward, they would need to approach the process in a different way. Together the authors decided they would send an invitational e-mail to members of their respective organizations and whoever showed up would be the right people.
It was the end of the spring semester and most students were busy preparing for their summer leave. We were able to gather a group of seven individuals, ranging from undergraduate students and graduate students to those having completed their graduate studies, together for a four-hour dialogue session. While all of the participants knew someone in the group, no one knew all the other participants. Some members of the group had previously experienced engaging in dialogue with each other on the topic of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Participants self-selected based upon the topic of the dialogue session.

The CMM process was introduced as a tool to help them surface some of the otherwise implicit stories, influences, and assumptions that shaped their narratives of their situation and their relationship with each other's group. These stories and the dialogue they provoked would potentially deepen their understanding of themselves, each other, and the conflict (Fisher-Yoshida, 2000; Wasserman, 2004).

The process we used was based on an appreciative collaborative inquiry methodology (Wasserman, 2004). Appreciative Inquiry and CMM are both grounded in social construction and together complement one another. Using these methodologies, the groups were asked to identify constructive processes that enabled them to engage disparate stories. This approach begins with paired interviews guided by appreciative inquiry process, an action research methodology that is grounded in social construction theory (Cooperrider, Barrett, and Srivastva, 1995; Ludema, Cooperrider, and Barrett, 1999). Central to this approach is the belief that what we talk about and how we talk are consequential to the shared meaning we create. Since the focus of our inquiry was conditions that transcend seemingly intractable conflict, we provided the following prompt for their conversations:

Share a story about a time when you engaged with someone who had a different point of view from you about the Israeli-Arab relationship and land issues and, despite your differing points of view, you were able to have a deep, respectful, and authentic conversation. What enabled these kinds of conversations to take place? What was it about you, the other person, and the conditions that enabled this to happen?

Talking about what enabled them to have respectful dialogues on controversial topics made explicit the principles that enabled those conversations. After their paired conversations, we identified as a group what they learned from their stories about what sustains engagement in conversations with another who has a very different perspective. This seeded the next step, which is a process they would use to reflect on their previous dialogues using the CMM model as a guide.

After the interviews, we introduced CMM and its four tools. The participants then formed two small groups and used whichever tools they selected to guide their conversations about the Arab-Israeli situation. For example, the LUUUTT Model was used to identify the stories that are lived by the different groups of
people in Israel. The storytelling process highlighted the manner in which the stories were told, revealing how stories alternate from people demonizing the other to having compassion for the other. They explored stories told in the Jewish community, in the United States, in the Arab community, in the Middle East, and in the general public discourse. The model also invited people to talk about the stories that are untold and the stories that are unheard, and opened the possibilities for exploring new avenues of meaning by imagining the stories that are unknown. In the process of using the CMM tools some of the untold, unheard, and unknown stories were told, heard by all, and became shared knowing.

The Serpentine Model helped to map the ebb and flow of relationships over a period of time and how different events marked the shifts and turns in this relationship for each of the groups. Since we each have our own way of determining the beginning, middle, and end of these episodes depending on where we choose to begin our story, the boundaries the participants placed to frame the periods of time significantly influenced the context and meaning derived from the story. In this particular case, turns in history shift relationships from thriving to warring, shift land ownership and geographical boundaries, shift who holds power in governance, and shifts the definition of insiders and outsiders and how they influence each other. They discussed how the story changes when they shift the beginning of the story from 2000, to 1973, to 1967, to 1948, to 1896, to 900, to 10, to 300 BCE!

The Daisy Model surfaced the various influences, conversations, and stories that shaped their views about Arabs and Israelis and their relationship to each other, as well as their own relationship to Israeli-Arab dynamics in the public discourse. This included identifying needs, desires, and entitlements based on how they construed the histories they lived, the patterns of conversations they had in their families growing up, the prescribed stories they inherited, and major news events they both heard about and witnessed. Petals on the daisy elevated how old stories could perpetuate objectifying the other, in the case of “they are people who want to annihilate us,” or create caring relationships, “we used to live as neighbors, we share so many of the same core values.”

The Hierarchy Model helped the participants situate the context they were privileging in how they told their stories. For example, one woman’s story amplified a personal relationship with her boyfriend. No matter what their differences were, they placed sustaining their relationship as the highest priority. In her story, relationship was the primary context; stories of intergroup conflict and the culture were less influential to how she made meaning and interpreted events. Another person in the group had a very different way of contextualizing meaning. For him, history of conquest and dominance was the elevated layer. This context or lens was so salient that it was difficult for him to hear stories of reconciliation and hope. The Hierarchy Model helped the group take a third person perspective to stand at the boundary to how they were making meaning of similar stories. The model
visually depicted how multiple layers contextualize meaning, each layer embedded in another. How we construe what is real to us and what is possible varies significantly by how we talk about events. We are all part of a bigger system and anything happening at one level sends ripples of impact to all other levels.

The shared group reflection provided a window through which they could hear what they have not heard and come to know what they did not know. When we reflect with others holding a very different perspective, particularly those whose historical narratives might be in conflict with our own, we have the opportunity to know ourselves differently in relationship with each other (Wasserman, 2004).

Emergent Meaning

In their initial conversations the participants identified five principles for engagement that allowed them to stay involved. We think these characteristics are important. These principles were:

- A strong value for listening to learn—this is different from listening to challenge and defeat, typical patterns of listening we have in conflict situations
- Seeking to understand and not trying to convince—another behavior different from a competitive stance some take in conflict
- A value for seeing both sides—broadening perspectives and what Oliver (1996) characterized as a component of systemic eloquence
- Having an overarching commitment to the formation, development, and preservation of their relationship over ideology—clearly distinguishing levels of importance and reflecting their values
- A desire to learn and grow in relationship with others who were different from them—a genuine interest and curiosity and value of the other side’s perspective

The participants held different principles regarding the role of emotion in their conversation. Some said that emotions need to be kept in check, while others said that expressing emotions is important and authentic. Identifying these principles and developing our readiness to be able to identify them require a level of self-awareness that comes through moments of critical self-reflection where implicit assumptions and values are surfaced and addressed (Fisher-Yoshida, 2003). Dialogue and the use of CMM are tools that create opportunities for these transformative shifts to take place.

The two groups presented the tools they used and presented the stories of their diagrams to each other. They each used the tools in different ways to expand and elicit the stories, rules, commitments, and entitlements that influenced their conversations on this subject and how they made meaning. First, there were the
stories of identity. The story of “a good Arab,” “a good Israeli,” “a good Muslim” and “a good Jew” was being written both within and outside the boundaries of each community. The framing of these stories sometimes acted to prohibit engagement with “the other side.” In some cases, such engagement would be considered to be betrayal. They received mixed messages as some members of their groups encouraged the dialogic engagement. However, the power of influence and potential feelings of being ostracized by one’s own group cannot be underestimated. Those who ventured forth in these endeavors experienced themselves as outsiders in both groups simultaneously.

As we listened, we could hear the voice of moral authority. There were members of each group who felt they had more of a right to be the voice for their group. CMM describes this voice as a logical force in that it is the dominant influence, guiding and defining meaning. Logical force is the overwhelming feeling of needing to act on our commitments, or our sense of what we should do, what we ought to do. For these participants, the amount of personal suffering was the criterion to decide who was more worthy of speaking for the group. Their logic was based on the frame that those who suffered more in the past are more entitled than those who did not. For those who felt or were told they were not as entitled to their point of view, they felt a sense of loss, of being ostracized from their communities.

The level of emotional engagement with the story of the other side affected the capacity to hear it, especially when it conflicted deeply with an alternative existing story they held. This supported a recent study of transformative discourse about deeply held historical identity differences where emotional engagement through the frame of storytelling was critical to transformative learning (Wasserman, 2004). In this instance, when the value of the relationship superseded the content of issues in the conflict, participants were better able to engage, hear, and accept a perspective or story that was significantly different from their own, while remaining in the tension of holding their own story (Buber, 1955; Pearce and Pearce, 2003).

**IMPLICATIONS**

The social constructionist view recognizes that there are many influences that shape how we make sense of our social worlds and our relationships with others. Among these influences are historical relationships and current social, political, economic, and relational realities. Further, the communication perspective asserts that we are continuously producing meaning in the ongoing processes of our engagements with one another through actions, words, policies, and practices. Viewed as such, we continuously have before us opportunities to choose and consider our position, what we choose to value and how we make meaning with each other.
Taking a communication perspective on moral conflict shifts the place of analysis from content to process. This approach from a systemic perspective creates new possibilities in what might formerly have been perceived as hopeless. Being mindful of what we are making together illuminates our responsibility and agency in the process of how we are relating to make something different. Patterns of thoughts and feelings, old deeply embedded stories, when made explicit, even mapped, can create new relationships and new and more constructive patterns of exchange.

The capacity to see our own view alongside another’s, the articulation of which may negate our own view, requires a level of thinking that we are not prepared for by the curriculum of our daily life (Kegan, 1994). Kegan calls this trans-systems thinking, or the capacity to incorporate or synthesize other incommensurate worldviews with our own.

The communication perspective extends the notion of trans-systems thinking to suggest that we must find grammars or logics that enable us to join and coordinate with others (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997).

**Learnings from the Field**

We have learned from our work as well as from others who work with groups of people who are involved in deeply entrenched moral conflicts, that getting people to the table to engage with each other is often the biggest hurdle. Once they have crossed that hurdle, the second challenge is to create a context in which people can meet. Regardless of the issue, incompatible ways of thinking cannot be addressed within the same system in which they were created (Bernstein, 1985). Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) use *transcendent eloquence* to describe the process of creating a context where people operating from incompatible ways of thinking can meet. In this section, we outline some important steps to consider to bring people together and to set the stage and context for a shared reflection process.

An important consideration is who should participate. People who are not in a leadership position are often the most promising participants in that they are less personally identified with their group’s position.

People who are attached to their position need to be assured that they and their position will not be annihilated in the process. Facilitated reflection creates the sense of a mediated space where they will not be threatened because of the position they hold. The facilitator can promote this sense of safekeeping by meeting with and developing a rapport with each group separately and listening deeply to their stories. In so doing they, in effect, become a placeholder for each position. The facilitator then can probe for underlying needs and reframe the demands each side is making.

A second step is to give people an opportunity to reflect on their own stories while teaching them the CMM model and its applications. This opportunity
gives people some experience and familiarity with the reflection process, and helps them move from the notion that their story is THE story to their story being A story. In this process, it is helpful to elevate differences and uncertainties and questions that exist among people on the “same side.” This is critical to ensure group safety even if everyone does not share the same beliefs. It reduces the possibility of some voices being silenced in the process or when expressed, being viewed as betrayal.

A third step is known as role reversal. It is a process similar to a role-play, except people within their own group are asked to explore the position and needs of the other group as if they were their own. In this situation people are asked to reflect on the dimensions of the narratives of the other side. It is an exercise in expanding points of view and developing empathy.

The fourth step is to bring members of the two groups together. It is helpful to begin with an activity or discussion that is neutral. For example, when the Public Conversations Project brought together people on opposing sides of the debate about abortion (Chasin and others, 1996), they gathered for a welcome dinner and were encouraged to get to know each other by discussing anything other than their views on abortion. Such meetings could also begin with people creating a list of ground rules for how they will engage with one another and guidelines for managing themselves in the process such as the process described by LionPac.

Once there has been some rapport built, people can begin to share their stories. The positioning of the storytelling as a shared reflective process, as noted in the groups we worked with, helps to foster empathy in the engagement of differences. The sharing of stories shifts their relationships with their own stories, with each other and how they view the situation.

Conflict in any context is challenging. Moral conflicts are even more so in that they touch the heart of how we define ourselves, our core values, and our identities. This chapter provides tools that seed hope and promise for engaging moral conflict in such a way that the issue itself is redefined, and, in the process, relationships are transformed.

CONCLUSION

Moral conflicts are challenging and require us to participate in addressing them in ways that may go beyond how we have been thinking, feeling, communicating and acting until now. CMM is suggested as one set of tools that has been found to be useful in supporting the creation of shared understanding across difference. We presented these tools and their applications to more fully illustrate some of the possibilities that could emerge as alternative meanings of the same event or situation are surfaced and shared.
There is an implicit and explicit honoring of the varied viewpoints and moral orders that the different parties bring with them and that influence how they perceive themselves, each other, and the situation of the conflict. The more we develop our capabilities to manage and live with multiple stories simultaneously, the more we will be able to live in harmony with one another.

References


For nearly two decades, a rebel movement calling itself the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been locked in armed conflict with the government of Uganda, leaving two million people displaced in the northern Acholi region and creating what the United Nations has called one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world. The LRA, originally welcomed by the economically and politically marginalized Acholi people, has become known for its mass abductions of children and brutal violence against civilians. Its leader, Joseph Kony, claims to have inherited spiritual powers and to be fulfilling a religious calling by waging a rebellion to install a new state based on the Biblical Ten Commandments. To fill its ranks, the LRA has kidnapped as many as 40,000 children over the years, forcing them to serve as child soldiers, concubines, or servants. Employing a potent mix of Christianity, indigenous religious traditions, and its own spiritual narrative, the LRA has indoctrinated thousands of children to fight in its corrupt holy war. The government of Uganda, noting that Kony and the LRA are irrational and cannot be negotiated with, has pursued a military solution to the problem, yielding little success over the years.

In 1998, determined to stop the ongoing abductions of children and with hopes of ending a war that has ravaged their communities, Catholic, Muslim, Anglican, and traditional religious leaders in Northern Uganda created the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). ARLPI leaders began accompanying thousands of children known as “night commuters” who seek refuge from LRA abduction by sleeping at city bus stations, parks, and other public places. The
presence of the religious leaders provides physical and moral support for the children and helps deter LRA attacks. Believing reconciliation was the best way to heal their society, ARLPI also went on to lead a successful advocacy campaign for passage of laws to provide amnesty for LRA fighters willing to leave the war and reintegrate peacefully into their communities. ARLPI has also worked to train hundreds of local leaders in peace building and conflict resolution and has undertaken nonofficial mediation between midlevel LRA leaders and government officials (often called Track Two diplomacy) to help establish ceasefires, encourage negotiations, and urge restraint on all sides. Responding to the physical, economic, social, and spiritual damage of more than two decades of war, these religious leaders in Northern Uganda are actively working to help protect civilians, reduce suffering, denounce spiritually motivated violence, and bring the parties in conflict closer to a peaceful resolution.

Whether the Acholi religious leaders can succeed in restoring peace and reconciling the people of Northern Uganda remains to be seen. However, their faith-based peacemaking efforts, coupled with the LRA’s own use of religion and spiritual myth to justify and fuel violence, demonstrate the complicated nature of religion’s role in human conflict and the practice of peacemaking.

**RELIGIOUS AWAKENINGS**

A brief survey of the most entrenched, deadly conflicts around the world suggests an urgent need for increased understanding of the role religion plays in human disputes. From the Middle East to Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka to Sudan, the Balkans to Nigeria, from the poor Acholi region of Northern Uganda to the financial centers of New York City and London, the destructive power of religiously motivated violence has been a stark, horrific reality for people around the world. Witnessing such a worldwide scourge of human life along religious divisions, some might conclude that religion itself is a dangerous cause of conflict—something the world would be better off without. Indeed, for a good portion of the last century, many scholars predicted the demise of religion as scientific inquiry and the more logical, less volatile age of reason came to the fore. Such predications have not come to pass, however, and in the early years of the twenty-first century, religion appears to be gaining, not losing, influence.

Rough estimates find two-thirds of the world’s population identify as part of a religious group. Of the earth’s 6 billion people, around 2 billion call themselves Christian, 1.3 billion identify as Muslims, some 800–900 million as Hindus, around 350 million as Buddhists, 200–300 million maintain traditional religions, some 14 million are Jewish, and millions more belong to smaller faith groups. Estimates of the number of people who do not identify with a particular religion or who call themselves secular or humanist range around 1 billion.
However, that number appears to be dropping in recent years. At the same time, fundamentalism—characterized across faith traditions by regressive interpretations of doctrine, strict adherence to conservative (often repressive) social rules, and harsh rejection of outsiders—is on the rise globally as people struggle to make sense of a rapidly changing world. Whatever the predictions of the past, the current reality is that religion is in fact alive and well in some form in the lives of most people in most of the world.

Given that reality, and given the large number of cases where religion has become somehow intertwined with violent conflict, incorporating religion into the theory and practice of conflict resolution has become an imperative. Unfortunately, the role of religion in situations of conflict and in peacemaking efforts has only recently begun to be systematically explored by those working to address situations of violent conflict, practitioners and policymakers alike. In addition, theory to help explain the relationships between religion, conflict, and peacemaking, has not yet been well-developed or effectively incorporated into conflict resolution and international affairs studies. While a number of notable scholars and practitioners are pioneering in the field, any definitive understanding of the nexus of religion, war, and peace remains illusive.

This chapter proposes that a more integrated and practical approach to understanding the role of religion in conflict and its resolution is needed within the theory and practice of conflict resolution, among foreign policymakers, and for anyone interested in helping the diverse human family coexist with less bloodshed and more compassion. By better understanding the influences religion can exert in conflict situations—negative and positive—and by examining religion as part of what William Ury (1999) has described as the “third side,” we may begin to fill a gap in our knowledge and treatment of human conflict. More importantly, we may be able to help tip the balance for the future, to reduce the destructive use of religion in the cause of killing and strengthen its power as a healing force in the world.

Religions Between War and Peace

Any effort to demonstrate the constructive contributions religion has made in the field of conflict resolution and peacemaking inevitably encounters skeptics. Particularly in the post–September 11 world, the prevailing conclusion of many is that the negative impact of religion on human relations far outweighs any positive contributions it might make. In 2002, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found 65 percent of people surveyed in the United States believed religion contributed to war either a great deal or fair amount (http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion.pdf). Given the wealth of historical and current examples of religiously motivated violence, it is perhaps not surprising that so many people find it difficult to think of religion as a positive force for peace. Religion has been used to launch crusades, to oppress and conquer, to justify violence and war. To disregard religion’s role in fueling conflict would be to disregard numerous chapters in human history.
However, religion can also undeniably claim a significant role in helping communities resolve differences, in advancing international human rights, in overcoming great injustices, and in encouraging peaceful management of conflicts. Faith-based peacemaking is most often associated with well-known names like Mahatma Ghandi, Rev. King, Bishop Tutu, Thich Nhat Han, and the Dalai Lama, or with the pacifist traditions of Quakers and Mennonites. However, a rich history of less recognized examples also exists: the courageous witness of Vietnamese Buddhists against the U.S.-Vietnam war, the dedicated coexistence work of Jewish and Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East through years of violence, the active leadership of Catholic clergy in the people power movement in the Philippines. This less recognized, but equally relevant, side of religion’s role in human affairs includes countless individuals and communities spanning the globe who have drawn on their faith to help prevent violence and rebuild broken relationships and countless more who are continuing this work today. Their contributions confirm that reducing the study of religion’s role in human relations to only the negative would also be a mistake.

How then should students and practitioners of conflict resolution approach religion? Is it part of the problem or part of the solution? Or both? Much may depend on how religion interacts with other social, cultural, political, and economic dynamics in response to problems. Religion exists in relation to, is affected by, and influences the broader sociopolitical context of conflict situations and ultimately needs to be understood as part of a complex human system. A clearer understanding of how religion is often used to fuel political violence and when conflicts are susceptible to such exploitation could help save lives and prevent the escalation of disputes. Those working to address situations of conflict, particularly conflicts drawn along faith lines, have a responsibility to acknowledge when religion is being used for destructive purposes and seek ways to reduce the harm. At the same time, the long history and ongoing practice of faith-based peacemaking that is increasingly being recognized suggests religion provides a significant resource for conflict resolution that remains largely underexamined and untapped. Thus, practitioners, scholars, and policymakers working to address entrenched conflicts should also be striving to understand the conditions that best support religious contributions to conflict resolution and actively seeking out such peace-building resources—resources that exist in some form in nearly every conflict situation.

**RELIGION AS THIRD SIDE**

Given the widespread and persistent appeal of religion, the diversity of spiritual traditions across the human experience, and the powerful influence of faith in people’s lives, religion and conflict can hardly avoid one another. While religion does not play an active role in every dispute or provide a resource for peacemaking
in every situation, wherever violent conflict erupts, religion is likely to form part of the social and cultural context surrounding the dispute. Participants may be believers or members of certain religious groups. Faith communities in the surrounding society will likely be impacted and may seek to respond in some way—taking sides, providing humanitarian relief, or seeking to help end the conflict peacefully. Thus, religion can often form part of what William Ury (1999) has called “the third side.”

What is the third side? In Ury’s words, it is “the surrounding community, which serves as a container for any escalating conflict” (Ury, 1999, p. 7). A traditional conflict resolution model presents conflict as a clash of positions, interests, or needs between two (or sometimes more) parties who must find a means of resolving the dispute, ideally on their own but perhaps with the help of some outside intervention. Incorporating the “third side” broadens the lens on the conflict to include not just the parties directly involved, but also the broader community surrounding the conflict. It takes individual disputes out of a vacuum and places them back in the societies and communities in which they occur, where a wide range of psychological, political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics are at play. Within the community surrounding a conflict exist a wide range of potential actors and resources that can, when mobilized effectively, become a positive third force in the dispute, a force that can help reduce suffering, push the parties toward peace, and reweave the social fabric. Ury describes the third side as “the emergent will of the community” to organize itself to help end the conflict constructively. It involves the contributions of many and can undertake many roles (prevent, resolve, contain, educate, provide, mediate, heal, witness, and so on). It consists of the wide range potential actors in the surrounding community as well as social norms and personal values—what Ury calls the “inner third side”—which can help move people caught in cycles of conflict away from violence and toward peaceful settlement. Thus, the third side is not composed of only one action or one individual, but the collective will and influence that arise from the broader community mobilizing for peace.

Of course, not all parts of the community that surrounds a conflict situation are always motivated toward such positive ends. Some individuals or aspects of the surrounding community, including religious elements, will be indifferent or actively seek to escalate the conflict for their own gain. However, in most conflicts, the surrounding communities are directly impacted by the violence, and in most cases, the majority of people do at least want peace and many are ready to work for it. It is that pooled energy and activity that creates the third side. The challenge of envisioning and empowering this third side, then, is to find and encourage those resources that are motivated toward peace within the surrounding community and context of a conflict situation and to limit or restrain the impact of negative influences from further inflaming tensions.
In most situations, religion is an important part of the surrounding community, which could—if mobilized and supported externally toward peace—be an active part of a strong third side. We now take a brief look at four ways in which religion exists in the third side and how those dynamics might contribute to the third side: (1) beliefs and values, (2) leaders and their followers, (3) social structures and networks, and (4) identity. While these four aspects of religion as third side overlap, they are presented separately to help us develop a framework for analysis when considering the role of religion in conflict and conflict resolution. For each, we offer a set of questions that might be used by conflict resolution practitioners and policymakers to better understand the role religion plays within particular situations and, hopefully, identify openings for supporting religious peacebuilding efforts and constraining the negative manipulation of religion.

Religion as Beliefs and Values

Muslim-Christian violence has racked Nigeria in recent years. Thousands of people have been killed and churches and mosques burnt to the ground. In the midst of ongoing tensions between their communities, two Nigerian religious leaders are using the values of their faith traditions to help replace interfaith conflict with interfaith cooperation. As youths, Mohammed Ashafa and James Wuye were personally involved in and affected by Christian-Muslim violence in their communities. Ashafa lost a beloved mentor and family member, and Wuye lost one of his arms in the fighting. As they each became youth leaders in their communities, the two men developed a deeper understanding of the teachings of their religious traditions. Separately, they underwent their own personal transformations away from violence and began spreading the teachings of tolerance, respect, compassion, and peacemaking found within each of their traditions. Convinced that the core teachings of both Christianity and Islam share common values that can serve as a foundation for interfaith peace, Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye began an interfaith dialogue initiative and wrote a book together, which utilizes seventy verses from the Bible and seventy verses from the Qur’an to teach respect, tolerance, compassion, and cooperation between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. Emphasizing these religious values, they have brought thousands of Muslim and Christian youth together in workshops to learn about each others’ faith traditions, engage in interfaith dialogue, and work together to reconstruct mosques and churches destroyed by interreligious violence.

Ashafa and Wuye’s use of scripture as a basis for their interfaith peacebuilding work, as well as their own personal transformations, demonstrate one way in which religion can function as part of what Ury describes as “inner” third side: “The [inner] third side manifests itself as a kind of conscience within the single individual engaged in conflict. It is the voice that urges us to heal old grievances; it is the capacity to listen to the other side and show empathy; it is the impulse to respect the basic human needs of all” (Ury, 1999, p. 21).
Religion is most often discussed in terms of beliefs and values, doctrines and dogma. The spiritual teachings of a faith tradition provide a narrative that helps believers make sense of the world and locate themselves in it. Religious values set guidelines for one’s own behavior and treatment of others. Religious doctrine can lay out rules for managing human relations and even specific instructions for what to do when conflicts arise. While religious teachings on issues of war and peace vary widely across traditions, a number of common values have been recognized across all the world’s major faiths—compassion, love, tolerance, respect for human dignity, sacredness of human life. Despite differences across traditions and with the interpretation of teachings within any particular faith, these shared values form a common ground and have contributed significantly to the development of international human rights standards, ethical norms, humanitarian law, and the philosophy and practice of peacemaking.

In addition, every religion includes its own particular teachings that can serve as resources for the peaceful management of conflict. Buddhism emphasizes compassion toward all and nonviolent living. Islam teaches tolerance of other faiths, a commitment to justice, and care for the poor. Christianity has articulated clear rules for limiting the use of violence through the just war tradition and lifts up Jesus’ teachings of forgiveness and peacemaking. Judaism promotes social justice, protection of minority rights, and encourages reconciliation through processes like *teshuvah*. Hinduism encourages transcending selfishness and has a long history of tolerance toward other religions.

Of course, religious leaders and followers do not always focus on or consistently live up to the best values and teachings of their faiths. Religious texts include language and teachings that can be, and often are, interpreted in destructive ways, just as they can be interpreted constructively. For example, Christianity’s emphasis on Jesus as savior can help lead people to follow the examples of forgiveness, nonviolence, and social justice demonstrated through the Biblical stories of Jesus’ life. On the other hand, an emphasis that only those who believe in Jesus are saved can lead to rigid in-group/out-group dichotomies and the dehumanization of non-Christians. Jewish theology regarding the idea of a “chosen people” similarly can be used to encourage a high ethical standard for behavior in the world, or as a source of division and dehumanization of the other. Considerable debate is underway within Islam today as varying interpretations of teachings on the treatment of non-Muslims, the role of women, and the relationship between government and religion play out in difficult, often painful ways across the global faith community. Ultimately, it is not necessarily the words of a sacred text that determine whether religious beliefs and values will promote cooperation or conflict, but how they are interpreted and the hermeneutic employed to explain them—factors that change over time and across social and cultural contexts.
Whether religious beliefs and values are contributing negatively or positively to a conflict situation will be an important indicator as to whether and how religion might be part of a positive third side. Questions worth considering in trying to understand the role of religious beliefs and values in particular conflict situations include:

- What are the most salient religious traditions or belief systems at work in the society or community? What is the history of religious teachings in the community?
- How overtly are religious values and teachings expressed by those involved in the conflict and in the surrounding community? Even if not overtly expressed, how do beliefs and values appear to influence the decisions and behavior of those in the conflict, of the surrounding community?
- Does the conflict include a religious or spiritual narrative? Are there specific religious teachings or narratives that are particularly relevant to the conflict? If so, do they serve to escalate or mitigate the conflict?
- What religious values and beliefs respected in the society encourage more constructive conflict management? Are there religious narratives or teachings that might help build bridges between the parties, move them away from violence, or provide a framework for peaceful settlement?

**Religion as Leaders and Followers**

While Ghandi, King, Tutu, and the Dalai Lama are well known for their instrumental roles in nonviolent struggles against oppression, countless other religious leaders throughout history and today have stood courageously against injustice and for a more peaceful world. One such leader worthy of recalling is Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Born in a family of Pathan farmers and raised in the Peshawar valley of British India, Khan grew up in the midst of conflict and turmoil as the Indian people struggled under the yolk of colonial rule and amid their own tribal and religious conflicts. Pathans themselves were known for their violent history, and Khan’s close friendship with Ghandi was an oddity to many of his people. Yet, Khan became convinced that active nonviolence was the best way to confront oppression and the proper path for faithful Muslims. Khan began working across the Peshawar valley to promote education, social development, forgiveness, and active nonviolence for India’s freedom. He became a leader among Pathans, called Badshah Khan, the king of khans, and respected as a committed Muslim teacher. As conflict boiled in India, he called on his followers to renounce violence and commit to service, freedom, and active nonviolent living. He soon led more than 100,000 Muslim men to join what became history’s first professional nonviolent army, calling themselves Khudai Khidmatgars, or Servants of God. He explained to his followers, “There is nothing surprising in a Muslim or a Pathan like me subscribing to
the creed of nonviolence. It is not a new creed. It was followed fourteen hundred years ago by the Prophet all the time he was in Mecca, and it has since been followed by all those who wanted to throw off an oppressor’s yoke” (Easwaran, 1984, p. 103). While Khan and his followers helped free India of colonial rule, they could not prevent the eventual breakup of the region into separate Hindu and Muslim states. Still, they contributed significantly to helping quell bloodshed at critical moments. In 1945, when violence spread to Punjab and local Muslims threatened the Hindu community, Khan called in ten thousand Khudai Khidmatgars, all Muslims themselves, to protect the Hindu and Sikh communities and restore peace to the city.

Khan’s authority with the Pathan people stemmed from his own courageous witness and strong leadership skills, but perhaps more importantly from his religious standing in the community. Khan used his moral authority as a respected Muslim leader to call on others to reject violence and engage in active nonviolence in the face of oppression and conflict. His followers formed a large movement that could intervene to help prevent violence and protect lives. In this way, he helped develop an active third side in the Peshawar valley.

Religious leaders can strengthen a third side for peace in conflict situations by using their moral authority within the community to help lead others away from violence and toward constructive conflict management. As respected voices in the community, they can lift up spiritual teachings that draw on the best of their own faith tradition, and reach out to faith leaders in other communities to strengthen ties between groups and counter interreligious violence. They can often serve as social and political motivators to wide constituencies throughout a society—constituencies with which they share a language, culture, and social reality. They can help mobilize their followers to more actively engage in peacemaking activities, while also representing grassroots concerns to governing authorities—acting as a bridge between decision makers and the broader community (Lederach, 1997). As respected leaders and people of faith, they can also engage in advocacy that may be risky to help address injustices and other root causes of conflict. In addition, religious leaders are often part of transnational faith networks, which include resources outside the context of the conflict that can be drawn on for constructive interventions—what might be called an “outer third side.”

To better understand the role of religious leaders and their followers when examining conflict situations and exploring potential resources for resolution, we might ask:

- Who are the prominent religious leaders in the community or society? Who are their followers? Are religious leaders or their followers actively engaged in the conflict or efforts to resolve it? If so, how?
• Are there particular leaders within the conflict using religion to fuel violence and division? If so, how? Who is their audience?
• How might religious leaders and faith communities help counter or limit the negative use of religion in the conflict? How might they contribute to more peaceful management or resolution of the situation?
• What external or transnational resources do local religious leaders and communities have access to or need that might contribute positively to helping mitigate and resolve the conflict?

Religion as Social Institutions and Networks
In Buddhism, the sangha, or community, is one of the three jewels of faith, a critical element along with Buddha (enlightenment) and dharma (doctrine or truth). The sangha, whether monastic or the broader Buddhist lay community, plays important roles both in the spiritual life of individual Buddhists and in the social and political life of Buddhist societies. During the brutal regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia and during the war in Vietnam, the Buddhist sangha, represented through monasteries, temples, community organizations, and national networks—was often targeted because of its powerful social organizing role and the peaceful resistance it promoted among its members. In Cambodia and Vietnam, Buddhism expressed through its institutions and social structures, became a force of resistance to the war and violence raging throughout the country. The sangha, though impacted heavily by the conflict, represented a social space that sought to transcend divisions and violence in the country. Thousands of monks and lay Buddhists sought refuge in the sangha and resisted the war through personal witness and acts of civil disobedience. In addition, Buddhist networks helped maintain family and community ties across the lines of conflict and provided a link outside the country to the international community. Buddhists resisting the war in Vietnam connected with Buddhist and other civil society groups in the United States to undertake humanitarian and antiwar campaigns. Buddhists in Cambodia embarked on long peace marches that drew international attention and mobilized people across the country. In the aftermath of the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia, as state structures had to be rebuilt and transformed, Buddhist organizations stepped in to lead economic and social reconstruction programs. In the absence of functioning government and social services, the Buddhist sangha organized to provide humanitarian aid, educate children, support community development, reunite families, care for widows and orphans, and create opportunities for reconciliation and healing to rebuild their societies. These efforts helped reweave social networks destroyed by the war, revive local economies, and build a community base for lasting peace between former enemies. In this way, religion as a set of social institutions and networks surrounding a conflict can be part of and help mobilize a strong third side for peace.
While churches, mosques, and temples have periodically been the site of violence during conflicts, more often they have provided refuge and become sites for humanitarian efforts and peacemaking initiatives. Faith communities provide an established network for mobilizing civil society to respond to conflict—networks that often may cross the lines of the dispute and create opportunities for bridging divisions. In most conflict situations, local religious groups will have an awareness of the dispute early on as it affects the communities they serve. Religious networks may provide early warnings of escalating conflict to warn others of danger, and extend regionally and internationally to help mobilize outside attention and resources. They are also often some of the first responders to crises, working to help those affected by the conflict and mobilize others in the community to respond. Religious organizations also often play an important advocacy role, bringing moral arguments into public policy debates and speaking out for underrepresented or underserved groups (for example, poor, immigrant, and marginalized communities).

In many ways, religion as a social organizer is even more durable as part of the third side than the state, giving it significant lasting power throughout conflicts. Religion helped organize society through its institutions and structures long before the rise of the nation state, and it continues to be a powerful force for organizing communities within and across nations. During conflicts, particularly where divisions are drawn on faith lines, religious institutions are often directly impacted and challenged to respond in some way. When conflict leads to the breakdown or collapse of the state and civic organizations, often religious structures and networks survive, becoming important arenas within the third side for reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.

Like other ways in which religion functions in society, religious institutions and networks can and have been used for ill as well as good. Thus, understanding their role in particular situations is important. Questions to consider include:

- What religious institutions, organizations, and social structures operate actively within the community or society? What parts of the population do they serve or engage?
- Are there particular faith-based organizations and institutions that relate directly to the conflict, the parties involved, or their political agendas? Are their religious institutions and structures directly impacted by the conflict?
- If certain religious institutions and faith-based groups are directly involved in contributing to the conflict in some way, what is their role and how might their impact be mitigated or reduced?
- Are there faith-based organizations or religious institutions already engaged, or that might be tapped, in peacemaking and conflict resolution initiatives? What roles are they playing? How might their efforts be supported, strengthened, or expanded?
Religion as Identity

Perhaps nowhere are the connections between religion, identity, and conflict more volatile than in the Middle East. The lines between Jews, Muslims, and Christians are drawn deeply in societies in the region and who you are is very much defined by your religious group. Religious narratives tell the history of the region, its land and peoples, and create a frame for explaining where one fits in the world and in relation to ongoing conflicts in the region. National and religious identities overlap, feed into each other, and sometimes conflict. Mixing with those of other faiths can be difficult, shunned, even dangerous. It is difficult to escape religion in defining identity in the Middle East, and perhaps more difficult to express religious identity in ways that bridge rather than deepen the divides. Yet, in the midst of ongoing violence, interfaith dialogue efforts between Jews, Muslims, and Christians have continued. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, a conflict resolution scholar and practitioner who leads interfaith dialogue in the Middle East, has noted that often the experience of interfaith dialogue is not as much about learning and understanding others’ religious traditions as it is about deepening the exploration of one’s own faith. Through interfaith dialogue, individuals gain a deeper understanding of their own religious identity and how it shapes their world view and behavior toward others. Respect and tolerance grows for people of different traditions as personal relationships develop and barriers of misunderstanding are broken down.

Religious identity forms from a mixture of beliefs and values, the influence of leaders and sense of belonging to a community, and one’s membership or relationship to religious institutions and networks. It thus intersects with the other three ways in which religion functions in the third side and includes both “inner” and “outer” third side influences. Religion is only one identity factor that contributes to a sense of self and helps define individuals and groups in society; however, it can be a particularly powerful influence in moving people toward or away from violent conflict. Because religion provides answers to the most fundamental questions of life for many people, religious identity can often overcome other identity factors in making difficult decisions. Religious identity can also draw the most extreme lines between in- and out-groups: sacred and profane, human and divine, saved and unsaved, good and evil. Because it can pose such stark divisions, it does have a high potential for contributing to the formation of what Herb Kelman calls zero-sum identities: collective identities that rely on the negation of other groups to increase their own validity and that present particular challenges to conflict resolution efforts (1987). Lines of religious identity are unfortunately often exploited by those engaged in conflict because they can be so powerful.

Religious identity can, however, take a different form. When being faithful means extending compassion, respect, tolerance, and justice to others, one’s
religious identity can lead people to actively contribute to preventing violence and building peace. When religious diversity is respected and celebrated as something that strengthens rather than threatens one’s own faith experience, religious identity becomes not a zero-sum force but an opening for shared understanding and cooperation. Religious identity can also provide an access point for connecting with parties in conflict to build trust and open dialogue. In this sense religious identity can contribute to what has been called faith-based diplomacy: conflict resolution strategies that integrate faith into diplomacy and seek to tap into religious identities as tools for promoting peace and reconciliation (Johnston, 2003).

Including an examination of religious identity within conflict analysis can help make sense of underlying dynamics beyond rational-based needs and interests that may be driving a conflict and can suggest unique avenues for engaging people toward more constructive ends. Questions to consider in conflict situations include:

- How religious is the society? Is religious identity a significant factor in personal sense of self and group belonging for those engaged in the conflict? For the surrounding community?
- Is the conflict drawn along lines of religious identity? Are all religious groups in the society involved, or are there groups that are outliers or somehow bridge the divisions? Are there divisions along other identity lines as well? How do the different identity factors relate to each other and to the conflict?
- How does religious identity relate to the root causes of the conflict? How should these religious identity factors be taken into account in developing conflict resolution strategies?
- Are there shared religious identities that bridge the groups in conflict? How might shared group identities be tapped in the service of peaceful resolution of the conflict?

These questions regarding religious identity, combined with the earlier questions on religious beliefs and values, leaders and followers, social institutions and networks, offer a basic starting point for incorporating religion into conflict and conflict resolution analysis. They are presented together here as a framework for analysis that might be used by peace practitioners, policymakers, and students of conflict resolution when seeking to understand the role of religion in particular conflicts and the potential for faith-based peacemaking. Such questions might be incorporated into a broader conflict analysis and used when working to develop constructive conflict prevention or response policies or programs that can support or strengthen the third side. While only a beginning, by more systematically asking such questions, we
may help bring to light both negative and positive roles religion is playing in conflict situations and provoke deeper analysis into ways of reducing the destructive influences and enhancing the constructive third side potential of religion. Asking such questions may help identify key religious actors that could be supported or engaged in peacemaking activities with resources and technical support. It may help those engaged in government or secular peace-making efforts better understand potential obstacles they might face and opportunities they may have overlooked. It might also suggest whether faith-based diplomacy would be worthwhile and help identify the potential problems that might arise from such efforts. Ultimately, finding practical ways of integrating religion more effectively into our analysis and conflict resolution efforts will lay the basis for developing stronger theory to help explain the role of religious dynamics and more successful practice to support the peaceful prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts.

Integrating Religion into Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Developing a Framework for Analysis and Action

Religion can play both positive and negative roles in situations of conflict. The following questions provide a starting point for better understanding religion’s role in any particular context, mitigating against the destructive manipulation of religion, and empowering constructive faith resources to peacefully manage and resolve disputes. This framework for analysis is offered as an initial reference point to be adapted and expanded as it is applied to particular situations.

I. Religion as Beliefs and Values

- What are the most salient religious traditions or belief systems at work in the society or community? What is the history of religious teachings in the community?
- How overtly are religious values and teachings expressed by those involved in the conflict and in the surrounding community? Even if not overtly expressed, how do beliefs and values appear to influence the decisions and behavior of those in the conflict, of the surrounding community?
- Does the conflict include a religious or spiritual narrative? Are there specific religious teachings or narratives that are particularly relevant to the conflict? If so, do they serve to escalate or mitigate the conflict?
• What religious values and beliefs respected in the society encourage more constructive conflict management? Are there religious narratives or teachings that might help build bridges between the parties, move them away from violence, or provide a framework for peaceful settlement?

II. Religion as Leaders and Followers
• Who are the prominent religious leaders in the community or society? Who are their followers? Are religious leaders or their followers actively engaged in the conflict or efforts to resolve it? If so, how?
• Are there particular leaders within the conflict using religion to fuel violence and division? If so, how? Who is their audience?
• How might religious leaders and faith communities help counter or limit the negative use of religion in the conflict? How might they contribute to more peaceful management or resolution of the situation?
• What external or transnational resources do local religious leaders and communities have access to or need that might contribute positively to helping mitigate and resolve the conflict?

III. Religion as Social Institution and Networks
• What religious institutions, organizations, and social structures operate actively within the community or society? What parts of the population do they serve or engage?
• Are there particular faith-based organizations and institutions that relate directly to the conflict, the parties involved, or their political agendas? Are their religious institutions and structures directly impacted by the conflict?
• If certain religious institutions and faith-based groups are directly involved in contributing to the conflict in some way, what is their role and how might their impact be mitigated or reduced?
• Are there faith-based organizations or religious institutions already engaged, or that might be tapped, in peacemaking and conflict resolution initiatives? What roles are they playing? How might their efforts be supported, strengthened, or expanded?
Strengthening religion’s role as part of a strong third side for peace ultimately must include both supporting conditions that contribute to faith-based peace-making and reducing the conditions that give rise to violent religious extremism. While there will rarely be clear and definitive answers as to whether religion’s role in a conflict situation is wholly positive or negative, certain factors may contribute to religion being more or less susceptible to manipulation for destructive purposes. Pluralist societies where social, economic, and political ties extend across and help link different religious communities may be less prone to religiously motivated violence. An active culture of interfaith communication and cooperation can provide a strong counter to attempts to draw conflict along religious lines. The promotion of religious tolerance and respect for diversity by faith leaders, as well as social, legal, and political institutions, can go far in preventing violence. A clear separation of church and state also appears to help reduce the space for manipulating religion for political purposes (though experiments in more democratic Islamic political systems may find new ways of merging religion and politics while still balancing tensions).

Ultimately, religion is a living human expression that must respond and adapt to ongoing processes of human change. When change sparks conflict or poses actual or perceived threats to individuals and communities, they can adapt new

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**IV. Religion as Identity**

- How religious is the society? Is religious identity a significant factor in personal sense of self and group belonging for those engaged in the conflict? For the surrounding community?
- Is the conflict drawn along lines of religious identity? Are all religious groups in the society involved, or are there groups that are outliers or somehow bridge the divisions? Are there divisions along other identity lines as well? How do the different identity factors relate to each other and to the conflict?
- How does religious identity relate to the root causes of the conflict? How should these religious identity factors be taken into account in developing conflict resolution strategies?
- Are there shared religious identities that bridge the groups in conflict? How might shared group identities be tapped in the service of peaceful resolution of the conflict?
ways of managing a constructive relationship between their faith and the world, or they can react and resist with negative force.

**Fundamentalism**

The recent growth in extremist fundamentalism across many religious traditions represents a powerful negative reaction to rapid modernization and the secularization of many societies over the past fifty years. Fundamentalism is not unique to any one religious tradition, although recent global attention has focused on the rise of extremist Islamist groups. In fact, the term *fundamentalist* was first used in the 1920s by conservative evangelical Protestants in the United States who sought to protect their faith from evolutionists. Fundamentalist movements can now be found across all the world’s major faith traditions and are often a factor in intrareligious conflicts within traditions. At their most extreme, they are characterized by a rejection of modernization and secularization; strong, sometimes glorified leadership; rigid, often repressive social rules; apocalyptic predictions; and high intolerance toward outsiders and moderates of their own faith tradition. Fundamentalist movements often have both a religious and political agenda that is designed to thwart the threats they perceive from modernization. While fundamentalists claim to be preserving and reviving the core truths of their religious tradition, in reality they usually pick and choose language from sacred texts and manipulate teachings to serve a particular agenda. While they claim to be returning to the fundamentals of their faith, in fact they are reacting to a changing world around them (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, 2003).

Fundamentalism itself may not be a problem: people do need ways of coping with the rapid changes of globalization and modern life. However, fundamentalist movements clearly become dangerous to human relations when they use religion to justify violence and take on extremist militant agendas. Mitigating against extremist fundamentalism requires both engaged effort from more moderate members of the same faith tradition to open dialogue, reduce intrareligious conflict, and constructively manage perceived threats from modernization, as well as secular approaches that can address underlying economic, social, and political problems. While fundamentalism may appear a purely irrational and extremist reaction to modernization, the very real problems of global economic and power disparities, marginalization, and environmental and cultural degradation contribute to the appeal of extreme religious responses and do need to be addressed.

**Prevention and Reconciliation**

One final challenge worth considering is when during a conflict cycle religion might be more or less suited to contribute positively. While religious values, actors, institutions, and identity may be present throughout the duration of a
conflict, their potential third side contributions will not be the same at all points in time or under all circumstances. In some cases, religion may be perceived as such a volatile part of the problem that trying to incorporate it overtly into a solution would be like pouring fuel on a fire. In any case, choosing the right strategy at the right moment to maximize religious resources for peacemaking will no doubt be a challenge.

In Burundi, after hundreds of thousands were killed in interethnic violence, local Quaker communities teamed up with fellow Quakers from the United States to find ways of restoring relationships and breaking the cycle of conflict. The experience of decades of conflict led Burundian Quakers to recapture a largely unexplored religious testimony of peace and nonviolence in their faith tradition and to respond to the violence around them with innovative peacemaking initiatives. To help rebuild their country, they identified two particularly acute needs: (1) dealing with the widespread trauma that they saw across all groups from years of ethnic violence, and (2) providing people with skills and training that would help them manage conflict without resort to violence in the future. They developed innovative workshops in trauma healing and alternatives to violence that brought Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa together, often for the first time in many communities. As their country struggles to stabilize a fragile peace, Burundian Quakers continue to train thousands of people across Burundi in the vital skills of rebuilding relationships and preventing future violence.

While many courageous religious leaders have acted in the midst of violent conflict to help save lives, speak out for peace, and bring an end to killing, the third side roles often played by religion are most effective when seized before a conflict erupts into violence or to help restore relationships after war. In the midst of violent conflict, religiously motivated actors can play important roles as witnesses and protectors, even as peacekeepers and by providing safe refuges, but their impact will likely be limited by the escalating dynamics of the conflict. Before violence erupts or when conflict deescalates, more space and opportunities are open for positive religious contributions to reconstructing societies and preventing a slide back into war. This is not unique to religion’s role—the space for constructive nonviolent conflict management is always greater in the pre- and post-conflict phases and conflict becomes much more difficult to handle after it has become deadly. Still, positive religious contributions in relation to beliefs and values, leadership, social networks, and identity may be most effective in the modes of prevention and reconciliation.

Religious actions can and should be helping to prevent deadly conflict by countering the negative use of religion to fuel conflict and promoting cooperation, tolerance, and respect for human dignity. As a case in point, many Muslim leaders across the world are speaking out more actively against the recent rise in attacks against civilians perpetrated by extremist groups claiming an Islamic mission. Working to reclaim the sacred space of Islam and engage Muslims globally
in renouncing violence, they hope to constrain the negative use of their religion and reduce the number of recruits available for such missions in the future. In a similar way, religious leaders of all faiths can promote teachings that encourage interfaith tolerance and respect, help adherents manage conflict constructively, and reduce the potential for new cycles of religiously motivated violence. If disputes begin to escalate, religious leaders with standing in the community can step in to deter violence and help mediate a solution. Such prevention efforts by religious leaders have helped head off violent disputes and reduce bloodshed in many cases, but more attention to mobilizing religious and other peacemaking resources before violence erupts is urgently needed.

Following the experience of violent conflict, religion can also be a vital tool for restoring relationships and encouraging reconciliation among former combatants. Most religious traditions include teachings on forgiveness, reconciliation, or managing relations with former enemies. In many ways, faith-based efforts can go where secular reconstruction efforts cannot, into the deepest pain individuals have experienced with resources to help them find hope again. As mentioned earlier, religious institutions and structures often survive wars or state collapse when other social and government institutions break down. Faith networks, churches, temples, and mosques are often the first to begin picking up the pieces after war and will remain as part of the communities long after humanitarian workers and international aid has moved on. More sustained support for religiously based peacebuilding efforts as a conflict recedes from the headlines is often needed.

While religion can function throughout a conflict cycle in both negative and positive ways, greater study is needed into how religiously motivated peacebuilding can be particularly effective in preventive efforts to avert violence and in restoring relationships in the aftermath of war.

**CONCLUSION**

Including religion more thoroughly and effectively in conflict resolution theory and practice will require considerably more research and practical learning. Fortunately, academics, policymakers, practitioners, and people of faith themselves are increasingly exploring the role religion plays in conflict and its peaceful management. While theories to explain concepts like “faith-based diplomacy” and “religious peacemaking” have yet to be clearly established, the practical experience of religion as both a negative and positive force in human relations is beginning to be more widely documented and acknowledged. Significant gaps and challenges remain, but the growing number of people engaging the nexus of religion, conflict, and conflict resolution offers reason for hope that faith will become a more integrated part of the search for solutions to human problems.
The questions posed in this chapter provide one starting point for better understanding religious dynamics at play in conflict situations and for identifying opportunities to support religious contributions to peace. It is hoped that they will serve as a practical tool for students of conflict resolution, practitioners, and policymakers to stimulate new insights, prompt new questions, and improve approaches to addressing conflict. In the meantime, people of faith have their own responsibility to promote tolerance and cooperative values within their communities; to build interfaith connections and open dialogue with the secular world; and to lift up teachings, leaders, and institutions that provide resources for constructive conflict management in their own tradition. Ultimately, by combining our efforts we may be able to reduce the impact of those who would use religion to justify violence and strengthen religion’s “third side” potential for building peace.

References


CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

Conflict Resolution
and Human Rights

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The fields of inquiry of human rights and conflict resolution are developing rapidly and poised to encounter further expansion in the near future. The relation between human rights and conflict resolution has been mutually beneficial, and the exploration of the opportunities and tensions between the two fields are the focus of this chapter. After a description of the historical evolution of human rights doctrines, we introduce the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the product of conflict resolution. This leads to a discussion of the need for complementarities between the two fields. While differences in approach and methodologies of these two fields are at times evident, especially around the need for identifying the best intervention strategies in violent deadly conflicts, the possibility of effectively creating synergies between conflict resolution and human rights is the preferred option, especially in the area of genocide prevention.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINES

The expression “human rights” is relatively new. It came into public discourse after World War II to replace older terms, such as “natural rights” and “rights of man.” The term “natural rights” was disfavored due to its association with dated concepts of natural law. In addition, with the emergence of feminist movements and other social changes, the term “rights of man” was replaced so as to make clear that women are included.
The concept of the “rights of the individual” goes back at least as far as Ancient Greece and Rome. Antigone, in the tragedy of Sophocles (c. 496–406 BCE), while overlooking King Creon’s order not to bury her murdered brother, insisted that she acted in compliance with the unchangeable divine laws, which lay above the regulations introduced by the people. Moreover, Stoicism (fourth century BCE), the Greek philosophical school, proclaimed that a universal working force pervades all creation and that human conduct therefore should be judged according to, and brought into harmony with, the law of nature (Weston, 1989, p. 13). Later, Roman law inspired by the doctrines of natural law and ius gentium (law of nations) allowed universal rights to be enjoyed irrespective of citizenship. Ulpian (third century; d. 228), the Roman jurist, proclaimed that natural law is valid for all people, Roman citizens or not.

The earliest rules about standards of social behavior mostly dealt with the prohibition of conduct that caused conflict. Roman and Byzantine lawmakers (for example Justinian, 483–565) attempted to codify rules and establish consistent schemas of rights and obligations. Also, the major religions of the world (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism) have all established ethical and moral codes of conduct deriving from divine law. Standards of behavior regulating the relations of people as well as explicit ideas on the value of human life were implemented. Although in the writings of Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) there were grains of modern notions of rights, the idea of human rights, as perceived and universally accepted nowadays, did not take hold until certain historical changes occurred. Even though notions of human dignity permeated every attempt to introduce a framework for human conduct and interaction, fundamental rights, such as those of freedom and equality, were not explicitly recognized. At the same time, the doctrines of notable philosophers recognized the legitimacy of slavery and villeinage.

After the Renaissance (fourteenth–fifteenth centuries), which emphasized self-expression and independence of thinking, and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) with the subsequent decline of feudalism, there was a shift from natural law as duties to natural law as rights (Weston, 1989, p. 13). Previously, someone could possess privileges and duties because of his social status or relationships. Then, the emphasis was shifted to the needs and participation of the individual. For the first time in history, the individual and his/her needs and dignity were brought into public discourse. At the same time, there was a spread of liberal ideas of freedom and equality across the European continent. Hence, we suggest that the foundations of the modern concepts of human rights were laid during the intense social changes in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Proofs of the changes are the influential teachings of philosophers such as Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and John Locke (1632–1704), as well as the English Bill of Rights (1689). The changes
implied that humans are endowed with inalienable rights, which are never renounced or restrained by the claim that monarchs have rights inherited by their gods (Weston, 1989, p. 13).

During the Age of Enlightenment (seventeenth–eighteenth centuries), along with the discoveries of Galileo, the rationalism of René Descartes, the empiricism of Francis Bacon, and other advances in science, there was a growing interest in human thought and humanism, which stimulated the development of the ideas of the *law of nature* and encouraged discussion of a universal order. John Locke claimed that certain rights pertain to individuals *ipsa facto*, because they existed in nature before even any organization of the society. He also argued that the rights to life, freedom, and ownership are of the most predominant value. In addition, the writings of philosophers, such as Montesquieu (1689–1755), Voltaire (1694–1778), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) contributed to the spread of ideas fighting intolerance, religious fanaticism, scientific dogmatism, and censorship.

The evolution of human rights developed in parallel to the appearance of the modern state as the model of governance. The *state* emerged as an ideal to promote the interests of the people. Because the state and its mechanisms have been vested with power and enforcement mechanisms, exercising the power could constitute a threat to the life and well-being of its citizens. Hence, the rights of the citizen function as “security” mechanisms to overcome the tension between the power of the state and the well-being of its citizens, whose interests the state is supposed to promote and protect. In other words, rights function as a protection for the citizens against the sovereign powers of the state itself.

The suggestions of Rousseau concerning the *social contract* between citizens and the state, as well as Locke’s suggestion that the individuals by participating in civil society cede only the enforcement of those natural rights to the state but not the rights themselves, have stimulated the emergence of the doctrines of the *rights of man*. Thus, the rights of citizen in the framework of the state became part of the political agenda by being based on the then “discovered” and proclaimed universal axioms governing nature and humanity. Rights of man were evolved in favor of citizen’s protection against the sovereign state and its legitimate authority. (See Tomuschat, 2003, pp. 7–8.) In other words, governments come into power with the consent of the people. Therefore, people are always entitled to revoke their mandate to government, which is bound to exercise the powers of the state in their name.

The aforementioned liberal ideas on the nature of the rights of man have also traveled from Europe to North America during the war of the colonies to achieve independence from the British crown. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), inspired by those ideas, insisted that his fellow countrymen were “a free people claiming their rights as derived from the laws of nature and not as the gift of their Chief Magistrate.” This doctrine prepared a fertile ground for the Declaration of Independence...
in 1776, which eloquently expressed that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” A few years later, in France, following the revolution of 1789, another important document, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens (1791), was formulated; it was a forward-looking step for the concept of human rights as they are understood now.

The idea of natural rights or the rights of man had a pivotal role during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, aiming at limiting political absolutism (Weston, 1989, p. 14). They emerged as a response of the failure of rulers to respect freedom and equality. Therefore, it is frequently claimed that humanity had first to go through certain social and political changes in order to accept that all individuals are entitled to basic and fundamental rights.

Nevertheless, because of the absolute character of those natural rights (inalienable, unalterable, and eternal) as well as the fact that they claimed a respect *erga omnes* (in relation to everyone), sometimes it was proved that rights were in conflict with one another. Moreover, natural law theories received much criticism, especially during the second half of eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Henry Maine (1822–1888), Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779–1861), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), German Idealists, Utilitarians, Marxists, and other schools of philosophy tried to give their explanation of the “idiosyncrasy of rights.” The main points of controversy were whether natural rights or rights of man derive from the law of nature or they should be closely regarded through the lens of legal positivism.³

Yet, the tragic events of World War II and the Holocaust showed in practice that certain actions are absolutely wrong irrespective of any doctrine. It was also made clear that a human right is natural in the sense that everyone is entitled to them not because of a legal process or because of belonging to any legal system, religion, political entity, race, gender, and so on, but simply by being human. Although human rights can be asserted against individuals, their main political objective is oriented toward the state, which has to protect, respect, and advance them.

In addition, it should be stressed that human rights, as perceived by the international community, encompass an immanent contradiction in terms. They proclaim the universality of their nature by emphasizing the position of the individual at the same time. The *individual*, however, is a social creation, whereas in times and cultures past, such a term might have been inappropriate or even unacceptable. Certain dynamic processes, though, have stimulated the shift toward the individualization of rights and created the need for a better protection of the individual as a unit within society. Through the lens of modernization, it can be argued that three major social and historically recent changes underpinned the aforementioned shift: the urbanization or industrialization of
societies (pluralist, complex, and heterogeneous domains); the proliferation of
education and information (encounter of new ideas); and the spread of mass
media introducing new social imaginaries, encounters with materialism, and so
on (see Donnelly and Howard, 1987, pp. 15–18).

The end of World War II created the opportunity for a reformulation of the
relationships between human beings and states. A window of opportunity
emerged with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. On December
10, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which opened a way for an articulation of human suffering that was to
be prevented and an expression of human desire that was to be fulfilled.4

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AS A CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is not a treaty. However, it
reflects the tendency of treaty making after the end of World War II. The very name
emphasizes that this Declaration aimed at setting a common standard of rights for
all people universally, irrespective of gender, race, ideology, social, or economic
status. It constituted a new moment in the history of humanity. “In substance as
well as in form, it is a declaration of interdependence—interdependence of peo-
ple, nations, and rights” (Glendon, 2001, p. 174) and by no means has it intro-
duced enforceable legal obligations. Quite the contrary, the implementation of the
UDHR is completely left at the discretion of individual states. The document would
affect millions of lives around the globe, especially those previously struggling for
freedom. It must be noted, also, that it is composed of almost all the traditional
civil and political rights proclaimed in the major legal systems and constitutions
of the world. The structure of the Declaration is as follows:

A. Preamble and Articles 1 and 2: It sets the purposes and the principles of
the document. Dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood constitute the four pil-
lars on which to “establish” the significance of human rights. Right in the
beginning of the preamble it is stated “. . . recognition of the inherent dignity
and of equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” and
this is regarded as the “foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”

Article 1 reflects the inspirational and universal nature of the project: “All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.” The reason for including it in the main text is to state firmly the
basis of all human rights, the rationality of human persons, and their obligation
to deal fairly with everyone else, regardless of race, gender, and so on.
B. Articles 3–11: rights that the individual is entitled to per se (Article 3, right to life; Articles 4–5: bans on slavery and torture; Articles 6–7: rights to legal recognition and equality before the law; Article 8: right to remedial action in case of violation of rights; Article 9: freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; Article 10: right to just criminal procedures; Article 11: recognition of fundamental principles of penal law (presumption of innocence and non-retroactivity of criminal laws).

C. Articles 12–17: rights and freedoms of the individual (Article 12: freedom of arbitrary interference with one’s “privacy, family, home or correspondence” as well as “attacks upon its honour and reputation”; Article 13: freedom of movement; Article 14: right to seek and be granted political asylum; Article 15: right to a nationality; Article 16: rights to marriage and family; Article 17: right to own property).

D. Articles 18–21: religious, public, and political liberties (Article 18: freedom of religion, conscience, and thought; Article 19: freedom of opinion and expression; Article 20: freedom of assembly and association; Article 21: rights to political and civil participation).

E. Articles 22–27: economic, social, and cultural rights (Article 22: right to social security and to free development of one’s personality; Articles 23–24: rights to work and rights pertaining to just work conditions, for example, equal pay for equal work, protection against unemployment, trade unions formation, rights to rest, leisure and holidays; Article 25: right to standard of adequate living for oneself and one’s family and special protection of motherhood and childhood; Article 26: rights pertaining to education and its paraphernalia, for example, “elementary education shall be compulsory,” “education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality”; Article 27: right to full participation in the cultural life of the community, as well as rights protecting the intellectual “products” of the individual). It should be noted that the set of Articles 22–27 is quite different in concept from the rest of the units. The differentiation is focused on the fact that that Articles 22 through 27 refer to what ought to be done for people (positive sense), whereas Articles 3 through 21 mainly refer to what must not be done to people (Glendon, 2001, p. 187).

F. Articles 28–30: individual, civil society, and the state—in lieu of a conclusion (Article 28: entitlement to a social and international order for the full realization of the rights and freedoms of the individual; Article 29: duties to the community to which the individual belongs and legitimate limitations of rights so as to attain mutual respect and well-being in any given society; Article 30: prohibition of any misinterpretation of the document). The last part of the UDHR sets the scene in which the respect and actual enjoyment of rights and freedoms proclaimed in the document can be materialized. Examining the UDHR after more than half a century, the only significant lack is in the area of
the environment. Nonetheless, it can be argued that this is implied from rights such as the right to life and to an adequate standard of living.  

CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights nowadays are part of the domestic legal system and international legal order. They are rights that a person enjoys simply by virtue of being human, without the requirement of any additional condition and they serve as universal wishes for the well-being of all people, which have been translated into and endowed with legal substance. Nevertheless, not everything that may serve to improve the well-being of people can or should be accepted as a human right. Moreover, the very idea of human rights presupposes a certain concept of the human being. In other words, the international community has acknowledged that indeed all human beings have something in common. They are all recognized as persons whose dignity must be respected. Against this backdrop, human rights principles can be delineated as follows (see Sieghart, 1990, p. 8):

- **Universal inherence.** Every human being has certain rights, capable of being enumerated or defined, which are not conferred on him by any ruler, by any purchase, but inherent in him by virtue of his humanity alone.
- **Inalienability.** No human being can be deprived of any of those rights, by the act of any ruler.
- **Rule of law.** The resolution of any conflict of rights is made by consistent, independent, and impartial application of just laws in compliance with just procedures.

Additionally, and with regard to the preceding principles, some fundamental aspects can be inferred. The first one deals with the distinction between “human rights” and (ordinary) rights. Rights usually take hold in dualistic form. In almost every right, there is a collative duty imposed on someone else, who is other than the holder of the right (for example, in property claims). Moreover, ordinary rights at large can be transferred, disposed, and diminished, while differentiation in treatment is permissible. On the contrary, human rights, being inherent and inalienable, cannot be acquired, transferred, disposed, or extinguished by any act or any event. The correlative duties lie on the states and their authorities. That is to say that human rights are principally claims against the authorities of the state intrinsically. (See Sieghart, 1990, pp. 16–17.) This is the second important aspect that refers to the core of the understanding of human rights:
the interrelation of human rights and the state, which also reflects the relations of the individual and the state.

Because each state is sovereign, it can exercise its powers deriving from national sovereignty in three different ways: (1) by dealing with its citizens (individualized sovereignty), (2) by dealing with its territory (territorial sovereignty), and (3) by establishing relationships with other sovereign states. Nevertheless, those legitimate functions of the state in modern society may potentially produce many abuses of citizens’ rights. (See Sieghart, 1990, pp. 11–12.)

The state is not a neutral entity (battle of classes and groups, manipulation, contradictory interests). Furthermore, states often attempt to strengthen their internal control by ideological unification and maintain internal order, which also can have an influence in human rights. Hence, sovereign power can become a threat to the individual’s rights. Actually, power is very rarely used to support human rights, unless there are countervailing forces to which those controlling the state must defer. That is why societies that have discrete bases of power (separation and decentralization of power) are the best protectors of human rights. (See Donnelly and Howard, 1987, pp. 20–23.)

Generally, in case of violations of human rights, international law prohibits intervention (Walzer, 1977). The principle of nonintervention is in close connection to the rights of self-determination. This consequently derives from the rights of individuals, acting as a group or a community (and therefore being free to decide on the governance models of their country). Nevertheless, sometimes human rights abuses are so violent, systematic, and massive they make the argument to insist on the rights of self-determination seem inappropriate or even cynical; hence, preventing further atrocities rests on the international community. In such instances, human rights are of such importance that their violations present a moral justification for international remedial action (Donnelly and Howard, 1987, p. 13).

Against this backdrop, one of the core dilemmas pertains to the legitimate use of force to address systemic human rights violations and/or to promote political regimes more conducive to a widespread respect of human rights. The debate over the notion of humanitarian intervention evidenced that human rights advocates strongly endorse the use of force as necessary. Besides, violence has been associated with human rights in various forms, especially at the time of the French Revolution (1789).

Once human rights are defined as inflexible principles that need to be strictly enforced, they tend to encourage the use of violence, although many, even within the human rights activism field, would consider violence unacceptable. Conflict resolution approaches focus more on processes and consider enlarging human rights as an ideal (currently formulated through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments) yet to be fully understood and implemented. For this reason, many conflict resolution experts would view the use
of violence in order to implement human rights as a highly problematic course of action that obstructs rather than resolves the inherent tensions in collectively understanding human rights themselves.

Another point of tension is the relation of culture and human rights. It is argued that the development of human rights is mostly a European cultural achievement, and therefore it is impossible to implement human rights notions in countries that have different cultural backgrounds. For example, in some countries political participation is an action that is absent from the public discourse and practice. Yet, counterarguments could insist that culture is adaptive (not static) and cultures do change, that individuals are actors of change even though they are affected by the prevalent social structure, culture, and ideology. Furthermore, just as those who try to modify or change customs may have personal interests in doing that, so also do those who attempt to preserve them. Hence, human rights are not neutral in their impact on different individuals and groups. In other words, cultures reflect the basic economic and political organization of a given society (Donnelly and Howard, 1987, pp. 18–20). The “tension” regarding the cultural dimension of human rights derived from the school of cultural relativism. Franz Boas (1858–1942) established the axiom that the individual’s beliefs are valid or make sense within his or her own culture, which subsequently provoked intense academic and political debate, because it enveloped a range of moral and ethical dilemmas.

**INTERDEPENDENCE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

Conflict resolution and human rights are complementary. There is no full expression of human rights without the freedom to engage in conflict, nor is conflict resolution constructive if human rights are negated during conflict. Human rights are inherent in each person by virtue of being human and they are an entitlement today, irrespective of the capacity of local, national, and regional bodies to recognize, uphold, and fulfill them. Moreover, human rights cannot be taken away, although they can be disregarded, violated, and denied. The most eloquent expression of this entitlement of each human person was given through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The emergence of human rights movements is one of the greatest gifts of the last half of the twentieth century and clearly has a primary expression in the UDHR.

The Declaration is seen by many as a point of departure for future developments in the field. It is true it was certainly a fundamental energizing moment for a movement that in a few years was able to shape the life of billions by transforming the way states interact with the citizens and citizens among
themselves. The growth of human rights activism is so extraordinary that there are now thousands of organizations dedicated to human rights advancement, while millions of people are involved in global organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Even so, many do not recognize how conflict resolution has been instrumental in bringing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to life and how conflict resolution can further contribute to the development of the field of human rights and vice versa.

After millions of deaths, countless wounded, and unspeakable suffering, the United Nations (U.N.) Organization was formed in 1945 to offer an institutional setting that could help maintain peace by resolving conflict. In addition, the very aspiration that led to the creation of the U.N. was the hope that it could help nations to resolve their conflicts constructively. Although the systematic study of conflict resolution as an academic or professional discipline is relatively new (see, for example, Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997, Introduction and Chapter 2), the capacity to resolve conflict constructively is human by nature, as is the capacity to resolve differences violently.

Conflict is a fundamental human choice that has been materialized in countless forms throughout history. What the conflict resolution field is offering today is a clearer, deeper, and more methodological understanding of how these choices come about, what the best conditions for them to come into view are, and why humans involved in conflicts end up using the more violent and destructive alternatives.

Against this backdrop, while descriptive work regarding the emergence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been produced extensively, rarely have those readings portrayed it as a conflict resolution process. However, if we move from the first secretarial draft of June 1947 to the final draft of December 10, 1948, we see the emergence of a wonderfully productive conflict resolution process that would strongly support the intimate connection and complementarity of the two fields.

The language used in the actual Declaration ratified was not the only possible one. There were several drafts (Humphrey Draft, Cassin Draft, Geneva Draft). The abundance of previous drafts was due to “struggling” to find the language that could express what had never been expressed before by an international body in those terms. The problem that the drafters were addressing was a fundamental human dilemma, giving expression to the unknown.

There was among the members of the Commission a shared sense that something inherent was linking them with the entire human family. Indeed, the idea that dignity was to be identified in the Preamble of the Declaration, to represent all humans, individually and collectively, was not obvious at that time. In other words, the responsibility toward future as well as current human generations was of paramount importance. Also, the same dilemma was emerging at every turn, every word, and every expression. Who could decide who was speaking
on behalf of everybody? We know that, although questioned by some, the diversity of the drafters was certainly an issue that led to a group of experts who attempted to represent a broad range of philosophical, legal, cultural, and religious backgrounds. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged as a successful outcome of a conflict resolution process that brought together a group of many to express the unknown. But, was this condition only true in 1948 or is it also valid today? In many areas, including human rights, we are still collectively facing many unknowns. How we are going to address them collectively is an essential question. As a field, conflict resolution has much to contribute in helping further developments to be addressed constructively.

One of the key premises of the conflict resolution field is that development occurs in conversations. This was certainly true throughout the process that led to the final text of the Universal Declaration, but it is also true in countless areas of further development of human rights. If we look at social, economic, and cultural rights, for example, we can see how debates are open and vibrant, indeed conversational. In particular, if we pay attention to the dynamics of dimensional

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**Figure 27.1** The Progression of Conflict.  
development as it applies to both human rights and conflict resolution, we have a glimpse at the importance of the interconnection of the two fields.

As the conflict moves from low to high awareness, the relations become unstable. Countless negotiations fulfilling the developmental potential must take place in order to move toward a sustainable peace, as a dynamic system of respectful human interaction. Under this spectrum, human rights have a central role, divided into three phases: (1) in raising awareness of injustice; (2) in offering the basis for action to address those injustices; and (3) in articulating the system of reference to evaluate both awareness and injustice (see Figure 27.1).

Therefore, it should be stressed that the negotiations in the third phase do not pertain to the human rights intrinsically. Experts of conflict resolution would agree that the articulation and implementation of them must infuse political realities through negotiations. No expert in the conflict resolution field would advocate or imagine a sustainable peace built against human rights such as systematic disrespect and abuses. On the contrary, conflict resolution literature considers human rights as the conceptual framework for any lasting and peaceful resolution of conflicts, especially the most violent ones.

**DIFFERENT APPROACHES BETWEEN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS FIELDS**

The most striking point of tension between the conflict resolution and human rights fields emerged in confronting the dilemma of enforcement with the choice of many human rights activists of a “naming and shaming” methodology.

In a world in which the power structure is still so much unbalanced in favor of powerful ruling classes, frequently against large portions of their own societies, human rights were perceived by many representatives of these powerful elites as merely worthless platitudes. However, the work done by pioneering human-rights–oriented organizations has significantly shifted the power balance. Disenfranchised powerless political prisoners, in regimes that did not respect human rights, were sometimes saved from torture and death by the intervention of foreign human rights activists, who had no other claim for their intervention than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent instruments. For example, Amnesty International’s thousands of activists demonstrated that it was possible to bring about change, even in nations very far away from home. Real change, though, did not happen in a moment. Many activists helped a new systemic power to emerge by taking human rights discourses seriously. The repressive capacity of states was fundamentally challenged by national and international networks of human rights advocates and activists.
So, it becomes clear that while, superficially, the “naming and shaming” as well as the “coercive” methodologies run counter to the conflict resolution literature, they have contributed in fact to a transformation of powerful and repressive forces into more open and benign ones. In other words, forcing states and international actors to take human rights seriously has been an indispensable component of a redistribution of power that has occurred and still needs to occur. The role of human rights organizations, using pressure to force powerful states to reduce violations and reform themselves in such a way that citizens may experience full expression of their rights, has been cardinal. However, if the human rights movement is reduced to “naming and shaming” or to coercive methods (and the only task that the human rights community aspires to fulfill is the enforcement of established norms, regardless of the means of their enforcement) then this inflexibility may run counter to the best practices of conflict resolution.

To justify a war as a way to implement human rights is certainly not a consensual position, neither in the human rights community nor in the conflict resolution one. Rather, many have stressed that less destructive and violent instruments have produced amazing results by respectfully engaging all actors in the processes. Even the proponents of regime change cannot advocate for war easily without at least acknowledging the powerful transformative experiences of nonviolent collective action.

Human rights and conflict resolution are at times portrayed as contradictory. On the one hand, there is a perception of human rights as a field, based upon moral principles, that does not accept compromise. On the other hand, there is a perception of the conflict resolution field as working in a murky environment in which actors want to keep everything ambiguous in order to maximize the possibility of politically settling disputes. On the one hand, there is a portrayal of the purity of the human rights principals, while, on the other, there is a claim for political and cultural experience as well as what is possible at a given time.

The aforementioned schemas are clearly stereotypes. Yet, it is common to find authors arguing about the tension between justice and peace in terms of the impossibility of having one, if the other is present. According to one view, the aspiration for pursuit of full human rights will necessarily prompt a less than peaceful state of affairs; hence, a peace, without full justice, is a little more than an appeasement of the powerful. Others believe that adversarial processes, relentless prosecution, and unforgiving commitments would not bring about peace or justice but rather a destructive conflict.

In our opinion, the realities of justice and peace are complementary. In this view, full justice comes through peace, as well as full peace comes through justice. A systemic approach helps us to craft the understanding of how these two realities get intertwined in a self-reinforcing loop. Rather than looking at peace as something that comes about at the expense of justice, we should recognize
that peace requires a period of stability, “devoid” of violence in which there is effective and fair political representation of the interests and needs of the parties previously involved in a destructive conflict.

After all, peace is the beginning of justice, not the end. Hence, lasting peace cannot be built by ignoring justice. Disrespecting victims and disregarding international norms of human rights are not solid foundations for any lasting peace. Such a peace would be a mere pause in a conflict. It would not be sustainable over time and it would be rightly described as insufficient. In other words, peace at the expense of justice is a mocking peace; it is fundamentally ignorant of the very components that should constitute a sustainable, acceptable, and lasting peace.

Peace can contribute to justice and its emergence in a society that may have lost its very sense of the “right,” the “legal,” the “just.” Peace is also a complex phenomenon that emerges and is sustained by human interaction. Politically constituted through an endless series of positive, constructive, and free encounters among human agents, peace is a fragile state of affairs constantly under threat. Finally, peace is a human construction that requires great ingenuity and dedication. It is composed of political elements that must be able to control military, economic, and social interests in a coherent and self-correcting project. Therefore, peace does not come out of the blue; it is never a simple statement of renunciation of hostilities.

In highly polarized societies—in which violence has been used, people have been killed, and human rights have been violated—the very possibility of thinking of peace is perceived by many as a weakness. The very possibility of conceiving a shift from enmity to partnership might be portrayed as treason. Extremists may claim that even opening channels of communication is a dangerous path that leads not toward victory, but toward capitulation. If the other remains an enemy, if the other’s, as well as ones’ own, attitude is geared toward victory, thinking of peace turns out to be very difficult.

Nevertheless, the capacity to think of peace is a fundamental human capacity that people retain even in the midst of the most terrible conflict. It is interesting to note that soldiers often have the capacity of imagining the potential of political agreement that would bring the vicious conflict to an end. Moreover, because of this deep knowledge of the horrors of war, soldiers are frequently more able to understand the importance of preventing threats to stability and peace than civilians. Realizing that this is important, the violent can become peaceful again, provided that the conditions are in favor of the discontinuation of violence.

The first and most precious need of all the parties involved (especially the powerless victims) is discontinuity. In any abusive system, the first and most important intervention is toward making sure that the abuse is not repeated, that violence does not occur again, and that victims are no longer victimized. The end
of violence is a responsibility of the whole human system around the parties. It is too easy to put the responsibility for protecting victims solely and squarely on the shoulders of the law enforcement agents. Prior to the violence as well as during the enforcement of its termination, the whole societal system around the parties is responsible. Those who could defuse a conflict, but did not do it, are responsible. Those who could address the conflict, but did not do it, are responsible. Those who could intervene, but did not do it, are responsible.

This is true at the “family” level, at the community level, and at the international level. Not doing anything or not doing them well places the responsibility not only on the parties themselves, but also on the system that allows those parties to behave so destructively. Moreover, negativity breeds negativity and destructiveness breeds destructiveness. Once again, in the presence of widespread violence and enmity, the first responsibility is to create discontinuity, to make sure that no further abuses of human rights are perpetrated, that enmity is used no more to justify violence, and that destructiveness toward the other is not condoned any longer as a societal duty.

**SYNERGY BETWEEN THE FIELDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

Human rights movements have never used only the “naming and shaming” practice to bring about change. Negotiations and other political processes have led to extraordinary changes in the international scene with new states emerging, being formed, and recognized. The constitutions of those new states always make references to human rights. Moreover, the ratification processes ensure that no new state openly and overtly makes violations of rights an acceptable premise of its political system.

States do not apply human rights only because they are forced to do so, but also because it is becoming clearer to many ruling elites that it is indeed advantageous to the stability and further development of the state. The correlations between human rights and development, human rights and economic growth, and human rights and political participation are astounding. They constitute a call for further exploration of conflict resolution approaches, such as dialogues, negotiation, and mediation. The ways these conversations will be handled will have a huge impact on our understanding of human rights and conflict resolution in the future. This is why there is a growing interest in both fields about overlapping complementarity and the tensions that have emerged. Nonetheless, stressing the need for building bridges between conflict resolution and human rights does not imply merging the two fields, for they address underlying violent conflict from different but synergistic responses. (See Babbitt, 2005.)
How can human rights be brought into conflict resolution processes then? When conflict resolution techniques are used in human rights disputes in ethnic conflicts, it is crucial that prevailing universal norms and applicable international law be taken into account explicitly. Using human rights arguments productively helps the parties to develop and reach accords that include significant shifts in the individual’s system of protection. Moreover, human rights facilitate processes of resolution and provide an essential framework for negotiation. For example, constitution making in South Africa was a stable and important device toward constructive conflict resolution. Although the parties found that they had different conceptions of human rights, they incorporated broad principles in the body of the constitution and many of the disputes (such as land disputes) were resolved through the constitutional framework. Furthermore, human rights could be more effective by expanding its tool kits beyond naming and shaming, and seeking remedies in a wider array of negotiation and diplomatic techniques from the field of conflict resolution. That is to say, the field of conflict resolution could better ensure that negotiations lead not just to a ceasefire, but to a permanent peace if it were more willing to assert basic international norms of human rights and humanitarian law.11

Societies that have experienced deep and sorrowful moments of human destructiveness have identified the need for discontinuity. Thus, they introduced and used the instrument of amnesties to indicate a clear shift: a shift from war to peace, from enmity to partnership, from destructiveness to collective engagement. In this light, amnesties are not a suspension of human rights, but rather the space of discontinuity that societies emerging from violent conflict require to think of ways to put human rights into practice.

There is little respect for human rights in the midst of violent conflict, for the right of life, for the right to due process, and for the right to freedom. Civilians are often the first to experience the massive violation of human rights that occurs in the time of war. If the attempt to tame human violence through international law was measured only by its results on victims, its record would be abysmal. The human rights implication of any violent confrontation is substantial and we should take very seriously the need for prosecuting those who go beyond the boundaries of military engagement intentionally, who destroy and disrupt the lives of many. There is certainly a need for a system of accountability that is effective and strong, both locally and internationally.

Nonetheless, the enforcement strategy that only restricts justice to persecution will not achieve the justice that it claims. For many societies, in fact, prosecution creates continuity, putting the conflict not in the past, but in the present. If this occurs, it is impossible to move on, to imagine the future that “must be imagined” for human rights to be fulfilled. Also, the implicit risk of prosecuting individuals is that by identifying only some (out of many) as the true culprits of the violence implicitly clears the others. Moving the responsibility from the system to
individuals is an important, yet dangerous step. The behavior of individuals constitutes expressions of the political formation, military structures, and systemic patterns concealing, sustaining, and actualizing violent behavior. Societies should not be deprived of their rights to get amnesties as a step toward the full realization of human rights.

However, as demonstrated in South Africa and Mozambique, a political process following violent conflict can be created that uses amnesties as a way to create a discontinuity from the violent system, ensuring the space in which a new political system will be developed along with an effective judicial system. This approach has huge implications as far as it concerns victims and their rights. No political authority can or should force victims to forgive, or even to forget. Instead, the experiences of the victims should be an integral part of the new political order, an order that recognizes, welcomes, and respects their memories. Furthermore, no successful peace process can emerge from forced oblivion. Rather, the very experience of victimhood (see Meister, 2002) should be placed at the core of a new political construction that makes violating human rights unthinkable. Yet, it must be recognized that humans have been capable of extraordinary ingenuity in imagining and executing the unthinkable. Human rights violations become less thinkable when the whole system is built on human rights principles. Sociopolitical, military, and economic components must all be integrated and geared toward the complete expression of human rights.

After the establishment of a discontinuity, the second step is to make sure that the voices of the victims of past abuses are heard and become an integral part of a conversation that includes them in such a way that new violations will be impossible. These processes take time and require a great political capacity, because victims are at times a difficult stumbling block on the way to peace. Unless the capacity of the system to represent them politically is secured, the actual emergence of peace is compromised. Also, victims must not necessarily have the leading role during the peace processes, but they should certainly be represented significantly in all stages.

**GENOCIDE PREVENTION**

The day before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved, there was another international instrument approved by the U.N. General Assembly through Resolution 260: The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention illustrates an attempt to give a name to the human destructiveness experienced by many, yet never legally described as genocide. It includes five qualifying activities that are clearly human rights violations as well. Considering that genocide is impossible without massive,
sustained, and systematic violations, it is imperative to take human rights very seriously if a coherent prevention strategy is to be conceptualized. (See Article 2, Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide.)

The international community is ready for a more committed effort toward genocide prevention. In 2005, sixty years after the liberation of the extermination camps in Auschwitz, a resolution was passed to remember the dead by committing the human family not only to the memory, but also to the prevention of such crimes. The terrible violence of Rwanda and Cambodia has also stirred the conscience of many who find it unacceptable for humans to kill humans and for the state to sustain, condone, and support such violence. As we also begin to realize that more people were killed by states in the last century than by active wars, intrastate violence becomes less acceptable.

Self-restraint, as previously mentioned, must be supported by negotiating transformative dynamics that will allow human rights to become an accepted norm for all humans and not just a few. In this framework, recent debate emerged at the beginning of this century around the concept of the responsibility to protect. The international commission that first introduced the term in the international debate clearly identified three stages in the responsibility to protect: prevention, reaction, and rehabilitation.

This new bold political move may have the effect on the international system of creating the equivalent of a law enforcement unit. When human rights are taken seriously, systems of prevention are in place and proper responses to potential violence are available. When early warnings indicate impending violence, then the debate is framed in terms of crime prevention. In such a system, violence is not prevalent and should not be expected, while abuses will only rarely be experienced. All current early warning systems include human rights as meaningful indicators. The challenge is to make sure that the political will to act on the assessments occurs not only occasionally, but with methodical regularity as well. Against this backdrop, a closer collaboration of conflict resolution and human rights can provide us with the systemic and transformative understanding we need to positively and creatively address the unknowns of our own destructiveness. In conclusion:

- Benefits of a prevention approach can be demonstrated only when such a strategy is pursued coherently over time. While the debate over responsibility to protect is very important, it has unfortunately at times been polarized in such a way that prevention has been perceived as intervention.
- Focus on genocide prevention could actually help individual states to develop convincing and effective preventive strategies that are not imposed by external actors, but rather indigenously created.
• Genocide prevention can provide similar momentum to catalyze our collective attention toward crystallizing prevention in new patterns of communication and new decision-making processes both within and among states.
• Development of networks can be extraordinarily effective. They have the capacity to operate across institutional lines, linking state and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and institutional actors.
• Early warning systems are fundamental components of a prevention strategy, yet they are still in formation. The need to establish mechanisms to collect and analyze information so as to present policy makers with meaningful political options is urgent.
• Effective early warning systems imply a deep understanding of root causes of conflict plus an establishment of the management capacity that allows systematic analysis and interpretation of relevant data as well as its systematic collection and recording.
• Need for consistency and accuracy of data sets is a crucial element in the overall worth of the early warning systems. However, collective human capacity to understand deadly conflict through a quantitative approach is relatively recent and must be strengthened by an emphasis on genocide prevention that takes seriously all human rights violations, relevant violent events, and indications of possible escalation of atrocities.

CONCLUSION

Human rights and conflict resolution are fields of inquiry and practice that have emerged relatively recently in human history. Also, human rights doctrines and conflict resolution principles and processes are still developing. The contributions of both fields to sustainable peace and respectful human development are paramount. It is imperative that areas of tensions between the two fields in terms of methodologies and tactical objectives be viewed as an opportunity for further growth and understanding. The existence of a genocide prevention movement provides an extraordinary opportunity for this development to occur. It will also provide the comprehensive framework to which practitioners of both fields could contribute by reflecting and theorizing from their own experiences. We are currently in a system creation phase; human rights and conflict resolution partners can productively contribute to the understanding and the actualization of a true constructive synergy.
References


Notes

1. Natural law or law of nature: normative legal theory that argues that the basis of law should be morality. Natural law argues that just laws are innate in nature, and therefore, no legal construction, such as a Bill of Rights, can create those laws, but only discover them. See for example chapter 2 in S. Samuels, *Law, Politics, and Society*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006.

2. Rousseau’s political ideas are articulated mainly in the book *Principles of Political Right* (1762).

3. Legal positivism (as opposed to “natural law”) is a school of legal thinking basically arguing that laws are constructions of human beings, and therefore there is no connection between law and morality. For a comprehensive overview of the development of legal ideas from early antiquity until recent years, including the major arguments of different theorists, see Penner, Schiff, and Nobles (eds.), *Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; J. W. Harris, *Legal Philosophies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.


PART SIX

CULTURE AND CONFLICT
CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

Culture and Conflict

Paul R. Kimmel

If our world is to become a global village, the need for better understanding and communication among peoples from different cultures is crucial. Most of today’s social and political issues transcend local or national interests and actions (Berman and Johnson, 1977). For example, common markets, resource shortages, ethnic conflicts, nuclear proliferation, natural disasters, drug and environmental problems, terrorism, and epidemics cannot be handled by individual nations. Relations among nations require meetings and communication among peoples with diverse cultural backgrounds. Whether the situation is bilateral or multilateral, the issues technical or ideological, and the standards for success victory or problem solutions, individuals from different cultures must communicate. Ideally, they will understand their basic cultural differences and create communalities that will facilitate their communications and problem solving. More likely, they will assume that they all share the same basic reality and thought processes and then experience conflicts and frustrations in their interactions when they find that they do not.

I use the term “microcultures” to refer to the communalities in meanings, norms of communication, and behavior; the shared perceptions and expectations; the roles and relationships that can develop among individuals from different cultural backgrounds as they interact over time. If no microcultures are created in such situations, major misunderstandings and breakdowns are inevitable. The largely unconscious expectations and assumptions that public and private negotiators bring to these encounters from their own cultures that are not shared by their counterparts from other cultures are the basis of these problems. Because each
negotiator thinks that the others could (and should) share their expectations and assumptions (their mind-sets), they assume that the others are misbehaving or are not serious about reaching agreements when they do the unexpected. That is, they attribute others’ behaviors to their situational attitudes and goals rather than their cultural backgrounds. A dramatic case in point was the meeting between the representatives of the United States and Iraq in Geneva in January, 1991.

Prior to this meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, the United States appointed a woman, April Glaspie, as its Ambassador to Iraq. The ambassador’s gender and her status as a “Westerner” made her a very weak representative in the estimation of the Iraqis. Her status and the ambiguity of the message she had delivered warning King Hussein against invading Kuwait signaled to Hussein that the United States was not concerned with his “retaking of Iraq’s territory.” To him, what the United States did not say was more important than what it did say.

The subsequent meeting in Geneva was plagued by cultural misunderstandings (Stewart, 1991; Kimmel, 1994). The two groups could not have done a better job of alienating each other had they tried. The Associated Press (AP) reported that Baker was “genuinely stunned” when Aziz refused to take President Bush’s letter, explaining to the king what the United States would do if Iraq invaded Kuwait. Aziz judged the Bush letter too explicit to be presented to Hussein. Although we do not know the contents, it is likely that they were blunt and unequivocal. Such communications are not acceptable in cultures whose officials expect room to maneuver so that they are not embarrassed (lose face). An explicit, written statement from one head of state to another was the wrong kind of message sent in the wrong way to the wrong person. As a result of their different cultural expectations and assumptions, Aziz and the Iraqis decided that the Americans were not serious about negotiating and were deliberately insulting them.

Publicly humiliating officials from a face-saving culture can create enemies for life. Such humiliation will stiffen their resolve and reduce the possibilities for change. For example, after Aziz had been scolded by the U.S. delegation in Geneva, one Iraqi delegate said in a “quaking voice” as he left the meeting, “I never thought that you Americans could be so arrogant. Such a free and open country you have and still you refuse to see our viewpoint.” Here is a man who felt condescended to and accused of something he did not intend. Lacking the knowledge to create microcultures, representatives’ different levels of cultural awareness often lead to more destructive conflicts, as this example illustrates (Kimmel, 1998).

THEORY

To clarify what we mean by culture and cultural awareness, we will discuss and illustrate some relevant concepts and theories from intercultural communication.
Subjective Culture and Mindsets

I think of a culture as the basis of social reality for all of its members. Cultures are historical human creations that define what is real and important for those who share them. They are organic, whole, and dynamic. Individuals are born cultureless. They learn their culture by growing up and being socialized in it. Through the use of language and nonverbal communications, human beings participate in and shape their common culture.

A culture is to a given people as personality is to a person (Tyler, 1987). Our learned shared perceptions, or subjective culture as Triandis (1972) has called it, contains the “categories, plans and rules people employ to interpret their world and act purposefully in it” (Spradley and McCurdy, 1971, p. 2). Subjective culture serves as a highly selective screen between the individual and the outside world that “directs the organization of the psyche, which in turn has a profound effect upon the ways people look at things, behave politically, make decisions, order priorities, organize their lives, and . . . how they think” (Hall, 1976, p. 212). Your subjective culture gives meaning and intention to your acts and your understanding of the acts of others. It provides the underlying grammar for sending, receiving, and interpreting communications. Many of our shared cultural perceptions have to do with how to communicate.

Edward Hall (1976) hypothesizes that the majority of our cultural categories, plans, and rules are unconscious. Thus, to take account of our cultural frame of reference or mindset (Fisher, 1988) in any given situation—that is, how we will typically think and feel in that situation—requires making conscious part of our unconscious (or perhaps preconscious) subjective culture and the context of the situation. Usually, members of a culture use their shared learned categories, plans, and rules without being conscious of them. When societies were simpler and more homogeneous, cultural perceptions about communication were often based on familiar ethnographic markers such as skin color, religion, nationality, gender, or ethnic background. As societies have become more complex and fluid, the subjective cultures of their members have diversified and these ethnographic markers are often unreliable guides for predicting and understanding mindsets, emotions, and behaviors (Avruch and Black, 1990, 1991).

Constructing Reality

You acquire a common culture through socialization by and with other human beings. In this process, what becomes your reality and common sense is selected from a wide array of alternatives in your social, cultural, and physical environment. Your subjective culture is constructed through your contacts with others who have already learned or incorporated certain alternatives from that environment. You perceive what you expect to perceive through the selection of information that fits with your learned categories or archetypes. A classic
example of the results of this construction process is Bagby’s (1957) study of Mexican and American school children, in which American children saw only a baseball player while Mexican children saw only a bullfighter when pictures of each (one to each eye) were simultaneously projected through a tachistoscope (a device that allows pictures to be flashed on a screen for an instant).

We develop, learn, and use symbols (such as words and sentences) that give meaning to our social activities. Language, our most complete category system, is the primary mode of communication in our symbolic environment. Its inherent reciprocity makes it ideal for constructing common meanings. As parents and children or teachers and students interact within a symbolic environment, the meanings they share and use define and reinforce mindsets in their subjective cultures and reality in their common culture.

Through the use of language, human beings participate in, shape, and spread their common cultures. Communication is relatively easy within a language community, not only because of similar conversational styles, but also because members have learned most of the verbal and nonverbal categories, plans, assumptions, and rules that are part of that language’s common culture. Although we develop individualized, unique subjective cultures through localized (for example, familial) interactions, people from the same common culture have more or less equivalent realities and mindsets. Thus, there is a strong relationship among the subjective and common culture of a people, their language, and their communication and cognitive styles.

Most of us are unaware of many of the important differences between our subjective culture and those of individuals from other common cultures because few of us are in direct contact with such individuals. When we sometimes experience aspects of different cultures in the news or traveling, these aspects are filtered through our own common cultures as archetypes and have little impact on our predispositions to perceive, reason, and communicate in accordance with our own subjective culture. Only more extended contacts with “foreigners” plus training in intercultural communication can help us expand our adult subjective cultures. (See the upcoming section, Education.)

Cultural Identity

As we are socialized, we learn to honor and respect the values and procedures fundamental to our own common culture. Children learn that the values and procedures of their culture are natural and normal. They are “common sense.” The social actualities of language, ethnicity, customs and traditions, religion, race, and region evoke existential feelings or emotions called primordial sentiments (see Shils, 1957) during each individual’s enculturation. They are the basis for social connections called “primordial bonds” that possess a powerful emotional force. Children develop a cultural identity grounded in these primordial bonds.
The bridge between one’s common and subjective culture is the identification process that binds us into cohesive groups (Emminghaus, Kimmel, and Stewart, 1997). Associations based on our primordial sentiments create a consciousness of kind that separates us from those who are different. Sumner (1906) coined the term *ethnocentrism* to describe the acceptance of those who are culturally like oneself and the rejection of those who are different. There are other possibilities for individual cultural identity formation than one’s primordial bonds, of course, but these primordial groupings of family and local community are encompassing for most because they come first in our enculturation (Volkan, 1992). Those who share primordial sentiments are sometimes referred to as a *people*.

All peoples believe that their ways of thinking about and doing things are the best ways. They learn to evaluate other ways of thinking about and doing things that differ from theirs as unusual, wrong, or inferior. Unless they have had mediated experiences with everyday life in other common cultures, they seldom become aware of the roots or uniqueness of their own and other peoples’ realities. Without such awareness, they are likely to misunderstand those from other cultures in face-to-face meetings due to basic differences in cultural identities.

To question the universality of your own reality or mindsets or to acknowledge that the reality or mindsets of others may fundamentally differ from your own is disorienting. It is easier to believe that all participants in an international meeting, for instance, will use one’s own established approaches. Contemplating the existence of a variety of approaches to and assumptions about negotiating is daunting and uncomfortable. If you are negotiating within your own common culture or with those from similar common cultures, your expectations of communality will often be met. When those from dissimilar common cultures are involved, there will be surprises (Cohen, 1991).

**Attribution Error and Miscommunications**

Because most adults’ subjective cultures are relatively stable and internally coherent, it is difficult for them to understand fully others whose mindsets are inconsistent with their own. Even in formal negotiations, like Camp David, where negotiators follow the rules of “diplomatic culture,” research on intercultural communications (Glenn, 1962) shows that negotiators usually perceive and think in terms of the more familiar patterns of their subjective cultures. They assume that their mindset is the one that makes sense in the given situation. When the communications and behaviors of “foreigners” do not square with this mindset, they will usually attribute these communications and behaviors to undesirable character traits and motivations of the “misbehaving” or “unreasonable” foreigners, rather than attributing the “inappropriate” acts and messages to cultural differences. (Attributions are judgments about the causes of behavior).
The tendency to assume that perceived negative behaviors exhibited by an unfamiliar person are a result of personal factors is called a *fundamental attribution error* (see Chapter Thirteen for a more detailed discussion of error) (Ross, 1977). Many communication problems in international negotiations have resulted from fundamental attribution errors (Cohen, 1991).

Even sending a signal interculturally is not simple. Attribution errors make misunderstandings likely among those with different subjective cultures, especially during political conflicts. For example, when Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States in 1961, he gave a speech at the United Nations in which he used a phrase that was translated as “We will bury you.” The combination of that phrase with the gesture of clasped hands held overhead (like a winning U.S. politician), produced a meaning that most Americans assumed to be malevolent. Edmund Glenn, chief interpreter for the U.S. Department of State at the time, pointed out that in his common culture the gesture used by Khrushchev means friendship. For most Americans, it signaled victory or conquest. This signal, in combination with the verbal “We will bury you,” created a message that had a threatening attribution for Americans in 1961.

The premier’s intent, according to Glenn, was not that hostile. Khrushchev’s meaning can be ascertained from Communist doctrine that postulates that Communism will replace capitalism as a way of (economic) life. Hence, when capitalism “dies,” it will be the responsibility of Communism to bury it. Thus, Khrushchev meant that the Communists would live to see the capitalists buried, that is, “We will bury you,” meaning “We will survive you.” The gesture of friendship suggests that the intention of his message may have been analogous to telling a dying relative that you will take care of the funeral.

U.S. analysts more often perceived Khrushchev as a villain threatening murder. The differences between the intended and received meanings had to do with the context of the communication and the mindsets of the communicators. Lacking awareness of cultural differences, fundamental attribution errors will reinforce existing images and feelings and create or exacerbate misunderstandings, misperceptions, and conflicts.

**Stereotypes**

The content of a fundamental error in attribution is not random. The character traits and motivations we attribute to those who behave differently are those associated with such behaviors in our own common culture. They fit our stereotypes. For example, a foreigner “jumping the queue” in England or “cutting in line” in the United States will be seen by the British and Americans as rude (character trait) and aggressive (motivation), because those are typically the characteristics of people in England and the United States who engage in such behavior. An international negotiator, mediator, or educator who works at a slower and less persistent pace than an American will be seen as stalling (motivation) or
lazy (character trait), as an American who behaved in this manner might be. Non-Westerners who prefer saving face to giving a direct “no” will be seen as evasive (motivation) or devious (character trait) by the Westerner who is not familiar with their cultures. In each of these cases, the foreigner may be exhibiting “normal” behavior in his or her culture. The less intercultural training and experience we have, the more likely we are to make fundamental attributions that fit our own cultural experiences and perpetuate our stereotypes.

If you communicate such negative attributions to those who have “violated” your cultural expectations, they are likely to become less receptive to your perspectives and ideas. Being accused of laziness or deviousness hurts, especially when you are intending just the opposite—that is, careful thinking and preserving harmony. The other party may become defensive, accusing you of “misbehaving,” “being unreasonable and impolite,” and “condescending,” as indeed you are from their perspective. Negative attributions lead to negative emotions and behaviors and more negative attributions. The ultimate attribution error occurs when all members of a group or people are stereotyped as expressing personal dispositions when they do something undesirable and as being under situational constraints when they do something desirable (Pettigrew, 1979).

**Reasoning and Cognition**

Culture also plays an important role in the way we gather information, arrive at conclusions, and make decisions—how we think and reason. There are cultural rules involved in any style of reasoning. When we do not articulate these rules (as is usually the case), our intentions (mindset) may not be apparent, and it may be hard for those from other cultures to follow our thinking.

Edmund Glenn (1981) developed a theory of reasoning based on the opposition between relying on authority, principles, and precedents (intuitive reasoning) and relying on observation, experience, and pragmatism (conceptual reasoning). The intuitive method of reasoning is more prevalent in more homogeneous and less specialized societies in which people’s experiences are shared and there is a reliance on precedents and historical experiences as the basis for knowledge. As societies become more specialized, experts are more often looked to in new and unfamiliar situations. Their ideas are initially limited, but as their conceptualizations become more universally accepted, these become what Glenn calls collective representations for that society. In their 1991 meeting with the United States, the Iraqis were more intuitive in their reasoning, relying on both historical experiences and precedents to make their points.

As societies become still more diverse and specialized, individuals rely more on pragmatic than consensual criteria to substantiate their reasoning. Glenn suggests that in these societies the conceptual method of reasoning is more prevalent. Collective representations come to be seen as hypotheses to be tested rather than absolute truths. Principles are ideas to be applied empirically and
to be changed or discarded if they do not work. The U.S. negotiators’ appeals to international law, U.N. resolutions, and diplomatic precedents in their discussions with the Iraqis were examples of such principles. Scientists are specifically trained to use the conceptual method of reasoning in their work. Negotiators are not.

What you consider the most valid information and how you handle uncertainty are closely related to your usual method of reasoning and thinking. Those who use the intuitive method of reasoning usually rely on fixed ideas and beliefs as the most valid kinds of information. They rank high on uncertainty avoidance, not easily tolerating ambiguity (Hofstede, 1980). The Iraqis' comments in Geneva, as reported in the press, were often based on ideological beliefs. Those who apply concepts in their reasoning are more likely to look at actions and data as the most valid information. They rank lower on what Hofstede (1980) has called uncertainty avoidance, tending to have a higher tolerance for risk and ambiguity.

High- and Low-Context Communications and Cultures
The Western reader may be identifying with the conceptual approach to reasoning and perhaps disdain the intuitive. We tend to blame others for the way we feel about their reasoning or communications, when we could understand them (and ourselves) better by looking at the differences in our conversational styles. Important conceptual dimensions in all communications are high versus low context (Hall, 1976) and restricted versus elaborated codes (Bernstein, 1975). “A high context communication is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low context communication is just the opposite; . . . the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code” (Hall, 1976, p. 91).

According to Edward Hall, different languages tend to favor one or the other end of this dimension of context in their communications. He characterizes Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, and other Mediterranean languages as more often high context; Swiss, German, English, and other Northern European languages are more often low context. Bernstein’s linguistic codes are also useful guides to the level of context being used in a given conversation. The restricted code categories (which appear more often in high-context communications) take the meanings of the listener for granted and thus place more strain on him or her. The elaborated codes (indicative of low-context communications) make meanings more explicit and fit the conversation to the listener, putting more strain on the speaker. Some theorists write about high- and low-context cultures in which the language and the linguistic codes are predominantly high or low.

Ascertaining your own and others’ level of context by listening for these codes can help you understand and monitor conversational styles in intercultural
situations. High-context communications are more often used in situations in which social relations are important. These communications are most likely to be directed to one’s own people. In the Iraqi and U.S. meetings in Geneva, much of the Iraq communication was high context, especially to their own group. The low-context approach is more likely to be used in situations where social relationships are not so important but the task at hand is. Much of the U.S. communication to the Iraqis was low context.

The use of English as the major language in international meetings also plays a cultural role. English, with its grammatical construction of subject-predicate, creates a world of objects that act or are acted upon with fixed relationships between things and their attributes. Thus, English speakers often think in terms of a causal world of actors-actions-results (Stewart, 1987). English also engenders a thought process based on a dichotomy between perception and thinking and on dichotomies within thinking (such as those used in this article). The use of such dichotomies supports divisive analyses, exclusive categories, and adversarial relationships (Trudgill, 1974), both in negotiations where English is the major language and in negotiation research by English-speaking researchers. It is no coincidence that until recently practically all of the English language research on communications in international negotiation has been devoted to bilateral negotiations.

EDUCATION

We can learn to become more aware of our own and others’ subjective cultures and to avoid misperceptions and errors of attribution. Although experience in international encounters is critical to such learning, experience alone is not sufficient. Feedback from the other negotiators, mediators, and educators (and from trainers) is also necessary to make us more aware and capable of dealing with the impact of our behaviors and perceptions during such encounters. We can be trained to understand and explicate our own positions, including our values and assumptions, in ways that can be understood by those who may not share the same styles of perceiving, cognizing, reasoning, and/or communicating (Kimmel, 1992; Emminghaus, Kimmel, and Stewart, 1997). With training and practice, we can become cultural integrators. (See the upcoming section, Cultural Awareness.)

Training Programs

To achieve such understanding and develop such communication skills, professional training in what I call intercultural exploration is necessary. I have found that realistic role-plays with and feedback from intercultural communication specialists and “cultural representatives” can facilitate empathic collaboration
in intercultural communication and problem solving (Kimmel, 1992, 1995). Intercultural exploration training does not try to persuade practitioners to develop or accommodate to a particular set of values, assumptions, or styles of perceiving, cognizing, reasoning, and communicating. Instead, trainees are confronted with their own subjective cultures and mindsets during the role-plays. Trainers then collaborate with trainees on developing their cultural awareness and communication skills so that they can continue to learn on their own in real meetings abroad.

To make intercultural exploration training relevant and transferable to today’s permanent negotiations, emotional involvement and practical skills are needed. Programs presented through seminars, discussions, and lectures are unlikely to get at the emotional aspects of the cultural misunderstandings. Mere information about your own and others’ cultures will not affect your mindsets, nor provide a solid basis for intercultural exploration. Training that stimulates real emotions and communication among the trainees will. Effective intercultural training is specific, with scenarios that take place within and in relation to real cultural situations. Current cultural topics provide the context for the role-plays and generate the emotions that make them meaningful. As trainer and scholar, Edward C. Stewart notes, “Trainees gain subjective insight into how their own culture is perceived by others and how its assumptions and strategies contribute to or detract from cross-cultural interaction” (1995, p. 56).

**Cultural Awareness**

Any training program should be tailored to the participants’ backgrounds, experience, and skill levels. In intercultural exploration training, the participants’ levels of cultural awareness are determined early in the program to establish the pace and duration of each individual's training (Bennett, 1986; Kimmel, 1994, 1995). Levels of cultural awareness are:

1. Cultural chauvinism—best exemplified by the narcissistic and egocentric world of early childhood. Individuals at this level of awareness have little knowledge of or interest in people with different subjective cultures.

2. Ethnocentrism—differences among peoples are linked to evident linguistic, ethnic, traditional, religious, racial, and regional differences of the individuals involved. Individuals at this level of cultural awareness are convinced of the superiority of their ways of acting and thinking.

3. Tolerance—foreign behaviors and communications are attributed to living in a different society rather than being inherent. These differences are not necessarily seen as undesirable, but the practices of one’s own society are regarded as more realistic and effective.

4. Minimization—inherent cultural differences are acknowledged, but trivialized. Individuals at this level of awareness emphasize what they believe are
more basic universal patterns of behavior—spiritual, economic, political, historical, or psychological “laws” that prove that all adult humans are basically alike.

5. Understanding—individuals at this level of cultural awareness believe that their reality and common sense and the reality and common sense of those from other cultures are fundamentally different and can be explained. They recognize that common and subjective cultures are created and passed on through the same social and psychological processes as other meanings.

6. Integration—those at this level of cultural awareness enjoy being with other cultural groups and creating microcultures. They are the least bound to their own cultures. They are skilled in recognizing their own and others’ mindsets.

Trainees may be at any of these levels of awareness and may change levels over time and situations. Trainers can determine the cultural awareness level of each participant in a given training situation by observing how trainees react to and judge the values, assumptions, and behaviors of others. The ethnocentric will see few, if any, values and beliefs as negotiable, while the integrator will see many as worth discussing.

For trainees at the ethnocentric level of awareness, the main goal of the initial training in intercultural exploration is to provide a description of cultural differences with an emphasis on the relativity of some of their own values. For trainees with more cultural experience and knowledge of cultural differences, it is possible to help them experience some of their basic assumptions and to improve their skills in intercultural communication. They can learn how to learn.

### Learning to Learn

Training in learning how to learn begins with the development of more cultural self-awareness and results in the acquisition of skills to participate effectively in intercultural dialogues (Kimmel, 1989). The more culturally aware person is conscious that he or she has internalized many cultural assumptions unconsciously over a lifetime. To achieve cultural understanding is to be more conscious of your enculturation from the concrete level of perceptions to the abstract level of values. To become a cultural integrator is to put this understanding into practice. Of course, it is easier to specify what to do in any training than it is to explain how to do it.

Many of the skills needed for successfully interacting with people from different cultural backgrounds are similar to social skills developed while growing up. It is possible to help children avoid the development of strong cultural identities by providing them with mediated experiences in learning these skills with other children who have different cultural identities. Examples of such
experiences are included in educational programs discussed in Chapter Thirty-One. However, the problem-solving, decision-making, and negotiating skills of most adults have not been culturally mediated and thus interfere with successful communication in intercultural situations.

To learn how to learn, we need skills that are less culture-specific. Because all perceptions involve archetypes that enable us to organize and categorize the characteristics of unfamiliar experiences, an intercultural explorations trainer must be familiar with the relevant archetypes in each trainee’s culture. Trainers must also know which social actualities (race, ethnicity, religion, language, tradition, and region) are relevant in given situations. Role-plays that make such contextual information explicit are created to enable trainees to understand and grow beyond their current cultural identities. The trainer takes an active, personal role in such training. He or she functions as a cultural integrator.

A technique that I have found most useful for expanding cultural self-awareness and understanding for Americans is the culture contrast training exercise (DeMello, 1995; Kimmel, 1992, 1995; Stewart, 1995). In this training exercise, trainees try to persuade role players whose mindsets about a meaningful situation are constructed to be in opposition to those of the trainee. The role players are “cultural representatives” whose subjective cultures are specifically designed by the trainer to contrast dramatically with those of the trainees. Realistic scenarios are used to involve the trainees. Trainers help trainees understand their behaviors and reactions in these intercultural training sessions through focused discussions before and interviews after the role-plays. By directly experiencing their own misperceptions and miscommunications—sometimes on video—and then discussing them with the trainers and cultural representatives, trainees become more aware of their subjective culture and its impact on others. Through repeated participation in such simulations, trainees can also improve their skills in intercultural communication and conflict management. (How the contrast American training technique would work in cultures with other learning styles is not yet explored to my knowledge.)

**Cultural Relativism**

A criticism often made of training programs like ours is that they condone or even encourage behaviors and values that may be inefficient or abhorrent in the name of cultural understanding and integration. This criticism rests on the mistaken assumption that to understand another’s subjective culture is to accept or endorse that subjective culture (a position sometimes known as cultural relativism). The intercultural exploration process does not require us to condone the values of another nor demean our own. In the process of creating new sets of meanings (microcultures) in an international meeting, we will be arguing for
some of our own values while remaining open to the arguments of the others for theirs. Openness to different ideas and values and counterpersuasion is crucial to the development of cultural understanding through intercultural exploration (Brummett, 1981).

When we have developed such understanding, we can more effectively communicate with others as equals and learn about their subjective cultures. As negotiators, mediators, and educators, we can become more involved in examining and critiquing our own and others’ values, assumptions, and beliefs. Especially important are considerations of how functional these are in light of the context or ecology of current situations. We can learn to become cultural integrators.

However, even the most culturally understanding will find that some of their values, assumptions, and beliefs are not negotiable. Both the negotiable and the nonnegotiable values, assumptions, and beliefs of the culturally understanding can be explicated through the intercultural exploration process. What is currently nonnegotiable (one’s universals) may slowly change as we engage in the creation of microcultures and as the ecologies upon which our common cultures are based also change.

Creating a Microculture: An Illustration

In the 1960s the U.S. Fulbright program selected several American nuclear physics professors to take part in a two-summer public diplomacy program for advanced Indian graduate students. The professors were chosen on the basis of their teaching reputations. They were well-liked by U.S. students who appreciated their warmth, humor, and informality in the classroom, as well as their knowledge of the subject matter. They communicated well with these students through the use of discussions and question-and-answer periods. Of course, they took these American teaching techniques and communication styles with them to India.

Because it is quite warm in India in the summer, the professors dressed in short-sleeved, open neck shirts, and light trousers or Bermuda shorts. They often sat on the edge of their desks or leaned back in chairs when lecturing, and frequently asked the Indian graduate students for their questions, ideas, or criticisms. They used jokes and anecdotes in their presentations and they expected the students to “think for themselves,” to challenge established ideas in the textbooks.

This American style of communication and approach to teaching was very unfamiliar to the Indian students. In their system of education (heavily influenced by the British colonial system) the professor, whose job it is to pass on specific information to the students, is an expert in the subject matter. The students copy what the teacher says, memorize it, and repeat it on examinations. The professor is expected to be formal and reserved, somewhat aloof from the
students, who are not expected to know anything about the subject matter before they are taught.

Needless to say, the students and the American professors did not work well together. The professors were disturbed to find that the students would not take part in the discussions or respond to direct questions unless they were on subject matter that had been covered explicitly. None would challenge the remarks of the professor (however outrageous) or the information in the textbooks. Even worse, they began to talk among themselves during lectures and to drop out of the class. The professors’ best jokes and anecdotes did not hold their attention.

From the students’ point of view the professors were incompetent. They did not know how to dress, present their material, or relate to students. They appeared not to know the material since they often asked the students for information. The students became confused when they were asked to challenge the authority of the professors or the textbook. Worst of all, they did not know what to study, because the professors did not make clear what information would be tested. As a result, they consulted each other for information or dropped out of the class to avoid the embarrassment of not doing well on examinations.

In the middle of the summer, the frustrated professors contacted the Fulbright officials and asked to come home. The officials contacted Dr. Bryant Wedge and asked him to go to India to straighten things out. Dr. Wedge, a psychiatrist and intercultural communications specialist, asked the professors for a meeting. He explained that the Indian students had very different expectations about education and asked the professors to modify their teaching accordingly. When some of them objected, he suggested that they treat the new approach as an experiment (hoping that as scientists they would find this an interesting idea).

For the remainder of the summer, the professors dressed more formally, presented their material in a traditional lecture format and tested the students only on the information in the textbook and the lectures. There were no discussions or jokes. The students responded well to this approach and did graduate level work in the course. The professors were quite uncomfortable with this teaching style, however, and all agreed that they would not return to India for the second summer of the program.

Once again the Fulbright officials called on Wedge. It had not been too difficult to show the professors how to accommodate to expectations about teaching that were similar to some they had experienced before in the United States. It was a more challenging assignment to persuade them to continue to use a different approach when they found such an approach intolerable. What was needed was an accommodation that would allow all parties to be comfortable. Intercultural communication is seldom effective when one party does most of the adjusting to the others’ values and mindsets, or styles of perceiving, cognizing, reasoning, and communicating. There needed to be more collaboration
between the professors and students in learning how to communicate and problem-solve better—how to create a microculture.

Dr. Wedge looked at the problem from the point of view of the professors. What was it about the accommodation that was making them feel uncomfortable? Having been a teacher in the United States and abroad, he knew that they thought that the Indian approach to education was rigid, authoritarian, and ineffective. But what underlay these perceptions that made them intolerant of this approach, something in their own mindsets?

Wedge had the Fulbright officials call the professors together on the promise that if they did not like his new plan, they would not have to complete the program in India. He told them that they should go back to India for one week and continue to behave as the Indians expected professors to behave. However, at an appropriate time during this week they were to tell their students that they had neglected to discuss their philosophy of education; a philosophy that they knew to be the best approach to education. That philosophy stated that in their classrooms the professor is in charge; whatever he wants to do or wants the students to do is for the best and must be done. They expected all of their students to comply with this philosophy and accept the way they dressed and their pedagogy.

The professors were stunned. They considered themselves to be very pragmatic and not to have any universal educational principles. But they could clearly see that Wedge had discovered such a principle that was at the root of their discomfort in using a style of teaching other than the one that they preferred. They did as Wedge suggested and found that the Indian students quickly grasped their teaching philosophy. One professor reported that a student asked, “Why did you not tell us earlier about your philosophy so that we could have understood what you were doing?”

The second summer of education was more collaborative as both the students and the professors did some accommodating and learning. As they became more aware of their universals and effectively shared them with each other, they developed microcultures and began intercultural explorations. They learned how to learn and become cultural integrators.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The mutual problems faced by parties in international conflicts and permanent negotiations are more amenable to solutions when seen from a wide perspective with many alternatives. Problem solving will be facilitated if participants can intentionally shift cultural frames of reference (mindsets). This ability, which is the result of training in intercultural exploration, will enable them to understand each other and their issues more fully. As cultural integrators, they
can avert cultural misunderstandings and misperceptions and ameliorate destructive conflicts by creating new meanings and relationships.

For public and private negotiators to create microcultures, both high- and low-context communications and intuitive and conceptual styles of reasoning are important. The primary process for creating and expressing new ideas is the intuitive style of reasoning, which is richer in meanings (Bordon, 1991). The primary process for organizing and elaborating those ideas is the more precise conceptual approach. When mindsets are quite different, the participants who are more explicit, direct, and concise (low context and conceptual) in their communications may be able to share information more effectively. Such sharing will be especially important early in meetings when the negotiators are trying to define their situation. When building and maintaining relationships are of greater concern, higher context communications with their more affiliative connotations (restricted codes) are more important.

Facilitated intercultural exploration can combine the ideas and approaches of individuals with different subjective cultures into something new that none of them could have conceived alone. Cultural integration will produce successful problem solving and successful problem solving will strengthen the relationships of the collaborators and reduce destructive conflict. “Defining a problem publicly can itself become part of the political process for dealing with it. The act of defining a problem together can become part of building a relationship among actors for dealing with it. Publicly redefining a problem can become a symbolically important act in shifting political support for dealing with it” (Saunders, 1987, p. 111).

A Diplomatic Example: Camp David

There is a great deal of evidence of major differences in the styles of reasoning used by the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators in their meetings at Camp David in the late 1970s. As Weizman (1981) notes, much of the hostility between the Egyptians and Israelis during these negotiations was fueled by remarks and actions that the negotiators felt were insulting, offensive, and reflected badly on their honor. The United States’ diplomacy added a third style of reasoning to the negotiations. There were also differences in cognitive and communication styles among the negotiators.

The Americans’ style of communication was usually frank and to the point with most of the meaning explicitly contained in the words. It was low context and conceptual. The Egyptians’ style was usually more rhetorical; many of their communications were intended to preserve and promote social interests. They were high context and intuitive. It is not surprising that the Egyptians sometimes found the Americans blunt and tactless, while the Americans felt the Egyptians were at times unclear, evasive, and elliptical (Cohen, 1991). The Israelis’ style of communication varied more than that of the Americans or the Egyptians during
these negotiations. When dealing with the substantive aspects of the negotiations, they were often more blunt, legalistic, and to the point than the Americans. But in their relationships with the other parties, they were usually sensitive to the social context and the implicit meanings of communications.

While many of the American negotiators publicly acknowledged the importance of honor and face, they became impatient with these “distractions” from the substance of the negotiations and seldom saw these cultural factors as potential resources for reaching agreements (Ting-Toomey, 1988). They usually preferred “reasoned persuasion.” The pragmatic Americans were frustrated when Egyptian or Israeli negotiators overlooked the facts and gave more credence to ideology.

The Americans at Camp David felt that the development of a mutually acceptable framework would facilitate the working out of later agreements. When focused on details early, the Israelis and the Egyptians brought up their familiar bargaining positions, increasing the adversarial atmosphere in the negotiations. In an effort to implement a more conceptual, low-context approach, the Americans kept Begin and Sadat physically separated at Camp David and worked on a single text using jurists from each of the delegations to try to find wording acceptable to both sides. The hope was that the single text would evolve into a peace agreement.

However, the Israelis came to see the Americans as favoring the Egyptians, whom they felt were impulsive and eager to foil the conference. The Egyptians saw the Israelis as intransigent and offensive and the Americans as ineffective in producing Israeli compliance with important principles. The Americans were upset with Egyptian and Israeli unwillingness to be “realistic” and lack of appreciation for all that the United States was doing for them. It took the pressure of different factions within the Israeli delegation on Begin, a concession wrested by Carter from Sadat on one of his principles, and leaving many important issues open, to get a last-minute signing of two framework agreements (not the single text that was hoped for)(Weizman, 1981).

Although these agreements broke down barriers between the Israelis and the Egyptians, they did not improve relationships among the Egyptians, Israelis, and Americans or create a microculture within which their negotiations could continue. There was little growth in cultural understanding and much miscommunication in these Egyptian/Israeli/American negotiations.

As this example illustrates, to develop an international microculture is a difficult and complicated process. Public and private negotiators with different cognitive and communication styles are unlikely to achieve creative solutions and lasting agreements if they lack the skills to shift to different mindsets. With more intercultural training than these negotiators had, and with a cultural integrator, it is possible that Camp David outcomes would have been more like those in the Fulbright example.
Saunders (1987) recommends that nations focus on their relationships before and while engaging in such international policy making. In our terms, he is suggesting personal interactions that would contribute to the development or enrichment of microcultures. Saunders hopes for a change in the perceptions of negotiators in conflict situations from “us and them” to “we.” If the negotiators in question have different subjective cultures, training in intercultural exploration is crucial to making this change. Cultural analysis should precede conflict management and cultural integration is critical for accurate analysis (Avruch, 2005).

Constructive Controversies, Intercultural Explorations, and Peace Building

Integrative discussions among those who can intentionally shift their mindsets will have the qualities of what David and Robert Johnson have called constructive controversies (see Chapter Three). The international microcultures that come out of such constructive controversies will benefit all parties in their efforts to end destructive conflict, solve problems, and build relationships. When we engage in such constructive controversies, we are challenged to represent more clearly our values and the cultural assumptions underlying them. Instead of polemicizing on the truth or virtue of a fixed position, as we might when speaking exclusively from our own mindsets (ethnocentrically), we must examine our positions in the context of the larger ecologies in which they are embedded (with cultural understanding). In this way, constructive controversies become intercultural explorations and promote peace building.

Peace-building skills include empathy, imagination, innovation, commitment, flexibility, and persistence. To be effective peace builders, we must be devoted to the development of relationships and the creation of consensual meanings and outcomes (Kimmel, 1992). Instead of relying on the Golden Rule, which emphasizes one’s own subjective culture, peace builders follow the Platinum Rule, “Do unto others as they would do for themselves if they could.” The Platinum Rule requires genuine cultural understanding. Implementing it depends on finding or training cultural integrators.

As Stanley Hoffman (1984) and Lloyd Etheridge (1987) point out, modesty and graciousness are key personal ingredients in intercultural explorations. Individuals with cultural understanding and the ability to engage in intercultural explorations with others have a sense of modesty and graciousness that serves them well in peace building. Those with more ethnocentric views and adversarial approaches often project a sense of arrogance and righteousness that does not promote constructive controversies (Kimmel and Stout, 2006). If you are a cultural integrator, you will be modest because you will be aware of the context, cultural assumptions, and limitations of your own positions. You will be gracious because you will more accurately perceive how your actions and words affect others.
There is little possibility that ethnocentrism, calculation, and misrepresentation can succeed in intercultural explorations. Attempts to misuse the intercultural exploration process to deceive others may have limited success with more ethnocentric individuals, but only until later actions undermine the deceivers. At this point, they will alienate the other negotiators, hurt their own reputation (and perhaps those they represent), and miss potential solutions to existing problems and conflicts. Those with cultural understanding will expose such deceptions, especially in permanent negotiation situations. “Word about you will get around a conference very quickly. If you are viewed as dishonest or malevolent, your effectiveness declines accordingly” (McDonald, 1994, pp. 3–4).

It is important to remember that in times of stress and frustration, even the most culturally understanding and integrative among us will make fundamental attribution errors. Such errors can be detrimental to communication and the development of international microcultures. “An international microculture does not usually have documentation, institutional support, or historical precedent. As such it can be a very fragile thing. Its development and maintenance rely on sustained good intentions, constant monitoring, and mutual trust” (Fontaine, 1989, p. 100). But it is these microcultures and the relationships supporting them that can get us through the stress and frustration that are inevitable in international conflicts.

**Problems Created by Minimization**

A basic assumption of many Western diplomats and social scientists is that there are generic principles of human behavior. Such minimization of cultural differences may be culturally based. “Americans typically believe that everyone is basically alike, and other people have the same needs that they have. Since the important differences among people are believed to be individual, not cultural or social, Americans are sensitive to similarities in others rather than to differences” (Stewart and Bennett, 1991, p. 151). This assumption of basic universal patterns of behavior explains the American use of a single text at Camp David. It also can be seen in John Burton’s work (1987) on deep-rooted conflicts. He attributes a basic ontological set of needs to all humans and assumes that deep-rooted conflicts among peoples result from the denial or frustration of those needs. His perspective is grounded in the needs hierarchy of Maslow (1970) who stressed that our needs for survival, security, identity, recognition, and control are innate.

This perspective pays little attention to the cultural meanings of the individual’s needs. It ignores the ways in which these meanings vary over time or from one group of people to another. Although Burton acknowledges that deep-rooted conflict may involve the “culturally determined ways in which needs are expressed” (Burton and Sandole, 1986, p. 343), he agrees with Maslow that the behaviors involved in this expression follow patterns orchestrated by the biology of the individual rather than the social or cultural context of the group. As
Burton (personal communication) wrote, “culture is a set of customs and beliefs followed by the members of a given society and accommodated to by members of other societies that are not as important as their more fundamental, ontological, universal, biologically based needs.” Thus, for Burton, the most basic conflicts are about needs, not about cultural values or assumptions.

Although this theoretical perspective may be useful in understanding some conflicts within or between similar common cultures, especially English-speaking Western cultures, it can be very misleading in analyzing conflicts between people from different cultures or ethnic groups (such as the Egyptians or Iraqis and Americans). The intercultural perspective described in this chapter assumes that the most basic intercultural conflicts are grounded in cultural differences and are about the nature of social reality (Avruch, 2005; Avruch and Black, 1991; Black and Avruch, 1989; Emminghaus, Kimmel, and Stewart 1997). Such conflicts are usually found in international situations, but may also occur between different peoples within heterogeneous nations as illustrated by current conflicts among ethnic and religious groups in the Newly Independent States, the former Yugoslavia, Ireland, Sudan, Iraq and Sri Lanka, for example.

The great danger in being oblivious to the impact of one’s own culture when building theories to explain human behavior lies in the promotion of one’s own cultural beliefs to formalized “scientific knowledge” (Avruch and Black, 1991; Black and Avruch, 1989). The search of Western science for such universal schemes can blind us to other cultural perspectives and information that would increase our ability to understand and improve negotiation and conflict management processes among different peoples (Emminghaus, Kimmel, and Stewart 1997; Kimmel, 1984). We are functioning at the minimalist level of cultural awareness when we could be promoting cultural understanding and integration.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have argued that international meetings and negotiations ultimately depend on human perceptions and behaviors and that such perceptions and behaviors are affected critically by the subjective and common cultures of the public and private negotiators involved. Differences in perception, cognition, reasoning, and communication styles can lead to misperceptions and miscommunications that hamper these meetings and create conflicts. What you feel and think in an intercultural conflict and what others intend for you to feel and think are not always the same. To avoid or ameliorate intercultural communication problems and the dysfunctional conflicts that they create or exacerbate requires training in cultural awareness and intercultural communication that promotes intercultural exploration and learning how to learn. Intercultural
exploration uses differences in cultures to develop new options and approaches, build relationships, and create unique solutions.

Intercultural exploration is becoming more needed as we move from the traditional world of bilateral diplomacy to the more complex world of multilateral, permanent negotiations (Winham, 1979). Those who use adversarial procedures and hold to official positions, behaviors that have (or had) some merit in traditional diplomacy, are counterproductive in these new situations. Similarly, the traditional techniques of Western peacekeeping and peacemaking may temporarily reduce the levels of violence in destructive conflicts, but they are unlikely to produce long-term problem solving and peace building (Kimmel, 1992, 1998). Peace builders trained in the intercultural exploration process can locate the larger issues, manage complexity, inspire confidence, get beyond immediate differences, and build relationships as cultural integrators.

As the examples in this chapter have illustrated, equalitarian relationships are crucial in today’s world of multilateral negotiations and consensual agreements. Without good faith and trust, multilateral agreements and resolutions will not hold and negotiations will break down. The recognition and respect that emerge when public and private negotiators genuinely feel that they are equals provide a foundation upon which they can engage in constructive controversy and collaborate regardless of major differences in their subjective and common cultures. Modesty and graciousness are prerequisites to constructive controversy and peace building. (See Chapters One, Two, and Three for fuller discussions of cooperation, equality, and constructive controversy.)

We are facing impasses in our political, economic, and diplomatic negotiations on more and more occasions. Ethnocentric and tolerant diplomatic approaches have harmed our international relationships. A great deal of effort has gone into getting nations and ethnic groups in destructive conflicts to meet. Persuading them to recognize and talk to each other has not been easy (Saunders, 1987). Similar amounts of effort are required to develop and implement programs to make their negotiations more successful through the development of the skills necessary to create microcultures. Hopefully, future policy makers will invest in the training programs needed to produce more culturally aware public and private negotiators who can learn how to learn. I believe that we can learn how to create international microcultures that will let us build a global village in which we can all live; a village in which groups of equals who desire each other’s welfare all participate and learn from each other as cultural integrators.

References


The multicultural perspective in conflict resolution has important benefits for leaders and organizations. First, groups in conflict might otherwise be limiting themselves to those more familiar alternatives within their specific culture. Second, given an appreciation of multicultural complexity, they are less likely to accept quick and easy, but wrong answers by imposing their cultural perspective on others. Third, by understanding a range of culturally different approaches to conflict resolution, their practical and theoretical options for resolving conflict are increased. A multicultural perspective of conflict resolution interprets the conflict in a multicultural context that helps explain that conflict meaningfully in terms of causes, processes, and effects. The multicultural context provides data that the antagonists themselves might otherwise take for granted but that can now be understood in a joint meaning-construction process to “explain” the conflict (Pedersen, 2001, 2005).

INTRODUCTION: MULTICULTURALISM AS A FOURTH FORCE

Contemporary global changes demonstrating the importance of a multicultural perspective are increasingly apparent in the literature about conflict resolution. First, conflicts between dominant majority and less powerful minorities defined by ethnographic, demographic, status, and formal affiliations are growing more popular and are more widely accepted outside and inside the United States.
Second, the Internet and other technologies have increased opportunities for communication with culturally different people, resulting in a more multicultural perspective across special interest groups. Third, there is a worldwide multicultural movement where ethnocultural minority groups have raised levels of economic, social, and political sensitivity to the importance of minorities’ perspectives. Fourth, there is a reexamination of cultural bias in the research literature so that instead of accepting dominant culture values and beliefs, there is more emphasis on discovering each cultural group’s unique explanation of their behavior and meaning (Carter, 1991).

Until recently, the influence of cultural similarities and differences has been typically overlooked in the published literature about conflict resolution. Instead, there is frequently a dominant-culture, White, middle-class, urban, male, Euro-American perspective to the resolution of conflict across cultures. With the increased influence of non-Western cultures and countries, a variety of different styles of conflict resolution have become more visible. It is necessary for leaders and organizations to understand how conflict is understood and resolved differently in Western and in non-Western cultures. This is important not only because individuals from those countries are increasingly employed in organizations in the United States and other Western cultures, but also because Western cultures can learn a great deal from non-Western cultures about multicultural conflict resolution (Fry and Bjorkqvist, 1997).

Pedersen (1998) examines in detail some of the issues involved in declaring multiculturalism as a “fourth force” in psychology complementing the psycho-dynamic, behavioral, and humanistic theories. We know that each behavior is learned and displayed in a multicultural context, making that cultural context central to strengthening traditional psychological theories in ways that might lead us to call this new perspective a fourth “dimension” rather than a fourth “force.”

S. Sue (1998) identified sources of resistance to the term and arguments against “multiculturalism as a fourth force.” First, some view multiculturalism as competing with already established theories of psychological explanation in ways that threaten conventional thinking. Second, the terms “multiculturalism” and “diversity” are closely associated with affirmative action, quotas, civil rights, discrimination, reverse discrimination, racism, sexism, political correctness, and other highly emotional topics. Third, to the extent that multiculturalism is connected with postmodernism, the arguments against postmodernism as a valid theory are also applied to multiculturalism. Fourth, those favoring a universalist perspective contend that the same practice of psychological services applies equally to all populations without regard to cultural differences. Fifth, others contend that there are no accepted standards for describing multiculturalism as a theory and that it is too loosely defined to be taken seriously. Sixth, there are no measurable competencies for multicultural applications of psychological services or adequate standards of “best practice.” Seventh, multiculturalism is too complicated and it would be
unrealistic to expect service providers to attend to such a range of factors simultaneously. Eighth, more research is needed on multicultural competencies, standards methods, and approaches. Ninth, multicultural standards cannot be incorporated into the services profession until all groups have been included. Tenth, multiculturalism represents reverse racism, quotas, and is anti-White.

In discussing these sources of resistance, S. Sue (1998) pointed out the tendency of the dominant culture to resist sharing power, to misrepresent or misunderstand the notion of multiculturalism, and to minimalize the dangers of that misunderstanding. This chapter will attempt to highlight understanding the advantages of a multicultural perspective in conflict resolution.

THEORETICAL BASIS OF MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism is based on theories of sociocultural identity, which provides the foundation for multicultural services such as conflict resolution. The premise of multiculturalism is that we can each belong to many different cultures at the same time, making it possible for a culturally different provider and consumer to find common ground in resolving conflict among those cultural perspectives they share (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990).

World Views and the Rise of Multicultural Theory

Yang (1999) describes the consequence of imposing the assumptions of a Westernized dominant culture on non-Western cultures. “What has been created via this highly Westernized research activity is a highly Westernized social science that is incompatible with the native cultures, peoples, and phenomena studied in non-Western societies. The detrimental over-dominance of Western social sciences in the development of corresponding sciences in non-Western societies is the outcome of a worldwide academic hegemony of Western learning in at least the last hundred years” (p. 182).

As an alternative to the dominant monocultural perspective Liu and Liu (1999) point out that spiritual interconnectedness in many non-Western cultures is becoming more important than the pursuit of individualistic values implicit in the Western perspective. In an attempt to go beyond the Western perspective, the study of “worldviews” became popular. The best-known value typology of worldviews was designed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). Kohls (1996) provides a useful overview of the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck model in five alternative orientations that contrast Western and non-Western cultures.

The first orientation is toward human nature. Some people have an optimistic and positive view of others and other people have a more negative view. Most people take a middle position, waiting to judge others until they have more data about their positive or negative intentions. Premature judgment of other people is
perhaps the single most frequent source of error in producing multicultural misunderstandings. The second orientation is toward the person’s relationship to nature. This orientation resembles the internal and external locus of control concepts. Westernized “low-context” cultures tend to put a more positive meaning on internal locus of control while other non-Western “high-context” cultures are more accepting of external locus of control. The third orientation is toward time, with some cultures valuing the past and other cultures valuing the future. Understanding a culture’s historical background is essential to developing a multicultural awareness about that culture. Westernized cultures have a reputation for putting more emphasis on the future or present than on the past. The fourth orientation is toward activity. Westernized cultures have a reputation for valuing activity and proactive behavior. Finally, in the Kluckhohn-Strodtbeck Model, attitudes toward social relations are assumed to be different from one group to another. The power structure in hierarchical cultures is authoritarian—from the role of the father in a family to the ruler in the state. In other cultures, equality is emphasized and each individual group member is allotted equal power.

The Kluckhohn-Strodtbeck Model has a long history of use across disciplines in the social sciences, resulting in measures of cultural difference, frameworks for comparing cultures, development of culturally sensitive treatments, measuring effectiveness, identifying cultural preferences, and organizing cultural information. The presumption is that mismatches of cultural values will inhibit the delivery of psychological services and complicate the communication process. Values are useful both for learning about oneself as a starting point for learning about culturally different alternatives.

More recently, Geert Hofstede (1980, 1986, 1991) described five dimensions with culturally constructed patterns of similarities and differences. The samples were collected from more than fifty-five different nations around the world. The resulting data were factor analyzed into four dimensions. The first dimension responses were distributed from High to Low Power Distance measures. The second dimension responses were distributed from Weak to Strong Uncertainty Avoidance measures. The third dimension responses were distributed from Individualist to Collectivist perspectives. The fourth dimension responses were distributed from Masculine to Feminine perspectives. A fifth dimension of Long-term versus Short-term perspective was added later in adapting this framework to Asian cultures. Each cultural context has its own rules and guidelines for successful conflict resolution.

These constructs were used to describe patterns of similarity and differences in the distribution of responses across countries. The resulting framework provides a frequently cited resource for classifying worldviews on an international level. A synthetic culture laboratory was developed where groups of individuals take on stereotyped identities according to one or another of these cultural dimensions to demonstrate the importance of cultural differences between groups. Participants are directed to find common ground and resolve conflict
across synthetic cultures without sacrificing their cultural integrity (G. J. Hofstede, Pedersen, and G. Hofstede, 2002). Culture is distinguished from the universally shared characteristics of human nature on the one hand and from the uniquely individualized characteristics of personality on the other. Culture is programmed both in response to the universal characteristics of human nature and the specialized perspectives of personality (Geertz, 1973).

Alternatives to Value-Based Worldviews

Values define the boundaries of cultural systems and are therefore very important for conflict resolution across cultures. A cultural value does not require external proof or outside verification to be accepted as true. Groups depend on similar values to communicate with one another and explain their identity. Values become a yardstick for groups to include or exclude individuals from their group. Groups with different value systems experience conflict or disagreement because they experience the same events differently. Each group begins from different assumptions and therefore makes different inferences. Examples of conflict between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, nationalities in Eastern Europe, or ethnic groups in the United States demonstrate clearly the conflict resulting from groups who presume different beliefs or values. These value differences may result from different national affiliations, different ethnic identities, or different social roles (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990).

The problem with differentiating cultural systems solely by their values is that cultures are more complicated and dynamic than traditional value perspectives seem to suggest. The description of cultures by their values suggests that culture is a trait or “disposition” to do one thing and not do another. Values presume a constancy over time, place, and person that denies the very dynamic and complex nature of culture. People who value “kindness” may sometimes act unkindly. People who value “fairness” may sometimes act unfairly. This variability applies to people who presume to share the same cultural values and priorities. These people act differently from one another even though they maintain the same cultural disposition according to their values. The more clearly defined and absolute these cultural categories are, the more likely they are to bend the data to fit their own rigid framework of standard topologies, mixing fact with inference.

The perspective of an “individualized” self, rooted in individualism of the Western world, is changing toward a more “familial” self, typical of non-Western cultures, as best described by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1975). “The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is,
however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures (p. 48).”

Theories of “self” have frequently failed to take into account the significance of social identification in the definition of identity. Social identities are self-definitions that are more inclusive than the individuated self-concept (Brewer, 1991). Brewer and Pierce (2005) have studied “multiple social identities” comparing those subjects who have an overlapping and convergent perspective of their in-group, showing low complexity, with those subjects favoring a distinct, simultaneous, and cross-cutting perspective of multiple cultural in-groups accepting a high-complexity profile.

They found that people with convergent overlapping memberships (low complexity) were less tolerant and accepting of out-groups than those with a distinct and cross-cutting (high-complexity) perspective. “Social identity complexity is the product of a process of recognizing and interpreting information about one’s own in-groups. Having a complex social identity is dependent on two conditions: first, awareness of more than one in-group categorization, and second, recognition that the multiple ingroup categories do not converge” (p. 429). Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder (2001) provide an excellent interdisciplinary edited book focused on the connection between social identity theories and intergroup conflict. They point out how social identities can be adaptive in building connections but that they can also contribute to the conflict by increasing biases about social groups.

Understanding the sociocultural context guides the definition of self in several ways (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). One way is through independent self-construal, in which the self is perceived as a separate identity with internal characteristics that are stable across situations regardless of context. This perspective is typical of the more individualistic cultures. An alternative way more typical of collectivistic societies connects their notions of self to societal roles and relationships. This interdependent self-construal is a relationship-centered perspective, requiring conformity and seeking harmony over personal goals. Definitions of the interdependent self depend more on the sociocultural context than internal attributes (Duryea, 1992).

Kagitcibasi (1996) characterizes Western psychology as affirming the separated self as a healthy prototype basic to the prescriptive nature of applied psychology. When this expresses itself as selfishness, self-centeredness, and a lack of social commitment, the monocultural perspective becomes more a part of the social problem for non-Western cultures than part of the solution. The individualistic Western cultural ethos draws a clear boundary between the self and nonself, contrary to the construal of self in many non-Western cultures. However, because the monocultural perspective has a dominant position in Western society, the individualistic perspective is often assumed to be universal. The linking of the social with the individual perspective is essential to the
development of a multicultural perspective among those resolving conflict in multicultural settings.

Cultural Identity Development Models

Cultural identity presumes issues of value and authority—involving issues of ethnicity, language, race, tradition, religion, and other beliefs—that are even more complicated than theories of conflict from a political, sociological, or economic perspective. This developmental model provides a synthesis of the worldview models and other alternative models. The cultural identity development model emphasizes the complexity of culture and the changing character of multiculturalism, emphasizing within-group differences as much as differences between groups. Conflict between “cultural states” involves what Emminghaus, Kimmel, and Stewart (1997) call “primal violence.” Such destructive conflicts are typically more personal and inhumane than wars for economic or political advantage initiated by national states. Each individual is “enculturated” by their identity group into the language, customs, traditions, and beliefs that become their “reality” and “common sense” internalized from their experiences as members of their sociocultural identity group. “Although the locus of personal culture is the individual, the nature and quality of its cultural meanings are socially constructed (p. 168).

The more cultural differences there are between people in conflict, the more difficulty they will have communicating or in understanding why they fail to communicate. Rabie (1994), writing on ethnicity and conflict, observed that “Diverse human interests and needs, largely incompatible religious social beliefs and competing individual and group goals cause conflict to arise and prevail” (p. 2). The identity issues, which are often the basis for conflict, can also become the basis of common ground through self-discovery. In resolving conflict when individual and group identity is at stake and the conflict is rooted in protecting identity needs, the conflict is often more difficult than for “interest-based” conflict resulting from competition over resources. “In identity conflict groups struggle for their basic physical and moral survival” (Rothman, 1997, p. 9). Each ethnic group teaches its members their identity. Understanding ethnic identity development models is relevant to multicultural conflict resolution, especially between minority and majority groups.

Individuals acquire a personal cultural identity through interactions with other human beings and their environments. In this process, what becomes reality and common sense for each individual is selected and internalized from their social and physical experiences. Their consciousness is constructed through their contacts with others who have already incorporated certain alternatives from those experiences. Language, customs and traditions, ethnicity, race, religion, and region all contribute to the construction of consciousness through social bonding in a process called enculturation. Enculturation is a synthesis of
social and psychological processes that continuously changes and develops to create the psychic content of the individual’s personal culture.

In developing multicultural identity, most stage-based development models suggest that individuals in transition experience three to five phases or stages of cultural identification (Connerley and Pedersen, 2005; Pedersen, 2000a). First, there is an identification with the dominant culture in a preencounter, conformity, or traditional stage. Second, there is an awakening to the impact of racism (including sexism, ageism, and so on) in a transitional encounter or dissonant stage, often involving anger toward the dominant culture by minorities. Third, there is an identification with one’s own ethnic group. Fourth, there is an internalization and integration of both cultures. The literature on Nigrescence, or Black racial identity, has led the research literature about ethnic identity development.

Helms (1985, 1990) and Cross (1991) are the best-known developers of a stage model. This model characterizes the stage-based identity development models as putting the responsibility for adaptation on the minority individual rather than society. Standard identity development models do not account for the adaptation process in change and assume that identity will develop in a linear, continuous process. The research on ethnic identity development models has described an alternative framework. Helms’ (1985) five assumptions about minority development models summarize the extensive literature on development of an identity by minority peoples. These five assumptions pervade the literature on developing a minority identity. “First, minority groups develop modal personality patterns in response to White racism. Second, some styles of identity resolution are healthier than others. Third, cultural identity development involves shifts in attitudes involving cognitive and affective components. Fourth, styles of identity resolution are distinguishable and can be assessed. Fifth, intracultural and intercultural interactions are influenced by the manner of cultural identification of the participants” (p. 241). Cross (1991) later expanded his earlier design to move toward a broader “divergent” and more inclusive focus toward developing multiple social identities at the highest stages. Successful conflict resolution needs to accommodate clients at their appropriate level of ethnic identity development.

Multicultural conflict resolution is based on the assumption that even the worst of enemies share common human needs in their search for identity. The very identity issues that are the basis for the conflict can also become the basis of common ground between enemies, providing that core concerns of survival, recognition, and dignity are addressed.

For example, when Palestinian and Jewish diplomats met in a Norwegian diplomat’s home in discussions that led to the Oslo Accord, the breakthrough was said to result from both antagonists resolving conflict for the sake of their children and their future families. Children became the common ground and this concept was prominent in the literature about the Oslo Accord.
The Complexity of Multiculturalism

Acknowledging the importance of complexity protects us from accepting easy answers to hard questions. This process is most apparent in our use of scientific theories. In attempting to understand complexity, we develop simplified models that can be explained and understood but that reflect only selected aspects of reality. Our embedded rationality requires that we construct simplified models of complex reality in order to explain things. If we behave rationally with regard to the model, we assume the behavior is appropriately explained in the real world. The danger is that we confuse simple explanations and labels with a more complex reality. There is a natural tendency to “keep things simple.” We normally have little tolerance for the confusion of aggregate, mixed-up, unsorted, undifferentiated, unpredictable, and random data. We naturally move quickly to sort, order, and predict simplified patterns from the chaos of our daily experiences. Rather than accepting a static worldview of fixed states, Butz (1997) describes the self as dynamic and similar to self-organizing, non-linear steady states in which stability becomes a phase of the system’s developmental process in the mode of “chaos theory” or, more recently, “complexity theory.”

Complexity theory assumes a chaotic, nonlinear dynamic and self-organization of phenomena that are unpredictable locally because of their complexity but, when viewed globally, are essentially stable. This provides an alternative to simplistic, linear, cause/effect theories and acknowledges the danger of simplistic answers to complex questions. Culture provides a metaphor for applying complexity theory to multicultural conflict resolution. The situation in which conflict occurs is inevitably complex and dynamic, involving networks of relationships and loyalties important to each individual’s self-identity and essential to consider in conflict resolution. Any monocultural perspective of that dynamic sociocultural system will not adapt to the changing sociocultural context.

Cohen (1991) and Sunoo (1990) recommend that the negotiators study the opponent’s culture and history, try to establish a warm personal relationship, do not assume that others understand what they mean, are alert to indirect communication, sensitive to face/status issues, adapt their strategy to their opponent’s cultural needs, are appropriately flexible or patient, and recognize that outward appearances are important.

Lund, Morris, and LeBaron-Duryea (1994) concluded their review of research on the need to go beyond a “taxonomy trap” of lists and guidelines for each cultural group. Culture is complicated and dynamic with considerable diversity within and between each cultural group. “The challenge is to develop a view of culture that delineates differences among individuals and subgroups within a culture and encompasses commonalities within that group without simplification, overgeneralization and stereotyping” (p. 24).
Dominant culture perspectives of conflict resolution often incorporate values and attitudes not shared by members of minority groups but that are based on culture-bound assumptions of the dominant majority culture. These culture-bound assumptions are both implicit and explicit in the staged models of mediation and conflict resolution taught by the dominant culture. By perceiving the world from a narrow or rigid frame of reference, we ignore the complex reality around us in the illusion of simplicity. Theories of cognitive complexity suggest that people who are more cognitively complex are more capable than others of seeing these multiple perspectives in contrast to simplified solutions of cultural bias.

Cultural bias that favors the Westernized “dominant cultural” perspective is not merely an abstraction but presents itself through a series of assumptions frequently found in the literature about conflict resolution (Pedersen 2000a). (1) We all share the same single measure of what is normal behavior. (2) Individuals, not groups, are the basic building blocks of society. (3) Only problems defined within a narrow framework of the provider’s expertise or academic discipline boundaries are of concern to the provider. (4) There is a superior quality judgment attached to “low-context” abstractions. (5) Independence is desirable and dependence is not desirable. (6) Clients are helped more by formal/professional experts than by their natural support systems. (7) Everyone thinks the same way, moving linearly from cause to effect. (8) Providers need to change clients to fit the system and not change the system to fit the client. (9) History is not relevant to a proper understanding of contemporary events. (10) We already know all of our culturally learned assumptions. In each example, the cultural bias favors simplistic solutions to complex and ambiguous problems.

Some persons are able to tolerate ambiguity better than others. These people are either better at differentiating and perceiving several dimensions in a range of alternatives or integrating and seeing complex connections between different sources. People who are more complex are able to see many different dimensions, classifications, theories, or alternatives to explain a situation. Because reality tends to be complex, those who are able to identify more alternatives are more likely to see correctly and make more appropriate decisions.

Culture’s complexity is illustrated by the hundreds or perhaps even thousands of culturally learned sociocultural identities, affiliations, and roles we each assume at one time or another. The dynamic nature of culture is demonstrated as one of those alternative cultural identities replaces another in salience. The service provider must keep track of the client’s salient cultural identity as it changes even within the context of an interview. Complexity involves the identification of multiple perspectives within and between individuals. For example, can the conflict manager perceive a problem from the multiple viewpoints of a culturally different client in the many different and changing culturally learned roles that the client fills from time to time and place to place?
The narrow definition of culture has limited multiculturalism to what might more appropriately be called a “multiethnic” or “multinational” relationship between groups with a shared sociocultural heritage that includes similarities of religion, history, and common ancestry. Ethnicity and nationality are important to sociocultural identity as one subset of culture, but the construct of culture—broadly defined—goes beyond national and ethnic boundaries. By defining sociocultural identities broadly to include within-group demographic variables (for example, age, sex, place of residence), status variables (for example, social, educational, economic), and affiliations (formal and informal), as well as ethnographic variables such as nationality, ethnicity, language, and religion—the construct “multicultural” becomes generic to all relationships. Persons from the same ethnic or nationality group may still experience cultural differences. Not all Blacks have the same experience, nor do all Asians, nor all American Indians, nor all Hispanics, nor all women, nor all old people, nor all disabled persons. No particular group is unimodal in its perspective. Therefore, the broad and inclusive definition of culture is particularly important in preparing providers to deal with the complex differences and similarities among and between clients from every cultural group in multicultural conflict resolution.

**IMPLICATIONS OF MULTICULTURALISM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

Developing a multicultural perspective of conflict resolution can improve the provider’s levels of effectiveness in many predictable ways. Pedersen (1997) summarizes a dozen positive advantages of the multicultural perspective for conflict resolution.

1. Recognizing that all behavior is learned and displayed in a cultural context makes possible accurate assessment, meaningful understanding, and appropriate interventions relative to that cultural context. Interpreting behavior out of context is likely to result in misattribution.

2. People who express similar positive expectations or values through different culturally learned behaviors, share the “common ground” that allows them to disagree in their behaviors while sharing the same ultimate positive values. Not everyone who smiles at you is your friend and not everyone who shouts at you is your enemy.

3. By recognizing the thousands of “culture teachers” each of us has internalized—from the friends, enemies, relatives, heroes, heroines, and fantasies—we can better understand the sources of our own
identity. As we encounter conflict we are likely to imagine how one or another of our culture teachers might respond and respond accordingly.

4. Just as a healthy ecosystem requires diversity in the gene pool, so a healthy society requires a diversity of cultural perspectives for its psychological health. By considering many different perspectives in problem solving, we are less likely to overlook the right answer.

5. Recognizing our natural tendency to encapsulate ourselves, a multicultural perspective protects us from imposing our self-reference criteria inappropriately by challenging our assumption. We see the dangers of a one-size-fits-all monocultural perspective.

6. Contact with different cultures provides opportunities to rehearse adaptive functioning skills that will help us survive in the diversified global village of the future. By learning to work with those different from ourselves, we can develop the facility for our own survival.

7. Social justice and moral development require the contrasting cultural perspectives of multiculturalism to prevent any one dominant group from holding hostage the standards of justice. Every social system that has imposed the exclusive will of the dominant culture as the measure of just and moral behavior has ended up being condemned by history.

8. By looking at both cultural similarities and differences at the same time, according to a quantum metaphor, it becomes possible to identify nonlinear alternatives to rigidly absolutist thinking. It is not just the content of our thinking but the very process of thinking itself that can become culturally encapsulated.

9. We are able to continue our learning curve to match the rapid social changes around us by understanding all education as examples of culture shock. Education is a journey through many different cultures.

10. Spiritual completeness requires that we complement our own understanding of ultimate reality with the different understandings others have in order to increase our spiritual completeness. All trails do indeed lead to the top of the mountain.

11. The untried political alternative of cultural pluralism provides the only alternative to absolutism on the one hand and anarchy on the other. Our survival in the future will depend on our ability to work with culturally different people.

12. A multicultural perspective will strengthen the relevance and applicability of conflict resolution by more adequately reflecting the complex and dynamic reality in which we all live.
Western and non-Western cultures have become more interdependent as multiculturalism has become more prominent (Liu and Liu, 1999). This multicultural global perspective of reality has replaced a “superpower” dominant monocultural perspective as a point of reference for both consumers and providers of conflict resolution. The implications of this change have required the redefinition of “competency” to fit a multicultural context both at the domestic and international levels.

Identifying Multicultural Competencies
Defining multicultural competencies builds on multicultural theory as the foundation. The ultimate multicultural theory is based on a contextual understanding of sociocultural behavior. To understand human behavior it is important to understand the multicultural context in which that behavior is learned and displayed. Understanding the multicultural context of sociocultural conflict is therefore important to defining professional competence in conflict resolution.

In attempting to provide professional guidelines for multicultural competence, the American Psychological Association has adopted a list of thirty-four multicultural competencies (D. W. Sue, and others, 1998) divided into three dimensions of awareness, knowledge, and skill, which apply to the field multicultural conflict resolution.

Dimension 1: Awareness of one’s own assumptions, values, and biases:
Being aware of one’s cultural heritage; being comfortable with differences but aware of one’s limits; knowing about oppression, racism, and discrimination; and being skilled in self-improvement toward a nonracist identity

Dimension 2: Understanding the worldview of the culturally different client:
Being aware of emotional reactions toward other racial and ethnic groups, knowing the culture of a client’s population and its influence on society, being skilled in psychological issues from other cultures, and being actively involved with ethnic minority groups

Dimension 3: Developing appropriate intervention strategies and techniques:
Being aware of religious and spiritual indigenous mental health resources; knowing how each culture fits with other cultures, institutions, and assessments; and being skilled in providing culturally appropriate services through multicultural conflict resolution

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Paul Kimmel (2000) describes the process of “intercultural exploration” involving role-play, feedback, and interaction to be the most promising approach to education and training about conflict resolution. “Intercultural exploration
training does not try to persuade practitioners to develop or accommodate a particular set of values, assumptions, or styles of perceiving, cognizing, reasoning and communicating. Trainers in the intercultural exploration process work with negotiators, mediators, and educators on their cultural awareness and communication skills so that they can continue to learn on their own in real meetings” (p. 461).

The implications of multiculturalism for conflict resolution focus on both cultural similarities and differences at the same time. No matter how different the individual or group may be, there will be similarities and no matter how similar there will be important differences. Culture can be used as a weapon to drive two individuals and groups apart, but it can also be used as a bridge to bring individuals and groups together in an appreciative mutual enlightenment through intercultural exploration. Intercultural exploration requires us to identify our “culture teachers” and how each experience from the real world becomes an opportunity for multicultural learning (Pedersen, 2004).

**Developing a Multicultural Awareness**

The starting point for education and training about conflict resolution is to clarify how culture controls one’s behavior with or without our permission. Imagine that several hundred “culture teachers,” collected by you over your lifetime, are sitting on your lap discussing the decisions you are now making. These culture teachers include family, friends, fantasies, mentors, and any others who have made a significant impact on your life. This “self talk” or “internal dialogue” shapes your decisions and behaviors from within (Pedersen, 2000b). Our students and clients, of course, bring their culture teachers with them also. To understand how these culture teachers control behavior, ask yourself three questions. First, what specific behavior are you trying to understand? Second, what did you “expect” to happen as a result of displaying that behavior? Third, who were the culture teachers who taught you to display that particular behavior at that particular time to get that positive expectation? This chain of questions is described in Figure 29.1, the Intrapersonal Cultural Grid.

The Intrapersonal Cultural Grid incorporates broadly defined social system variables on one dimension and personal behavior-expectation-values on the other, in a personal/cultural orientation. “Culture controls each specific behavior or identifiable action of each individual through that person’s expectations. Expectations are the cognitive variable that includes behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome expectancies that guide the individual’s choice of behavior. Expectations, in turn, are controlled by underlying values. Values are the belief systems that explain the importance and prioritize expectations. Social system variables are the sources in society from which values were learned. An accurate understanding of culture requires that we understand how an individual’s
behaviors in a particular context are controlled by learned expectations and values based on or taught by broadly defined social system variables” (Pedersen and Jandt, 1996 p. 17).

Cultural teachers might come from family relationships, business associates, fellow countrypersons, ancestors, or those with shared beliefs. Power relationships based on social friendships, sponsors, mentors, subordinates, and supervisors or superiors may provide cultural teachers. Memberships shared with coworkers or in organizations, gender or age groups, and workplace colleagues may contribute cultural teachers. A wide range of nonfamily relationships, friendships, classmates, neighbors, or just people like you may also have contributed as teachers.

### Personal Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Teachers</th>
<th>Where You Learned to Do It</th>
<th>Why You Did It</th>
<th>What You Did</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Family relations</td>
<td>relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fellow countrypersons</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>ancestors</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shared beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Power relationships</td>
<td>social friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sponsors and mentors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>subordinates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supervisors and superiors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Memberships</td>
<td>coworkers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organizations</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gender and age groups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>workplace colleagues</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 29.1** A “Within-Person” Cultural Grid

APPLYING THE CULTURAL GRID TO INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT

The Cultural Grid has relevance in the context of culture-centered conflict resolution. A separate Interpersonal Cultural Grid is demonstrated in Figure 29.2, describing the relationship between two people or groups by separating expectations or intentions from behaviors. The Interpersonal Cultural Grid includes four quadrants. Each quadrant explains parts of a conflict between two individuals or groups, recognizing that the salience of each quadrant may change over time and across situations.

In the first quadrant, two individuals have similar behaviors and similar positive expectations or intentions. The relationship is congruent and harmonious and there are positive shared expectations or intentions behind the behavior. Both persons are smiling (behavior) and both persons expect friendship (expectation). There is little conflict in this quadrant.

In the second quadrant, two individuals or groups have different behaviors but share the same positive expectations or intent. There is a high level of agreement in that both persons expect or intend trust and friendliness. However, each person or group is likely to incorrectly interpret the other’s behavior as different and possibly/probably hostile, when that behavior is interpreted out of context. This quadrant is characteristic of cultural conflict in which each person or group is applying a self-reference criterion to interpret the other’s behavior. The conditions described in the second quadrant are very unstable and, unless the shared positive expectations are quickly found and made explicit, the salience is likely to change toward the third quadrant. It is therefore important in cross-cultural conflict for at least one of the two persons to discover and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why It Was Done</th>
<th>What Was Done?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Shared/Similar Positive Behaviors and/or Actions</td>
<td>Perceived Opposed/Different Negative Expectations and/or Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Shared/Similar Positive Expectations and/or Intentions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Opposed/Different Negative Expectations and/or Intentions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 29.2** Between-Persons Cultural Grid

identify the presence of shared positive expectations for trust, respect, fairness, and so on, which may be expressed through quite different behaviors. This second quadrant is the ideal context for multicultural conflict resolution to occur, focusing primarily on the shared positive expectation or intent and only secondarily on different behaviors.

In the second quadrant, two people may both share the positive expectation of TRUST but one may be loud and the other quiet; they may share RESPECT but one may be open and the other closed; they can both believe in FAIRNESS but one may be direct and the other indirect; they may value EFFICIENCY but one may be formal and the other informal; they can seek EFFECTIVENESS but one may be close and the other distant; or they may want SAFETY but one may be task oriented and the other relationship oriented. Each example of common ground becomes a “plank” in building a “platform” and only when the platform is strong enough for both conflicting parties to stand on it and be assured that there is at least a potential for developing friendship with this former enemy can the discussion shift to which behaviors are most likely to achieve the shared common-ground outcomes valued by both parties. Only when each behavior is assessed and understood in its own cultural context does that behavior become meaningful. Only when positive shared expectations or intentions can be identified will two individuals or groups be able to find common ground without sacrificing cultural integrity.

Why have sports groups so frequently been culturally inclusive? Because players from different cultures all share the positive expectation of winning. Why did business communities in the Ottoman Empire of the Middle East include Christians, Muslims, and Jews working in harmony? They all shared the positive expectation of making money. Why do battle groups successfully integrate soldiers from different cultural backgrounds? They share the positive expectation of staying alive. During the bloody race riots of 1968 in Malaysia I was driving an ambulance because Caucasians were the only group not being attacked. In one trip carrying supplies to the government headquarters I saw the heads of the Malay, Indian, and Chinese political parties playing cards to pass the time. They shared a positive expectation for the future.

In the third quadrant, the two persons have the same behaviors but now they have different or negative expectations or intent. The similar behaviors give the “appearance” of harmony and agreement through displaying the congruent or desired behaviors, but the hidden different or negative expectations or intent will ultimately destroy the relationship. Although both persons are now in disagreement, this may not be obvious or apparent to others. One person may continue to expect trust and friendliness while the other person is now negatively distrustful and unfriendly, even though they are both presenting the same smiling and glad-handing behaviors. If these two people can be guided to remember an earlier time when they shared positive expectations they might be able
to return to the second quadrant and reverse the escalating conflict between them. If the difference in expectations is ignored or undiscovered, the conflict will ultimately move to the fourth quadrant.

The fourth quadrant is where two people have different and/or negative expectations or intent and they stop pretending to be congruent. The two persons are at war with one another and may not want to increase the harmony in their relationship any longer. They may just want to hurt one another. Both persons are in disagreement and that disagreement is now obvious and apparent. This relationship is likely to result in hostile disengagement. It is very difficult to retrieve conflict from the fourth quadrant because one or both parties have stopped trying to find shared positive expectations. Unfortunately, most conflicts between people and groups remain undiscovered until reaching the fourth quadrant. An appropriate prevention strategy would be to identify the conflict in behaviors—as indicated in quadrant two—early in the process when those differences in behaviors might actually be a positive resource (as long as there is a context of shared positive expectations) allowing both parties to build on the common ground they share without forcing either party to lose integrity.

Each cultural context is complicated and dynamic, influenced by many cultural teachers from the individual’s cultural context, who take turns being salient according to the time and place. An awareness of one’s cultural identity requires being able to recognize how each action is the expression of specific expectations, how each expectation developed from specific values, and how each value was learned from one or more cultural teachers in the cultural context.

Some Case Examples Applying the Cultural Grid

Think of your “best friend” and ask yourself if your best friend is similar to you in her/his behaviors, dress, talking, working, and other ways. Typically, you may find great differences in behaviors between you and your best friend. If a total stranger said or did to you what your best friend does would it be acceptable? Typically, it would not be acceptable. However, because you share the common ground, positive expectation of “best friend,” differences of behavior become less troublesome and can even enhance the relationship.

A man sits next to you on an airplane seeming very anxious, constantly walking around the plane and looking at the other passengers. You become concerned and ask if he has a problem. He responds saying “birds!” and continues his strange behavior. You ask him twice more during the flight if you can help and he responded in a similar unrelated manner. As the flight lands the man turns to you and explains that he is a federal marshal who had information there may be a problem on this flight so he needed to survey the passengers. He had been trained to discourage distracting conversation with other passengers by responding in a single and totally unrelated word. While the man’s
behavior might have been very different from yours, you shared the common ground of “safety.”

A couple comes to you who plan to divorce one another. As long as you talk about changing the husband’s or wife’s behavior, the conflict continues to escalate. However, when you ask them to discuss how they first met and fell in love they are able to “build a platform” of positive memories that provide the common ground on which to “stand” and rationally discuss whether or not they should proceed with their divorce.

Yoo (1996) presents one of the twenty-three case examples using the Cultural Grid to resolve conflict in Jandt and Pedersen (1996). “Hyundai Resources Development Company had a contract for logging operations in the old-growth boreal forests of the Russian Far East. International environmentalists planned to stop Hyundai’s logging operations. A Korean nongovernmental organization, the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), was pressured by international environmentalists to intervene” (p.145). The turning point in negotiations with the Hyundai chairman, who was a presidential candidate in the Korean government, occurred when he was reminded that these forests were the last refuge for the Korean tiger, which is the chairman’s political party mascot. The common ground for both sides became the protection of the Korean tiger, but for entirely different reasons.

**CONCLUSION**

By reframing conflict between people into cultural categories, it becomes possible for two persons to disagree without either of them being “wrong” based on their different culturally learned assumptions. This chapter has described the advantages of reframing conflict into cultural categories for multicultural conflict resolution. Multicultural conflict resolution may become the first priority of leaders in the twenty-first century, especially when conflict is between culturally different people. Leaders need to find common ground without losing their integrity and without forcing other parties to lose their integrity as well. It will become important for leaders to understand conflict in the cultural context in which those behaviors are learned and displayed.

Harrison and Huntington (2000) emphasize the role of culture in resolving conflict. “The role of cultural values and attitudes as obstacles to or facilitators of progress has been largely ignored by governments and aid agencies. Integrating value and attitude change into development policies, planning and programming is, I believe, a promising way to assure that, in the next fifty years, the world does not relive the poverty and injustice that most poor countries, and underachieving ethnic groups, have been mired in during the past half century” (p. xxxiv).
References


China is a powerful test of the universalistic aspirations of Deutsch’s (1949, 1973) theory of cooperation and competition and, in particular, its utility for understanding the conditions and dynamics through which conflict becomes constructive. As part of a collectivist culture, Chinese people are expected to be particularly wary of conflict and its open discussion (Leung, 1997). Many social scientists consider the application of Western-developed theories to Asia unwarranted, even “imperialistic.” Since 1994, we have conducted cooperation and competition research in China and East Asia by using experimental, survey, and interview methods to understand interdependence and conflict and their manifestations in areas such as organizational teamwork, quality of service, and leadership.

Deutsch’s (1949) original theory aims to explain the development of relationships and values; actors were thought to have motives and goals, without assuming particular values and preconditions. China provides an opportunity to understand how values and other preconditions impact the cooperative and competitive management of conflict. Chinese people are, for example, expected to be particularly oriented toward the projection and protection of social face.

The research findings and evidence about mediation mentioned in this chapter are presented in greater detail in Tjosvold and Su (2006).
and to rely on high-context, nonverbal communication. Studies have focused on how Chinese values impact cooperative conflict.

Westerners, believing they are open and responsive, conclude that Chinese people avoid conflict and are closed to dealing with differences. They see themselves as democratic and Chinese as autocratic. Our studies explore and explode these generalizations about China.

The chapter first outlines the North American research base for our research and summarizes arguments against generalizing Deutsch’s theory to China and East Asia. It then describes our experimental, interview, and survey research approaches. Our studies show that Chinese people have been found to use open discussions productively, especially within a cooperative context, and to value relationship-oriented, democratic leadership. Research in China is just beginning to challenge and extend the theory. The last sections outline research and practical major implications, including how to manage conflict in Sino-American joint ventures.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY

Deutsch’s theory of cooperation and competition proposes that goal interdependence very much affects expectations, interactions, and effectiveness. (See Chapters One and Three in this volume for more detailed discussion.) Deutsch argued that cooperative compared to competitive goals contribute to productive conflict management. Our experimental research on constructive controversy documents that discussion of opposing positions can contribute to cooperative problem solving and specifies the dynamics by which controversial discussions become constructive (Tjosvold, 1985, 1998). It also helps detail the nature of the promotive interaction that cooperative goals induce. But social scientists have challenged the validity and usefulness of applying these ideas developed in North America to China.

North American Research

Controversy occurs when persons discuss their opposing views about how a problem should be solved. (See Chapter Three for a detailed research review.) Research has documented that controversy promotes curiosity, exploration, understanding, and integration. When confronted with an opposing view, people have been found to feel uncertain about the most adequate solution, are curious, and seek to understand opposing views. The expression of various views and the defending and articulation of their rationales and the internal uncertainty and search for new, more complete information and understanding all develop new, useful solutions to the problem that the protagonists accept and implement. Controversy has been found to be highly constructive when protagonists have cooperative goals because
they are willing to integrate opposing views and reach a high-quality agreement. Field research has shown that the dynamics of cooperative controversy can be highly useful for solving a wide array of complex problems for organizations (Tjosvold, 1998; Tjosvold and Tjosvold, 1995).

**Should the Theory Be Applied in China?**

Many social scientists are skeptical that Western theories can be applied in such collectivist cultures as China, arguing that an imposed theoretical framework captures the cultural experience only of the West. Specific objections have also been raised to the application of the Deutsch theory. The theory assumes that individuals are self-interested. Their actions and feelings are hypothesized to depend upon whether they believe their self-interests are cooperatively or competitively related. As collectivist rather than individualist, Chinese are thought to pursue the interests of their groups rather than their own. Is the Deutsch assumption that self-interest motivates group behavior justified in China?

A related objection is that as collectivist, Chinese people are highly oriented toward cooperation where competition and independence are not preferred. Are the Chinese able to interact in competitive and independent ways, or are these experiences infrequent and countercultural?

Deutsch argued that conflict is an inevitable aspect of social interdependence and that, even with highly cooperative goals, group members conflict. However, the Chinese culture highly values harmony, making conflict anathema.

A related, though somewhat inconsistent objection is that conflict, when surfaced, is inevitably competitive, although Deutsch argued that conflict has a cooperative face. The Chinese word for conflict connotes warfare, suggesting that conflict is invariably win-lose. Is a cooperative conflict approach viable in China?

Chinese people are thought to avoid conflict because they are particularly sensitive to social face and highly averse to interpersonal hostility and assertive ways of handling frustrations and problems. These values make it difficult to initiate conflict; just disagreeing easily and nonverbally communicates an aggressive affront to face. With social face values, can conflict be dealt with directly and open-mindedly?

Chinese society is considered a traditional, hierarchical one where employees readily defer to their superiors. But open conflict is more consistent with participative management. Is constructive controversy consistent with autocratic values in China?

More generally, the open-minded teamwork proposed by Deutsch’s theory supports organizations pressured to maximize value for customers. Deming and other popular theorists have argued that teamwork and conflict are necessary because of market demands to serve customers with quality products and services. China remains largely a centrally controlled economy dominated by state
owned enterprises (SOEs) that appease ministers, not serve customers. Are Chinese organizations using cooperative conflict to serve customers?

Deutsch’s theory, like any other, cannot be assumed to apply in another culture, but applying it in China may be particularly questionable. Before examining our findings, the next section reviews our experimental and field methods.

Research Methods in China

North American research methods to test the theory, like the theory itself, cannot be assumed to apply in China. East Asian researchers have modified our North American methods. Trained both in the East and West and based in East Asia, researchers have debated the theory and developed the methods. The network itself has demonstrated the value of cooperative teamwork and constructive controversy! We are most grateful for our colleagues’ openness and contributions to the research.

In an initial step, network members as well as managers in the region argued that cooperation and competition were both important phenomena in Chinese organizations. Concretely, they translated the major concepts and research questions into Cantonese (the local Hong Kong dialect), Mandarin (the national language of China), Japanese, and Korean. This process also simplified and improved the English operations. Interviews, questionnaires, and experimental methods have all been used to test the theory.

Interviews

The interview studies have employed the critical incident methodology. Rather than provide general ratings, respondents describe concrete experiences. Interviewers can establish a relationship with the respondents, provide an informal and personal climate, clarify and answer questions, and encourage the respondent. Chinese people, with their relationship-oriented culture, were thought likely to respond positively to this climate.

The interview has a highly defined structure. For example, in a study on developing commitment to Japanese organizations in Hong Kong, Japanese and Chinese managers were asked to identify a specific interaction that affected their commitment and to describe the setting, what occurred, and the consequences (Tjosvold, Sasaki, and Moy, 1998). Then they answered specific questions about goal interdependence, constructive controversy, and consequences that allow statistical tests of the framework and hypotheses.

The interviews provided rich descriptive information about effective and ineffective interaction between Japanese and Chinese that affected commitment. Data were coded and sorted to identify the reasons for cooperative, competitive, and independent goals, the interaction behaviors that occurred in them, and the consequences of the interactions. These interview methods have been used to study cooperation and competition and constructive controversy in a variety of organizational contexts.
Questionnaires

Questionnaire surveys allow for the sampling of many people and the use of independent sources for outcome measures. For example, 191 pairs of supervisors and employees were recruited from ten SOEs in Nanjing and Shanghai to participate in a leadership study on goal interdependence, justice, and citizenship behavior (Tjosvold, Hui, Ding, and Hu, 2003).

Employees completed questionnaires on measures on cooperation, competition, independence, and constructive controversy with their supervisor and their level of procedural, distributive, and interactional justice. Their supervisors completed questionnaires on the extent that the employee engaged in-role performance (productivity) and extra-role performance (organizational citizenship). The overall model supported by a structural equation analysis of the data was that a strong sense of justice promoted cooperative goals, which led to open-minded, constructive controversy, which in turn resulted in high levels of job performance and citizenship behavior.

Experiments

Experiments directly test hypothesized causal relationships with high internal validity. We theorized, for example, that open discussion of conflict need not affront social face in China and could contribute to effective problem solving when face was confirmed (Tjosvold, Hui, and Sun, 2004). Eighty participants from a university in Guangzhou were randomly assigned to four conditions: open discussion–affront to face, open discussion–confirmation of face, avoiding discussion–affront, and avoiding discussion–confirmation.

To begin, the participants read that as supervisors they were to meet with employees about job rotation. The supervisor, as a representative of management, opposed this job rotation as inefficient. The “open” participants read where their organization valued frank discussion of differences and could earn up to five chances in a lottery if they discussed their differences openly and directly. The “avoiding” participants would earn chances to the extent that they minimized their disagreement.

After eight minutes of discussion, the participant and a confederate completed a questionnaire that included the social face induction, which the experimenter unexpectedly exchanged. The “affront” participants read the confederate’s ratings indicating that they were seen as ineffective and the “confirm” participants that they were seen as effective. After another ten minutes, participants made the decision, were fully debriefed, given a small gift, and one chance in the lottery.

Curiosity was measured by the number of questions the participants asked and learning by their listing the opposing arguments. Participants also indicated on seven-point scales their interest in learning and strength of their relationship. Their decisions were coded as to the extent that they integrated the opposing
view into their decision. Results indicate that the Chinese participants were curious, informed, and integrative when they had an open discussion, especially when their face was confirmed.

Interview, surveys, and experiments have their strengths and limitations. Our results are not method specific and deserve confidence because they have been developed through diverse methods.

Results of East Asian Tests of the Theory

Chinese people have been found to distinguish cooperation and competition and respond much as do North Americans. Experiments indicate that conflicting opinions when discussed in a cooperative context promote open-mindedness and integrated views. Studies are showing how Chinese values can contribute to positive conflict. Field studies document that cooperative conflict dynamics contribute to effective teamwork, leadership, and quality customer service in today’s Chinese organizations.

Documenting Causal Relationships Between Cooperation, Open-Minded Discussion, and Effectiveness

In an experiment, Chinese people who had cooperative compared to competitive goals were more open toward the opposing position and negotiator (Tjosvold and Sun, 2001b). Participants in cooperation were committed to mutual benefit, were interested in learning more about the opposing views, considered these views useful, had come to agree with them, and tended to integrate them into their own decisions. They were more attracted to the other protagonist and had greater confidence in working together in the future than participants in the competitive condition.

More surprisingly, the Chinese participants were able to use and responded favorably to open discussion itself. Direct disagreement, compared to smoothing over the opposing views, strengthened relationships, and induced curiosity where Chinese people asked questions, explored opposing views, demonstrated knowledge, and worked to integrate views (Tjosvold and Sun, 2003). Indicating that they found open discussion valuable, participants characterized protagonists who disagreed directly and openly as strong persons and competent negotiators whereas avoiding protagonists were considered weak and ineffectual.

Chinese participants were found to choose disagreement when they felt confident in their own abilities (Tjosvold, Nibler, and Wan, 2001). Protagonists used direct controversy to build a cooperative relationship and open-mindedly explored and understood the opposing view whereas avoiders were competitive and unaware (Tjosvold and Sun, forthcoming). In another experiment, participants in China found that open compared to avoiding discussion and problem solving compared to blaming stimulated the exploration, integration, and adoption of alternative ideas as well as strengthening interpersonal relationships.
Evidence also suggests that openness and problem solving have these effects by developing perceived cooperative interdependence that encourages people to believe that incorporating alternative ideas can help them succeed. Avoidance and blaming, on the other hand, result in a competitive struggle to see who can impose their ideas on the other, leaving people committed to their original thinking.

Cooperation, Open-Minded Discussion, and Effectiveness in Chinese Organizations

Field studies provide evidence that the experimental findings apply to various kinds of task and organizational settings in China. Cooperative goals have been found to promote the open-minded discussion of diverse views. Studies also indicate that managing conflict for mutual benefit (cooperative conflict) promotes effective teamwork and leadership.

In a study of thirty-nine groups and their supervisors in Hangzhou, China, work teams in China that used open-minded, constructive discussion of their differences promoted product quality and cost reduction; these discussions were more likely with cooperative than competitive goals (Tjosvold and Wang, 1998). Cooperative, open-minded discussions of service problems helped restaurant employees work together to serve their customers (Tjosvold, Moy, and Sasaki, 1996). Conflicts over scarce resources have been thought particularly divisive. However, an open-minded discussion helped Hong Kong accountants and managers dig into and resolve budget issues, strengthen their relationships, and improve budget quality so that limited financial resources were used wisely (Poon, Pike, and Tjosvold, 2001). These discussions were much more likely with cooperative than competitive goals.

Constructive controversy can be useful for Chinese people to deal with both task and emotional issues. Over one hundred teams working in Chinese organizations who discussed issues open-mindedly were able to deal with biases and took risks effectively (Tjosvold and Yu, forthcoming). These risk-taking groups were able both to innovate and to recover from their mistakes. Constructive controversy also helped managers and employees in Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland express and handle their anger successfully (Tjosvold, 2002; Tjosvold and Su, forthcoming).

Earlier studies found that cooperative goals and constructive controversy were useful for Singaporean Chinese managers and employees to resolve issues and work productively together (Tjosvold and Chia, 1989; Tjosvold and Tsao, 1989). Findings also demonstrated that student groups that have cooperative goals have more open-minded and more productive discussion of diverse ideas than those with competitive and independent goals (Chen and Tjosvold, 2002; Tjosvold, Wong, Nibler, and Pounder, 2002).

Studies have shown that cooperative approaches to managing conflict are typically more productive for getting things done as well as developing
relationships compared to competitive, trying to win and avoiding approaches to conflict. Cooperative conflict was found to help 100 work teams in Shanghai, China, reflect upon their work effectively so that they could adjust and strengthen their procedures (Tjosvold, Hui, and Yu, forthcoming). Teams that rated themselves as high on cooperative conflict and reflexivity were also rated by their managers as productive and as good organizational citizens. Cooperative conflict was found to develop a sense of fairness in teams that helped them be productive (Chen and Tjosvold, 2002). Work teams in China that managed their conflicts cooperatively strengthened their confidence in the their relationships and this confidence in turn predicated to team effectiveness (Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu, 2005).

Cooperative conflict management may be an important contributor to effective top management teams in China. Executives from 105 high-technology firms around Beijing who indicated that they relied on cooperative rather than competitive or avoiding conflict were rated by their CEOs as effective and their organizations as innovative (Chen, Liu, and Tjosvold, 2005).

Studies have also shown that cooperative conflict management contributes to effective collaboration across organizations. Supply chain partners in China that relied on a cooperative approach to conflict, rather than competitive or avoiding approaches, felt that they had developed a strong sense of justice in their relationships and this in turn resulted in strategic advantage and innovation (Tjosvold, Wong, and Chen, 2005). Hong Kong, Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese building contractors used cooperative conflict, but not competitive or avoiding conflict, to work successfully with their subcontractors (Tjosvold, and others, 2001). Manufacturing managers in Hong Kong who handled conflict cooperatively used their frustrations with suppliers in mainland China to improve product quality (Wong, Tjosvold, Wong, and Liu, 1999).

**CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES**

A few studies have directly suggested that the theory is useful in cross-cultural settings. Hong Kong senior accounting managers were found to be able to lead employees working in the mainland of China when they had cooperative goals, but not when their goals were competitive or independent (Tjosvold and Moy, 1998). They were then able to discuss their views open-mindedly; that led to stronger relationships and productivity, consequences that in turn resulted in future internal motivation.

Chinese employees described specific examples of when they worked with their American or Japanese manager (Chen, Tjosvold, and Su, forthcoming). Results indicated that cooperative goals contributed to an open-minded discussion
of views that led to productive collaborative work and strengthened relationships. Managers in the Hong Kong parent company and new product specialists in Canada who developed cooperative links and engaged in constructive controversy were able to develop strong, trusting relationships despite their cultural differences and geographic separation (Tjosvold, 1999). Cooperative, constructive controversy interactions were also found critical for Chinese staff to work productively and developed relationships with Japanese managers, outcomes that in turn built commitment to their Japanese companies (Tjosvold, Sasaki, and Moy, 1998). Cooperative conflict was found to help Chinese employees develop effective relationships with their Western managers (Chen, Su, and Tjosvold, forthcoming).

More than two hundred Chinese employees from various industries in Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, and Shandong indicated that cooperative, but not competitive or independent, goals helped them and their foreign managers develop a quality leader-member exchange relationship and improve leader effectiveness, employee commitment, and future collaboration (Chen and Tjosvold, forthcoming). Cooperative interdependence and open-minded discussion of opposing views appear to be an important aid for overcoming obstacles and developing an effective leader relationship within and across cultural boundaries (Tjosvold and Moy, 1998).

Field and experimental studies in North America and Asia provide strong internal and external validity to central hypotheses of cooperative and competitive conflict. Whether protagonists emphasize cooperative or competitive goals drastically affects the dynamics and outcomes of their conflict management. Surprisingly, Chinese participants appear to appreciate others who speak their minds directly and cooperatively.

**Chinese Values for Conflict Management in China**

Chinese values may not be so inimical to open approaches to conflict management as traditionally portrayed. Valuing relationships is not an impediment to conflict management, and indeed, as the studies just reviewed indicate, cooperative relationships are a foundation for open, constructive conflict. Leung (Leung, Koch, and Lu, 2002) has recently proposed that harmony has two distinct motives in Chinese society. Disintegration avoidance is instrumental in nature in that the maintenance of harmony is a means to other ends. With this motive, people avoid conflict as a way to further their self-interest and avoid potential interpersonal problems. Harmony can also refer to the desire to engage in behaviors that strengthen relationships, a motive called harmony enhancement. This motivation represents a genuine concern for harmony as a value in and of itself and involves feelings of intimacy, closeness, trust, and compatible and mutually beneficial behaviors. Valuing collectivist relationships then can lead to open conflict management, not conflict avoidance.
Consistent with Leung’s argument, a study of 194 teams in three regions of China suggests the positive role of collectivist values on conflict (Tjosvold, Law, and Sun, 2003). Teams that had developed collectivist rather than individualistic values were found to have cooperative goals. The analysis also indicated that these cooperative goals helped the teams discuss their opposing views openly and constructively; that in turn resulted in strong relationships and productivity as rated by their managers.

A recent experiment supported the causal relationships that collectivist values heighten cooperative goals and open-minded controversy. Chinese protagonists with opposing views in organizations that valued collectivism, compared to individualism, were found to feel cooperatively interdependent (Tjosvold and Wu, 2005). They were also confident that they could work together and make decisions, sought to understand the opposing position by asking questions, demonstrated that they understood the opposing arguments, accepted these arguments as reasonable, and combined positions to create an integrated decision.

Experimental studies also indicate that social face concerns, when expressed by confirming the face of protagonists, can promote cooperative conflict (Tjosvold, Hui, and Su, 2000; Tjosvold and Sun, 2001). Emphasizing their cooperative goals, protagonists demonstrated more curiosity in that they explored the opposing views and were interested in hearing more of the other’s arguments. Protagonists whose face was confirmed, compared to those affronted, were prepared to pressure the other and, when they also disagreed, they experienced more collaborative influence. They also indicated that they learned in the discussion, considered the opposing views useful, and worked to integrate and accept them. A field study also indicated that confirmation of social face helped Chinese people discuss their frustrations cooperatively and productively (Tjosvold, Law, and Sun, 2003).

Chinese people have been theorized to avoid conflict because they assume that conflict requires coercion and they prefer persuasion. However, conflict can give rise to either persuasion or coercion. Persuasive influence was found to result in feelings of respect, cooperative relationships, and openness to the other person and position (Tjosvold and Sun, 2001a). Persuasion compared to coercion helped discussants seek mutual benefit, open-mindedly listen to each other, integrate their reasoning, and strengthen their relationship.

Chinese culture has been characterized as a high-context society where implicit communication is influential (Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey, and Chua, 1988). Conflict is thought to be avoided because open conflict communicates interpersonal hostility. However, nonverbal communication can help develop a cooperative context for conflict discussion. Expressing warmth compared to coldness developed a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship with the opposing discussant (Tjosvold and Sun, 2003). Protagonists who
experienced warmth incorporated the opposing view and reasoning into their
decision and thinking, and were confident they could work with the other in
the future.

Chinese values are not only compatible with cooperative goals and con-
structive controversy, they can be a valuable foundation for them. Feeling col-
lective, sensitivity to social face and in particular giving social face, using
persuasive influence attempts, and expressing interpersonal warmth have been
found to help Chinese managers, employees, and partners deal with their
differences openly and productively.

LEADERSHIP IN A HIERARCHICAL SOCIETY

A persistent Western stereotype is that Chinese leadership is autocratic
where followers quickly and automatically follow the wishes and decisions
of leaders. Consistent with this image of power distance, Chinese employ-
ees have been found to accept unilateral decision making and prefer their
leaders be benevolent autocrats (Leung, 1997). However, superior power in
the West is often associated with domination and authoritarianism, but
leaders in China are expected to be supportive and nurturing (Spencer-Oatey,
1997).

Our research challenges Western stereotypes and indicates that leaders in
China must develop an open, mutual relationship with employees (Chen and
Tjosvold, forthcoming; Liu, Tjosvold, and Yu, 2004; Tjosvold, Hui, and Su,
2004; Tjosvold, and Leung, 2004; Tjosvold, Wong, and Hui, 2004). Author-
ity cannot be assumed but leaders must earn it by demonstrating a commit-
ment to employees and an openness to them. Strong cooperative goals were
found to be critical for a high-quality leader relationship, and this relation-
ship in turn led to employees being effective organizational citizens
(Tjosvold, Law, and Hui, 1996). An open-minded discussion of opposing
views between leaders and employees was highly crucial, resulting in pro-
ductive work, strong work relationships, experiencing the leader as democ-
ratic, and believing that both the leader and employee are powerful
(Tjosvold, Hui, and Law, 1998). Hong Kong senior accounting managers were
able to lead employees working in the Mainland when they had cooperative
goals, but not when their goals were competitive or independent (Tjosvold
and Moy, 1998).

Democratic, open-minded leadership is valued in China; Chinese employees
want a relationship with their leaders and, although hesitant to initiate con-
flictual discussions, expect them to consider their needs and views. Coopera-
tive conflict is a concrete way for managers in China to develop the leader
relationship and demonstrate their openness. Despite power distance values, leaders and employees in China can benefit a great deal by managing their conflicts cooperatively. Cooperative conflict is an ideal that both managers and employees in China and in the West can aspire to.

**THE VALUE OF APPLYING THE THEORY IN CHINA**

The theory of cooperation and competition has performed well in China with the amount of variance explained comparing favorably with studies in North America. However, our results do not indicate that the theory of cooperation and competition is highly useful for a full capturing of how Chinese people experience and manage conflict. Our research though does demonstrate major alternatives that Chinese people have in managing their conflicts and explodes stereotypes and assumptions that interfere with our understanding.

Chinese people clearly distinguish and understand cooperation and competition. They recognize that they can promote their own goals as well as those of team members. It is not necessary to project that Chinese are collectivist who emphasize their group interests without concern for their own. They can pursue joint outcomes when they believe their goals are cooperative.

Our research in China questions the unidimensionality of collectivism-individualism. Individuals can be highly committed to the collective with strong cooperative goals, but this does not assume a lack of individuality. Indeed, a cooperative, collective commitment has been found to promote the open expression of individual opinions and needs. A strong cooperative team fosters outspoken, assertive, and confident individuals; an effective cooperative team depends upon members’ willingness to express their individuality (Tjosvold, 1991, 1997; Tjosvold, Chen, and Liu, 2003). Individuals can be both self-assertive and team-oriented; cooperative goals encourage both.

Although a theory developed in the West has guided our research, the resulting studies have exposed Western stereotypes of China. In contrast to the ideas that Chinese consider conflict anathema and that they inevitably deal with open conflict competitively, Chinese people were found to welcome and value open discussion of opposing views and used conflict to explore opposing views and integrate them.

Chinese values on social face, persuasion, and nonverbal communication need not imply conflict avoidance. These values, when constructively expressed, contribute to open-minded, cooperative conflict management. Organizational values in China support developing effective, two-way relationships among
leaders and employees. Chinese leaders are more effective and appreciated when they seek the views of employees and develop cooperative relationships with them.

Cooperative conflict was also found to develop the teamwork to deliver high-quality, high-value service to customers, a competitive advantage needed to survive and flourish in China’s growing market economy (Tjosvold, Chen, and Liu, 2003; Tjosvold and Hu, 2005). Ironically, although the theory of cooperation and competition has been developed in the West, it may be particularly applicable to relationship-oriented China.

Expanding the Theory Through Cross-Cultural Research

Studying conflict in different cultural contexts can challenge and refine present understanding of conflict management. Our research in China so far has not much capitalized on this possibility. We are uncertain about the conditions under which competitive or independent goals are productive or the conditions when cooperative approaches to conflict are costly and risky. A recent study suggests that competition can be constructive when competitors already have an effective interpersonal relationship (Tjosvold, Johnson, and Sun, forthcoming). Similarly, another study conducted in China identified cooperative interpersonal relationships as an important ingredient to effective conflict avoidance (Tjosvold and Sun, 2002). Research in China has the potential to widen our understanding of conflict and the theory of cooperation and competition.

Responsiveness to Goal Interdependence

One potential cultural difference is that Chinese people, as highly relationship oriented, may be particularly responsive to goal interdependence differences. They are highly flexible and responsive to the situation, and hence they may be very conscious of the goal relationship they have with others. In-group members are allies worthy of trust; out-group members are suspect. Leung (1988) found that Chinese were more likely to criticize a stranger, and less likely to criticize a friend, than were Americans.

In North America, independent goals have an impact on dynamics and outcomes similar to but not as powerful, as competition. However, in some field studies in China, interactions with independent goals have been more powerful and destructive than competition (Tjosvold, 1998; Tjosvold, Sasaki, and Moy, 1998). It can be speculated that Chinese people are particularly suspicious and closed-minded toward persons with whom they are not involved. At times they find the lack of relationship implied by independent goals more highly disruptive of effective collaborative work than competition.
Antecedents of Cooperative Goals

Chinese society has a unique relation system, guanxi, where personal connections are central to work. Maintaining good relations is a key job motivator and ingredient to success. Particular ties—coming from the same village, attendance at the same school, and prior connections between fathers—all can build guanxi. Research on guanxi may illuminate how cooperative goals evolve. Guanxi bases may be prima facie evidence that the partners are on the same side with cooperative goals, and these beliefs of cooperative interdependence in turn lead to mutual trust and assistance. Guanxi bases, however, do not inevitably result in mutual relationships. Perhaps the development of competitive goals between partners can explain the failure to capitalize on guanxi bases. At present, it is unclear how guanxi may facilitate or hinder the development of cooperative goals. Studies could also explore the extent that Westerners have similar relational ties that help them develop strongly cooperative relationships.

Research in China has begun to suggest conditions conducive to the formation of cooperative goals. Confirmation of face, implicit communication to convey warmth, benevolent and participative leadership as well as in-group relationships and guanxi may convince Chinese people that their goals are cooperative. These conditions may also promote cooperative goals among Westerners.

Approaches to harmony may affect goal interdependence in China (Leung, 1997; Leung, Koch, and Lu, 2002). Harmony enhancement—the desire to engage in behaviors that strengthen relationships—is “solid” and involves feelings of intimacy, closeness, trust, and compatible and mutually beneficial behaviors whereas disintegration avoidance—tendency to avoid actions that will strain a relationship—involves differences in values and interpersonal styles and the avoidance of contact and conflict. Research can explore the hypothesis that harmony enhancement induces cooperative goals and disintegration motives lead to competitive ones.

Practical Implications

Our studies indicate that learning how to resolve conflicts constructively is very valuable for managers and employees to operate effectively in the emerging market economy of China. They need cooperative conflicts so that they can contribute significantly to the teamwork needed for their organizations to improve product and service quality. Organizations also benefit when they can use cooperative conflict to strengthen their supply chain and other partnerships that cross organizational boundaries. But how can individuals, teams, and organizations become committed and skilled in developing cooperative relationships and managing conflict constructively?
Space does not allow for a review of the training research. Research on cooperation and competition supports the findings of training research on the major conditions that promote training effectiveness. They both indicate that employees need to be motivated and knowledgeable of the target ideas and behaviors, actively participate in the training, be trained as a cohort, and engage in ongoing development and feedback for effective training. In addition, cooperative goals themselves have been found to facilitate learning and application for a wide range of training objectives, including teamwork (Johnson, Druckman, and Dansereau, 1994).

Cooperative goals should be strengthened over time and supported by ongoing feedback. Unresolved disputes, promotion opportunities, ineffective interaction, and many other developments may lead team members to emphasize that their goals are negatively or independently related. Competition and independence are both possible and at times highly appealing alternatives.

A major advantage of cooperative team training is that using cooperative groups can themselves be very facilitative of the goals of the training. Findings indicate that people in cooperative groups have higher achievement than those in competitive and independent settings (Johnson, Druckman, and Dansereau, 1994). Team members can become more knowledgeable and skilled in working cooperatively through team training and follow-up activities. The method of cooperative team training reinforces the message. Relatedly, cooperative experiences can improve feedback processes that stimulate learning. Chinese people have been found to be more accepting, open, and respectful of feedback when they are working cooperatively rather than competitively (Tjosvold, Tang, and West, 2004).

A combined consideration of training and cooperation and competition research suggests the following features for cooperative teamwork training. Members from interdependent teams:

1. Form cooperative learning teams to understand the theory and review the research to appreciate the value for them and their organization of strengthening cooperative goals. They also learn major ways to reinforce cooperative goals and reduce competitive and independent ones.

2. Use constructive controversy to debate and decide whether they want to invest in developing cooperative teamwork.

3. Participate in postworkshop follow-up activities to assess and receive feedback on their teamwork within and between groups and develop concrete ways to strengthen them.

4. Commit themselves to ongoing development of their cooperative teamwork.
Cooperative team workshop and two-month follow-up of team feedback and development used the preceding four steps to train teams in a high-technology company based in Beijing (Lu, Tjosvold, and Shi, 2005). Over 150 employees from all the teams in the company participated in the workshop and the follow-up activities. The design allowed the measuring of the effects of the workshop and follow-up activities on the relationships and interaction among the teams as well as within teams. Overall, the results support that the theory of cooperation and competition not only can identify conditions and dynamics by which teams can effectively contribute to their organization but also provide a basis upon which teams can strengthen their internal functioning, their collaboration among teams, and their contributions to their organization. In particular, the study indicates that cooperative teamwork training can heighten beliefs that goals are positively related, foster constructive controversy and creative processes across teams as well as within them, and result in group productivity and potency.

CONFLICT FOR POSITIVE DIVERSITY

Different cultures express themselves to a large extent in how they manage conflict. Conflict is a window to understanding national cultures (Leung and Tjosvold, 1998). Although research supports the theory of cooperation and competition in China, results do not imply that goal interdependence is operationalized in a highly similar way in the East as in the West (Tjosvold and Hu, 2005).

While the “geneotypes,” the underlying conceptual structure of the theory, appear to be similar, the “phenotypes,” how the theory is manifested in particular situations, often are not. In particular, the actions that develop cooperative goals or communicate an attempt to discuss conflicts open-mindedly may be quite different in China than in North America, as may the general levels of goal interdependence and cooperative conflict.

Even if they have common goals and objectives, people from different cultures may have different views of right and wrong, the best ways to accomplish goals, the value of a long-term versus a short-term perspective, appropriate etiquette, and the value of the contributions people make to a joint venture. Although some studies suggest the utility of a cooperative conflict approach between East and West (Chen and Tjosvold, forthcoming; Tjosvold, 1996; Tjosvold, Lee and Wong, 1992), more research is needed to document its potential for managing cross-cultural conflicts.

In today’s diverse and global marketplace, theories, especially about conflict, that can only be applied in one culture are increasingly irrelevant. If continued to be successfully demonstrated in Europe as well as East Asia
(Tjosvold and De Dreu, 1997), the framework of cooperative, constructive controversy has the potential of acting as a common guide for how people from different cultures can develop their own ways of managing conflict. Diverse people together decide that they want to use a cooperative approach to conflict as the major way of handling their disputes and then put in place the incentives and procedures that support cooperative goals and constructive controversy.

Developing a theory of cooperation and competition so that it can be applied in various cultural texts contributes to the building of organizations that promote and value diversity. With a common framework, people from several cultures can agree upon how they are going to disagree. They develop ways of managing conflict that are appropriate and effective for them. Then they are able to express their diversity and use their conflicts to solve problems. Cooperative open-mindedness strengthens their relationships and their appreciation of their diversity.

Without a common framework, organizations are apt to impose the procedures of one culture on another, for example, insisting that everyone conform to the head office’s ways. Or they may use trial and error in the hope that they develop new procedures. However, these approaches are apt to result in organizations characterized by destructive conflict and conflict avoidance.

**CONCLUSION**

Harmony has traditionally been highly valued in China, but considering conflict as negative and avoiding conflict appear generally ineffective for promoting successful organizations in China. Chinese people want harmony but appear to recognize that managing conflict is needed to develop authentic harmony where frustrations are resolved and relationships maintained (Leung, Koch, and Lu, 2002).

Our studies in China suggest that conflict management is critical for modern development. Chinese employees who use their conflicts cooperatively have been found to improve the quality of products and services and reduce costs. They have used cooperative conflict to strengthen their relationships within their groups and organizations but also with alliance partners. Participative management and democracy more generally require that leaders be responsive and open; cooperative conflict contributes to open-minded, productive relationships between leaders and employees.

Yet our research is a beginning. More work is needed on how Chinese values and settings affect the underlying dynamics of cooperation and competitive interdependence. We have not proceeded far in using studies in China to modify the theory. We also need more experience in critical ways that the theory is
operationalized, important antecedents to cooperative goals, the frequency of cooperative and competitive conflict, and how they can be used to characterize Chinese conflict management. However, our research does suggest possibilities and document that cooperative conflict is a viable, potentially highly constructive approach in China.

References


PART SEVEN

MODELS OF PRACTICE
This chapter describes the Coleman Raider model, used to teach negotiation and mediation skills to adult learners. By making explicit our teaching philosophy, course objectives, and methods, we hope to stimulate discussion and research about how conflict resolution is taught. Although there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of conflict and the processes of negotiation and mediation as applied in diplomacy, business, and labor relations, there is very little systematic research on the pedagogy of conflict resolution or on the models and methods used to teach these skills to adult or student learners (Raider, 1995; also see Chapter Thirty-Six). We first share six pedagogical insights derived from our practice that have come to underpin our training design. Then we discuss the objectives of the course as a whole and the learning activities in each of our seven training modules. We follow with some recommendations for social science researchers and theorists. We conclude with a postscript to the original edition in which each of us talks about how we have expanded our practice with the tools and concepts outlined below as a foundation.

INSIGHTS FROM PRACTICE

The first pedagogical insight is that each learner has a unique and implicit “theory of practice” for resolving conflicts. Each individual’s theory of practice has been developed over a lifetime, influenced by many factors, such as various
individual differences, skills, and competencies (see Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen), as well as salient cultural and identity groups’ norms and values (see Chapter Twenty-Eight), and situational roles and hierarchies.

Second, learners need both support and challenge to examine their own theory of practice. Intellectual and experiential comparison of competitive and collaborative processes can create challenging internal conflict for most learners. From our experience, learners experience two types of internal conflicts. The first is felt by those who embrace collaboration as an ideal and yet experience dissonance as they discover through course exercises how much of their own behavior is viewed by others and themselves as competitive, accommodating, or compromising. (See discussion of the dual-concern model in Chapter Fifteen.) The second is felt by those who resist or reject collaboration and then experience dissonance between their own theory of practice and the alternative paradigm presented in the workshop. Although the first group is typically larger, because most participants in our training are volunteers, the trainers must create a learning community where all feel safe enough to try on new skills and attitudes.

The third insight is that experiential exercises shift the responsibility for learning from the trainer to the participant. For many adult learners, role-playing and subsequent public debriefing are powerful learning tools as well as unfreezing devices for behavioral and attitudinal change. The excitement, fun, and support of mutual self-discovery counteract the potential embarrassment of being less than perfect in front of the other students.

Fourth, self-reflection based on video or audio feedback gives many learners motivation to modify problematic behavior. Videotaping or audiotaping the role-play exercise, for later review, enables each learner to observe and reflect on his or her own behavior in terms of general knowledge about the collaborative conflict resolution process presented by the trainers.

Fifth, user-friendly models and a common vocabulary enable a group of learners to talk about their shared in-program experience. Conceptual frames, like the ones taught in modules two through seven (discussed in the next section), are broad enough to illuminate the underlying structure of a collaborative process across many contexts and cultures because they leave room for variation. The trainer needs to be contextually sensitive to explain and illustrate the heuristic frames in ways that are culturally and situationally relevant.

The final insight is that learners need follow-up and support after workshop training to internalize new concepts and skills. As in other areas of skills training, most participants need additional coaching in a supportive environment for behavioral change to occur (Raider, 1995). A three- to six-day workshop in conflict resolution can make the learner aware of what she does not know, thereby beginning the learning process; but more work is needed if a collaborative process is to become the preferred response to mixed-motive conflicts. This humbling but valid observation needs serious consideration by the conflict resolution field—by trainers as well as organizations that sponsor trainings.
OVERVIEW OF THE COLEMAN RAIDER WORKSHOP DESIGN

Developed by Ellen Raider and Susan Coleman, Conflict Resolution: Strategies for Collaborative Problem Solving is a highly interactive workshop typically conducted in a three-day or six-day format. (It is based on Raider’s 1987 training manual, A Guide to International Negotiation.) The three-day format is for groups requesting training in collaborative negotiation. The longer format includes an extensive three-day module on mediation. All participants receive a training manual, which is divided into sections corresponding to the seven course modules.

Module one presents an overview of conflict resolution, with emphasis on distinguishing between competitive and collaborative resolution strategies.

Module two introduces a structural model, the Elements of Negotiation. In this module, we focus on the difference between positions and needs or interests, as well as the skill of reframing and the use of a prenegotiation planning tool.

Module three describes five communications behaviors or tactics that are typically used during negotiations, and it emphasizes the difference between the intent and the impact of any communication.

Combining the learning from the previous modules, module four gives the learner a sense of the flow of a collaborative negotiation by introducing a stage model.

Module five describes how cultural differences affect the conflict resolution process.

Module six helps participants understand and deal with emotions, which typically arise during interpersonal and intercultural conflict.

In its short form, module seven introduces mediation as an alternative if negotiation breaks down. The longer form teaches participants the general skill and practice of mediation.

Although the information contained in these seven modules is the foundation for every workshop, the material presented is customized to meet the needs of each client. This is accomplished through selecting or creating case simulations, including previously recorded video examples of negotiations or mediations from our library, and prior assessments of the trainee group.

This pre-course assessment and customization is an important part of our work. During the assessment, the training team builds rapport with the client and discovers many of the conflicting issues currently in the client’s system. This information enables the team to anticipate, recognize, and then incorporate relevant “teachable moments” during the training, that is, to link the training material to real concerns of the learner as they emerge. In this way, we have been able to teach this course to such diverse groups as schoolteachers in New York, Dallas, and Skopje; corporate executives in Buenos Aires, Paris, and Tokyo; grassroots community groups dealing with tenant organizing and environmental justice;
diplomats from the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the European Union; and United Nations staff throughout the world. The course has been taught over the past twelve years to over ten thousand people. The materials have been translated into French, Spanish, Arabic, and Macedonian, and a book based on our manual has been published in Japanese.

So far, we have trained thirty individuals from diverse backgrounds to teach our workshop. To be certified as a trainer, an individual must acquire important content, presentation, and group dynamics skills and successfully apprentice with us for three or four workshop trainings. Some trainers are certified to teach in certain cultural or organizational settings but not in others; we feel there are important contextual differences between educational, diplomatic, and business settings as well as between people with differing cultural norms and values.

WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES AND PEDAGOGY

Like other educators, we find it useful to identify for ourselves specific knowledge, skills, and attitude objectives for the training.

Knowledge Objectives

A glance at the table of contents of this volume indicates that there are many areas of academic inquiry that affect the study of conflict and its resolution. How much of this body of knowledge can be included in an introductory experiential workshop?

We have decided to emphasize the distinction between competitive and collaborative approaches to conflict resolution (see Chapter One). Thus, we want participants to understand conceptually and experientially why and under what conditions cooperative conflict resolution processes such as collaborative negotiation and mediation are a better choice for individuals and society than are the commonly used strategies of competition and avoidance. Although we make it clear that we value cooperation, we also believe that we must not impose it on others. Our pedagogy encourages participants to “try on” this new paradigm to see if it is useful. Ultimately, each participant must be self-motivated to make meaningful changes in his or her conflict-resolving behavior. We hope to provide information and experiences during our training that foster this exploration.

Through short essays in the training manual and mini lectures, the trainers highlight and summarize in nontechnical language key insights from the field. In graduate courses at Columbia University and other institutions, we have supplemented these essays and mini lectures with additional assigned readings.
Although specific knowledge objectives are associated with each module, there are some “global” knowledge objectives for the course:

- To develop an understanding that conflict is a natural and necessary part of life, and that how one responds to conflict determines if the outcomes are constructive or destructive
- To develop awareness that competition and collaboration are the two main strategies for resolving conflict and for negotiation
- To develop awareness of one’s own tendencies in thinking about and responding to conflict
- To become a better conflict manager—in other words, to know which conflict resolution method is best suited for a particular conflict problem (for example, avoidance, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, litigation, or force)
- To become aware of how critical it is to the process of constructive conflict resolution to share information about one’s own perspective without attacking the other, and to listen and work to understand the perspective of the other side

Skills Objectives
The most fundamental skills objectives of our training are the following:

- To effectively distinguish positions from needs or interests
- To reframe a conflict so that it can be seen as a mutual problem to be resolved collaboratively
- To distinguish threats, justifications, positions, needs, and feelings and to be able to communicate one’s perspective using these distinctions
- To ask open-ended questions in a manner that elicits the needs, rather than the defenses, of the other and, by so doing, communicate a desire to engage in a process of mutual need satisfaction
- When under attack, to be able to listen to the other and reflect back the other’s needs or interests behind the attack
- To create a collaborative climate through the use of informing, opening, and uniting behaviors

Attitude Objectives
The shifts in attitude and awareness that we intend to support are a little harder to enumerate succinctly. We hope that each participant leaves the program believing that collaborative conflict resolution skills are useful in their own lives.
We hope that they commit to the larger goal of increasing the use of cooperative conflict resolution skills at all levels to create a more caring and just society. We want people to leave with a greater sense of “humility” or “conscious incompetence”—an awareness that there is always room to improve their conflict negotiation skills and that improvement will not only make their lives better, but will enhance the lives of those around them. We want participants to be aware of the pervasiveness of identity-based conflict and to increase their own sense of humility to counter the self-righteousness and dangerous fundamentalism that has grown so exponentially in our time. In short, we want them to leave owning their part.

In a similar vein, we want participants to leave with an appreciation of difference as a source of richness rather than a liability. We want them to be intrigued by the multiple perspectives that human beings from around the globe can have about the same event and the multiple possibilities there are for misunderstanding. While we want to excite and motivate, we also want to avoid the Pollyanna effect with participants underestimating just how difficult it can be to use these skills. In most of our programs, participants are returning to systems that are not predominantly collaborative. They will likely encounter managers and colleagues who may very well not support them in their use of collaborative conflict management skills. We want them to leave ready and wanting to do the hard work and be realistic about how difficult it might be. (See Chapter Twenty.)

Our process permits exploring this continuum through whole-group and small-group discussions and reflection through personal journaling. This investigation varies in depth and breadth depending on the specific audience and the time available for the training.

SEVEN WORKSHOP MODULES

With this overall learning perspective in mind, we will present a description of the seven modules of the Coleman Raider workshop training with accompanying pedagogical commentary. Focus on each of the seven modules in the training sequence is adjusted according to the learning objectives of the audience.

Module One: Overview of Conflict

The first module presents an overview of conflict. The focus is on exploring the participants’ existing attitudes. The exercises chosen are intended to create internal conflict within each participant, so that he examines his own attitudes toward conflict, competition, and collaboration. The main activities include a diagnostic case, a physical game, and an interactive video-based mini lecture illustrating various methods of conflict resolution.

Collaborative negotiation and mediation are introduced by locating them along the spectrum of conflict resolution approaches that range from avoidance to war.
Both negotiation and mediation are explained as consensual alternatives that focus on the parties’ underlying needs and interests and require their buy-in to try to reach an agreement. This is contrasted with quasijudicial and power-based methods such as arbitration, litigation, or war. (See Figure 31.1.) In the mini lecture we connect these strategies to important theories, such as Deutsch’s Crude Law (see Chapter One) and the dual-concern model (see Chapter Fifteen).

A diagnostic case is the first experiential learning exercise. Small groups of four to six people are divided in half to represent each side of the dispute. The groups negotiate for twenty-five minutes—competitively for ten minutes, then collaboratively for fifteen. A frequently used diagnostic situation, the “Ossipila Case,” is a conflict between international developers who, with local government backing, want to strip-mine on the ancient farmland used by villagers (who have support from environmental groups).

The exercise is recorded on audio (or video) and played back to the small groups; it is also used in module three for an in-depth analysis of negotiation behavior. There is a short debriefing immediately after the exercise.

The diagnostic case serves six functions:

1. It immediately involves both skeptics and believers in our process.
2. It generates a baseline assessment for participants to discern those specific skill areas they need to work on during the rest of the training.
3. It brings out the inherent discrepancy between what we propose and what participants are actually doing.

4. It demonstrates that the learning exercises in the workshop are highly participatory.

5. It allows learners to experience the difficulty of switching from one negotiation strategy to the other, as well as the possible consequences of each approach.

6. It initiates a positive atmosphere of shared learning.

The power of this experience comes from the direct challenge to the participants’ views of competition and collaboration. As they listen to themselves and hear the group’s feedback, the participants contrast their behavior with their own implicit theories and self-perceptions. This creates a discomfort that is the pivotal stimulus for change during the training. We have found that even if people cognitively grasp the principles of collaboration and want to use them, many will still act out a competitive or avoidant orientation without further practice and motivation to change.

Module Two: The Elements of Negotiation

In module two, the goal is to introduce a framework we call the elements of negotiation. The elements serve as the underlying grammatical structure of a negotiation. Just as parsing a sentence for verbs, nouns, and adjectives fosters understanding in any language, so too understanding the elements of negotiation fosters analysis of a conflict prior to and during a negotiation. We identify six structural elements: worldview, climate, positions, needs and interests, reframing, and bargaining “chips” and “chops.”

One’s deeply held beliefs, attitudes, and values comprise a worldview. They are derived from one’s culture, family, and other important groups with which one identifies. Worldview is a central component of one’s identity. It is almost always nonnegotiable, although it can change over time.

Climate is the mood of the negotiation. It reflects the competitive or collaborative orientation of the parties in the negotiation.

Positions are the specific demands or requests made by each party as negotiation commences—the party’s preferred solution to the conflict. If someone is competitive in her orientation, she may inflate her position or state it as non-negotiable. A collaborative approach requires positions that are specific, clear, and honest with respect to negotiability.

Needs and interests are what each negotiating party is looking to satisfy. If the position is “what you want,” the need is “why you want it.” Collaboration sometimes requires sorting through layers of positions and needs to arrive at a place where both sides’ salient needs can be adequately addressed and met.
Reframing is a way to refocus the conflict issue on needs—not positions. It is essentially the question how can we satisfy the priority needs of the parties to the conflict?

“Chips” and “chops” are bargaining offers or threats that each side can use to influence the negotiation. Chips are positive “need satisfiers” that one side proposes so as to meet the needs of the other. They are effective only if perceived as valuable by the other party while also not undermining one’s own interests. Chops are negative “need thwarters,” such as threats or insults. They may be useful to counter threats or to level a power imbalance between the disputants. However, they can encourage competition and undermine the trust needed for collaboration, so we discourage their use.

This shared frame of reference, with its common language, becomes a tool to make clear what the students often know intuitively. They learn to analyze the elements of each conflict presented and to use this analysis to prepare for negotiation. A key learning goal is to be able to distinguish needs from positions and to reframe conflict from a competitive clash of positions to collaboration based on understanding and acknowledgment of underlying needs and worldviews. The theoretical discussion underlying reframing in Chapter One of this book constitutes the intellectual context of our emphasis here. The main learning activities include analysis of simple or complex cases to practice recognition of needs, positions, and reframing (see Figure 31.2) and use of the elements as a prenegotiation planning tool. We describe an example shortly.

After a mini lecture explaining the elements, the trainers lead the group through analysis (using a form similar to Figure 31.3, the “negotiation planning

![Figure 31.2 Coleman/Raider Reframing Formula](c31.qxd_8/1/06_11:03_AM_Page_703)

*Figure 31.2* Coleman/Raider Reframing Formula

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form”) of a conflict presented in two parts on video. Part one shows a heated conflict, and part two shows one possible resolution. Using a video to display the conflict grounds the discussion in a specific real-world context. The choice of which case to use is an important design decision and is made with understanding of its suitability for a particular client group. One case, “A Community
Dispute,” has proved useful in many contexts, so we briefly describe it here to illustrate the definitions given earlier.

The mayor of Centerville has called a meeting to address citizen complaints that a factory in the town is emitting powerful toxins that are causing respiratory illness. The owner of the chemical plant, the town’s main employer, is present, as are three members of Concerned Citizens of Centerville (made up of plant workers and community members). The mayor cautions that the cause of the illness is as yet undetermined but announces that the results of a preliminary environmental report require the factory to close for one week to see if it is the source of the problem.

As the video begins, it is not immediately clear whether this conflict is a clash of worldviews or an apparent conflict of interests. Assumptions abound, however, during class discussion. Is the factory owner a “greedy capitalist” unconcerned with the well-being of the town? Are the concerned citizens merely “environmental crazies” out to destroy the factory, as the owner implies? The workshop discussion generated by the ambiguity helps participants distinguish among position, interest, and identity-based conflict and to better understand the concept of worldview.

In part one of the video, the climate is very hostile and competitive. The disputants interrupt, yell, contradict, and accuse one another as well as make it clear that each side sees the other as unreasonable. The position of the community group is to close the factory immediately. The owner’s counterposition is to keep the factory open, and he asserts that his plant is not causing the infections.

Through analysis, the class members come to understand that the community needs health and jobs. The owner needs to protect the economic viability of his factory and healthy workers to run it. In addition, all have the need for accurate information about the source of the infections, as well as having their perspective acknowledged and understood. Much common ground is uncovered in what initially appears to some as a worldview clash. The rhetoric of the competitive climate simply makes it difficult to see what calm analysis reveals.

After part one, the trainers lead the class in forming a reframing question. When they view part two of the video, they are able to compare their own reframe with the one used by the mayor: “How can we clear up the source of the symptoms and keep the factory and the economy of this town in good shape?”

In part one, community members’ chops include the threat to take the environmental report to the local newspapers, thereby undermining the factory owner’s reputation and bottom line. Among the owner’s chops is the implied threat to move the factory to another town, taking jobs with him.

In part two, after hearing the mayor’s reframing question, the group exchanges chips. At the psychological level, both sides listen to one another as they meet their mutual needs for respect and understanding. On the tangible
level, the chips from the worker-and-community side are the workers’ willingness to take paid vacation time all together during the same week in July and an agreement by the community to consider a tax break if the inspection finds that the factory is not the source of the problem. The factory owner’s chips include his willingness to close the factory for the inspection and to be flexible concerning the workers’ vacation and work scheduling.

After analyzing the video, the participants divide into dyads to continue practicing the skills of identifying positions and needs and forming reframes, using a series of small cases. Through repetition, these drills pose the opportunity to try, err, and retry applying cognitive learning until learners thoroughly understand the skill. Mastery may or may not occur during the workshop. We hope that sufficient value and understanding are experienced so that the learning can continue to be practiced and applied in the participants’ lives.

The participants then use a similar format (see Figure 31.3) as a planning tool for further conflict simulation. The planning process helps each party not only clarify its own side of the conflict, but also begin to understand the other side better. We caution participants that identifying the other’s positions, needs, and so on can only reveal party A’s assumptions about party B and vice versa and that these assumptions must be tested during the upcoming negotiation. We also ask parties to think of all their chops, and the other’s, in this planning process so they can prepare not to use or react to them negatively, which would nullify the attempt to be collaborative.

Module Three: Communication Behaviors

In an ideal collaborative negotiation, each side thoroughly communicates its perspective and arrives at an understanding of the other side. In reality, the unique and particular worldviews of individuals and groups often make our interactions very complicated. Even though two people speak the same language and know each other well, they may feel that they do not really understand one another. Furthermore, conflict can exacerbate misunderstanding. When our buttons are pushed, our ability to communicate can become quite imprecise and problematic.

To develop collaborative skills and enhance understanding of the communication process, we introduce a second frame, which is grounded in a research tool known as behavioral analysis (Rackham, 1993; Situation Management Systems, 1991). We identify five communication behaviors that occur during negotiation:

1. Attacking
2. Evading
3. Informing
4. Opening
5. Uniting
The mnemonic for these behaviors is the familiar English language vowel series AEIOU. These categories encompass nonverbal as well as verbal communications. We employ only these five types of communication behavior because they amount to an easily learned framework for understanding core communication behavior in conflict.

At the beginning of the module, the trainers present and role-play a two-line interchange. An example of a context-relevant mini skit frequently used with groups of managers is an employee reminding his boss about his upcoming vacation. Each time the interchange is repeated, the boss responds by demonstrating another behavior. The trainers elicit from the group a description of the kind of behavior they are observing. Then the trainers label the behavior:

- **Attacking (A)** includes any type of behavior perceived by the other side as hostile or unfriendly: threatening, insulting, blaming, criticizing without being helpful, patronizing, stereotyping, interrupting, and discounting others’ ideas. It also includes nonverbal actions such as using a hostile tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture.
- **Evading (E)** occurs when one or both parties avoid facing any aspect of the problem. Hostile evasions include ignoring a question, changing the subject, not responding, leaving the scene, or failing to meet. Friendly or positive evasions include postponing difficult topics to deal with simple ones first, conferring with colleagues, and taking time out to think or obtain relevant information.
- **Informing (I)** includes behavior that, directly or indirectly, explains one side’s perspective to the other in a nonattacking way. Information sharing can occur on many relevant levels: needs, feelings, values, positions, or justifications.
- **Opening (O)** invites the other party to share information. It includes asking questions about the other’s position, needs, feelings, and values (nonjudgmentally); listening carefully to what the other is saying; and testing one’s understanding by summarizing neutrally what is being said.
- **Uniting (U)** emphasizes the relationship between the disputants. This behavior sets and maintains the tone necessary for cooperation during the negotiation process. The four types of uniting behavior are (1) building rapport, (2) highlighting common ground, (3) reframing the conflict issues, and (4) linking bargaining chips to expressed needs.

After a presentation of AEIOU, the class returns to the small groups that were formed for the diagnostic case in module one. The participants listen to the audio (or video) of the case. Together they fill in an AEIOU coding form.
Table 31.1. Coleman Raider AEIOU Coding Sheet (abridged)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiating Styles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack: threats, hostile tones or gestures, insults, criticizing, patronizing, stereotyping, blaming, challenging, discounting, interrupting, defending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evade: ignore, change subject, withdraw, postpone, table issue, caucus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform: reasons, justifications, positions, requests, needs, underlying positions, feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open: listen quietly, probe, ask questions nonjudgmentally, listen actively, paraphrase, summarize understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unite: ritual sharing, rapport building, establish common ground, reframe, propose solutions, dialogue or brainstorming</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(see Table 31.1) by identifying each comment as an attacking, evading, informing, opening, or uniting behavior. Within their groups, each member receives very specific feedback on how his or her statements are perceived. Importantly, the type of behavior is identified by its impact on the receiver rather than by the intent of the speaker.

Each group has its own insights and, as a result, is often motivated to try on new skills after people hear how they themselves sound. They also learn to give safe feedback by focusing on the impact the behavior has on them, rather than assuming the intent of the sender. Self-awareness is also heightened when a speaker finds that her actions have an unintended effect. This disparity gives her the opportunity to clarify or rectify her message. It also gives her a chance to think of how she generally comes across to others. It is clear from the debriefing of this exercise that the participants learn about the complexity of the communication process and its importance in maintaining a collaborative process.

We believe that for most trainees this experiential learning is necessary, beyond cognitive understanding, for behavioral changes to take place. Multiple skills exercises combined with personal feedback motivate learners to produce the effort needed to change conflict behavior habits (Raider, 1995). Learners often describe this part of the course as a life-changing event. But because we know how difficult it is to integrate these skills and change one’s behavior, we believe that continued learning requires a supportive postworkshop environment, heightened self-motivation, and follow-up programs wherever possible. Empirical research into the long-term effect these workshops have on participants, in the context of supportive or resistive environments, would be very helpful.
Module Four: Stages of the Negotiation

For life and for training purposes, we think it is useful to have a sense of the general order of an ideal collaborative negotiation. Even though there is usually a back-and-forth flow to the negotiation process, it is useful to break it down into stages for training purposes. In module four we posit four stages:

1. Ritual sharing
2. Identifying the issues (positions and needs)
3. Prioritizing issues and reframing
4. Problem solving and reaching agreement

Although we present the stages linearly, we acknowledge that unless both parties want to be collaborative and are equally competent in collaborative skills, most real-life negotiations do not follow this simple pattern. However, this is not to say that they cannot.

The mini lecture by the trainers starts this segment, using a video of a rehearsed “bare-bones” negotiation (see Figure 31.4): one in skeletal form that places each element and behavior in its ideal spot within the framework of the four stages.

Ritual sharing involves preliminary and often casual conversation to build rapport, establish common ground, and pick up critical background information (such as the other’s values), which may affect the negotiation. Uniting behavior predominates during this stage.

Identifying the issues has two phases: identifying the positions that frame the conflict and clarifying the needs that drive them. Informing and opening behaviors predominate during this phase, the first being used to tell where you are coming from and the second to understand the other.

Prioritizing issues and reframing has two parts. Prioritization is needed if there is more than one key issue, and an order must be established (through a mini negotiation) for manageable problem solving. Reframing invites the parties to engage in creative problem solving around needs. It is characterized by a neutral and inclusive question, such as how can we satisfy the needs of A while also satisfying the needs of B?

Problem solving and reaching agreement, the final stage, are characterized by brainstorming (using the informing, opening, and uniting behaviors) that facilitates fresh, novel solutions to the now shared problem. Humorous and even apparently absurd ideas are encouraged because they increase open-mindedness and often inspire clever solutions. Uniting and opening behaviors are used to diffuse any perceived attacks, highlight common ground, and reiterate the objective: to find mutually satisfying solutions. The negotiators then choose from the
brainstormed list those solutions that are feasible and timely and that optimize the satisfaction of each party’s needs and concerns. Success depends, in part, on maintaining a continued collaborative, positive climate that encourages creativity.

As stated earlier, the trainers present the stages as a linear progression, but real-life negotiations rarely flow so predictably. A good negotiator develops the ability to identify the essence of each stage to diagnose whether the essential tasks embedded within it have been accomplished and to feel comfortable with the surface disorder. As certain needs are addressed, others may surface. Recognition and processing of all of these needs is necessary for a good and sustainable agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Ritual sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Both A and B engage in <strong>uniting</strong> behavior.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A states his position flexibly (<strong>informing</strong>)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Underlying needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. B probes for and paraphrases A’s underlying needs (<strong>opening</strong>).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Underlying needs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. A probes for and paraphrases B’s underlying needs (<strong>opening</strong>).</td>
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<tr>
<th>Stage 3</th>
<th>Reframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Either A or B asks, &quot;How can we satisfy the priority needs of sides A and B (<strong>uniting</strong>)?&quot;</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 4</th>
<th>Problem solving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. A and B brainstorm a number of possible alternative ways (<strong>chips</strong>) to satisfy their needs (<strong>uniting</strong>).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 4</th>
<th>Reaching agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. A and B evaluate the alternatives, pick the best combination for both sides, and summarize their agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 31.4** Coleman Raider “Bare-Bones” Model.

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After the stages have been covered, participants practice their own bare-bones negotiation. Trainers explain metaphorically that this is more like a map of the territory than the territory itself. As with maps, we must make a mental leap from a symbolic portrayal to what is seen when navigating the real landscape. The more clearly the underlying structure and process of bare bones are embedded in our thinking, the more effectively we as negotiators can deal with the variations that occur in actuality.

The bare-bones framework is the most prescriptive in our training. Therefore, great caution has to be used by the training team to make sure that examples used to illustrate this module are context-relevant in form and substance, so that the model is seen as doable in various cultural contexts. The participants analyze conflict cases taken from their own lives and then present a skeletal and ritualized performance in front of the whole group (see Table 31.1). Each step is abbreviated, thus revealing whether the role players really understand the essence, or bare bones, of the conflict. The trainer coaches the role-players and gives feedback at each point of the process. It is in this way that the role-players and other participants begin to internalize all the previously learned material.

**Module Five: Culture and Conflict**

From its inception, our training model has woven the topic of culture throughout the process of teaching and learning negotiation skills. Our original audiences were made up of managers from multinational organizations eager to learn how to negotiate across borders. Building on the work of Weiss and Stripp (1985), Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001), Ting-Toomey (1993, 1999, 2004), and others, we facilitated the trainees’ learning through readings, video clips (for example, “Going International, Part Two,” Griggs, 1983; *The Multicultural Workplace*, Wurzel, 1990; *Cross-Cultural Conference Room*, Wurzel, 2002), and role-plays to understand and internalize cultural variables such as high- or low-power distance, high- or low-communication context, individualism or collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and polychronic or monochronic time.

One role-play exercise has been particularly instructive and enjoyable for the participants. The group is divided into small groups of four. One pair from the foursome is instructed to create a fictitious cultural ritual based on the Hofstede dimensions. The other pair comes to the role-play unaware that they are entering a “new culture” and, as a result, experience a simulated form of culture shock as they interact with the classmates who have taken on different persona. The experience is videotaped and then reviewed by each foursome, with much laughter. The educational point is made that it is ideal to know the rules and norms of another culture and, at a minimum, to avoid negative judgments in order to have a successful negotiation.

Video clips and exercises like this are debriefed by using our “filter check model” (see Figure 31.5). For example, one of the video clips from “Going International,
Part Two shows a businessman from the United States (Mr. Thompson) waiting for his Mexican counterpart (Sr. Herrera) in an outdoor cafe in Mexico City. Mr. Thompson reacts negatively to the late arrival of Sr. Herrera (to whom he is trying to make a sale), apparently assuming the lateness is some form of disrespect or power play.

The video captures elegantly and with humor how monochronic and polychronic individuals can misunderstand each other. Sr. Herrera, the polychronic of the two, is late because he is greeting important people along the way. He also does not want to get down to business until he has gotten to know something about the man with whom he is doing business. Mr. Thompson, though, is driven by the task, always looking at his watch and pushing to get the contract signed—so then he can go out and have a good time!

By working through the filter-check chart, participants come to see that the misunderstanding displayed is based on cultural assumptions (filters) of the meaning of time, task, and relationships. Neither way is the right way; they are just different. Of course, it is noted that “when in Rome, do as the Romans do,” certainly so if you are in a lower power position, as a seller typically is relative to a buyer.
For audiences of educators, we use role-play simulations such as Melting Pot or Salad Bowl to surface issues of class, race, and gender. The disputants in this case are two groups: the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC) and the predominantly White school governance committee at an urban high school in New York City. (This case is based on a real conflict mediated by Raider; it is also discussed in the Introduction and Chapter One of this volume.) The BTC demands a Black seat on the governance committee, claiming that the student population is predominantly “of color.” The governance committee rejects this demand for a “race-based” seat, countering that representation should be by academic department, not by racial or ethnic identity group.

One way to use this case is to divide a group of four into sides A and B. In round one of the negotiation, each side presents its point of view while the other side tries hard to listen and paraphrase the underlying needs it is hearing. In round two, sides A and B switch and repeat the negotiation, following the model of academic controversy (Johnson and Johnson, 1987). This technique helps not only to move the conflict toward resolution but to get participants to realize how difficult it is to step into the shoes of the other side. This technique might be unworkable if the gap in worldview’s is too vast perhaps due to the participants’ emotional attachment to the issues or their inability to take another’s perspective.

Module Six: Dealing with Anger and Other Emotions
To effectively work with emotions that arise during conflict, a negotiator must have good listening, communication, and problem-solving skills. This section outlines how these skills can be employed to direct emotions into a positive and productive component of the negotiation process. Anger is our main focus because it presents one of the biggest challenges to resolving conflict.

A Philosophy for Dealing with Anger. The philosophy we present to participants is that if someone blames you, states his position inflexibly, confronts you, or attacks you:

1. Avoid the defend-attack spiral and ethnocentric and egocentric responses. Assume that the other has a perspective different from yours and that you need to find out where he is coming from.
2. Listen actively. Your needs are more likely to be heard by the other if he knows through your active-listening behavior that you have understood his needs.
3. Continue to change the climate from competition to cooperation by acknowledging that there are differing perspectives at play, each with part of the truth.
4. Work with the other as a partner to solve the problem.
To build awareness on this topic, participants read an essay in the training manual covering such topics as the relationship of anger to unmet needs, anger as a secondary response that masks more vulnerable emotions, the attack-defend spiral, and additional destructive and constructive responses. Sometimes in the workshop participants form groups of four to discuss the essay. Members offer examples from their own lives, sharing situations in which they themselves were angry or were dealing with another person’s anger.

**Skills Practice.** A key exercise we use in building skills in this area is a round-robin, with one side of each negotiation team working competitively and the other collaboratively, and with one side moving from group to group and the other staying put. In the first round, the traveling partners are competitive. This means they can use attacking and evading behaviors to act angry, patronizing, and unfair. They are encouraged to make their attacks personal if possible. The stationary partners take on the role of skilled collaborative negotiators. They work to change the climate by using predominantly opening, and some uniting, behaviors to draw out the needs, feelings, and concerns of the others. This round lasts for ten minutes. The goal of the exercise is not to reach an agreement but simply to build readiness for negotiation by changing the climate. In the second round, all the traveling pairs rotate to the next table. The group reverses roles so that the stationary pair is now competitive and the traveling partners are collaborative. In the final round, the traveling pairs move to a third table, where a new foursome attempts to solve the conflict by having both sides use collaboration.

The whole group debriefs after each section so that the participants learn as they proceed. The rounds are often tape-recorded for review. The trainers guide the discussion with questions: “How did the emotions affect the process?” “Were the negotiators able to draw out emotions, unexpressed perspectives, and underlying needs?” “Were they able to create distance between the other’s position and needs in their paraphrases?” and “What could they have done better?”

In this exercise, participants experience how difficult it can be to manage another’s attacks, emotions, and blaming behavior. Many acquire the insight that people have little control over someone else’s responses apart from developing their own collaborative skills. This is when they become “consciously incompetent”—beginning to know what they don’t know. We consider this an important learning milestone because handling another’s anger is a common motivating concern for participants coming to the workshop. This exercise further motivates them to develop their own skills of listening and “going to the balcony,” or rising above the conflict to see it objectively from all perspectives (Ury, 1993).
Module Seven: Introduction to Mediation

In the Coleman/Raider model, we often introduce a brief, one-hour overview of mediation in our three-day workshop. The longer version teaches mediation skills. Here we briefly discuss the longer program (see Figure 31.6).

The negotiation model already learned forms the framework for understanding mediation. We might move into the mediation segment of the program by asking participants to create a model for mediation based on what they already know about collaborative negotiation. This task is surprisingly simple as students realize how closely mediation is related to negotiation.

Stage 1:
Set up the mediation.
1. Set up the room.
2. Deliver an opening statement.

Stage 2:
Identify the issues.
1. Listen to each side, one at a time; probe for their priority underlying needs (opening).
2. Reframe (uniting).
3. Prioritize the issues.

Stage 3:
Facilitate IOU and problem solving.
1. Help them negotiate directly (informing, opening, and uniting).
2. Keep reframing (uniting).
3. Clear up assumptions (cultural issues).

Stage 4:
Reach agreement.
1. Have disputants confirm their understanding of their future commitments to each other.
2. Write the agreement, if appropriate.
3. Close the mediation.

Figure 31.6 Coleman Raider Mediation Model.

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Participants are introduced to four stages of the mediation process (which almost parallel negotiation): (1) setting up the mediation, (2) identifying the issues, (3) facilitating informing, opening, and uniting (IOU) behaviors, and (4) problem solving and reaching agreement. The vehicles used to practice these stages are skill practice and role-playing, the latter constituting the bulk of the activity.

The role-plays offer the participants the opportunity to practice everything learned in both the negotiation and mediation segments of the course. Each mediation stage is practiced in trios, rotating the role of mediator. In debriefing, the mediator receives feedback from the trainers and the disputants themselves—how they felt the mediator moved or blocked the process, and how specifically the mediator could have helped their role-play character. (For further discussion of mediation, see Chapter Thirty-Two.) Cases are either furnished by the trainers or elicited from the audience. In addition to small-group mediations, trainers may facilitate the role-plays in the center of the room, fishbowl style, with the class watching. Audio- or videotape is often used in various ways and in any segment of the program.

Throughout the program, trainers present numerous videos of experienced mediators, each with a distinctive style. These show differences in pacing, amount of questioning or silence, and a variety of techniques. The message we intend to impart is that there is no one right way to mediate. We present our model like training wheels on a bicycle: as soon as the learner-mediator grasps the process, he can begin to discover how to make it his own.

Relevant topics (such as caucusing, shuttle diplomacy, getting the parties to the table, organizational context, and culture) are discussed at intervals throughout the program. Prepared videos are used wherever available and relevant to elaborate on these topics and enrich the participants’ learning.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, we have tried to give the reader a sense of the theoretical underpinnings and pedagogical techniques used in our delivery of a conflict resolution training program. We have enumerated a number of insights, drawn from our years of practice, that inform our training designs. We have summarized the knowledge, skill, and attitude objectives we strive for in conducting the program. Finally, we have described in some detail the typical learning activities used in each module of the program.

It is our view that practitioners are a largely untapped resource for researchers in the field of conflict resolution. Practitioners intuitively know a great deal from years of experience. Researchers would do well to cull from trainers what they believe is true and develop systematic methods to verify it.
Researchers and practitioners need to seek out opportunities where both can be useful to each other and to the clients they serve. Such a marriage may very well make the difference between a field that loses steam and one that forever changes the ways humans deal with their differences.

**POSTSCRIPT**

Throughout the 1990s, the professional lives of the three authors intersected daily while delivering conflict resolution programs through the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia University. Subsequently, in different arenas, all have taken on the difficult, complex, and exciting task of applying collaborative skills to large-scale, systemic change. In the following paragraphs, we talk about the challenges this has presented for us, what we have learned, and the critical questions and dilemmas with which we are currently grappling.

**Ellen Raider**

By teaching negotiation and mediation to individuals and groups, I know that I have helped thousands deal more collaboratively with the many interpersonal and intergroup conflicts in their lives. I am extremely proud of this work. I spend much of my time now advocating for fundamental change in an urban public education system. I can confirm from this experience that collaborative negotiation and mediation skills are extremely useful in building the needed coalition of like-minded allies. These same skills, however, have little direct effect, in the short run, on an entrenched education and political bureaucracy intent on maintaining the status quo. As is the case in other important policy areas such as health, housing, the environment, and so on, the “playing field” in education is not level among ordinary folks—parents, students, and their communities on the one hand, and the other powerful stakeholders on the other (that is, the politicians at the local, state, and federal levels, the unions, and the business community). These latter stakeholders have considerable political power, money, and the organizational and legal support needed to move their respective agendas. Unorganized parents do not.

Although we failed to mention it in the earlier version of this chapter, we frequently talk briefly in the workshop about what is to be done when neither cooperative nor competitive negotiation is possible (see Figure 31.7, Corrective Action). The first part of the figure follows from Deutsch’s Crude Law. It shows that cooperation leads to cooperation, competition leads to competition. If, however, the powerful are not willing to cooperate and the powerless are not yet organized to effectively compete as equals (as is the case with organized labor
Prerequisites
Power balanced or neutralized
Trust moderate to high
Need to maintain or build relations
Willingness to negotiate
Cooperative attitude

Power balanced
Trust moderate to low
Willingness to negotiate
Competitive attitude
Relationship unimportant

Power imbalance
Distrust
Unjust laws
Human rights violations
Poverty
Discrimination
Racism, sexism

Consequences
Open communication
Search for common ground
Problem solving
Concern for the needs of the other
Friendly climate
IOU sequence

Hard bargaining
Cards held close to chest
Little concern for the needs of the other
Winners and losers
Competitive climate
Use of attacking behavior

Political action
 Strikes
Civil disobedience
Social unrest
Terrorism
Revolution
War

When those in power are not genuinely willing to negotiate

Figure 31.7 Negotiation Strategies
in some workplaces), then the powerless must engage in what we call “corrective action”—boycotts, strikes, marches, demonstrations, and/or forms of civil disobedience—to build their numbers and organize and attract the attention of the public, the politicians, and the press, thereby creating readiness on their part to come to the table.

Here then is my current dilemma. Can education advocates develop creative nonviolent strategies and tactics, capable of building a powerful mass movement to fundamentally change the education system from its current form—a bureaucratic top-down factory model, to a more cooperative school/community-based system where parents, students, and teachers work together to build learning communities based on mutual trust and respect? And should these tactics and strategies be consistent with the goals of the collaborative system we are trying to create? It is so easy given the current “savage inequalities” (Kozol, 1992; Schwebel, 2003) in the public educational system to want to organize within an adversarial frame.

Our advocacy group has decided to lead with a proactive collaborative strategy that relies on a human rights framework developed in various international treaties and covenants as an explicit values base on which to build a shared vision of a new system (Web reference to National Social and Economic Rights Initiative, www.NSERI.org). Launching a multiyear campaign, we are calling for an independent taskforce made up of educators, academics, community advocates, students, and parents to work collaboratively over the next two years to design what a new human-rights–based system of education could look like. We hope this approach will be able to unite, under one umbrella, the many single-issue struggles currently being waged against the education establishment. We want to model the kind of changes we would like to see happen and not just rail against the things we find objectionable. We want to seed an open, transparent dialogue and strategic visioning process among all stakeholders in the city who wish to work collaboratively. We will stay open to those who do not want to join this effort now and hope they will come on board as this education-as-a-human-right movement builds.

In light of this advocacy work, I feel that the aspect of the workshop briefly described in this postscript needs to be expanded by explicitly including it as a full module with references, readings, and an extended class discussion about the other essential skills such as community organizing and nonviolent civil disobedience techniques to give participants a broader range of tools in our collective quest for a more just and equitable society. In addition, students should be encouraged to take additional workshops that explicitly teach these skills. (See section on Janet Gerson.) Without knowledge of these tools and how they have been used in other similar struggles, hope for peaceful change will be fleeting and the mounting frustration of the powerless could lead to violence and the continued use and glorification of the worst in our species.
Susan Coleman

I am currently an organizational consultant specializing in conflict resolution and collaboration.

While always a mediator, for most of the last decade, I have also been ensconced in implementing conflict resolution programs in large, multinational quasi-governmental organizations. In that capacity, I have provided training to professionals from all continents and most nations. With few exceptions and only some variation depending on culture, participants have provided excellent ratings of the programs and found them transformational. Nonetheless, participants have always been faced with the prospect of returning to a hierarchical context where conflict is managed more by who has the power than by any other means.

With the events of September 11, 2001, it is my perception that this reality only became more extreme. As the world climate became more competitive and collaboration less valued (even though more needed than ever), it permeated into organizational culture and reduced the value placed on a conflict resolution workshop.

In this larger context, I transitioned professionally from “trainer” to “consultant.” Given systemic pressures, I needed to expand my ability to scan systematically and offer wider choices to my clients about choice points for creating desired change. If they wanted to become more collaborative and manage conflicts more effectively, sometimes leadership coaching, interdepartmental mediation, or a system-wide large-group process might be the better vehicle given various goals and constraints. Nonetheless, the conflict resolution workshop has remained in my mind one of the most profound vehicles for giving people a turbocharged sense of what is possible through collaboration.

What exactly do I mean? In a recent chapter that I wrote with Ellen Raider, “Intercultural Conflict Resolution Training,” *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Communications*, we argued that, based on our years of working with intercultural groups around conflict, whether the climate is competitive or collaborative is more important than any possible cultural difference or conflict. In other words, if the climate is collaborative, the group will manage cultural differences well, and, if competitive, it will polarize them. As trainers, we know the myriad ways we can enhance understanding of collaboration and create an experience of a collaborative community in a group. When we have been successful in that regard, we and the participants experience firsthand how much more easily the group is able to manage the conflicts we address pertaining to race, class, or other aspects of identity, or conflicts in general, that in other circumstances would disintegrate into tense and polarized interactions.

I think our observations from the human laboratory of a training context have important implications for our organizational, local, and even global communities. When we endorse our leaders in creating a more adversarial environment, we
think identity group tensions and other conflicts will increase exponentially. And, if we pressure them to do the reverse, people will be able to manage those same conflicts more effectively. In other words, the more attention we place on creating a collaborative climate, the less conflict we need to manage because people will manage it themselves. But the more emphasis we place on creating a competitive, adversarial climate, the more difficult it will be for any conflict resolution intervention, skills training or other, to stick.

This raises a “Which came first, the chicken or the egg?” kind of dilemma. Can we really implement system-wide collaboration if individual leaders have not internalized how to be collaborative? Will leaders who desire to lead in a collaborative fashion ever be able to do that within systems that are entrenched in power and rights-based processes? In my view, and given the enormity of the task, efforts are needed at all levels of system—individual to large scale—to shift toward more collaborative functioning. If Deutsch’s Crude Law is correct—that collaboration leads to collaboration—each positive shift in any level of system will reverberate in others. And, if those reverberations become strong enough, is it possible that we will achieve a critical shift in human consciousness where the interdependence of all life is organically understood and no longer questioned.

Janet Gerson

I am director of training and acting director of the Peace Education Center, Teachers College, Columbia University. I also consult internationally in the development of peace education programs and trainings.

While the end of the Cold War brought hopes for a peaceful world, the reality has been a proliferation of deadly conflicts—the multiple wars in Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine. Nor has the end of the Cold War mitigated an increase of poverty side by side with extreme wealth, ecological destruction, and other types of structural violence. In response to these developments, I find among both my academic and professional students an intensified urgency to learn skills they need to address these real-world conflicts. Internationally and locally, I encounter individuals courageously accomplishing nonviolent social change. For example, the massive transnational antiwar mobilization and the World Tribunal on Iraq dramatize the possibilities to criminalize state-perpetuated aggression and create a more peaceful world order. These developments—and many more—invalidate my enthusiasm and hope.

With collaborative conflict skills as a foundational base, my teaching is currently guided by two overarching concerns—how to separate violence from conflict and how to educate for a more humane and inclusive world community. Pedagogically, I encourage my students to see violence as intentional or preventable harm in order to help them learn how to separate conflict from violence. This definition underscores human agency and responsibility and,
therefore, points to the possibilities for action. To define violence more thoroughly, we use matrices to map out manifestations of social, cultural, and political violence on all social levels: from intra- and interpersonal to family, community, regional, national, and global. In this way, learners are able to see the interrelationships of different types of violence. This also helps bring to the surface the students’ own experiences of violence.

Each course focuses on a particular problem, a complex of related aspects of violence. We examine current conflict and peace problems through the lens of nonviolence, human rights, social justice, equity, and ecological balance. Inquiry questions focus the analysis. Examples of this process might include:

- How might governance diminish violence and increase well-being?
- How are militarism and gender imbalance linked?
- How has international law been used to reduce or prevent global conflicts?

Then particular cases of these issues are analyzed. Keeping in mind the maxim “She or he who hits first has run out of ideas,” we work to develop alternatives to force and preventable harm.

Having articulated a problem of violence, we next address visions, alternative strategies, and plans of action. In this case, human rights documents are valuable teaching tools because they articulate multiple aspects of visions for peace. An expanded array of conflict processes also is presented. These include anticipation, problem analysis, resolution, institutional mechanisms for conflict management, nonviolent action, reconciliation and reconstruction, and constructing positive relations. (These conflict processes are elaborated in Learning to Abolish War: Teaching Toward a Culture of Peace [Reardon and Cabezudo, 2001] and available on the Internet.)

As in the conflict resolution workshop, I try to build a “learning community” in our classroom. This provides a collaborative experience for the students. The values of interconnectedness, interdependence, and moral inclusion developed in the classroom expand the basis of understanding global community (Opotow, Gerson, and Woodhouse, 2005). We explore ways in which conflict management can be used to build common ground through an expanded sense of humanity. We combine these with an investigation of the institutions that manage conflict structurally. This offers the participants an opportunity to question the basic purposes of governance, as well as the limits and possibilities of justice systems. Finally, country-specific cases are presented that demonstrate how international law has been used to increase fairness and minimize destructiveness.

I have found that teaching models, practices, and methodologies for challenging power imbalance, discrimination, and resource inequities are vital components of educating for peace. Recently, in my teaching I have increasingly
emphasized the importance of strategies that promote nonviolent escalation of latent conflict. To do this, I include teaching about social movements and their use of nonviolent strategic action to confront latent conflict. My goal is to help students discover the indirect violence that is structured into our society. Specific cases range from the work of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Gene Sharp to the more recent transnational social movements that have promoted human rights, gender equality, environmental protection, and the formation of the International Criminal Court.

As in the conflict resolution workshop, we use experiential learning through dialogue and skills-based activities in conjunction with each theoretical section. I have found that the role-plays and theater games developed by Augusto Boal (1992) are particularly useful to express latent conflicts, to energize or “dynamize” them, and to form creative alternatives. This embodied conflict methodology encourages participant collaboration and facilitates personal and group transformation.

Teaching peace education is exciting and rewarding. Participants bring into the classroom an enormous diversity of life experience and, in most cases, concrete experiences in attempting to be a good peace educator. Our world is immersed in war and violence. The relevance of peace education and the tension that exists in all of us to find effective ways to work for peace make the classroom electrified by the power of learning.

Notes

We wish to express special thanks to Marc Roennau for preparing the graphics for this chapter.

1. The author is grateful for wonderful conversations about conflict in large groups with the following practitioners whose ideas contributed greatly to this chapter: Billie Alban, Dick and Emily Axelrod, Bridgett Bolton, Al Fitz, Robert Jacobs, Harrison Owen, Larry Peterson, Kris Quade, Nancy Cebula, and Roland Sullivan.

2. A person with a polychronic orientation will prioritize relationships over tasks; a person with a monochronic orientation will get tasks done and then focus on the relationship. A monochronic orientation is characterized by tightly controlling time. A polychronic orientation is more loose with time. See Hall, 1976 for further discussion of these cultural dimensions. (taken from sage article)

References


Mediation may be defined as a process in which disputants attempt to resolve their differences with the assistance of an acceptable third party. The mediator’s objectives are typically to help the parties search for a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict and to counter tendencies toward competitive win-lose strategies and objectives. Mediators are most commonly single individuals, but they also can be twosomes, threesomes, or even larger groups.

Although mediation is a pervasive and fundamental human activity—try to imagine family life devoid of parents’ interceding in their children’s squabbles—in the last two decades formal mediation has begun to play a role at all levels of society and in virtually every significant area of social conflict. Some of the most prominent examples are divorce mediation, peer mediation in the schools, community mediation, victim-offender mediation (to help deal with the psychological and practical aftermath of property crimes and minor assaults), mediation of public resource disputes, judicial mediation, mediation of disputes within organizations, and the increasing visibility for mediation in international conflicts between and within nations. Within the United States, the federal and state governments have become active sponsors of mediation programs, ranging from personnel and employment dispute to public conflicts in health care, economic development, governance, and the environment. Federal sponsorship of mediation and related programs has been characterized as “one of the most significant movements in U.S. law in the latter half of the 20th century” with
“profound effects on the way the federal government handles conflict” (Nabatchi, forthcoming).

**THEORY AND RESEARCH**

Use of mediation in its myriad forms far outstrips systematic research on the process. Nonetheless, with increased use has come widening understanding. Our knowledge of mediation as a social psychological process has three major sources: extrapolation from theories of conflict (for example, Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1981), empirical research (for example, Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 2004), and the in-depth “case wisdom” of practitioners (Kolb, and others, 1994; Moore, 1996).

In this chapter, my primary goal is to give a concise account of what this collective literature has to tell us about the factors influencing the use of mediation and what happens during the mediation process, particularly in terms of mediator behavior. Since I first summarized these matters for the initial edition of *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, the practice of mediation has continued to grow and research to flourish. Among the major developments has been the unprecedented expansion of mediation programs within the federal government, the appearance of comprehensive surveys of the effectiveness of mediation in numerous conflict domains, and a greater, if still incomplete understanding of the great variety of mediation styles and their relationship to the differing social contexts in which conflict occurs. It is in describing and summarizing these developments that the current chapter differs most from its predecessor. I begin with what is known about the efficacy of mediation and the types of conflict for which it appears most (and least) effective.¹

**The Efficacy of Mediation**

The rise in mediation services over the last two decades has generally occurred in the context of offering disputing parties an alternative to traditional use of lawyers and the courts. The proponents of mediation have argued that it should provide superior outcomes because it is based on a model of cooperative conflict, rather than the win-lose orientation of the adversarial legal system, and because it involves the parties directly and actively in searching for solutions to their differences rather than imposing a solution on them. This intensive participation, it is argued, should lead to psychological commitment to whatever agreements are reached, as well as to agreements that are enduring because they well reflect the needs and circumstances of the disputants. Much of the research on mediation has sought to evaluate whether these and other presumed advantages of mediation reliably occur.
Research on mediation’s efficacy has distinctive strengths and weaknesses. The critical reaction has been well articulated by Beck and Sales (2001), in their incisive review of studies of divorce mediation, arguably the most highly developed area of mediation research. Among the problems Beck and Sales note are the generally small sample sizes, the failure (or inability) to randomly assign disputing parties to mediation or control conditions, the absence of standardized mediation protocols and checks on mediator adherence to such protocols, the paucity of well-defined outcome measures and the atheoretic, one-shot nature of most studies (as opposed to more theory-driven, programmatic research). Reviews of research in other domains of mediation have expressed similar concerns. (Compare *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 2004, number 1–2.)

The research record also ignores almost entirely the types of informal mediation that occurs outside traditional legal settings, such as within families or friendship circles or among coworkers.

On the positive side, the cumulative record on mediation’s efficacy is extensive—involving assessments of many thousands of disputes across numerous domains of conflict and employing a wide array of methods. This large and methodologically diverse literature is remarkably consistent in its overall picture of mediation as an imperfect, but highly useful and satisfying adjunct or alternative to more traditional means of conflict management. (It is also worth noting that, despite it shortcomings, mediation research compares favorably in its vigor and extensiveness to the far more limited empirical record on the conflict management behaviors and impact of lawyers, judges, arbitrators, and governmental administrators.)

The most positive results are in terms of client satisfaction, settlement rates, and compliance with the agreements reached. On the order of 70 to 90 percent of disputing parties who have tried mediation say they were pleased with the process, would recommend it to a friend, think it should be available to others in similar circumstances, and things of this kind. Even for those who fail to reach agreement in mediation, the satisfaction rate is typically above 75 percent. These results compare favorably with public satisfaction with kin-dred services, such as use of attorneys (66 percent) and the role of the courts (40 to 50 percent).

Mediation also fares reasonably well in terms of its ability to produce a formal settlement agreement, with settlements occurring in the 40–80 percent range across a variety of settings, the median being about 60 percent. These may appear modest figures in contrast with the 90 percent settlement rate achieved by attorneys without recourse to judicial intervention, but it is important to remember that the settlement figures for mediation include many intractable cases in which attorneys have already tried and failed to produce settlement. Evidence on the rate of compliance with mediated agreement is also generally favorable. For example, in small claims disputes, compliance with
mediated agreements has been reported in 81 percent of the cases, compared to 48 percent for those using traditional adjudication.

In small claims disputes there is also evidence that mediated agreements are more likely than adjudicated ones to include nonmonetary provisions, immediate payment of at least some money, and provisions for installment payments—i.e., more detailed agreements designed to improve the likelihood of compliance (Wissler, 2004). Similar findings have been reported in management of disputes between divorcing parents (Kelley, 2004). Although there are occasional nonconfirmatory, contradictory findings, there is also evidence that, compared to adjudication, mediation produces more compromise and more equal sharing of resources.

The record is more equivocal for mediation as an instrument for saving time and money. A few studies report appreciable savings for mediation compared to more adversarial traditional methods (for example, the Air Force estimates it saves $14,000 and 276 labor hours by using mediation rather than formal grievance procedures for resolving employee complaints); the evidence from other studies is more uncertain. Thus, in general civil cases, Wissler (2004) reports a few studies finding in favor of mediation and a nearly equal number finding no cost savings compared to adjudication. Part of the difficulty in drawing firm conclusions is due to the complexity of making cost comparisons and the lack of appropriate comparison groups (Dukes, 2004).

Perhaps the most ambitious claims made for mediation is that it can be a vehicle for personal and social change. When mediation began to expand significantly beyond its industrial relations base in the 1970s, such claims were often extravagant. The research record paints a more modest but still favorable picture.

Impact on Individuals. Mediation is not intended to be psychotherapy and even in areas such as divorce mediation, where its aims are broadly psychological, there is no evidence that it can improve psychological adjustment in measurable ways. However, useful personal consequences of the mediation experience have been documented. Thus, offenders participating in victim-offender mediation have been found to have lower levels of offending than they did before or compared with a similar group of offenders who did not meet with their victims (Umbreit, 2004). The most extensive effects on individuals have been reported from peer mediation programs in the elementary schools (Jones, 2004). Compared to students without such training, students who have served as peer mediators have been found to have improved social skills (including an improved capacity for handling conflicts at home and outside of school), decreased aggressiveness, a greater capacity for perspective taking, and higher academic achievement. (These effects, however, are much less frequently found at the middle and high school levels.)
Improvement in Relationships. Studies of court-connected mediation of civil disputes (other than divorce) find little consistent evidence for an ameliorative impact of mediation (Wissler, 2004), but in other domains there are more positive results. While the evidence is limited, in studies of environmental mediation respondents are more likely than respondents using traditional approaches to report improvements in their capacity to discuss controversial issues, to work more productively with the other, and to resolve differences more easily (Dukes, 2004). Bingham (2004), makes a similar point for the evidence on mediation versus arbitration in the resolution of employee grievances. In divorce mediation, mediating parents are more likely than parents relying exclusively on lawyers and the courts to report an increased capacity to work together as parents and a reduction in parental conflict. In one of the rare studies employing random assignment, Emery and others (2001) report that compared to fathers who litigated custody or visitation, fathers who were assigned to mediation remained more involved with their children not only after the first year postdivorce but as long as twelve years later.

Social Impact. The capacity of mediation programs to alter wider social environments has been relatively little studied, but ameliorative effects have been reported. Peer mediation in elementary schools has been associated with student and teacher perceptions of improved classroom climate and with decreases in classroom management problems, discipline referrals, and suspension rates. Research on the impact of the U.S. Postal Service’s implementation of a nationwide mediation program for dealing with employee grievances reports a significant impact on the USPS conflict management system, including a reduction of complaint caseloads and the number of chronic complainants (Bingham, 2004).

It is also noteworthy that in several domains mediation programs may have spurred enhanced receptivity to additional forms of conflict management and social collaboration. Thus, peer mediation in the schools has expanded into the related areas of peace education, violence prevention, social and emotional learning, and antibias education (Jones, 2004); victim-offender mediation has become part of a larger movement of restorative justice (Zehr, 2004); environmental conflict resolution has expanded to include conflict assessment, consensus building, facilitation of strategic planning, and community-based conservation (Dukes, 2004).

Conditions for Effective Mediation

Mediation is not a magic bullet for resolving any and all conflicts. The accumulating evidence suggests that mediation is most apt to be successful in conflicts occupying a general middle range of difficulty. I have selected six factors from among those associated with decreased probability that mediation will produce agreement.
High Levels of Conflict. In empirical studies of mediation, a high level of conflict is the most consistent factor associated with mediator difficulty in helping the parties reach agreement. The measures of conflict intensity that correlate negatively with settlement include the severity of the prior conflict between the parties; a perception that the other is untrustworthy, unreasonable, angry, or impossible to communicate with; and the existence of strong ideological or cultural differences.

Low Motivation to Reach Agreement. In industrial mediation, mediator perceptions that the parties have low motivation to resolve the conflict have been found negatively associated with the probability of settlement; mediation of disputes between nation-states has been closely linked to what is referred to as a “hurting stalemate” (Touval and Zartman, 1989). There is evidence that divorce mediation tends to fail if one spouse has a high level of continuing psychological attachment to the partner or refuses to accept the decision to divorce.

Low Commitment to Mediation. It is a widespread conviction among experienced labor mediators that the chances for agreement are reduced if only one of the parties requests mediation services; empirical studies confirm this. The settlement rate is also lower if the chief negotiators are unenthusiastic about mediation or do not trust the mediator.

Shortage of Resources. Mediation is especially unlikely to succeed under conditions of resource scarcity, as studies of labor and divorce mediation have documented. Resource scarcity presumably limits the range of mutually acceptable solutions that can be found and may reduce the motivation of both the parties and the mediator to search for them.

Disputes Involving “Fundamental Principles.” Several lines of evidence support the long cherished notion of experienced mediators that disputes involving matters of “principle” are especially difficult to resolve. This has been documented for international disputes (when ideology is at stake), for labor mediation (when the dispute is about union recognition as opposed to wages), and in mediation of environmental conflict (where disputes about general policies are half as likely to be resolved compared to site-specific conflict).

Parties of Unequal Power. It is widely felt by practitioners that disputes in which one side is much more powerful than the other (more articulate, more self-confident, better able to withstand the economic and political consequences of a stalemate) are among the most difficult to mediate. The belief is given a measure of support from studies of the mediation of conflicts as disparate as those between warring states and between warring spouses.
It is important to note that mediation often succeeds in disputes with one or more of these characteristics. This is because the skillful mediator may be able to modify some of them in a favorable direction. It is also true that parties in such disputes may attain notable benefit from mediation even if they do not succeed in reaching an agreement: issues may be clarified, the opponent may be humanized, or partial agreement may be reached. Nonetheless, even in isolation, these factors are bound to present the mediator with serious challenges. Collectively, they suggest why the practice of mediation is so stressful and why mediator burnout is a well-recognized phenomenon.

Factors Determining Use of Mediation
Conceptually, mediation should be helpful in any conflict in which the basic framework for negotiation is present (Moore, 1996). The framework includes these elements:

- The parties can be identified.
- They are interdependent.
- They have the basic cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities to represent themselves.
- They have interests that are not entirely incompatible.
- They face alternatives to consensual agreement that are undesirable (for example, a costly trial).

Mediation is especially likely to prove useful whenever there are additional obstacles that would make unassisted negotiations likely to fail:

- Interpersonal barriers (intense negative feelings, a dysfunctional pattern of communicating)
- Substantive barriers (strong disagreement over the issues, perceived incompatibility of interests, serious differences about the “facts” or circumstances)
- Procedural barriers (existence of impasse, absence of a forum for negotiating)

Although many disputes meet these formal criteria, getting mediation started turns out to be something of a challenge. In interpersonal disputes of all kinds, one-third to two-thirds of those given the opportunity to use formal mediation decline it. It is also apparent that in work settings where informal mediation could be used (as by a manager), the would-be mediator declines to intervene, looks the other way, or chooses to employ power and authority rather than the skills of facilitation. Characteristics of the social environment, the disputing parties, and the potential mediator are among the variables that determine whether or not mediation occurs.
Characteristics of the Social Environment. Anthropologists have shown that in many nonindustrial societies the community is frequently unwilling to tolerate the disruption in social life that would be triggered by intense conflicts between clans having many cross-cutting kinship ties. In such cases, much social pressure may be brought to bear for the parties to mediate, and powerful community leaders are likely to be involved in making sure that mediation occurs and that the parties take it seriously.

There are, of course, notable instances in our own society in which mediation is socially mandated, as in labor laws that require mediation once bargaining has reached an impasse. Less formal but equally powerful mandates occur, as when a judge to a small claims or divorce dispute “suggests” to the parties that they try mediation before proceeding to a judicial hearing. One of the important research findings is that such pressure does not appear to decrease the effectiveness of divorce, small claims, or neighborhood mediation.

In work settings, the environment may work for and against the use of mediation. Support for the process comes from, say, an organization’s need to get work done by means of a task force comprising individuals or groups with equal standing and no common superior. Conflict frequently erupts in such a group and poses an opportunity for informal mediation for a manager with conflict resolution skills. On the other hand, although the modern organization is comfortable with the notion of conflict with its competitors, it is often much less disposed to acknowledge that conflict exists within the organization. Managers often behave accordingly, preferring conflict-avoidant strategies to mediation. They are inclined to bolster these approaches by defining conflicts as being rooted in the parties’ personalities and thus not amenable to resolution.

The most extensive analysis of the pervasive importance of social forces on the likelihood that mediation services will be used comes from studies of the reaction within federal agencies to the government’s ambitious efforts to promote alternative dispute resolution methods, beginning with the enactment by Congress of the Administrative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Act in 1990. The act did not require, but strongly encouraged all federal agencies to consider using alternative dispute resolution. The response was highly uneven, with some federal agencies implementing ambitious and widely used mediation programs and others reacting in a much more tepid or resistant manner. Nabatchi (forthcoming) and Bingham (2004) describe the panoply of social factors associated with this diverse response.

Part of the variability in response was due to the legislation itself, which provided no sanctions for failing to implement ADR programs and no additional funding to mount them. In addition, although the legislation designated the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and a newly created Working Group on ADR to facilitate the spread of ADR programs, neither had much authority, experience, or resources to do so.
Despite this ambivalent initiative, the use of mediation to resolve employment disputes has gained wide acceptability within the U.S. Postal Service, the federal government’s largest employer. Among the reasons: the long, well-established history of employment mediation within the federal government; the largely intraorganizational nature of employment disputes, which allows agencies such as the Post Office to reap the benefits of ADR directly; the development of a unified and heavily promoted nationwide system of mediation; and strong external pressure to implement ADR (for example, the General Accounting Office and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission both strongly pressed the Postal Service to do a better job of resolving EEO complaints).

By contrast, mediation programs have been largely resisted in the area of civil enforcement (for example, environmental disputes). In this domain there was a very limited prior history of mediation and no external “champions” pressuring federal agencies to use mediation. In addition, such cases typically involved powerful external actors (e.g., citizens groups, other agencies of government), many of whom exercised either political oversight or the ability to expose the agency to unfavorable publicity in highly complex, controversial, and polarized disputes.

**Perceptions of the Disputants.** A decision to mediate often depends on the parties’ attitudes toward alternative means of attaining their objectives. Thus, a nation may choose to mediate when the human and financial costs of continuing conflict become too high; divorcing parents may mediate as a preferred alternative to the expense and unpredictability of relying entirely on lawyers and the court. In divorce mediation, a modicum of goodwill also appears helpful in making the commitment to mediate. Compared to nonmediating divorcing couples, those who choose mediation have a more positive view of their spouse, more optimism about the prospects for cooperating as parents, and greater willingness to accept responsibility for the marital breakup.

The choice of mediation may also hinge on whether a party perceives that the mediator has leverage with the adversary. Thus, industrial mediators report that management sometimes prefers a mediator with whom the union is very comfortable if they perceive that the union is being inflexible. In the sphere of international mediation, the classic illustration is Egypt’s eagerness to have its 1974 dispute with Israel mediated by the United States because of its known affinities with and strong economic influence over Israel. Receptivity to mediation may also be a function of the justice orientation of the party; a disputant with a strong desire for revenge is likely to find mediation unappealing because of the wish to retaliate.

**Characteristics of the Potential Mediator.** The crucial distinction here is between contractual and emergent mediation. In contractual mediation, the
mediator is an outsider with whom the parties contract for the specific purpose of helping them resolve their dispute. The contractual mediator’s relationship with the parties usually ends when the mediation ends. Moore (1996) points out that this form of mediation is common in cultures with an independent judiciary that provides a model of fair procedures and use of third parties as impartial decision makers.

In emergent mediation, the parties and the mediator are part of a continuing relational set with enduring ties to one another. Emergent mediation is found in families, friendship groups, organizations of all kinds, and international relations. Emergent mediators often have a strong vested interest in the outcome of the dispute (for example, family stability), are usually willing and able to mobilize considerable social and other pressure toward resolving the conflict, and maintain ongoing ties to the parties after the mediation effort ends.

In the contractual case, getting mediation started is comparatively straightforward. All that is required is that the disputants (or a party such as the court that controls their interests) decide on mediation. In emergent mediation, by contrast, potential mediators may decline to serve even if the parties wish assistance, or the parties themselves may need to be persuaded to mediate. For these reasons, mediator characteristics are especially important in determining whether emergent mediation occurs.

Third parties may choose to mediate if important interests of their own are at stake. Thus, in organizational settings managers are willing to take on the mediational role if an important agreement between organizational task forces is being negotiated; in an international conflict, nation-states are willing to mediate to protect or extend their own spheres of influence. Whether in international politics or in communal affairs, powerful mediators with self-interested motives for mediating a conflict are more likely than less powerful ones to be able to convince (or oblige) the disputants to make use of their services.

There is also some evidence about variables that deter third parties from mediating. In organizational settings, mediation does not appear to be a popular choice among managers, despite some lip service to the contrary. Speculation about why this is so includes lack of training in mediational skills for managers and the perception that the informal mediational role is not generally valued in organizations or may not be highly visible to the would-be mediator’s superiors. There is also evidence that third parties decline to mediate if they feel there is little likelihood of a win-win solution (little common ground) or if they are not concerned about whether the parties attain their aspirations.

**Mediator Behavior**

It is impossible to give a universally accurate account of what transpires in mediation since the process occurs across so many domains of conflict and since mediators often strive for quite contrasting goals, ranging from settling the
**Figure 32.1** Twelve Stages of Mediator Moves.

Stage 7: Defining issues and setting an agenda
- Identify broad topic areas of concern to the parties
- Obtain agreement on the issues to be discussed
- Determine the sequence for handling the issues

Stage 8: Uncovering hidden interests of the disputing parties
- Identify the substantive, procedural, and psychological interests of the parties
- Educate the parties about each other's interests

Stage 9: Generating options for settlement
- Develop an awareness among the parties of the need for multiple options
- Lower commitment to positions or sole alternatives
- Generate options using either positional or interest-based bargaining

Stage 10: Assessing options for settlement
- Review the interests of the parties
- Assess how interests can be met by available options
- Assess the costs and benefits of selecting options

Stage 11: Final bargaining
- Reach agreement through incremental convergence of positions, final leaps to package settlements, development of a consensual approach, or establishment of procedural means to reach substantive agreement

Stage 12: Achieving formal settlement
- Identify procedural steps to operationalize the agreement
- Establish an evaluation-and-monitoring procedure
- Formalize the settlement and create an enforcement-and-commitment mechanism
substantive issues narrowly defined to accomplishing broad relational, psychological, or social objectives. It is also becoming increasingly evident that differences among mediators are not idiosyncratic, but are shaped in systematic ways by the social context in which they work and the types of disputes they handle. In an important sense all mediation is “local.” (I shall consider this issue in more detail in my subsequent discussion of mediator style).

Despite these matters, researchers and reflective practitioners have captured certain regularities in mediator behavior. Most of the knowledge on this subject is derived from studying the contractual mediator operating in what may be loosely described as a problem-solving model, oriented to ending a dispute with legal or quasilegal overtones, as in a labor conflict or divorce.

In describing mediator behavior, I use a typology that I first developed while studying experienced labor mediators. With modifications, the typology has also been used to describe other forms of mediation (Kressel, 1972, 1985; Kressel and Deutsch, 1977; Kressel and Pruitt, 1985; Carnevale, Lim, and McLaughlin, 1989). It divides mediator behavior into reflexive, contextual, and substantive strategies. Mediator behavior also varies in the degree of assertiveness, a dimension that cuts across these three categories. Here I am not attempting a comprehensive catalogue in each area but rather trying to convey the overall flavor. The reader wishing detailed accounts may consult the works cited in this paragraph.

Before proceeding, I want to make two preliminary observations that may be helpful. First, any typology of mediator behavior involves obvious oversimplifications. Mediation is a fluid, multifaceted activity in which the same act may serve several purposes. Second, it is commonplace among practitioners that successful mediation is a structured activity proceeding in distinctive stages, with various mediator behaviors predominating in each stage. Empirical evidence supports this general proposition, although the precise number and characteristics of such stages may vary considerably, depending on the nature of the parties involved, the complexity of the conflict, and the skills of the mediator. Thus, Figure 32.1 presents Moore’s twelve-stage model (1996) for professional mediators dealing with complex conflicts, while Exhibit 32.1 (Deutsch and Brickman, 1994) presents a simpler stage model for students, parents, or other nonprofessionals to use in mediating simple conflicts.

**Reflexive Interventions.** By reflexive intervention, I refer to mediators’ efforts to orient themselves to the dispute and to establish the groundwork on which later activities will be built. Of necessity, they are of primary importance early in mediation, although they occur throughout. Establishing rapport and diagnosis are the most important of the reflexive strategies.

Absent rapport with the parties, mediators can hope to accomplish little. Among the many things mediators can do to establish rapport, we may include
Exhibit 32.1 A Mediation Outline for Parents.

I. Introduction
1. Get the quarreling children’s or adolescents’ attention.
2. Ask them if they want help in solving their problem.
3. If they do, move to a “quiet area” to talk.
4. Explain and get their agreement to four rules:
   • Agree to solve the problem.
   • Do not use name calling.
   • Do not interrupt.
   • Be as honest as possible.

II. Listening
5. Decide which child will speak first.
6. Ask Child #1 what happened, how he or she feels, and his or her reasons.
7. Repeat what Child #1 said so that Child #2 can understand.
8. Ask Child #2 what happened, how he or she feels, and his or her reasons.
9. Repeat what Child #2 said so that Child #1 can understand.

III. Solution
10. Ask Child #1 what he or she can do here and now.
11. Ask Child #2 what he or she can do here and now.
12. Ask Child #1 what he or she can do differently in the future if the same problem arises.
13. Ask Child #2 what he or she can do differently in the future if the same problem arises.
14. Help the children agree on a solution they both think is fair.

IV. Wrap up
15. Put the agreement in writing, read agreement out loud if necessary, and have both sign it.
16. Congratulate them both.


giving a convincing and credible introduction to the mediation process and the role of the mediator, conveying sincere concern about the dispute, showing empathic understanding of each side, and behaving evenhandedly. Although rapport building is a central tenet of the practitioner community, it does not receive wide attention from researchers. Such strategies are associated with favorable outcomes in studies of labor mediation and mediation of interpersonal disputes in a community justice center.
Maintaining neutrality toward the parties and impartiality about the issues is often invoked as the sine qua non of rapport building and effective mediation generally, but as we have seen, many mediators (especially those of the emergent variety) hold decided preferences and biases and are often selected by the parties for precisely this reason. Perhaps more crucial than neutrality and impartiality is mediator acceptability, the route to which appears to be through rapport-building activities.

Before they can intervene effectively, mediators must also educate themselves about the dispute and the disputing parties. Among the diagnostic tasks we may count deciding—with the parties’ input—whether or not mediation is an appropriate and mutually acceptable forum (in a case of extreme power imbalance or where there is a history of violence and intimidation, it may not be), separating the manifest from the latent (and more genuine) issues, identifying the real leaders and power brokers (in complex, multiparty disputes), and understanding the relationship dynamics between the parties. Among the mediator’s common diagnostic tactics are use of sustained interrogatories (often in conjunction with separate caucuses with each side, where “sensitive” questions can be asked easily) and keen observation of the parties’ behavior in joint sessions.

**Contextual Interventions.** Contextual interventions refer to the mediator’s attempts to produce a climate conducive to constructive dialogue and problem solving. This class of strategy embodies the traditional view that a mediator ought to be a catalyst and facilitator, not an arm-twister or proponent of a specific solution. Among the contextual strategies, we may include improving communications, establishing norms for respectful listening and language, managing anger constructively, maintaining the privacy of negotiations, educating the parties about the negotiating process, and establishing mutually acceptable procedures for fact finding. There is evidence that many of these behaviors, especially those associated with improving communication flow, are associated with favorable mediation outcome.

Structural intervention, such as deciding who should be present at negotiation sessions and conducting separate meetings with the parties (caucusing), may also be used as a method of “climate control.” Using the caucus is both common and somewhat controversial. The majority of practitioners see caucusing as an essential mediation tool for managing intense emotions, getting at sensitive information, and overcoming impasse. But some mediators avoid the caucus on the grounds that it fosters distrust between the parties, places an undue burden on the mediator for maintaining confidentiality, and engenders secrecy and scheming. Research on mediation of interpersonal disputes in a community justice center (Pruitt, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Fry, 1989) documents that mediators spent approximately one-third of their time in caucus and tended to do so when hostility
was high and positions rigid. Although the caucus was used by many disputants as an occasion to bad-mouth the other side to the mediator, the results were a strong decline in direct hostility between the parties and an increase in problem-solving activity. More equivocal results for the caucus have been reported in labor mediation under particularly unfavorable conditions (unmotivated parties, large positional differences, and high hostility), where mediators sometimes fared better by eschewing the caucus altogether.

**Substantive Interventions.** Substantive interventions refer to tactics by which the mediator deals directly with the issues in dispute. All mediators are obliged to deal with the issues in some way, although some philosophies of the mediator’s role deemphasize a substantive, problem-solving focus in favor of relational objectives, such as increased understanding of self and other (Bush and Folger, 1994). Competence at formulating an overarching strategic direction for the negotiations—a flexible plan for reaching agreement informed by a sound understanding of each party’s interests, constraints, and limitations—is considered a central cognitive ability for the mediator in models that emphasize a problem-solving focus (Honoroff, Matz, and O’Connor, 1990). Certain contexts appear to promote a substantive focus for the mediator. This appears to be the case for mediators who work directly in the shadow of the law, such as divorce mediators or judges who elect to play a mediational role as part of pretrial conferencing.

Research on mediator behavior suggests three distinct but overlapping substantive domains for mediator activity: issue identification and agenda setting, proposal shaping, and proposal making. Mediator interventions in all of these domains have been associated with favorable mediation outcomes, although the pattern is not always uniform.

There is also increasing awareness of the importance of substantive activities aimed at increasing the probability that agreements reached in mediation are implemented and complied with. The risk of noncompliance may rise with increasing number and complexity of the issues, the number of parties involved, the level of tension and distrust between the disputants, the strength and number of internal factions within each party whose cooperation is needed to implement the agreement, and the length of time during which the obligations set forth in the agreement must be performed (Moore, 1996). Among the important substantive activities of the mediator in this final stage of agreement implementation, we may include assistance in selling the agreement to various constituencies, help in developing criteria and procedures for monitoring and evaluating compliance, procedures for dealing with intentional or unwitting noncompliance, encouraging a return to mediation if disagreements arise during the implementation stage, and preparing the parties to maintain their agreements in the face of opposition and resistance from extremist factions (Coleman and Deutsch, 1995).
**Assertiveness.** Assertiveness refers to how forcefully the mediator behaves in the reflexive, contextual, or substantive domain. It describes a continuum ranging from mild and nondirective at one end to forceful and highly directive at the other. Assertive behavior is most common in the substantive domain. Mediators frequently engage in arm-twisting to persuade reluctant parties to accept particular agreements, particularly during the later phases of mediation. Reflexive and contextual activities are not generally insistent, but even here mediators can act forcefully to overcome obstacles. Thus, judicious diagnostic questioning can yield to demanding and pointed interrogatories if the mediator suspects dishonesty or concealment; interventions aimed at improving the flow of communications and fostering mutual understanding can become stern and confrontational if one or both parties persist abrasively or provocatively.

Although the practitioner literature conveys a decidedly ambivalent attitude about behaviors at the assertive end of the spectrum, it is clear that pressure tactics are commonly used, especially if the dispute involves very high levels of tension and hostility, if a mediator’s own interests or values are at stake, if the mediator is under strong institutional pressure to avoid the costs of adjudication, or if the mediator wields power over the disputants (a far-from-rare occurrence in some settings, as with judicial mediators). It is also clear from the research literature and more than a few case studies that assertive and even downright heavy-handed and coercive mediator tactics are often effective in producing settlements, particularly if conflict is intense and positions badly polarized. What is not yet clear are the long-term effects of exercising such pressure, particularly on compliance and future willingness to use mediation.

**Mediator Style**

Although most empirical studies of mediator behavior have focused on discrete intervention of the kinds just summarized, it is clear that mediators also have distinctive stylistic leanings. Mediator style refers to a cohesive set of strategies that characterize the conduct of a case. Mediators typically have an espoused commitment to a particular approach to the mediation role, but there is evidence that they are often unaware of their actual stylistic (behavioral) inclinations and that many of them tend to enact the same style from case to case, despite variety in issues and dynamics.

Research on mediator stylistic preferences is still in its early stages and any summary is bound to oversimplify and ignore significant areas of overlap among mediators practicing in broadly different styles. However, a discussion of mediator stylistic differences alerts us to the distinctively different worlds of practice encompassed by the term “mediation” and the extent to which practice is powerfully shaped by context and experience. Most stylistic accounts portray the mediator acting in either a problem-solving or relational style.
The problem-solving style has long been the dominant mediation approach and, until fairly recently, the presumptive “official” style of nearly all mediators. It gives priority to unblocking the parties’ stalled efforts to reach agreements (the “problem” to be solved) through the mediator’s active grappling with the issues in the form of shaping and making proposals and the liberal application of pressure tactics. The style is often combined with skepticism about the parties’ ability to deal with each other and a corresponding sense that the mediator needs to do the lion’s share of the work, often through caucusing. The problem-solving approach frequently characterizes mediation of highly polarized disputes in which the costs of unabated conflict are onerous or when the time available for mediation is limited. Within the problem-solving mode three major stylistic subtypes can be identified: facilitative, evaluative, and strategic.

In the facilitative subtype (Riskin, 1996) mediators focus on helping the parties identify and express their underlying interests and needs, on the assumption that so doing will bring to the surface underlying compatibilities or areas for trade-offs and compromises. Mediator neutrality is emphasized, both in regard to the parties and to how issues are resolved (as long as agreements are acceptable to all sides). This is the classic integrative approach to agreement seeking enshrined in Fisher, Ury, and Patton’s (1981) best-selling, Getting to Yes. It is also the most popular philosophy of the mediator’s role, albeit one that is frequently contradicted by empirical studies of mediator behavior. The facilitative approach appears to be most often used in complex disputes involving parties with an ongoing relationship (for example, divorcing spouses) and multiple tangible and intangible issues.

The evaluative subtype (Riskin, 1996) is a more distributive version of the problem-solving approach. In this variant the mediator’s implicit assumption is that the primary obstacle to settlement is the parties’ unrealistic confidence in the validity of their respective positions. A primary job of the mediator is to provide the parties with a more balanced and realistic positional assessment. The approach is often highly directive and appears most common in settings where the disputants have no ongoing relationship, are contending around a single issue, usually money (for example, in small claims or general civil court cases), and where there is an emphasis on speedy resolutions to conserve time and money (as in many court settings). The model is often favored by mediators used to exercising considerable decision-making authority (such as judges or former judges).

The strategic subtype is far less commonly discussed in the mediation literature, perhaps because it rests on an assumption alien to the labor relations and legal traditions from which professional mediation arose: namely that destructive conflict is often the result of powerful latent causes of which the parties are unaware. A primary focus of the strategically oriented mediator is to help the parties identify such causes and modify them to the extent necessary to produce agreements.
on substantive issues. The approach is associated with mediators who have had training in disciplines where the notion of latent causes is familiar (e.g., psychotherapy or organizational development) and who work with parties who are deeply interdependent and have the time, capacity, and motivation to engage in the requisite analytic work.

Strategic approaches were first reported in divorce mediation (Kressel, and others, 1994), where they are sometimes referred to as “therapeutic” models (Irving and Benjamin, 1995; Johnston and Campbell, 1988; Smyth and Moloney, 2003), but they appear viable in organizational contexts as well. In intensive case studies I conducted with Howard Gadlin and his colleagues at the Office of the Ombudsman at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (Kressel and Gadlin, 2005), the strategic approach was the “default” intervention style. The NIH ombudsmen had become adept at recognizing and addressing three primary latent causes of dysfunctional conflict: impaired communication patterns (typically avoidance or coercion), a blocked trajectory toward scientific autonomy in the mentor-protégé relationship, and systemic dysfunction (for example, ineffectual leadership) in the unit in which the conflict was occurring. The preference for the strategic model appeared to be significantly augmented by the ombudsmen’s repeated opportunities as institutional “insiders” to develop expertise in recognizing these latent causes, their formal responsibility for facilitating systemic change within NIH, and their regular consultation with each other in the management of cases.

Relational Styles. In contrast to problem-solving styles, relational styles focus less on agreement making and more on opening lines of communication and clarifying underlying feelings and perceptions. Relational styles are of relatively recent origin and gain at least some of their impetus from a dissatisfaction with the perceived limitations of the problem-solving approach. They tend to be optimistic about the parties’ ability to manage their own affairs and emphasize the need of the parties to work through to their own solution. The orientation is ordinarily combined with interest in improving the parties’ long-term relationship and has a strongly humanistic flavor. Transformational (Bush and Folger, 1994), narrative (Monk and Winslade, 2001) and victim-offender mediation (Umbriet, 2001) are examples.

Transformational mediation is perhaps the best articulated, and certainly the most popular, of the relational approaches to the mediation role. It is popular in community mediation settings and has served as the basis for the U.S. Postal Service’s ambitious and successful approach to managing employee grievances (Bingham, 2003). The transformational mediator’s allegiance is to the twin objectives of empowerment and recognition. Empowerment refers to strengthening each party’s ability to analyze its respective needs in the conflict and to make effective decisions; recognition refers to improving the capacity of the
disputants to become responsive to the needs and perspectives of the other. The approach is avowedly critical of mediator activities to produce settlement, direct problem solving, or substitute mediator judgment or analysis for that of the parties. All of these activities are felt to narrow the parties’ opportunity for self-reflection, mutual recognition, and enhancement of autonomy.

Despite the polemical tone that often characterizes discussions of problem-solving and relational styles, the degree to which they occur in their “pure” forms in actual practice is largely undetermined. Polemical claims notwithstanding, there is also no empirical evidence for preferring one mediation style over another. Comparative studies, pitting well-defined stylistic models against each other in disputes with well-delineated characteristics, have yet to be conducted.

Another interesting question is the degree to which mediators adjust their style in relationship to dispute characteristics. Research on the subject is limited. In labor mediation there is evidence for both stylistic invariance (Kolb, 1983) and stylistic flexibility (Shapiro, Drieghe, and Brett, 1985). A flexible approach would seem desirable, since disputes can very widely, even within the same domain. (See Chapter Thirty-Seven of this book for a discussion of “contingent” approaches). In the NIH study ombudsmen had a preference for the strategic problem-solving approach, but switched to a narrower tactical approach (facilitative or evaluative) depending upon a diagnostic assessment of whether or not latent causes were fueling the conflict and of the parties capacity and motivation to address such matters if they were present.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING CONFLICT**

I divide my thoughts on the practical meaning of our knowledge about mediation into two segments: the relevance of this knowledge for the user (or would-be user) of mediation and its relevance for the mediation practitioner.

**Implications for the Mediation User**

Although mediation has become more familiar in recent years, this chapter reviews evidence that its use is often hindered by ignorance, resistance, and a lack of social support. Embroiled parties and the individuals with formal or informal authority over them can do a number of things to offset these tendencies.

**Encourage Use of Mediation.** Whereas research indicates that mediation is effective in many conflicts, parties are often reluctant to try it because they are unfamiliar with the process and distrustful of their adversary. For this reason,
exercising tactful but firm pressure on antagonists to try mediation is often extremely helpful. Those in a position to exercise such pressure can take comfort from the evidence that it has not been found damaging to the mediation process, so long as the parties retain the right to withdraw from mediation at any time.

A more pervasive issue is the unavailability of mediation in many settings, particularly in the workplace. There are at least two things that people with organizational authority can do in this regard. The first is to promote establishment of formal mediation services. Typical settings for such services are part of a human resource department or ombuds office, but other creative locations can be found (in one university, a faculty development center became the locus for informal mediation of faculty disputes). Such services need to respect confidentiality and privacy, and the employee mediators need assurances that their work is valued.

A second way to foster use of mediation in the workplace is to give managers mediation training. Such education can be useful in helping them make informed and appropriate referrals to mediation and in promoting the acceptance of mediation services, as happened in the U.S. Postal Services nationwide employee mediation program (Bingham, 2003). Mediation training can also empower managers and other emergent mediators to intervene directly in conflict between subordinates in new and productive ways. Although managers often fear to mediate the conflicts of their subordinates on the grounds that they are not “neutral,” it is clear that neutrality is not a sine qua non for effective mediation. More important is acceptability built on rapport and the mediator’s evenhandedness. These qualities depend on skills and attitudes basic to all good human interaction: active listening, patient inquiry, respect for differences, skepticism about win-lose solutions, and avoidance of premature closure whenever complex issues and feelings are involved. People taught such skills and attitudes as part of a mediation training program often report general improvement in their interactions with others, quite apart from their usefulness in mediation proper.

Be Prepared to Participate. Voluntarily seeking or accepting referral to mediation is almost always a sensible thing to do in any conflict. Disputants should enter mediation willing to suspend distrust and competitive stratagems at least long enough to give the process a chance. It is also important to keep in mind that active participation in the mediation process is likely to produce benefits even if a comprehensive settlement is not reached. Benefits include such things as gaining a clearer perspective on your interests and objectives as well as those of the other, making progress toward agreement on some issues, and the satisfaction of knowing that a thorough and sincere effort to work collaboratively has been made. In addition, parties who have made a good faith initial effort at
mediation often return to the process later in the trajectory of their dispute, with positive results.

Managers and others with authority over the disputants should also be receptive to participating directly in the mediation process if invited to do so, since many conflicts are a reflection of broad dynamics that the parties alone may have limited ability to influence. Authoritative third parties often have knowledge or resources that can greatly expand the opportunities for creative problem solving in such circumstances.

**Accept a Broad Definition of the Mediation Role.** Mediation comes in a great range of strategies and styles, and all appear useful under some circumstances. This fact contrasts with the mythic beliefs—strangely persistent among many mediators—that a proper mediator must be neutral, nondirective, and impartial or that a particular style is suitable for any and all disputes. The consumer of mediation services needs to be aware of the pluralistic world of practice. The important thing in judging the suitability of a given mediator—and we are always talking about that, not some abstract, uniform process—is to be able to give positive answers to some basic questions: Does the mediator communicate a reasonable definition of his or her role? appear evenhanded? make you feel safe? understood? free to make your own decisions?

**Implications for the Practitioner**

Mediation is an inordinately stressful social role. Mediators work under conditions that are often emotionally unpleasant, and they usually work in isolation. The role also contains contradictory and ill-defined elements and is often poorly understood by disputants and referral sources alike. (Detailed discussion of the nature and consequences of role stress for the mediator may be found in Kressel, 1985; and Kolb and others, 1994). Mediator stress is further compounded by the lack of proven theory on many central issues of professional behavior. Three practical implications for avoiding mediator burnout can be drawn: maintain realistic expectations, develop awareness of your own role and stylistic preferences, and become a reflective practitioner.

**Maintain Realistic Expectations.** Like the participants in mediation, the mediator too should have realistic expectations for success. Since so much depends on the motivation and circumstances of the parties, do not expect every case to settle; as many as one-third or more do not, regardless of your best efforts. Settlement mania is an unfortunate occupational hazard among mediators, who need to bear in mind that disputants often derive benefits from mediation independent of their ability to reach agreement and that parties leaving mediation without an agreement but with a good feeling about the process and the
mediator often return at a later point when their motivation and circumstances are more suitable to using the process effectively.

**Know Your Own Style and Role Preferences.** Mediator activity is driven by strong, if sometimes unarticulated, ideas about how the mediation role should be enacted. There is evidence that some of these role interpretations may be superior to others for certain types of conflict, but our knowledge about these matters is sketchy. It is important that mediators become aware of their own role predilections. A mediator without this kind of self-awareness may be particularly vulnerable to unrealistic expectations for success and to social pressure from referral sources and others to produce settlements. Being clear about your own vision of the role also helps you give the parties appropriate expectations of what mediation requires of them—a crucial matter since disputants often enter the process with notions that are either vague or unacceptable (to you) of what will happen. For example, my colleagues and I tried to be clear with the divorcing couples referred to us by the family court that we saw our primary role as helping orchestrate a good problem-solving process, more or less independent of the goal of settlement (the problem-solving style discussed earlier). We did our best to socialize the parties to this version of the mediation role, but if they had other motives from which they could not be dissuaded (to reach a speedy agreement, or to give cover to a behind-the-scenes deal, or to extract revenge or expiate guilt), we learned to tactfully refer the case back to the attorneys and the court.

**Become a Reflective Practitioner.** Although not every case can reach resolution, every case can be an occasion for reflective learning. A reflective practitioner can also make an important contribution to conflict theory since practitioners often have much intuitive wisdom about the dynamics of conflict that inform their strategic choices that they are not necessarily able to articulate without special procedures. For example, when I began my work with Howard Gadlin at NIH, the ombudsmen were dubious that they had well-defined stylistic preferences. Our reflective case study procedures revealed that in the actual conduct of their mediations with NIH scientists they had, in fact, two implicit, but well-delineated mediator intervention schemas: a strategic style, described earlier, aimed at identifying and addressing underlying sources of conflict, and a more tactical approach, focusing on the issues as identified by the parties and eschewing the examination of any “deeper” dynamics. In addition, our reflective procedures revealed that the ombudmen shared implicit, but discernible decision rules governing which schema to employ in a given case. Cultivating habits of systematic reflection can make this kind of knowledge explicit and available for systematic study.
Reflective learning can be done in many ways, but a number of suggestions may be helpful (a detailed account of these ideas is found in Kressel, 1997). First, be systematic. Try to think reflectively after every session where possible, or certainly at the conclusion of mediation. Reflection can be made systematic with the help of even very simple debriefing protocols. Among the items that such a protocol might include are questions about the characteristics of the parties or their circumstances that appeared to facilitate or inhibit the mediation process, and interventions or strategies that were particularly helpful or unhelpful. Much of what occurs in mediation is relatively familiar and uneventful. Periodically, however, puzzling, unanticipated, vexatious, or transforming episodes occur for which training and prior experience provide no ready answers. These “indeterminate zones of practice” (Schön, 1983) represent the greatest challenge to professional competence. Reflective case study protocols can be tailored to help identify and understand them.

Second, reflect with others. Interaction with others can enrich reflective learning; indeed, it may be a precondition for it. A reflective partner or team can also serve as at least a provisional check on wishful or incomplete thinking and extend emotional as well as intellectual support. There are many ways to structure the interaction with teammates. Ideally, team meetings should be regular and give each member of the team an equal opportunity to debrief using the same reflective protocol to organize dialogue. A useful approach is to build the dialogue around persistent questioning of each other’s tactical choices. The best interrogatory moments are those in which the team is able to simultaneously convey a supportive stance toward the mediator whose case is being discussed, while pushing for articulation of hidden hunches about the conflict or the mediation role that produced the intervention being scrutinized. A typical series of queries might ask: “Why did you do (or not do) X?” “What were you thinking when you did X?” “Can you say more about the cues in the situation that led you to do that?” “Why didn’t you do Y or Z?”

Interestingly, team discourse of this kind relies on the same sort of skill that mediation requires: empathy, persistent questioning, attentive listening, curiosity about underlying ideas, and willingness to tactfully challenge positions. In this sense, a reflective team can help develop an explicit understanding of mediation theories in action, while simultaneously presenting an opportunity to practice the interpersonal skills needed in mediation.

The third suggestion is to formulate and test reflective hypotheses. No reflective method is immune to subjective bias or distortion, but the insights of reflection can be subject to a crude but useful verification procedure. The approach is essentially this: first, establish a reflective hypothesis based on observed similarities over a number of sessions or cases; second, at the next appropriate occasion, use the hypothesis to fashion a relevant mediation strategy; third,
evaluate the consequences of the intervention strategy. Did it make sense to the parties? reduce tensions? lead to creative problem solving?

My colleagues and I used this procedure to identify the central role of mediator question asking in divorce mediation. We noticed that even though we experienced a strong press to control conflict by using exhortations and advice, they appeared far less useful than persistent and focused queries on topics directly related to the focal conflict. A mediation strategy was formulated reflecting this possibility (“In the next session, try to avoid exhortations and suggestions. Instead, ask as many open-ended, relevant questions as you can think of”) and its effects observed. Several things became apparent. Asking good questions was easier said than done, there were distinctive types of questions that were useful for different purposes, and question asking was indeed a powerful vehicle for reducing tensions and moving the parties toward problem solving. Here again, the team discourse reinforced skills needed in mediation itself. In both contexts, it is important to develop hypotheses about underlying phenomena by persistent questioning and to devise strategies to test them.

Finally, make use of a reflective facilitator where possible. My experiences with the reflective case study method as a research tool in divorce mediation and in the mediation of disputes among scientists at the NIH indicates that, particularly in group settings, reflective learning can be impeded by evaluation apprehension, implicit pressures to maintain group cohesion, a proclivity for talking in abstractions rather than about concrete instances, and the need to tolerate extended periods of ambiguity and confusion about case meaning. The presence of a skilled facilitator who is not a formal member of the group can help the group cope with such obstacles by reinforcing the norms of reflective learning (for example, concreteness, supportive confrontation), by monitoring counterproductive group processes, and by helping to coalesce reflective insights in a timely way. The task of reflective facilitation, like any quasiclinical role, contains hazards of its own. There is an emerging need to develop the role as a subspecialty in its own right and to train people to cope with its demands.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING**

The ability to effectively manage conflict may well be considered one of the basic characteristics of the truly educated person. Training in mediation is an important subset of this ability. There is evidence that such training may profitably begin as early as the elementary school years. Ironically, although there is an extensive cottage industry in mediation skills training, much of it is geared to preparing contractual mediators to handle formalized conflict of the kind that typically ends up in court. Relatively speaking, training in generic mediation skills for the nonspecialist has been left to languish. This is doubly unfortunate,
since conflict in the workplace, school, home, and community is ubiquitous and would often respond well to mediation—if only there were a mediator prepared to handle it! Several implications for training the nonspecialist in mediation may be derived from the material presented in this chapter.

**Train Leadership**

The most effective way to multiply the benefits of mediation training is to offer the training first and foremost to the leaders of a group or organization. Leaders who understand the mediation process can make effective and meaningful referrals to mediation within the organization, can stimulate others within the organization to acquire and use such training, and are likely to turn to mediation in the event that serious conflict arises. In addition, leaders often need the skills of mediation as much as others in an organization or group, if not more, because the power and authority that leaders possess often leads them away from collaborative modes of influence for resolving their differences with others. Mediation training can, in theory, reduce this tendency. In sum, organizations wishing to convey to the rank and file their serious commitment to collaborative conflict management can send no clearer message than to train their leaders.

**Teach a Hierarchy of Mediation Concepts and Skills**

We are still far from a complete understanding of which mediator activities and styles are most appropriate under which conditions of conflict, but for training purposes it is obviously useful to distinguish between two broad classes of intervention: foundational and higher-order activities. Foundational activities are the reflexive and contextual interventions by which mediators establish rapport and provide a meaningful negotiating structure within a collaborative (rather than adversarial) set of norms. Skill in active listening and the ability to gather information about the dispute and the parties’ perspectives on it are the most salient foundational activities. Foundational activities also rest on mastery of certain basic concepts, such as the importance of distinguishing interests from positions and the primacy of situational forces rather than personality attributes in fostering destructive conflict. In problem-solving models, the higher-order activities are substantive and assertive behaviors by which mediators interject themselves forcefully into a conflict and play an active role in the problem-solving process, including imparting strategic direction to negotiations and shaping the substantive proposals.

Although the more vigorous higher-order activities are often necessary in an intensely polarized dispute, the foundational skills and concepts are often sufficient to produce a collaborative orientation in the low- to moderate-intensity conflict that permeates organizational and group life. They also have broad general utility for trainees, quite apart from their usefulness in mediation. For these
reasons, the foundational skills should be emphasized in mediation training programs where training time is limited, as is especially likely if the trainees are organizational or community leaders.

Create a Supportive Environment for Reflective Learning

Learning the skills of mediation, including the foundational skills, requires direct practice and active learning through role play and simulation. These are often done to greatest collective profit in a fishbowl setting, where the entire group can share the same experience and compare ideas and reactions. Practicing skills in front of others also duplicates some of the tension associated with actual practice; for this reason it is often highly valued by trainees for its verisimilitude. However, such a context also stirs anxiety and evaluation apprehension, which can be inimical to skill development and inhibit a reflective stance toward the learning experience. There are many ways to conduct experiential learning to produce a supportive and reflective learning environment. A four-stage schema for debriefing mediation role play has proved useful in this regard, and I describe it here for illustrative purposes.

Reflective debriefing of a role play begins with a “ventilation” stage, during which the person who has been the mediator is encouraged to describe immediate feelings and impressions associated with the role play. The trainee is instructed to emphasize spontaneity (“here and now” feelings) and to deemphasize cerebral analysis. It is meant partly to be cathartic and partly to begin the reflective process. The other trainees are encouraged to respond to the target person by exercising empathic listening skills; they are also instructed to avoid critical evaluation or advice giving.

There then follows a stage of supportive feedback, during which members of the training group are asked to praise the mediator for things that were done well during the role play, with the injunction to be as specific and concrete in their remarks as possible (not “You were calm” but “When one of the parties challenged your lack of experience as a mediator, you answered nondefensively and reasonably”).

Once all supportive feedback has been given, a third, reflective stage begins. The target person is instructed to describe any source of puzzlement, frustration, or surprise that occurred during the role play. Once again, the other trainees are required to respond in an empathic, nonevaluative manner. They are also encouraged to ask questions that may help clarify the underlying issues raised, and to offer suggestions to the mediator role player on strategies for handling them.

A final, implementation, stage follows, with a return to the role play and an attempt to make use of any lessons learned from the reflective debriefing. Throughout the process, the trainer (1) ensures that trainees adhere to the debriefing procedures and (2) models appropriate behavior and attitude.
CONCLUSION

The empirical and practitioner literatures of more than two decades make clear that mediation is an important and useful instrument for managing many forms of social and interpersonal conflict. Mediation is of documented value for conflicts occupying a broad middle range of difficulty, but for highly polarized disputes as well it can bring distinctive benefits even if settlement is not reached. They include reducing tension, clarifying issues, and humanizing the adversary. Research and practice have also identified the structured, if never precisely predictable, stages that constitute the mediation process and the skills, attitudes, and behaviors characterizing the mediator’s art. Certain of these skills and attributes (such as the ability to establish rapport with angry parties, gather information through sustained questioning, listen actively and empathetically to contending points of view, suspend judgment, and foster norms of collaboration) would seem of such demonstrable value that training in mediation can well be justified as part of the learning experience of the well-educated person.

My review also suggests some intriguing ironies. Thus, even though mediation is an empirically validated process, getting disputants to use it often amounts to a hard sell, requiring the persuasive powers of a court or application of other powerful social and cultural pressures. A second irony: most of our knowledge about mediation comes from the formal arena of legally definable conflicts; about use of mediation in the informal and ubiquitous conflicts of everyday life we know a good deal less. Here too, there is evidence that the process is underused. It also appears to be the case that for all its established value, those who assume the mediation role enter a world of significant ambiguity and stress, where the potential for burnout seems high. A final irony, or perhaps merely the inevitable result of a field still in its relative infancy, is that the successful mediation process is still something of a mystery, as is illustrated by argument over such things as the meaning and importance of mediator neutrality, the appropriateness of highly assertive mediator tactics, and the relative merits of problem-solving versus relational approaches to the mediation role.

This blend of positive findings, intriguing ironies, and demonstrable role stresses and ambiguities amounts to a rich opportunity for researchers and practitioners, especially those of the reflective variety, who can approach the conundrums and debates of the field in the same tolerant, focused, and inquisitive manner that characterizes the constructive mediation process itself. My broad overview also suggests a seminal role for the friends and supporters of mediation. By familiarizing themselves with mediation and encouraging its use, managers, parents, and leaders (of a community, an institution, a group) can transform mediation from a frequently untapped resource to a familiar and common instrument for resolving the disputes of everyday life.
Note


References


CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

Managing Conflict Through Large-Group Methods

Barbara Benedict Bunker

This chapter begins in practice and works backward toward the theoretical question: Are there situations where managing conflict is enough . . . in which our socialized desire for conflict resolution may be more than is really needed for joint action?

We live in a world in which our environment is continuously changing. Organizations and communities are constantly dealing with new developments and pressures. A predictable and stable world surrounding organizations and communities is a luxury we used to take for granted that no longer exists. In the United States, we are also living in communities and in organizations at work in which our diversity and our awareness of our differences in values, ethnicity, religion is increasing. Learning to manage these differences is becoming ever more important. This new situation requires organizations that are far more flexible and responsive than those in our past. It requires communities to develop ways of gathering people for input and planning immediately, not six months hence. It requires methods that can acknowledge and deal with differences, not suppress them in the service of homogeneity.

Over the last fifteen years, practitioners who consult with organizations and communities have developed large-group methods of working with “the whole system” in large groups. These remarkable Large-Group Methods allow groups from fifty to several thousand to gather and work together. Billie Alban, an internationally known organization development (OD) practitioner and I have been studying these methods since the early 1990s. Our book, Large Group Interventions: Engaging
the Whole System for Rapid Change (Bunker and Alban, 1997) is a conceptual overview of twelve major methods, what underlies their effectiveness, and why they work. In March 2005, we edited a special issue of The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, which presented recent trends and developments in the use of these methods. This chapter represents our most recent thinking as we continue to develop our understanding of what these methods can do and how they work. The first three sections are about each of the types of methods now in use. The three types are Methods for Creating the Future, Methods of Work Design, and Methods for Discussion and Decision Making. After an explanation of each type of Large-Group Method and a case example, I will describe and speculate about the processes that allow conflict to be managed and sometimes resolved in these events. In the final section, underlying principles that make these methods effective in dealing with differences will be proposed.

WHAT ARE LARGE-GROUP INTERVENTION METHODS?

These methods are used in large-scale change to create changes such as a new strategic direction for a business or agency, the redesign of work in order to be more productive, or the resolution of some community or system-wide problem. In contrast to older methods where decisions were made by an executive group at the top of the business or in the mayor’s office, these methods gather those who are affected by the decision or actions to participate in the discussion and decision making. In business organizations, this might include employees, customers, suppliers, even competitors. In school districts, teachers, administrators and board members might be joined by students, parents, and community representatives. In a community, agencies, schools, churches, police, housing areas, local and state government might all be present. Depending on the nature of the issue, the questions are asked who is affected by this decision/action? Who has a stake in the outcome? The idea is to “get the whole system into the room” (all of the stakeholders) so that a new kind of dialogue about the situation they face can take place. The size of the group assembled is determined by the “critical mass” of people needed to bring about real change and is constrained by limitations of budget and the available meeting space.

Why bring together so many people? Why not let the decision makers do their jobs and make the decisions? This question leads us to the second major defining assumption of Large-Group Methods. The assumption is that when people have an opportunity to participate in shaping their future, they are more apt to sustain the change. “People support what they help to create.” These are very participative events. By participative, I mean that people express their views, they listen to others, they have “voice” and are heard. They do not necessarily make every decision, but they have the opportunity to influence others and the decisions.
Stakeholders in communities and organizations bring knowledge, values, and experience to these events. Often the kinds of decisions that face us today are enormously complex and need the best thinking and experience of all those involved, not just a few. Executives who participate in Large-Group Events for the first time are often moved by the amazing variety of talent and capacity in their organizations. They often make remarks like, “I had no idea how great and how talented the people in this organization are! It has been a revelation to me!”

Underlying these methods is an assumption that democratic processes are more effective for moving forward in a united direction than hierarchical or bureaucratic processes. This assumption closely matches Deutsch’s ideas about the values underlying collaboration and cooperation. (See Chapter Two.)

THREE TYPES OF LARGE-GROUP METHODS

In our original formulation (Bunker and Alban, 1992, 1997), we found that a useful way to organize these methods is by the outcomes that they produce. A brief description of each type with an anecdote that illustrates one of the methods follows.

Methods that Create the Future

Future Search (Weisbord and Janoff, 1995), the Appreciative Inquiry Summit (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr, and Griffin, 2003), the Search Conference (Emery and Purser, 1996), the Institute of Cultural Affairs Strategic Planning Process (Spencer, 1989), Real Time Strategic Change (also called Whole-Scale Change) (Jacobs, 1994; Dannemiller Tyson Associates, 2000), and AmericaSpeaks (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005) are six methods that gather systems to define and set goals for the future. (See Figures 33.1, 33.2, and 33.3 for brief summaries.) “What kind of school system do we want to be by 2005?” “What new market niche can we create in the next three years?” “What decisions shall we make about the Social Security system in the United States that will ensure its financial viability?” “How can we be a community with housing for all by 2010?” “How can agencies and funders collaborate to provide better mental health care in our community?” All these are appropriate theme questions for these future-oriented conferences.

Each future-oriented event is carefully planned by a group representing the sponsoring system working with a consultant who is expert in the method. For example, when I ran a Future Search for a small Jesuit college business school on what they needed to do about their curriculum to create a successful future for the MBA program, the planning committee included representatives from the dean’s office, faculty, staff, students, alumni, and business community. If the planning committee includes all the stakeholders, there is better understanding of what the system is like and helps anticipate conflicts that may emerge in the
large-group meeting. If there are unions, it is essential that they are part of the planning committee. Sometimes, some of the conflicts can even be resolved in the committee so that they do not emerge on the floor of the large group.

What are the meetings like? Here I wish I could show a video, but let me try to create the image in words. I am going to describe a Future Search that

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**THE SEARCH CONFERENCE**

Purpose: To create a future vision

*Merrellyn and Fred Emery*

- Set format: Environmental scan, history, present, future
- Criteria for participants: Within system boundary
- Theory: Participative democracy
- Search for common ground
- Rationalize conflict
- No experts
- Total community discussion
- 2.5-day minimum
- 35 to 40+ participants
- Larger groups = Multisearch Conference
- 1/3 total time is action planning

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**FUTURE SEARCH**

Purpose: To create a future vision

*Weisbord and Janoff*

- Set format: Past, present, future, action planning
- Stakeholder participation (no experts)
- Minimize differences
- Search for common ground
- Self-managed small groups
- 18 hours over 3 days
- 40 to 80+ participants
- Larger groups = Multisearch Conference

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**WHOLE-SCALE CHANGE**

Purpose: To create a preferred future with system-wide action planning

*Dannemiller and Jacobs*

- Format custom-designed to issue
- Highly structured and organized
- Theory: Beckhard Change Model
- Common database
- 2 to 3 days + follow-up events
- Use of outside experts as appropriate
- Use of small groups and total community
- Self-managed small groups
- 100 to 2,400 participants
- Logistics competence critical
- Daily participant feedback
- Planning committee and consultants design events

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**ICA STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS**

Purpose: Strategic planning

- Focus
- Question
- Implementation
- Timeline
- Practical Vision
- Strategic Actions
- Underlying Contradictions
- Strategic Directions
- Stakeholder participation
- 2 to 7 days
- 50 to 200 participants
- Planning committee and consultants design events

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**Figure 33.1** Large-Group Methods for Creating the Future.

Purpose: To engage community/citizen groups in a process of learning and discussion around important issues affecting these groups
Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer

- Format designed to engage the issues
- Participative democracy
- Full spectrum of stakeholders a basic requirement
- Laptop computers at each table to record discussion themes
- Keypads for voting for every participant
- Table facilitators structure discussion
- Overhead screens to display discussion themes and voting tallies
- Subject matter experts on call to discussion tables
- Several hundred to 5,000 participants
- Usually one day
- Extensive prep and setup work

Figure 33.2  A Large Group Method for Creating the Future

Purpose: To build the future on recognizing and expanding existing strengths
David Cooperrider

- Format similar to Future Search
- Participation not limited by number, includes stakeholders
- May be done over several days
- Four phases:
  Discovery: Interviews and storytelling surface positive strengths.
  Dream: Based on stories and interview data, group builds a desired future.
  Design: Group addresses the system changes needed to support the desired future.
  Delivery: Group plans for implementing and sustaining the change.

Figure 33.3  Another Large Group Method for Creating the Future
occurred in Danbury, Connecticut. The initiating concern that brought the community together was the rapid increase in violence in schools as well as in the community as a whole. Realizing that “Reducing Violence” was too limited an emphasis for the future they wanted, they finally agreed on “Creating a Community Free from Fear” as the theme.

Imagine 180 people arriving at a big hall and picking up name badges that assign them to one of twenty-three five-foot round tables that seat eight. They are purposely assigned as heterogeneously or “max-mix” as possible. This means that they will meet and work with representatives of all the other stakeholder groups at their assigned tables. Each table is designed to be a microcosm of the system in the room.

Future Search begins with a statement of purpose from the sponsors and then everyone is asked to participate at their tables in an activity that reviews the history of the community, the world, and each person over the last thirty years. Using a work sheet, people think about the important events in these histories first. Then, everyone gets up and writes their important events on long sheets of butcher paper that have been posted on the walls and labeled by decade. After everyone has put up their thoughts, the facilitators assign each table to do an analysis of the patterns they see and report their analysis to the whole assembly. This activity gets people involved and working together at the tables. In the course of the analysis, the history of the system is shared with everyone, the impact of the environment on the system is better understood, and people get to know each other personally.

The Future Search method has developed a “design” or series of activities that is standard and can be used with very little modification. They involve discussion, self-disclosure, imagining, analyzing, and planning. These activities have both an educational and an emotional impact on participants. They represent the major steps in any open systems planning process. Thus, there are activities that scan the external environment and notice the forces impacting the organization or community. Next, there are activities that look at the capacity of the organization to rise to the challenges it faces. Then, there are activities that ask people to dream about their preferred future in the face of the reality that they confront. Finally, there is work to agree on the best ideas for future directions and action planning to begin to make it happen. Although the overall plan is rational, the activities themselves are also emotionally engaging, fun, and challenging. The interactions that occur among people create energy and motivation for change.

In two days, the conference in Danbury discovered in their history that the sense of community had been disrupted by the loss of industry that moved out, the building of a new superhighway that bisected the town, and the loss of the well-known community fairgrounds that brought the community together. In addition, new groups were moving into the area. They learned that forty-two languages were now spoken in the high school, creating new educational issues. When they assessed the resources of the community, they found that many
groups did not know what other groups were doing and that there were untapped opportunities for synergy, coordination and cooperation. The skits that groups created developed themes about housing, racism, hospital services in underserved areas of the city, and summer recreation transportation for children. Action planning groups were formed and began work. In two days, 180 people created over a dozen major initiatives to improve life in that community. Two years later, a number of these task forces were still at work and a number of major initiatives had been completed.

Three other future methods, Search Conference, ICA Strategic Planning Process, and Real Time Strategic Change all have elements in common with Future Search. They vary in design activities, in the structure of decision making, in how many people they can accommodate. Currently, practitioners often combine or modify methods to deal with specific organization and community needs.

The work of AmericaSpeaks, one of the more recently developing methods, is of particular interest. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was furious debate about what was going to happen to the World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan. Many stakeholders had divisive and competing ideas about what they wanted to see there: the people who lived in the area, the owners, the leasers of the site, the survivors of the disaster, the families of the victims, people from nearby states who worked in lower Manhattan, the transportation authority, police, firefighters and more. AmericaSpeaks created a one-day meeting in the Javits Convention Center in New York City to which five thousand representative stakeholders came to express their views on how the site should be developed. Using voting keypads and computers to enter the group and individual products of discussion at max-mix round tables, their views were presented to the decision makers at the end of the meeting and clearly affected the subsequent decision making. AmericaSpeaks is committed to creating processes that help citizens find their voice and be heard in projects at the national, regional, and city level. They describe their events as “21st Century Town Meetings.” In them, they make available to stakeholders expert knowledge on the selected topic from a range of points of view. After exchanging views at the tables, individuals express their own opinions by voting, which is simultaneously displayed on big screens for all to see. These votes are a valid representation of the views of all the stakeholders to an issue because great effort goes into assuring that people attend in numbers that represent the prevalence of their stakeholder category. Thus, it is possible to see what the majority wants even when the loud voices of interest groups may dominate the available airtime. Large-group methods have led to creating new innovations in participative democracy.

The Appreciative Inquiry Summit also deserves special comment since it has more recently come into prominence and is very popular. This method takes only a positive approach to change. In examining history, for example, it looks for the very best experiences from the past in order to carry that best into the future and amplify it. No attention is given to negative experiences which, if they emerge, are
required to be translated into future desires. Appreciative Inquiry has been extra-
ordinarily effective in organizational mergers because it provides a process for
affirming the best of both organizational cultures rather than the usual "takeover"
by one culture of the other. However, whether it can be effective in deeply divided
systems where conflict is rampant remains a question.

Dealing with Differences About the Future. One would think that when you bring
together people from many different interests and perspectives you are bound to
have conflict or at least major differences about perceptions and future directions.
What keeps these methods from blowing up? So many aspects of organizational and
community life disintegrate into bedlam. Why don’t these events?

First, of course, there are differences, real differences and many of them. But
all of these events operate under a different assumption from, say, a traditional
town meeting or a hearing in front of the city council. The key here is the search
for common ground. People are asked to focus their minds and energy on what
is shared. Early activities in all of these events create a shared data base of infor-
mation as well as knowledge about the views of those present; sometimes,
invited experts and relevant outsiders provide information which contributes to
the shared data base. People are encouraged to notice and take differences seri-
ously, but not to focus on them or to give a lot of energy to conflict resolution.
Rather, they try to discover what they agree on and this becomes the base for
moving forward. Usually, people are surprised by how much agreement there
actually is when they look for it. This is because the usual process of noticing
and focusing on differences is disrupted.

When groups gather or individuals meet, there is a tendency, at least in West-
ern cultures, to feel comfortable with others who share their views, values, and
attitudes. We notice when people are different or when groups do not seem to
share our assumptions. When that happens, the tendency is either to withdraw
and ignore the difference or to become competitive and attempt to change the
other over to your view. In the latter case, the more competitive the situation
becomes, the more win-lose the atmosphere. When people are focused on mak-
ing their points stick, on winning, they tend to loose sight of what they have in
common with others and only see the difficult differences.

Some years ago, National Public Radio had a story that illustrates this different
approach. It was reported from St. Louis where the Pro-Life and Pro-Choice
forces were certainly not in agreement except that some leadership in both groups
wanted to avoid violence. They asked the question is there anything that we agree
on that could become a source of common ground? And, although there is much
that they will never agree about, they discovered that there was common ground in
their mutual concern for pregnant teenagers. As a result of this discovery, they cre-
ated a successful jointly sponsored project to help pregnant adolescents that did a
great deal to manage the incipient violence in that city.
Merrelyn Emery’s thinking about the relationship between conflict and common ground in her writing about The Search Conference makes these issues very clear (Emery and Purser, 1996). She sees the conference setting as a “protected site” where people can come together and search for commonalities despite their fear and natural anxiety about conflict. She believes that “groups tend to overestimate the area of conflict and underestimate the amount of common ground that exists” (p. 142). “Rationalizing conflict” is the important process that takes conflict seriously when it arises so that the substantive differences are clarified and everyone understands and respects what they are. If the conflict is rationalized and everyone is clear about exactly what the agreements and disagreements are, it is possible to allow a short time to see if it can be resolved. If it cannot be resolved, it is posted on a “disagree list” meaning that the issue will not receive further attention but the differences are acknowledged.

At the Seventh American Forestry Conference held in 1996, using the Real Time Strategic Change method, the importance for conflict management of the principles and processes we have just discussed is further illustrated. Beginning in 1882, Forestry Conferences were convened by the President of the United States to set forest policy for the upcoming decades. They included nurserymen, forest scientists, lumbering interests, and citizen advocates. Early congresses created the momentum for the system of forest reserves set aside for public use and the creation of the U.S. Forest Service. In more recent years, the American Forestry Association had enough credence to be able to call for congresses that were held in 1953, 1965, and 1975. Since 1975, however, the various interests have been so conflicting that no one group had been strong enough to call the seventh congress. Finally, in 1995, the Yale Forest Forum brought together a roundtable of fifty stakeholders from environmental groups, industry, public agencies, small owners, community-based groups, research, and academia. Despite their diversity, using participative methods, they were able to agree on visions and principles to guide the next congress. They became strong in their commitment to making the congress happen and formed the nucleus group that called the Seventh American Forest Congress.

Before the congress was convened, over fifty local roundtables and collaborative meetings were held all over the United States to develop draft visions for the next ten years and principles to support them. These meetings were structured and sponsored by a Citizens Involvement Committee. In addition, there was an Internet Web site for the congress and some visits to other countries to benchmark best practices. In this prework, it became clear to the conference planning committee that they could not use the traditional “talking heads” conference format. They chose Real Time Strategic Change and Kristine Quade and Roland Sullivan of Minneapolis, Minnesota to design and facilitate the conference.

When the fifteen hundred people invited to the three-and-a-half–day conference convened in Washington, D.C. in 1996, the draft visions and principles
already created by these local meetings formed the basis of discussions at the tables. Their table task was to incorporate the various visions and principles into one set that most people could endorse as the desirable policy for the next decade.

In order to avoid the win-lose confrontations so typical of public issues with diverse stakeholders they adopted several ground rules:

1. The leadership did not take positions on controversial issues even though there were interest groups present that wanted them to do so.
2. Voting or showing where you stood used colored cards. Green signaled agreement; yellow indicated uncertainty or ambivalence; red meant disagreement. Agreement was declared when more than 50 percent of the congress was green. This method created space to explore people’s views, especially the meaning of a yellow vote.
3. Some potentially explosive issues such as divisive pending legislation were avoided as part of the agenda for the congress. In other words, the level of conflict was managed. (Practitioners of large group methodology have “rules of thumb” for dealing with conflict like “don’t open up anything you don’t have time to work with and resolve” and “don’t open up conflicts late in the event when there is no time to adequately deal with it.”)

Much of the first day was devoted to diverse table groups of ten working together and getting to know each other. Then, at the end of the first day and beginning of the second, many information sessions by knowledgeable experts and conversations about that topic were offered. Tables decided where they wanted members to go and these members came back and reported what they had learned to their table team after each of these sessions. During the second and third days, table deliberations were integrated, creating visions and principles that more than 50 percent of those assembled agreed upon. Finally, time was devoted to planning next-step initiatives to carry forward the vision and principles.

The processes that create this kind of agreement across diverse interests occur within individuals as well as at the group and system levels. Individually, people arrive seeing the world and the future from the perspective of their own interest. At this point individuals are “egocentric” meaning that they are not fully understanding of other views or interests. In the course of discussions, acquiring new information, trying to move toward agreement, they begin to understand if not agree with others at the table. Their boundaries become less rigid, and they become more flexible in looking for solutions that might provide gains both for themselves and for others on their table team. As they engage in this more cooperative process, the atmosphere at the group level becomes supportive and affirming. The group begins to feel successful. One symptom of this
A shift in perspective is that rather than saying “I,” there is a noticeable increase in the use of “we.”

Interestingly, at this congress, there was a group of about two hundred people who did not like the participative way the congress was organized and met in rump sessions to plan the disruption of the congress although they too were delegates. They wanted the leadership to take specific positions and they were prepared to picket and heckle in order to influence others to join them. As the table groups worked together, fewer and fewer of the original dissident members were willing to go to rump meetings or participate in disruptive demonstrations. They realized that they could get some of what they cared about through this more collaborative process. Toward the end, only a single person, the leader of this movement, was still walking around the floor picketing and trying to arouse others! The process had clearly captured and involved all of the others.

**Methods for Work Design**

The second group of methods involves stakeholders in the redesign of work. (See Figure 33.4 for a summary.) The 1980s and 1990s were a time when United States manufacturing and service businesses were under severe pressure to be more productive and efficient in the developing global economy. Work design methods were very popular in this period because they helped accomplish these goals. Today, with so many manufacturing and service jobs offshore, there is

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### LARGE GROUP WORK DESIGN

**The Conference Model, Whole-Scale Work Design, Fast Cycle Full Participation Work Design**

- Integrated series of large group meetings.
- 1- to 2-day sessions
- Topics:
  - Create the vision.
  - Conduct environmental analysis.
  - Conduct work systems analysis.
  - Conduct social system analysis.
  - Develop a blueprint for the new organization/process.
  - Plan for implementation.
- Whole system communication strategy is followed between meetings.
- Small task force work adds detail to large-group meeting results.

### PARTICIPATIVE DESIGN

**Fred and Merrelyn Emery**

- The process is bottom-up.
- Organizationwide education is first step.
- Management sets minimum critical specifications.
- Each level coordinates and controls its own work.
- Each unit designs its own work.
- Six design principles are used to redesign work.
- Multiskilling is the norm.

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**Figure 33.4** Large-Group Methods for Work Design

less demand for these activities. Now, there are two methods. The first, large-
group work design, focuses on optimizing the fit between efficient technology
and a responsive and motivating human environment for workers.

Rather than only top management understanding the business environment,
today everyone needs to have a picture of the business environment in order to use
their best talents to analyze the most efficient and socially productive way to
do the work of the organization. This form of work design appears under several
different names: The Conference Model, Whole Scale, or Real Time Work Design.
What seems to occur now is that large conferences or meetings are interspersed
with smaller task forces or work by the steering group in a pattern that makes
sense for each client. This always includes addressing future goals both for the
organization as a business and as a social system, an assessment of the impact of
the environment on the organization, a technical analysis of the core work process,
and a redesign of that process and the structure that supports it. This participative
process is used in all types of organizations from hospitals to manufacturing plants
and usually takes about six months to complete the full process.

In the Mercy Healthcare system in Sacramento, California, for example, five
hospitals needed to redesign their patient care delivery processes, a core process
in a hospital. They needed to save a lot of money and at the same time to
improve patient care. The first two conferences, the Vision Conference and the
Customer Conference create a vision of the goal of patient care and consults with
customers (in this case, former patients and the community) about their desires.
(Recently, these two conferences have often been combined.) Then there is an
analysis of the current patient care process and where it needs to be improved
(the Technical Conference) and a Design Conference to make changes and cre-
ate an improved process and the organizational structure to support it. Finally,
the decisions are refined and acted upon in an Implementation Conference. The
Technical Conference was held in five adjacent ballrooms, one for each hospi-
tal, so that, when needed, there could be coordination among the hospitals. For
example, at different moments in the process, selected members of each hospi-
tal went on a “treasure hunt” to the other four ballrooms to look for good ideas
that they could incorporate that others had created. These conferences are usu-
ally held about a month apart, which gives time for a specially designated team
to go back into the system and present to those not attending what has hap-
pened at the conference and get their input. When Mercy Healthcare surveyed
three thousand people in the hospital system, 85 percent said that they felt
involved and able to give input to the process. This is rather remarkable since
only about 150 people from a hospital attended any conference.

The underlying principle here again is that there is a great deal of wisdom
and experience in the people who do the work and deliver the service. They,
better than others, often know where the problems are and what goes wrong at
work. Therefore, they need to be involved in the analysis and redesign process.
Even if jobs are at stake, and they were at Mercy Healthcare, people would ordinarily rather have a voice in what is changing than simply to have it done to them. In situations like these, anxiety runs high. It is very helpful to people during anxious times if there is openness about the process of change as well as lots of communication about how decisions will be made.

The other work design method is distinctively different. Participate Design, created by Fred and Merrelyn Emery (1993), is a method that redesigns work and the work organization from the bottom of the organization up. It is based on the idea that the people who do the work need to be responsible for, control, and coordinate their own work. This is in sharp contrast with the bureaucratic principle where each level controls the work of those below them. Work is redesigned to conform to the six critical human requirements that create meaningful and productive work. Management decides in advance what constraints or minimum critical specifications the unit must work within, for example, that they cannot add jobs or exceed certain budgetary levels. Then, within these limits, the whole work unit analyzes what skills are needed to get the work of their unit done and who has them. Next, they redesign the unit to meet both the objective criteria for satisfying work and their own requirements. After the bottom of the organization is redesigned, the next higher level then asks, “Given this new work design, what is our work?” and proceeds to redesign their work. Theoretically, this continues to the very top of the organization. To be successful, Participative Design requires top management to understand and endorse this very democratic approach to working with employees (Rehm, 1999).

Interpersonal conflict occurs most often in the Participative Design Workshop when people in the work unit are analyzing their work and creating a new organization that they will manage and be responsible for. According to Nancy Cebula, an experienced practitioner doing work with this method, about halfway through the redesign process the group wakes up to the fact that in the new world that they are creating, they will have to deal with and manage their own conflicts. This is usually a new experience because in hierarchically controlled organizations, people can run to the boss and complain and expect her to do something. In a self-managing unit, the unit must develop processes for dealing with conflicts in their own team and with other teams. It has been observed that interpersonal conflict that festers on and on in teams often is a cause of death. For this reason, consultants suggest that teams work out a script for the steps they will take when conflict appears. They may start by having the affected parties try to talk it out, then it may become team business. Some teams have rotating roles for mediators. The steps can include calling in Human Resources to mediate as a last resort. When the process is defined in advance, it helps people openly deal with issues.

In one team on the verge of becoming self-managing, the process faltered when the group seemed not to be able to select people for the two new teams that were
proposed. Someone finally blurted out to the inquiring facilitator: “Our problem is that we have two slackers in the group and no one wants them on their team.” The facilitator asked, “What’s the best way to deal with this?” The group decided to go off into a room and deal with it without their manager or the facilitator. The facilitator said they could take one hour. They retired to the room, from which angry sounds emerged from time to time. Thirty minutes later, however, they emerged with two teams each including one of the slackers who had been told that they would have to shape up or depart. They had had their first experience at managing their own conflict. Interestingly, one of the slackers quit within a few days. The other turned herself around. She could no longer be mad at the system. Now there were peers in her world to whom she was accountable.

Training in conflict management, particularly in systems where there is a strong history of conflict, is often part of the prework that gets a system ready to do Participative Design.

**Conflict and the Redesign Process.** Unlike methods for future planning that can be used in many types of groups, such as communities, associations of like interest, organizations, methods for work design are always used by organizations to improve their own processes. This means that the people who come to these events belong to the same organization and have a stake in its future. Even if labor relations have been troubled and there are intraorganizational battlefields, it is not in anyone’s self interest to let the organization die. Thus, there is always a certain level of energy for change and improvement available in these settings.

One of the first issues to understand when doing this kind of work is the organization’s conflict history and the climate in which redesign will occur. Participative methods such as these offer people an opportunity to get engaged and have input into how their job life is structured. For some organizations with a long history of mistrust between labor and management, such an invitation will not be easily believed (and management needs to seriously consider its own willingness to accept participation before they embark on this course).

This history is likely to be in evidence in the large-group meeting. It appears in a number of forms. Often it is carried by outspoken individuals who make themselves known on the floor. Although the rules of large-group events are that people and their views will be listened to and treated with respect, what do facilitators do when someone grabs a microphone and produces a tirade against management? On the one hand, they deserve to be treated with respect. On the other, they are not authorized to speak and their speech violates acceptable behavior. Often such a person will instigate others with similar axes to grind. In all likelihood, they represent only a small percentage of those present, but their aggressiveness is often intimidating to those whose views are more moderate and are more hesitant to express themselves in front of five hundred other people.

One theory that governs this kind of emotional display is catharsis theory. The idea is that you let these people have their say, even if it disrupts the time
schedule that you planned, but you do not let them have the day. They are not allowed to filibuster or totally disrupt proceedings. After a reasonable time, if they do not seem to be finished, you may call a short break (everyone else will depart for the coffee and restrooms) and then go on to the next activity.

I had an experience of this process in one plant in the Midwest with a troubled labor history. The vocal group of disbelievers in management’s good intentions was holding forth on the floor and it was affectively very negative and very strong. I had my fill after about fifteen minutes and wandered out into the hall, where to my surprise, I found a lot of people grousing. They said things like: “It’s always the same people and they always say the same things. Why don’t they shut up and let’s see what happens. I am tired of listening to them.” After the break, when people went back to work on the next activity, the energy level in the room was high and very positive. People were deeply engaged and making suggestions for changes that would improve work at the plant.

A second strategy that is sometimes useful is to respectfully engage the whole group in reacting to what is being said by the vocal minority. For example, a facilitator might ask for an indication of those that agree with what is being said and then ask for those with different views to make themselves known. Facilitators often ask questions that bring out other points of view. Moderates need encouragement to express their views, but when they do, a clearer picture of the views of the whole system begins to emerge. As others get into the discussion, the community begins to manage it. People will say things to the people hogging the floor like, “Joe, you know you are taking advantage of this and that we don’t support you. Why don’t you sit down and shut up?” Working in this context, the facilitator senses when the group has had enough and is ready to move on and guides the process to the next steps.

There are times, however, when the frustration and aggravation with the organizational situation and with management is very strong and for good reason. When people really have a right to be angry because they have not been treated well, they need to be able to say this publicly to management and hear their response. This level of conflict has the potential of escalation and of taking a destructive turn. If voices from the floor become personally accusative and cross the invisible line of acceptable public behavior toward superiors, a bad situation could occur. This is everyone’s black fantasy about large groups, that there might be an irreparable explosion that would do permanent damage.

Although this possibility always exists, it is interesting to consider the other forces working in this setting to keep conflict within responsible limits. An organization is not an association of persons with no particular bonds. There is a history, a present, and hopefully a future. It is in everyone’s self-interest that things come out better rather than worse. These are forces that encourage collaboration and help to keep the conflict responsible. In a large-scale event, conflict is a public process that occurs with the whole system present. The public nature of the conflict is also a force for responsible management of the conflict. The facilitator’s
skill to martial the positive forces while at the same time allowing the expression of the conflict is key to its successful management.

Methods for Discussion and Decision Making

The third category of methods developed as ways to diagnose and find solutions to problems. They are predominantly oriented toward fixing specific problems that have developed in the past.

The large-group methods used for these purposes are substantially different from each other (see Figures 33.5 and 33.6). Work-Out is a method developed at General Electric that is being used in numerous companies to solve serious organizational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIMU-REAL</th>
<th>WORK-OUT (General Electric)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: Do real-time work on current issues, test future designs, learn about system Donald and Alan Klein</td>
<td>Purpose: Problem identification and process improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organization selects issue for work.</td>
<td>• Improvement target selected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Room arrangement reflects organization’s structure.</td>
<td>• Employee cross-functional meeting held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• People act their organizational roles.</td>
<td>• 1 to 2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are periods of stop action and reflection.</td>
<td>• Process: Discuss and recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decision process is agreed to in advance.</td>
<td>• Senior management responds immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1 day</td>
<td>• Champions and sponsors follow through to implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 50 to 150 people</td>
<td>• 30-, 60-, 90-day follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facilitator needs expertise in process consultation.</td>
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<tr>
<th>WHOLE-SCALE INTERACTIVE EVENTS</th>
<th>OPEN SPACE TECHNOLOGY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: Problem solving Dannemiller and Jacobs</td>
<td>Purpose: Discussion and exploration of system issues Harrison Owen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses same methodology as Whole-Scale in Figure 33.1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flexible method with many different uses.</td>
<td>• Is least structured of Large Group Methods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 33.5 Large-Group Methods for Discussion and Decision Making

problems by bringing together all of the stakeholders in a time-limited problem-solving format. Simu-real (Klein, 1992) creates a simulated organization with the real role holders acting their own jobs in order to understand problems or even to test out a new design for a new organizational structure. Large Scale Interactive Events (Jacobs, 1994) uses the Real Time Strategic Change framework to solve many types of problems from diversity issues to intergroup coordination problems. For example, to get police, emergency rooms, agencies, homeless shelters to better deal with the rise of tuberculosis among homeless people in New York City.

In terms of conflict resolution, these three methods use many of the principles of creating common ground, acknowledging but not dwelling on conflicts, rationalizing conflict, and creating new conditions for resolution as previously described.

Recently, an interesting new method, the World Café, was created (Brown and Isaacs, 2005), which is quite useful for creating discussion among diverse stakeholder groups. People are seated at heterogeneous small round tables of four to five in a large room. Their tables are covered with white paper where ideas can be recorded with markers or crayons. A theme for the discussions is introduced and then each table engages the topic for twenty to thirty minutes.

**Figure 33.6** Large Group Method for Discussion and Decision Making

At the end of that time, half of the people at the table are asked to find another table (while maintaining the diversity of the tables) and at least one person stays behind to explain what the previous group was talking about. At least three rounds of conversation occur before reports are given to the whole. This method is useful in settings with potential conflict because it does not allow people to cluster in their interest groups, but continually exposes them to different viewpoints but in a very personal and relationship-oriented setting.

Open Space Technology (Owen, 1992, 1995) is unique among these methods. Instead of using designed activities in preplanned groupings, it places the responsibility for creating and managing the agenda on the participants. Its founder, Harrison Owen, describes it as a method that is effective in highly conflicted situations. For this reason, I will focus the discussion in this section on Open Space.

Briefly, this method creates a simple process in which people who come to an Open Space create their own agenda for one, two, or three days of discussion of a chosen topic or issue. For example, the Presbyterian Church USA invited five hundred people to an Open Space to discuss some difficult and contentious issues before the church just prior to their annual national meeting. A series of Open Space meetings were held in Canada to consider the Quebecois issue. A hospital system in California faced with the need to cut costs held an Open Space in each hospital community to get input from the community about their concerns and priorities. This method has been used in hundreds of different venues to create good conversations about a wide range of issues.

What is Open Space? The simplest way to put it is that it is a self-managing meeting in which the people who come create their own agenda in the first hour of the event. Everyone sits in a large circle with “open space” in the middle. The facilitator introduces the theme of the meeting and describes the norms for participation. Then, people are invited to come forward and declare a topic that they have strong feelings about so that they can convene an issue group to talk about this topic. They write their topic and their name on a piece of newsprint, announce their topic to the total group, and post it on a wall called the “Community Bulletin Board.” As they post their topic, they select a time and place from the choices organized for them and written on Post-it® notes. They stick the “time and place” Post-its on their topic sheet and hang it on the wall. The posted topics create the visual agenda for a meeting of several days. People can add new topics whenever they want to by tacking a notice on the bulletin board. Each person who proposes a topic, agrees to show up to start the discussion and, after it is over, to go to the “newsroom” and type a summary of what was said using a simple computer template. These meeting reports are printed out and immediately posted on another long wall so that everyone can keep up with what is being said in other groups.

After the initial agenda setting meeting, the only meetings of the total group are brief gatherings in the morning and evening for comments and new topic announcements. The group discussion periods are usually about one hour and a
half long. This means there can be four or five sessions (with multiple groups convening at each session) during a day and more if the evening is also used.

A unique feature of Open Space is its rules and norms. Rather than being an uptight event where everyone is supposed to attend everything and people play hooky and feel mildly guilty, it encourages self-management and freedom to do what is needed to maintain individual focus and energy. The Law of Two Feet suggests that if you are not engaged in the group you are attending, you get your two feet under you and go somewhere else that you will find more productive. There is a lot of floating around and in and out, which is quite freeing and energizing. Other norms suggest that things begin to happen when people have energy to make them happen so that: “Whenever it starts is the right time.” “Whoever comes is the right people.” Whatever happens is the only thing that could have.” And “When it’s over, it’s over.”

Open Space removes the “oughts,” “shoulds,” and “musts,” and suggests that you “follow your bliss” to quote Joseph Campbell. What happens is usually quite interesting, even remarkable. An example may be helpful in getting a better feel for this unusual methodology and how conflict is dealt with. In this example, an intact organization uses Open Space three times over a period of a year to deal with long-term conflicts in the system.

**Business School in a Public College.** The dean, now in her third year, believed that the school had fallen behind in its ability to produce “job-ready” B.A. graduates because faculty were using old methods, texts, and technology. Shrinking government funding intensified the competition for resources and exacerbated the already present interdepartmental rivalries. The faculty was unionized, as was the staff. This was a faculty that was angry at each other, at the dean, and at the administration.

Harrison Owen has said that Open Space should be used (1) for issues that affect the whole organization/system, (2) in situations of high conflict, and (3) when you cannot think of anything else to do. It is possible that all three reasons were part of the dean’s decision to try Open Space. The theme to be explored was “Issues and Opportunities for the Future of the Faculty of Business.” The event was held during working hours at the college over two and a half days. Fifty of eighty faculty attended, plus staff and administration. The first two days were Open Space as previously described. The final half day was a convergence process often added to the Open Space experience in order to plan for action.

In the opening agenda setting circle, the facilitator was struck by the fact that no one looked at anyone else (often a symptom of deep conflict in a system). Although the topics posted were about the expected number, they were superficial given the theme (for example, “the cleanliness of the college” and “academic excellence”). There was a general air of anger toward the administration. The evening news at the end of the first day was bland.
The overnight soak time clearly had an effect. The next morning, new issues were posted that were quite different from the first day such as “conflict and conflict resolution” and “the strategic direction to get out of this mess.” The dean posted a topic, “The human face of management,” which was attended by everyone present. In that discussion, she talked personally about her role and views and became a person to those present. As the day progressed, a number of individuals approached the facilitators saying things like, “You wouldn’t believe what is happening in our group!” There was excitement and energy on the second day as compared with flat affect and withdrawal on the first day.

The Open Space exploration was closed at the end of day two with a “talking stick” circle (a version of a Native American custom). The stick is passed around the circle. When you have it, you may speak if you choose to and others are expected to listen respectfully. These are not group reports but just what people are thinking and feeling at the end of the day. From the comments, it was clear that the faculty had begun to move from being frozen in conflict to another posture. Examples were, “I haven’t spoken to [another faculty member] for fifteen years because of a disagreement we had, but that is going to change.” A number reported the first meaningful conversations in years. Others talked about the need to sort out relationships and move on.

Open Space is a divergent process for allowing ideas to emerge and develop. It creates really good conversations. Many people, particularly Westerners with our need for visible results and actions, add a half day convergent structure to it in order to plan and take action. In this case, everyone voted on the issues as they emerged in the group reports and then it was possible to name the top vote getters and form voluntary task forces around them. The group decided to hold another Open Space in four months to hear reports from the task forces and to continue the conversation.

Four months later, forty-five members reassembled for another two-and-a-half-day Open Space event. This time, it opened with a one-and-a-half-hour session of reports from the task forces. Then the facilitator opened the space for new agenda and the meeting continued in the form described. This time there was much more willingness to address the complex and difficult issues that they faced as a faculty trying to create a better future. Many more academic issues were addressed as were the difficulties of dealing with departments where everyone is both tenured and out of date. Again, the last half day was used to prioritize and organize new task forces with a four-month reporting date.

The final Open Space was run completely by the faculty. They had learned to use the methodology and made it a way of working together. Many changes have occurred and the faculty is continuing to work with the dean to create a secure future. One marker event that happened between the second and third Open Space is diagnostic. A dismissed faculty member tried to rally support for
ousting the dean. When he went to his former antiadministration supporters, he was rebuffed and told that “This dean is the best one we have ever had.”

What principles might explain this shift in energy from being dug into conflict, blaming, and attacking to being able to problem solve and work together? One major dynamic is the removal of the hierarchical authority structure in Open Space. There is no “they.” It is all “we.” Facilitators wait for people to create their own agenda. They believe that what is on the wall is what that group needs to talk about. Nothing is imposed. Although there is a theme, participants decide what issues they will address. The dean was there but as a member of the group.

When hierarchy is absent, the well-worn patterns of manipulation and control are disrupted. There is no decision structure or way of getting power. The normal way of doing business is suspended and people are asked simply to follow their own energy and commitments so that they both get and give. In Open Space, the Law of Two Feet and the Four Principles replace hierarchy with guidance for individuals that creates huge freedom to act that is both delightful and can make people a bit anxious... but everyone else is in the same situation and people enjoy exploring their freedom, they work it out. It leaves the participants with one very important question: what is it that we have energy and the will to do?

What is the impact of participatory meetings of the whole system after the event is over? What happens back at work? There is anecdotal evidence that one meeting of this type can create new plans and get action going that strongly impacts the system. Another big effect of all of these methods is to create new networks and relationships that are useful. In the case of the business school, they began to use Open Space as a way of working together. When this happens, hierarchy and the bureaucratic processes in the organization are modified. I want to strongly point out that senior management’s understanding of the collaborative nature of these meetings is crucial. They need to understand and agree to this method of working and provide strong sustained leadership of the process from the beginning.

**Embedding New Patterns of Collaboration**

What we see in the business school case just described is the transfer of or embedding of new patterns of working together and relationship management from the large group event into the workplace. This truly is a culture change. In the case just described, the movement was from hostility and suspicion to collaboration and a more productive and satisfying workplace. Since writing this chapter for the first edition of this book, experience with the use of these methods has grown both in the West and around the world. As my colleague Billie Alban and I have collected new cases of the uses of Large-Group Methods for the special issue of *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* (Bunker and Alban, 2005) and also for *The Handbook of Large Group Methods* (Bunker and Alban, 2006), we have found a number of polarized or conflicted settings in which
these methods have been used regularly to shape and change the culture of the organization in the direction of more focused collaboration. For example, in Florida, two teachers unions merged but the history of competition remained in the functioning of the newly merged union, resulting in distrust and suspicion. Over a period of a year, using these methods in a series of large and small meetings that modeled a more participative process, the culture gradually addressed the sources of mistrust and began to collaborate and develop an effective culture for the organization. In another example in Great Britain, a Primary Care Trust, part of the National Health Service, which involves many types of agencies with different functions, has just emerged from a three-year planned process of involving stakeholders in decision making to change the quality of patient care and create a collaborative and effective culture. Notice that this is a process over time, not a single event. What we think happens is that people have a new and positive experience in these large-group meetings. Then, they want to take that back and experience these new patterns in their own organization. With strong, persistent leadership over time, there is growing evidence that it is possible to shift the culture of organizations from polarized and conflicted to much more collaborative and productive.

CONCLUSION

Practitioners of Large-Group Methods have created processes that work at the organizational and community level to either manage or resolve conflicts. Here are eight principles about large group processes that account for their effectiveness.

1. *Focus on common ground,* areas of agreement rather than differences or competitive interests.
2. *Rationalize conflict.* This means acknowledge and then clarify conflict rather than ignoring or denying it. Agree to disagree and move on to areas of agreement.
3. *Expand individuals’ egocentric views of the situation* by exposing them to many points of view in heterogeneous groups that do real tasks together collaboratively and develop group spirit. This broadens views and educates.
4. *Promote the development of personal relationships* through structures such as small table groups that exchange information and views with each other in structured activities. (A sense of having a personal relationship helps manage differences.)
5. Allow time to *acknowledge the group’s history of conflict* and feelings before expecting people to work together cooperatively.
6. **Manage the public airing of differences and conflict.** Treat all views with respect. Allow minority views to be heard but not to dominate discussion. Preserve time for the expression of views of people “in the middle” as well as those who are more extreme.

7. Manage conflict by *avoiding incendiary issues* or issues that cannot be dealt with in the time available.

8. *Reduce hierarchy* as much as possible. Push responsibility for working together and for managing conflict down in the organization so that people are responsible for their own activities.

Large-Group Methods tackle conflict in different ways at different points in its development. Sometimes dealing with past history, sometimes putting differences aside and simply managing them, sometimes directly addressing and resolving issues that divide people and groups. The principles described are primarily at the systems level. These processes, however, simultaneously affect the group and the individual level as reflected in principles 3 and 4. These methods also document many of the principles developed in the research on conflict and conflict resolution. We can hope that they may also stimulate new theoretical thinking about how conflict is managed and resolved.

**References**


CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

Conflict in Organizations

W. Warner Burke

Think of a man fifty-four years of age who has been with his employer for twenty-five years. In recent years the company he works for has grown significantly, primarily via acquisitions. As a result of this growth the workforce in the past decade has more than doubled in size. The strategy and structure of the organization have changed several times during these recent years. Our protagonist in this brief story has experienced many and rather intense changes. First, the nature of his relationship with his employer has shifted from one of relative job security to a feeling that he could be redundant any day now. Second, there are many new faces in his work life now with a number of them being “different”—younger, of course, but also different in ethnic and educational backgrounds as well as seeming to hold divergent values. These differences become manifest in problem-solving meetings and our friend often disagrees but does not know whether to speak up or keep his mouth shut. In either case, he ends up feeling uncomfortable and conflicted. Third, while the organizational structure seems to change annually, what remains constant are silos, units within the organization acting independently with little exchange of information and cooperation with one another. And, finally, with each new acquisition there is yet another corporate culture to absorb, and these acquired cultures never seem to fit.

Thus, the current workplace for our friend is in a constant state of flux causing considerable stress, and he is therefore seriously contemplating taking the company’s early retirement package.
Our short story illustrates the nature of conflict in organizations today, conflict at multiple levels. Our friend is experiencing conflict at an individual personal level. The characteristics of his psychological contract with his employer have changed causing internal, personal angst and conflicted feelings about whether to remain loyal and hardworking or to leave.

The different workforce has contributed to his feelings of being from another planet, and not knowing whether it is worth confronting and discussing these divergences or simply to let well enough alone and revert to his comfort zone of introversion.

In earlier days when our friend’s company was smaller, cooperation was the norm. Today members of work units protect their turf, and the norm is more like win-lose instead of collaboration with the possibility of win-win.

And bringing in these new businesses with their strange cultures requires an enormous amount of energy to cope with the differences and attempt to work together. Moreover, these new acquisitions are like second marriages—hope seems to overpower experience and reality.

Conflict in organizations, then, can be addressed and understood at four levels or interfaces: (1) the individual with the organization, (2) individuals with one another, (3) organizational units with other units, and (4) interorganizational relationships. These interfaces are not discrete, but it is useful to our understanding to treat them as somewhat distinct.

The organization of this chapter is therefore according to the four levels/interfaces and our ultimate purpose is twofold: to understand the nature of conflict at each level and to suggest ways of dealing with these conflicts in a productive manner.

Before covering each of the four levels of interfaces, let us take a moment and review what seem to be the primary contributors to our causes of conflict in organizations today.

- Globalization with the consequent need for greater understanding and effectiveness in dealing with cross-cultural dynamics
- Constant and a more rapid rate of change especially in the external environment for organizations causing a lag effect, i.e., the organization experiences an unprecedented state of trying to “catch up”
- Greater employee diversity
- Flatter organizational hierarchies causing less managerial oversight, more self-managed groups, and virtual teams
- Increasing complexity of work in most organizations, which leads to myriad perspectives and viewpoints
- Increasing electronic communication, particularly e-mail, which causes (a) less face-to-face contact (losing the benefit of nonverbal cues) and
(b) more “freedom” to communicate in confrontive, potentially hostile ways

- Constant pressure on organizations to be cost conscious and effective at managing costs causing a scarcity of resources, which in turn increases competition among managers, in particular, and employees, in general

These seven contributors to conflict in organizations are not comprehensive nor exhaustive, but they do represent some of the most important and powerful forces in the workplace today that give rise to discord. Let us now consider the consequences of these contributors in terms of four levels and interfaces in the modern organization.

**PERSONAL/INDIVIDUAL**

In the areas of both organization and management theory (a division of the Academy of Management) and organization development and change (another division of the Academy) Lawrence and Lorsch (1967 and 1969, respectively) contributed theoretically and practically to our thinking and application with their notion of “interface.” They concentrated on what they considered to be the three primary interfaces: the organization-environment interface, group-to-group interface, and the individual-and-organization interface. As noted already these three interfaces plus interpersonal comprise the four parts of this chapter beginning with the individual-organization level and interface.

Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) address this person-organization interface in broad terms as the degree of congruence between the organization’s goals and those of the individual employee. For our purposes in this chapter we need to be more specific and therefore focus on the psychological contract between the organization (management) and the individual employee. One of the first to address this idea was Argyris (1960). The idea “of a psychological contract implies that there is an unwritten set of expectations operating at all times between every member of an organization and the various managers and others in that organization . . . expectations about such things as salary or pay rate, working hours, benefits and privileges that go with the job, guarantees not to be fired unexpectedly, and so on” (Schein, 1980; pp. 22–23). The psychological contract, broadly considered, has been about job security. The implicit message has been one that loyalty and satisfactory work performance on the part of the individual will link to a promise on the part of the organization not to fire one unexpectedly and for the most part not to fire anyone at all. In other words, be loyal to the organization, perform satisfactorily and you keep your job until retirement. This implicit agreement was an important, albeit unwritten, expectation for many years especially in the business-industrial world. This agreement is no longer the same
The change in the psychological contract has been a consequence of downsizing, mergers and acquisitions, and, as mentioned earlier, the more rapid rate of change. With downsizing people are "laid off," with mergers and acquisitions people become "redundant" and half have to go, and with more change in general, individual jobs and the people who hold them change as well. It is now clear that to expect a job until retirement is a relic of the past. In fact some corporations such as General Electric make it clear to new hires that they should not expect to be with GE for all or even a majority of their working life. What is the more current psychological contract if one exists at all?

Again we need to bear in mind that the psychological contract is a set of unwritten rules and what has not changed that much regarding one’s expectations are such things as rate and amount of pay (usually what the labor market trends dictate) and a reasonable amount of clarity about what the job is and requires in terms of performance. Most everything else regarding expectations has changed, even the content and amount of fringe benefits. The most significant change is, of course, the relative lack of job security.

The internal conflict for today’s employee is whether to work hard and be loyal all the while knowing that the organization’s management is not likely to be loyal in return.

While not entirely clear, there does appear to be a trend in the direction of providing for employees opportunities for training and development, that is, to enhance one’s skills and abilities, to learn new ones, and to be reimbursed for tuition payments at local colleges and universities in order to advance oneself with an academic certificate or degree. In other words, the implicit agreement is something like management’s stating, “Give us your brainpower, abilities, and hard work and we will give you in return a decent, competitive salary perhaps with additional incentives for high performance plus opportunities to improve your work skills via training and development opportunities.” In a sense, job security has been replaced with opportunities to learn and improve oneself. This trend regarding the new psychological contract is by no means true for all organizations, maybe not even for most, but is likely to continue and spread as the competition for talent grows.

The antidote for this special case of individual, personal conflict is constantly to (a) seek opportunities for lifelong learning and (b) keep one’s résumé up to date.

**INTERPERSONAL**

The interpersonal level/interface can be defined in terms of a relationship between two people, for example, boss-subordinate or leader-follower, and relationships among a number of individuals—how three, four, five, six and more
people relate with one another. In any case, most often at the interpersonal level in organizations we are referring to people who work together much of the time.

At this level in the organization it is important first to distinguish between real and phony conflict. Jerry Harvey has called this distinction to our attention with a theory that he has referred to as “The Abilene Paradox” named after an ill-fated family trip to Abilene, Texas when all four members of the family agreed to go on the trip yet individually none of them really wanted to go. In other words, each family member colluded with a process that he or she felt was actually stupid to do simply “to keep peace in the family,” even though after the trip they got into a big argument. Harvey (1974) calls this collusive behavior a crisis—a serious lack of managing agreement. He further contends that dealing with underlying agreement is an important problem in organizations. He goes on to state that:

There are two kinds of conflict, real and phony:

a. Real conflict involves real, substantive differences. ("The research project is technologically feasible."
   "Not according to my reading of the data.")

b. Phony conflict consists of the hostile, negative blaming behavior that occurs when agreement is mismanaged. ("I told you the project wouldn’t work. Look at the mess you’ve got us in."
   "Don’t blame me. It would have worked if you had done your job.")

Thus conflict is a symptom—not a generic process—which is frequently used as a defense against taking existential risks. Being a symptom, conflict is frequently symptomatic of mismanaged agreement! (Harvey, 1977, pp. 165–166).

Having established that the conflict is real let us now explain the nature of conflict at the interpersonal level, first addressing the boss–subordinate or leader–follower relationship and then peer to peer.

**Boss–Subordinate and Leader–Follower**

Ask employees these days if they are experiencing stress on the job and most are likely to reply with a resounding “Yes!” Ask a second question about what causes this stress at work and, again, most are likely to respond “My boss!” Citing a study by Hogan, Raskin, and Fazzini (1990) the authors of an article four years later in the *American Psychologist* (Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan, 1994) noted that organizational climate studies from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s routinely show that 60 percent to 75 percent of the employees in any organization—no matter when or where the survey was completed and no matter what occupational group was involved—report that the worst or most stressful aspect of their job is their immediate supervisor. Good leaders may put pressure on their people, but abusive and incompetent management create
billions of dollars of lost productivity each year (p. 494). Without question conflict abounds at this level in work organizations. What are some remedies? Here are some possibilities:

- Provide “managing people” training for supervisors and managers.
- Reexamine criteria for selecting individuals for supervisory, managerial, and especially leadership positions. Too often the basis for selecting people for these positions is primarily technical ability—a good engineer is likely to be a good supervisor; a good classroom teacher is likely to be a good school principal; a good salesperson is likely to be a good sales manager. There is no evidence to support any of these statements. While job knowledge is important for credibility as a manager or leader, more important are such qualities as conceptual ability, emotional intelligence, which includes self-awareness, and a controlled desire to make a difference, i.e., not for personal reasons such as self-aggrandizement, but for reasons that are associated with organizational goals.
- Establish or definitely maintain a process of job rotation particularly for management positions. This practice can help people in management to learn and develop and can help employees to believe that they are not going to be stuck with a bad boss forever.
- Incorporate a regular process of multirater feedback for people in management. Systematic feedback over time about one’s management and leadership practices when coupled with coaching can improve performance, see, for example, Luthans and Peterson (2003), Seifert, Yukl, and McDonald (2003), and Smither, and others (2003).

These actions can help and so can other remedies not listed, such as quick removal of people in management who are clearly incompetent especially in terms of managing and relating with others. The point is that this kind of conflict between bosses and subordinates, leaders and followers should not be allowed to continue. There are remedies.

**Peer-to-Peer**

Conflict between and among peers in work organizations usually takes the form of competition—competing for scarce resources, competing for attention and recognition from a common boss (assuming the person is not abrasive and arrogant), and competing for the “best” way to accomplish a task. Additional conflict at the peer level certainly occurs but not as obviously as the previous examples convey. This latter form is in the arena of organizational politics such
as currying favor from some influential person in the organization to obtain what one may want, forming an informal coalition to “defeat” some intended action, or spreading negative opinions about someone to lessen his or her influence and status. Paying attention to organizational politics can also be seen as positive—making certain that many if not all stakeholders and constituents are informed, asked for their opinions and advice, and otherwise included before some decision is made or action taken.

Antidotes to peer conflict include the kind of action just stated regarding involving and “networking” with stakeholders and constituents. Other remedies besides the simple and obvious one of communicating include providing opportunities for employees at all levels to learn and practice effective negotiation skills and perhaps occasionally seek the help of a third party to resolve the conflict. Stereotypes of both Americans and Japanese are relevant here. Americans supposedly confront conflict directly and Japanese do not preferring the assistance of a third party. As with any stereotype it does not fit universally. Some (many?) Americans prefer to avoid conflict and hope that it will go away. For these “nonstereotypical” Americans, copying the Japanese might be appropriate, that is, asking a third person to talk independently with the two conflicting individuals and then either attempt to mediate the conflict in a face-to-face meeting or to continue to work toward resolution by talking separately with each of the two persons in conflict.

Finally, for this interpersonal level it is important to bear in mind that fundamental individual differences based on personality, not just ethnic differences, cross-cultural differences, or overlapping roles and responsibilities contribute to conflict. One interesting example is Jung’s distinction between sensing and intuitive types. People with a strong preference for sensing in how they take in information want facts, specific, concrete information and rely on what they see, hear, smell, i.e., what they “sense” to then make up their mind and perhaps make a decision. Intuitive types prefer ideas, images, patterns and rely on their hunches (intuition) to make up their mind and then perhaps make a decision. It has been said that these two different types represent the greatest communication problem between two people known irrespective of where they were born, grew up, or educated. Tolerating this kind of basic, human difference between us can go a long way toward resolving interpersonal conflict.

Intergroup

In this volume an entire chapter by Ronald S. Fisher (Chapter Eight) is devoted to intergroup conflict. In his chapter Fisher provides coverage of (a) the history of theory and research, (b) sources and dynamics of conflict, and (c) implications for understanding and practice. Building on his chapter, this section will address some consequences of intergroup conflict and
then consider ways of reducing the negative consequences of this kind of conflict followed by an actual case that illustrates how the deployment of conflict management methods between groups can be conducted and lead to resolution.

The fundamental paradox of organization design and structure is that work needs to be divided among people and groups (work units), yet at the same time, the work must be coordinated and integrated for ultimate organization effectiveness. As tasks are differentiated work units form, and these groups develop and become committed to their own norms and goals. Over time this commitment to “our” goals and “our” way of doing things strengthens. Thus, silos become the dominant characteristic of organizational structure, and coordinating, integrating activities and entities become comparatively less important. Organization effectiveness suffers since resolution of inevitable differences between groups has to occur at the very top of the hierarchy or pyramid. Conflict rising to the top take time and then may be resolved in temporary ways if resolved at all. As Schein (1980) put it:

The overall problem, then, is how to establish collaborative intergroup relations in those situations where task interdependence or the need for unity makes collaboration a necessary prerequisite for organizational effectiveness (p. 172). (Emphasis in the original.) Schein (1980) goes on to list some of the consequences of intergroup conflict/competition with the thought in mind that these consequences reduce overall organizational effectiveness.

What occurs within the competing groups:

- Each group “closes ranks” and becomes more closely knit and loyal to one another as members.
- Group climate becomes more task focused and less informal and casual.
- Group leadership becomes more authoritarian and less participative.
- Group structure, for example, member roles and responsibilities, becomes more formal and tight.
- More loyalty on the part of members to the group is demanded so that a solid front can be maintained.

What happens between the conflicting groups:

- The other group is seen as the enemy.
- Distortion of perceptions increase, for example, we are strong, they are weak.
- Hostility between the groups increases.
- Members tend to “hear” only those things that support their group’s position.
RESOLVING CONFLICT BETWEEN GROUPS

While the following ideas and suggestions may not completely resolve intergroup conflict, with effort they are at least likely to reduce the conflict.

1. Find or develop a superordinate goal. From the early work of Sherif and his colleagues (see Chapter Eight, Intergroup Conflict, in this volume and, for example, Sherif, Harvey, and Sherif, 1961), this may not be the only way to reduce if not resolve conflict between groups, but it clearly seems to be the primary mode.

2. Similar to the notion of a superordinate goal is to concentrate on a “common enemy.” This might take the approach of shifting competition between the two groups to joining forces in order to defeat a competitor in the marketplace.

3. Conduct an intervention that brings the two groups together experientially to reduce if not resolve the conflict. Finding solutions together to resolve the conflict can itself serve as a superordinate goal. The case that follows illustrates this process and intervention.

CASE EXAMPLE

Even though these three briefly listed ideas and suggestions have been around for a long time, and even though there is further literature about the nature of and how to deal with intergroup conflict (see, for example, Beckhard [1969]; Blake, Shepard, and Mouton [1964]; and Walton [1969]), using these ideas and techniques appears to be limited, a rare occurrence even in the face of considerable need. Blake, Shepard, and Mouton’s coverage of a headquarters—field conflict was quite comprehensive and took six days for reasonable resolution. Perhaps the length of time, energy required, and strong emotions that are likely to arise cause reluctance.

On the hunch that perhaps a lack of knowledge and experience with specific steps and procedures for conducting an intergroup intervention in an organization of less than six days can in part account for a lack of use of these kinds of interventions, the case to follow will be described in detail.

Although one example, this case is highly representative of other instances that I have personally employed as a consultant in similar situations—such groups as:

- Production and maintenance engineers from a company in the metals industry
Prior to the Meeting

It is useful to conduct some diagnostic work before the meeting. More specifically, the reasons in this case were not only to determine the need for such an intervention, but also (a) to give the consultant a “feel” for the situation and (b) to determine the clients’ motivation for and commitment to a problem-solving meeting. If one finds low motivation and commitment, my suggestion is to consider strongly calling the meeting off or simply not hold it if one had not been presumed. Frequently managers assume that the purpose of a meeting such as this one, or a team building session for example, is for training and education. The consultant is going to “lay something on us.” What must be made clear is that the objective of the meeting is to identify and work on real, nagging, and, up to this point, unsolvable problems. Problem-solving work is difficult and tedious. The client must understand that the meeting is for work. Consultants make mistakes at this beginning point by allowing the client to place them in a teacher or trainer role and not in a role of facilitator and catalyst. The consultant must emphasize that he or she cannot identify the issues and problems much less solve them. The client must do this work, not the consultant. If the consultant determines that the objective for the meeting is not understood, then work must be done to make it clear with an alternative being one of not holding the meeting, at least not the kind of meeting described in this case.

After determining that the diagnosis warrants an intergroup intervention, a general meeting of all concerned (the persons who will attend and do the work and those in the organizational hierarchy who are responsible for this client group), should be held on site prior to leaving for the meeting. This meeting should be called and conducted by the person (or persons) in the organizational hierarchy who is a common superior to the two groups. In the case example I am using, it was the division manager to whom the heads of manufacturing and engineering reported. The purposes of the manager’s calling this meeting are (a) “officially” to sanction the meeting; (b) for the boss (here, the division manager) to present any mandates (what he hopes will be accomplished); and
(c) to explain the “boundaries” or authority of the meeting. In other words, with this latter objective, the manager needs to say what decisions can be made, what actions can be taken, and what is “out of bounds.” As the consultant, I follow the manager by then explaining, from my perspective, the purpose of the meeting and what the design will be. With respect to the purpose, I explain that we will not attempt to change anyone’s personality or character structure but that our objectives are to discover what the actual problems are in the interface between the two groups and to plan action steps for correcting these problems. Incidentally, in my experience with this intervention, most people have not had training in group dynamics nor have they participated previously in any kind of team-building process. I do not believe that either is a prerequisite for this intergroup design to work effectively. These prior experiences would undoubtedly help but with the kind of structure used for this two-day meeting neither is a necessity.

The Off-Site Meeting

Although this meeting could be held on location, the advantages of going off-site are well-known. Away from distractions, conditions are such that most energy can be directed toward the problem at hand and during breaks, meals, and social time, the people usually remain together and continue working in some different ways than the work done during the “formal” sessions. These informal talks often facilitate the overall problem-solving process.

Phase 1—Image Exchange (Two Hours). I like to begin a meeting of this kind with a brief description of other sessions I have conducted with other organizations. These examples (a) provide the client group with an overview of what they can expect and, therefore, reduce some of the ambiguity and anxiety, and (b) show that the consultant has done something like this before, again giving them some means of reducing counterproductive anxiety so that energy can be focused on the interface problems and not on the consultant and his or her design.

After my opening statement, usually no longer than fifteen minutes, I divide the total group into their natural groupings. In this case there were six men in each group, Engineering and Manufacturing. Each of the two groups work separately for an hour and produce three lists:

1. How do we see ourselves? (It is frequently useful to include also a listing of how the group sees its responsibilities.)
2. How do we see the other group?
3. How do we think they see us? (In other words, each group is trying to predict the other group’s second list.)
Their lists can be sentences, phrases, or one-word adjectives. Table 34.1 shows a sampling of what these two groups, Engineering and Manufacturing, produced. The rationale for conducting an image exchange is as follows:

The meeting begins on a note of personal involvement and discovery and not that of wrestling with the problems at the outset.

Sharing perceptions usually takes care of some problems at the beginning. For example, the Engineering group believed that Manufacturing saw them as intruding on their (Manufacturer’s) functions. (See Table 34.1, list 3, item f.) The Manufacturing group didn’t see them that way at all. This “perceived problem” was eliminated immediately.

The exchange helps to sharpen what the real issues in the interface are. I like to conduct the exchange of perceptions in the following order:

First, Engineering (arbitrarily selected or they volunteer to go first) presents their List 1. (How do we see ourselves?)
Second, Manufacturing presents their List 2. (How do we see them?)
Third, Engineering presents their List 3. (How do we think they see us?)
Fourth, Manufacturing presents their List 1.
Fifth, Engineering presents their List 2.
Sixth, Manufacturing presents their List 3.

The reason for this order is that it (a) maximizes exchange; one groups presents followed by the other, and (b) provides for quick feedback; for example, Engineering reports on how they see themselves and this is followed with how they are seen. Engineering could present their Lists 1 and 3, followed by Manufacturing’s presentation of the List 2, and so forth for the remaining three steps in the procedure.

During the period of presentations, about an hour, the ground rule is that questions of clarification only can be discussed. This is not the time to debate differences or to take issue. The purpose of this phase is to present the data and to seek understanding.

Phase 2—Problem Identification (Three Hours). This phase has four steps. Step one is to begin the task of identifying the problems that exist with the interface. To facilitate this step, I arrange for all six of the image exchange lists to be hung on the wall so that the individuals can use the data for helping them to formulate their thoughts. This initial problem formulation is done by each person independently. About thirty minutes is required for this individual work. The rationale for this individual work at the outset of Phase 2 is to (a) legitimize and sanction independent thought and (b) maximize conditions for comprehensive coverage
Table 34.1 Sampling of Image Exchange Lists Between the Engineering Department and the Manufacturing Group Within a Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List 1. How Do We See Ourselves?</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Stabilizing influence in the division</td>
<td>a) Competent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Flexible but uncompromising</td>
<td>b) Inexperienced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Cooperative</td>
<td>c) Error-prone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Competent but fallible</td>
<td>d) Not cohesive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Strategy formulators</td>
<td>e) Creative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Creative</td>
<td>f) Hardworking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Sensitive to criticism</td>
<td>g) Sensitive to criticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Second-class citizens</td>
<td>h) Second-class citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List 2. How Do We See Them?</th>
<th>Engineering (describing Manufacturing)</th>
<th>Manufacturing (describing Engineering)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Unstable organization</td>
<td>a) Error prone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Individually competent but not as a group</td>
<td>b) Competent technically</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) History-oriented rather than forecast-oriented</td>
<td>c) Unaware of manufacturing problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Unwilling to accept responsibility (they “call engineering”)</td>
<td>d) Do not have a sense of urgency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Unwilling to compensate for others’ errors</td>
<td>e) More responsive to marketing than to us</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Not creative</td>
<td>f) Unified as a group and consistent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Conscientious and industrious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List 3. How Do We Think They See Us?</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Poor knowledge of their function</td>
<td>a) Constantly changing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Engineers live in an ivory tower</td>
<td>b) Error-prone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Know technical end but not tuned to manufacturing’s needs</td>
<td>c) Not quality-conscious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Error-prone</td>
<td>d) Reactors rather than planners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Don’t feel pressure of end dates for product shipments</td>
<td>e) Crisis prone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Intrude on other functions</td>
<td>f) Unwilling or unable to follow drawings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Overly restrictive requirements and tolerances</td>
<td>g) Inflexible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of problems. Since group work predominates in this type of design, some individuals may be inhibited in a group and the opportunity for independent work may be the primary mode for their contribution.

The second step is for the two groups to meet again separately and consolidate their individual work into a group list. By consolidation I do not mean to imply that the final group list will necessarily be shorter than the total for the individuals’ list. It may be that little overlap occurs although this is rare. It may also be that as a result of the group discussion other problems not previously thought of during the individual work become identified, a result that is common among groups that work effectively.

Step three consists of each group’s presenting its problem list to the other. The purpose of this step is for each group to understand what the other group’s perception is of the problems and what emphases each places on which issues. Again, only questions of clarification can be raised; debate is yet to come. In fact, I explain at the beginning of Phase 2 that a ground rule will be that we refrain from discussing any solutions to problems until we, as thoroughly as possible, identify and clarify what the problems are. The Engineering Department had a list of sixteen problems and issues and, coincidentally, Manufacturing had sixteen as well.

The fourth step is one of consolidating the two lists. At this point, I ask each group to select two of their members to meet together for the purpose of consolidating the two lists. I ask each of the two groups to select two of their members for this task because (a) I obviously cannot do the job as effectively as they since I’m not as familiar with the issues; (b) both groups’ perceptions should influence the final problem list if accuracy of problem identification is to be achieved (people act according to their perceptions of issues not according to the reality of the issues); and (c) neither group holds a high degree of trust for the other at this point, and equal representation, as well as choice in selecting who will perform the work, contributes to an abatement of suspicion.

These four individuals (here, two from Engineering and two from Manufacturing) take the two lists (thirty-two statements in all), eliminate overlaps, and restate the problems in as clear a way as possible. This temporary group works in public view while the others either observe or take a break. The consolidating work, depending on the total list of statements, of course, takes about thirty minutes. In the case example, the final list contained twenty items. (See Table 34.2 for a sampling of some of these items.)

**Phase 3—Organizing for Problem Solving (Thirty Minutes).** There are two steps in this third phase. First, each person selects from the total list of problems (twenty in all) the ones he sees as the most important. In the case example, I told them to select the top six. I chose the number six based on how I wanted to organize the remainder of the session. I suggest that they select these top problems according to one or both of the following criteria: (a) those
that affect you the most and/or (b) those that you believe need the most immediate attention. After each person makes his selection, I ask him to rank these top problems from most important to least. These rankings from everyone are tallied and the top group of problems (again the number was six in the case example) is selected as a function of the sum of the tallies of the rankings and, of course, the group’s judgment.

The second step in this brief phase is for each person to make a first and second choice of the problem he would like to work on. Following these choices as much as possible, problem-solving groups are formed with half of each problem-solving group’s members being from one of the organizational groups and half from the other. In the case of the Engineering and Manufacturing example of twelve persons, three “cross” groups were formed of four members, two from Engineering and two from Manufacturing. The rationale for this way of organizing is the same as the reasons I outlined for step four of Phase 2. Different perceptions influence the “shape” of the problems and both perceptions must contribute to the solving of the problems. Otherwise, the problems will remain, and no commitment to action steps on both parties’ part will have been achieved. Moreover the degree of misunderstanding and suspicion is reduced when the two groups have a chance to interact with one another toward a superordinate goal (Sherif, 1958).

Table 34.2 Sampling of Consolidated Problem List from the Engineering and Manufacturing Intergroup Problem-Solving Session.

- Engineering does not feel responsible for understanding and using procedures; a lack of concern for details.
- Organizational inconsistencies—Engineering is highly vertical and Manufacturing horizontal.
- Lack of participation by the Manufacturing group at Engineering level on long-range planning
- Both units tend to be overly bureaucratic and inflexible; not responsive to one another’s requests.
- Drawings and “specs” full of errors.
- Instability of Mfg. organization; lack of depth and lack of experience.
- Frequent product and process changes; lack of advance communication on changes.
- Lack of mutual confidence.
- Engineering does not understand Mfg.’s problems with the union.

Phase 4—Problem Solving (Four Hours). This phase is begun with a brief lecture on steps in problem solving. The lecture includes an explanation of Force Field Analysis and how to use it in problem solving. I prefer to build the problem-solving steps around the Force Field Analysis because the technique is (a) easy to understand and use, (b) instrumental in establishing specific objectives for change, and (c) based on Lewin’s theory of change. The following seven steps are similar to others in use by applied behavioral scientists. Briefly, the steps are:

1. Identify the problem.
2. Prepare documentation—illustrations and examples of the problem.
3. Analyze the causes and establish the objective for change: the Force Field Analysis.
4. Select the appropriate restraining force(s) to reduce. This step is based on the Force Field Analysis conducted in the previous step. Selecting restraining forces for reduction is, of course, based on Lewin’s principle of change; that is, reduction of restraining forces, as opposed to increasing driving forces, develops less tension in the system and therefore, less resistance to change.
5. Brainstorm ideas for reducing the restraining force(s).
6. Test brainstorming list for feasibility and make selections.
7. Plan action steps.

Phase 5—Problem-Solving Presentation (Three Hours). After completing the seven steps of problem solving for one of the problems selected, each group prepares a presentation of its work for the other groups. After each group’s presentation, the other groups critique the presenting group’s work with feedback and suggestions. The rationale for this phase is to (a) use each group as a resource to all others; (b) practice what they will probably need to do when they return to their job (often presentations need to be made back “at the shop” to peers, subordinates or to superiors); and (c) enhance motivation (shared ownership) since each group is presenting to its peers. If time permits, each group can take a second problem, usually their second choice, from the original list of most important problems and begin the problem solving process (Phase 4) again.

As a conclusion to the meeting, I make a brief statement. It is usually something like, “Often when groups complete a meeting such as this, they take the attitude of ‘we’ve done our work; now we’ll go back to the shop to wait and see.’ If your attitude is similar to this, then you’ll wait for and see nothing. Action must be taken by you if any change in the organization is to occur.”
This statement is followed by a brief questionnaire of four items:

1. What are the advantages of following the kind of format (or design) we used during these two days?
2. The disadvantages?
3. To what extent do you believe anything will be different as a result of these two days? The question is answered via a seven-point scale ranging from one, “no difference,” to seven, “to a great extent.”
4. What is your degree of optimism/pessimism about the “state” of your organization at this time? This question is also answered on a seven-point scale ranging from one, “high pessimism” to seven, “high optimism.”

The reason for asking the first two questions is to give me some feedback about the adequacy and relevance of the design. The purpose of asking the remaining two questions is quite another matter. I believe it is important to determine at this point in the meeting the “feeling state” of the client. People behave according to what they think and feel. If, for example, individuals believe that what they have done will amount to naught (a feeling of pessimism), then the problem-solving process will have been nothing more than an exercise. When I discover that pessimism is relatively high I then probe to try to discover why and if we can do anything about it.

For purposes of this chapter typical responses to the first two questions are the more relevant.

Some quotes for question 1 have been:

“Breaks down some barriers, may reveal feelings not previously known or understood.”
“Working on real problems gives sense of purpose.”
“Gets things going; gives you an idea of path to follow.”
“Sets up actions and responsibilities for actions.”
“It had the advantage of saving time and preventing disorganized discussion.”
“Bringing things out in the open.”
“Allows criticism without taking it personally.”
“Helped to get problems down to ‘bite size.’”
“Helped to formulate most troublesome problems.”
“Gave me more insight into other groups.”
“Opens the door to honest communication with each other.”
“Reduces tension between the groups.”
Some quotes for question 2 have been:

“The structure may keep some of the real issues hidden.”

“Image exchange may have been unnecessary for groups who know each other as well as we already do.”

“Aspects of total problem involving other management levels and other functions can’t be covered adequately.”

“Restricted some significant division problems from being presented.”

“Some issues when discovered in the middle of the session may not be covered fully enough because backtracking is difficult.”

“Could cause hurt feelings, widen gulfs.”

“Can think of no disadvantages.”

Naturally, groups’ responses to questions 3 and 4 vary according to organization. Generally, people believe (but not strongly) that there will be a difference, the average is usually around five on the seven-point scale. Responses to the fourth question vary even more than those to the third. This fourth question taps individual differences with respect to feelings more than the other questions.

To close the meeting, I report back to the groups their answers to the four questions and we discuss the implications. The primary purpose of this final process, as stated earlier, is to face the reality of people’s feelings and that, in the final analysis, the extent to which action will actually be taken rests largely on individual emotion and motivation.

Follow-Up

Follow-up to an intervention such as this one may take a variety of forms. A must for the consultant, especially the internal practitioner, is to consult in whatever way appropriate with the problem-solving groups formed during the off-site meeting. For example, in the case reported, a “progress report” meeting of the entire off-site group was planned for one day six weeks later. I met with the group to help design and facilitate the meeting for this day. I recommended that I return for this meeting to help with the design but also to ensure that the meeting would indeed be held.

Another follow-up activity to an intergroup intervention is to plan yet another intervention. As the experienced consultant knows, an intervention sets in motion new and different organizational dynamics that call for further diagnosis and possible intervention as a consequence. With respect to the case example described in this paper, two additional interventions were planned. One was a team-building event for the head of Manufacturing and his staff, and another was an additional intergroup problem-solving session for the next lower levels of management in Engineering and Manufacturing.
Summary

So that the reader will not be lost in the details, I shall summarize this intervention for managing intergroup conflict by providing an outline of what I have described.

**Prior to the meeting:** General meeting of both groups with the relevant person(s) in the organizational hierarchy to establish objectives, boundaries of authority, and so on.

**Phase 1—Image exchange:** The two groups share their perceptions of themselves and one another according to three questions. (1) How do we see ourselves and our organizational responsibilities? (2) How do we see the other group? (3) How do we think they see us?

**Phase 2—Problem identification:** State the problems individually, consolidate individual work in the organizational grouping, groups present their list to one another, and these two problem lists are consolidated into one working list.

**Phase 3—Organizing for problem solving:** Individuals rank order the problem list from most important problem to least, then make a first and second choice as to the problem they want to tackle. Finally, "cross-function" problem-solving groups are formed.

**Phase 4—Problem solving:** Each problem-solving group presents its work in terms of the content for each of the steps and their action plans.

Finally, it is important to obtain some assessment as to what the group thought about the meeting and their feelings about the future.

CONCLUSION

With respect to the advantages or strengths of this design for intergroup intervention, the preceding quotes from previous clients speak for themselves. These quotes are fairly typical ones. The limitations of this design in my opinion, are primarily in the area of structure. The format is quite structured and paced. This structuring and pacing is deliberate on my part due to the brevity of time. What is sacrificed, however, is the opportunity for people to think inferentially as opposed to deductively; in other words, to “free wheel” and possibly discover issues and/or solutions that would likely not occur in this tight design. Moreover, people are not quite as free to express their emotions as would be the case in a less structured design. With follow-up support, however, there are certainly opportunities to think in these ways following the workshop.

With all things considered, especially time, I believe this design is the most productive one, at least for the kinds of groups I’ve consulted with. I also believe that this design has broader applicability to groups other than the ones with whom I’ve worked such as racial differences, federal government and state
government, school and community, and many others. The design would undoubtedly require modification according to the kind of groups in conflict.

**INTERORGANIZATIONAL**

The fourth and final level is the interface between organizations. This interface can take many forms—mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint ventures, consortia, and partnerships represent the main ones. For our purposes in this chapter we will concentrate on the first two, mergers and acquisitions. The other forms can lead to considerable conflict but mergers and acquisitions may represent the greatest degree of conflict because with these actions two organizations are being brought together to form a third (merger) or at least a larger and more complicated organization as a result of an acquisition. Strategic alliances, joint ventures, and the other forms require cooperation and resolving conflict, but they remain somewhat separate and autonomous from one another; whereas, for a merger or acquisition absorption and integration are required, the conflict is immediate, highly salient, and emotional.

There are several reasons for these “joinings.” Two reasons stand out: (1) share resources, some of which perhaps being scarce, that neither organization by itself can maintain, and (2) improve the management of costs by reducing redundancies. By their very nature these joinings force organization change, in general, and generate conflict in particular. Most of these joinings, especially in the form of mergers and acquisitions, fail. What is promised to stakeholders—increased sales, savings, larger market share, and “synergies”—simply does not occur, at least for the most part. In their extensive study of interorganizational relations, Burke and Biggart (1997) found that the majority of mergers and acquisitions failures are primarily due to the following reasons or conditions:

- Insufficient clarity about goals and how to measure progress toward the goals
- Imbalance of power and control between the two organizations when merged or, say, a strategic alliance or joint venture is established
- Imbalance of expertise, status, and/or prestige between the two parties
- Overconfident and unrealistic notions about future success of the relationship, that is, holding a belief of having sufficient control over key variables
- Lack of a contingency plan (organization change including these joinings never unfolds as expected)
- Lack of perceived equity, for example, distributions of key jobs and roles
As can easily be imagined, conditions for success are the opposite of those on the failure list. To clarify, here are a few examples:

- Having a superordinate goal, that is, a goal or goals that can be accomplished only through the cooperative efforts of the two parties (See the section on “Coercion and Confrontations” in Chapter 2 for the original research in this domain, the work of Sherif [for example, Sherif and Sherif, 1969] and Blake, Shepard, and Mouton [1964].)
- Having a balance of power, expertise, and status
- Creating mutual gain
- Having a committed leader
- Alignment of rewards (In the early stages of a merger or acquisition, it is important to consolidate various compensation systems into one.)
- Having respect for differences
- Achieving equity
- Having realistic assumptions about what can be accomplished and in what time frame
- Having good luck!
  (As summarized in Burke, 2002.)

A few years ago I was consulting with the mortgage division of a large bank. They had recently gone through an acquisition, although it was called a merger, and at the time was about to experience another one. In a meeting with seven executives (some of whom were the acquirers and others the acquired) of the new, larger mortgage division, and now about to become even larger, I asked them one question. What have you learned from the previous joining that you think would apply to the forthcoming acquisition? These executives were weary from their previous experience, but maybe applying some lessons learned, this next “round” might be a little easier. A brief summary of their responses to my question were:

1. They emphasized the importance of having a vision for the future (sound familiar?).
2. They noted that having a rationale behind the joining and explaining this carefully to all those affected is critical.
3. They stressed the importance of being open and honest about the change.
4. They pointed out how important it is in the early stages to have informal relations between the two parties, such as going to a ballgame together, having meals together, and so on.

5. These executives argued that rapid decision making was imperative even if some of the decisions would have to be changed later. They pointed out that people cry for structure and order and this need should be addressed.

6. The seven executives emphasized the importance of what they referred to as “walking the talk,” meaning matching words with actions, or the absence of hypocrisy.

7. They stated that in the midst of this kind of organization change, typically, the customer is forgotten. With so much time and energy being focused inwardly, conducting the business and serving customers suffers.

These responses from the executives were based on their experiences and do not represent the results of a rigorous study. Yet, as can be seen, there is considerable overlap with the findings from the Burke and Biggart (1997) study. While it is true that most mergers and acquisitions do not achieve what is promised to stakeholders and constituents, some do succeed. For one that not only succeeded with merging two companies but two nationalities in addition (British and American), see Bauman, Jackson, and Lawrence (1997).

Summary

The short story of our friend, the fifty-four-year-old man who had been with his employer for twenty-five years, depicted conflict for him at four different, albeit overlapping, levels and interfaces. His psychological contract with the company was in transition; job security was no longer a source of comfort. Younger, more highly educated, and ethnically quite diverse employees caused our friend additional discomfort interpersonally. Intergroup conflict, particularly due to a highly differentiated organizational structure with little integration, was a daily source of consternation and frustration for our friend. And on top of everything else, due to management’s strong desire to grow, get larger, and dominate the marketplace, there were these frequent acquisitions bringing with them strange and different cultures that needed to be absorbed. And while fictional, our friend’s story is not necessarily extreme or unrepresentative of life in many large and complex organizations today. Conflict, like change, is a way of life.

Even though conflict is inevitable in organizations we are not without ways to manage the process and to help with resolutions. There are tried-and-true ways to help two people in conflict to resolve, at least to some degree, their differences. Intergroup conflict can be managed and resolved as the case example based on an
actual situation illustrated. And ways that help us interpersonally and with conflicting groups can be applied on a larger scale to facilitate a more successful process of acquisitions and mergers. And the changing nature of the organization’s psychological contract with employees may not be bad. Job security is a thing of the past, but giving and being loyal to the organization in exchange for opportunities to learn and develop professionally can provide for employees career security, that is, career security may be replacing job security.

Managing conflict and working toward resolutions require considerable time, energy, skills and motivation. Not dealing with conflict in organizations, however, drains if not inappropriately uses even more time and energy. We know much about how to deal with conflict. Spending more time and energy than we typically do on applying this knowledge is time well spent.

Note

1. I refer to this particular step as “hanging up our dirty linens.”

References


Because I manage an organizational change consulting firm, I am often asked to describe my work (and am thankful for that request when it occurs).

Upon reflection, I have seen that describing myself as a psychologist, though certainly true, leaves out more than it might convey.

I am not a scholar, nor do I see myself as a researcher in the formal sense of the word.

Instead, my work, and the enormous energy, curiosity, and (often) joy that it generates in me, are best understood as that of a craft.

Much as might a violinmaker or builder of furniture, I have devoted my career to the enhancement, and refinement, of the skills of application of a (relatively) few rather simple tools to aspects of social interaction so common as to sometimes go unnoticed.

My tools are borne of psychological theory, research, and my years of less formal observation. I apply these tools to phenomena that are the very fabric of interpersonal life. I am particularly interested in the resolution of interpersonal and small-group conflict. That is because of the many aspects of group life that I have had the opportunity to observe, it is the resolution of such conflict that seems to have the greatest benefit of group cohesion, relationship building, and accelerated development of creativity and growth. If I were to borrow the language of my many colleagues from the corporate world, I would say that of the many aspects of group life, “conflict well-resolved has the greatest leverage.”
As I started to think about what I might write here, I soon came to see that conveying the substance of my conflict resolution methodology on the printed page was all but impossible. My initial attempts were something akin to describing dancing in print: “Be sure to move your left foot just a bit further forward as the music starts . . . .”

Rather than engaging in that folly, I will describe here the concepts that have driven the development and refinement of my methodology and will make suggestions about ways that others can build upon these ideas as they work to improve their own methodologies for the productive resolution of small-group conflict.

SUPPORT, WHEN POSSIBLE

“Help” and “support” are simply two different ways in which people might assist one another. Providing assistance is, in a sense, the “fuel” that drives the success of small groups and larger social systems. With certain types of assistance, groups can become much more than the sum of the contributions of their individual members. As a result, these concepts have extremely broad application to my work and the work of those concerned with enhancing the benefits of group and organizational interaction generally.

We define help as “doing something so that another person need not do it.” Quite obviously, providing help is often a fine thing to do in that it can make the situation of the recipient easier. In addition, receiving help is usually appreciated and that sentiment can enhance our interactions. Help, then, is “comfort-inducing” assistance.

Support means “contributing to a person’s capacity.” And (perhaps obviously), we intend the notion of “capacity” very broadly. I would include such things as creativity, contribution, commitment, or productivity. When support is offered (and is successful, which is certainly not always to be expected), the recipient becomes stronger, or in some other way, more effective at whatever it is that he or she hopes to achieve. Support, then, is “strength-building” assistance.

Before we explore these concepts further, it is important to say that though they are central to my practice, they are, by no means of my creation. Indeed, these are ancient ideas. Perhaps most familiar is the parable of the fish: “Give someone a fish, and they eat for a day. Teach someone to fish and they eat for a lifetime.” This tells us something about fundamental characteristics of help and support.

I am drawn even more strongly to the description offered by the twelfth-century philosopher-physician Maimonides Rambam. He taught that there were twelve levels of holiness of charitable giving in the eyes of God. The holiest of these is to “Teach someone to do something so that they are no longer
dependent upon you.” There is something beautiful about that description, but perhaps more important here is that it introduces the important connection between support, help, and dependency.

**INCREASE SUPPORT SUCCESS**

As mentioned earlier, support does not always succeed. In contrast to providing help, providing successful support is a rather complicated matter.

If support is to succeed, it must imply a “stretch” for the recipient. But, in this regard, human beings reveal elasticity in ways that are similar to that displayed in the physical world. We can all stretch, but not without limit. The extent to which one is asked to extend his or her capacity is important for support success. If the stretch is too great, the intended recipient is likely to abandon the effort or may even see the attempt as absurd. When that happens, it is likely that the motivation and judgment of the provider of the support will be questioned, thus decreasing the likelihood of successful support being offered by the same person in the future.

The recipient must be **willing** to grow in the ways implied by the support effort. The recipient must be open to the possibility of such growth and must also be open to the possibility that the particular supportive interaction could be beneficial.

The recipient must trust the positive intent and motivation of the person offering the support.

The provider of support must trust the positive intent and capacity of the recipient.

The provider must be willing and able to relinquish primary control of the events subsequent to the effort to provide support.

To illustrate these last two concepts, I often mention that if one is teaching a teenager to drive a car, at some point in the process it is absolutely necessary to “hand over the keys.”

For an act of support to succeed, the provider must be willing and able to provide it, and the recipient must be willing and able to accept it.

**BUILD THE SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP**

When help is provided, over time, the recipient is likely to become dependent upon the provider. Again, over time, the recipient is likely to feel somehow diminished by the pattern of helpful interaction and may become resentful. With continuing help, the centrality of the helper is increased and that of the recipient
diminished. This is extremely important in organizational settings in which those who provide help are typically more likely to be noticed for their contributions and, as a result, are more likely to be rewarded for them.

In contrast, when support is provided, there develops a peerlike tone in the relationship between the provider and the recipient. They become, in effect, partners in increasing the productivity derived from their interaction. This is not to suggest that when support is provided in an organizational context there is some disruption of the organizational hierarchy, but rather that the spirit of the supportive relationship encourages an experience of equality.

Related to this idea is another that many people find to be counterintuitive: Successful conflict resolution is a form of partnership. As a result, significant discrepancies of skill between the parties to a conflict can lead to a decrease in the likelihood of success. If one is invested in true resolution, it is therefore often useful to contribute to the strength of the other party so that he or she can become a more effective contributor to the process of resolution. Using the language we have explored here, it is often by providing support that we can shift the participation of the other from that of conflict opponent to that of problem-solving partner.

Often, as I describe these ideas, an unintended consequence is that it may appear that I am somehow an opponent of help, but that is certainly not true at all. It would be accurate to say that I am an opponent of help that is offered reflexively rather than thoughtfully. This is because there are many situations in which there would be much greater individual, group, and organizational benefit were support provided.

Why then, do people so frequently choose to provide help when they might have offered support? One motivation seems immediately obvious to people who reflect on this matter: Providing help is far more efficient of time than is providing support. This is most obvious in organizational settings in which the time pressures are often profound. Even those who well understand the long-term benefits of providing support are pulled in the direction of offering help because providing support is so time-consuming in comparison.

Less obvious, but in many ways more important, is the fact that when help is provided, the helper maintains primary control of the interaction. In contrast, when successful support is provided, control must be shared with the recipient.

Those who tend to have difficulty relinquishing control (for any of a variety of reasons) are likely to become habitual, or as I described them earlier, reflexive helpers.

When help is provided, the “spotlight” tends to shine on the helper. When support is provided, the focus is on the increased capacity of the recipient of the support. It is ironic to note that in organizational life those who provide support often go unnoticed in comparison to those providing help even though it is the support that will have far greater lasting benefit.
ENCOURAGE BENEFICIAL CONFLICT

In many situations, it is easy to understand why people might avoid engaging in conflict. Indeed, if we reflect on the “big picture,” we see that there is often the potential for very significant costs when conflict occurs. I need not detail those costs here.

But in my work, we tend to “think small.” Our work is done with small groups of people who gather to enhance their skills of interaction. Yet, despite (what would certainly appear to be) much lower “stakes,” conflict avoidance is the norm.

Over the years, I have seen many situations in which small groups sat in stunned silence rather than so much as mention any of the conflicts that were plainly visible before them.

There is a clear tendency to avoid conflict in these situations.

This is an issue of no small concern to my colleagues and me because we know that the greatest single source of significant group development is the experience of conflict well resolved, and so the issue of conflict avoidance became a focus of our interests for many years.

At some point, we started to explore these matters with our program participants. The results of these discussions, in truth, provided significant surprise.

We are all well aware that many aspects of psychology have found their way into day-to-day communication. For example, in any corporate cafeteria we might overhear a conversation in which someone was characterized as being “defensive.” And, were we to ask just what that meant, the answer we would receive is likely to be quite reasonable.

In my observation, and in stark contrast, knowledge of the psychology of conflict has not yet filtered down “to the street.”

Initially, this was confusing to us. But, over time, we began to see that in very important ways, our program participants’ exploration of conflict issues was the “reverse” of what we had come to expect based upon our experience with many other issues.

For most of the phenomena we explore in our programs, participant knowledge is typically far greater than their emotional connection to the issues at hand.

For the world of conflict and its productive resolution, the opposite is true. Participants came to us with virtually no knowledge of these issues, but with emotional connections so strong as to provide the motivation for their avoidance of the issues altogether. The mere mention of the word “conflict” immediately stimulated memories of childhood bruises both literal and figurative. Our participants were very much connected to the issues. Everyone, it seemed, knew how conflict felt but very few had any useful ways to understand it.

As a result, in my experience, the single most significant motivation for the avoidance of conflict (in the small-group settings in which we operate) is the limited tolerance for the ambiguity generated by the experience of conflict itself.
Stated simply, the people with whom we work, though typically very sophisticated and skillful in the arena of their chosen professions, are utterly lacking in knowledge of conflict, and this, together with the intensity of their emotional connection, generates confusion that makes them hesitant to explore it at all.

They avoid conflict because they do not want to appear incompetent and also because they are fearful about engaging something that they understand is powerful, yet, at the same time, unknown, perhaps for them, even unknowable.

We deal with this in several ways.

Frequently, we will launch an informal conversation about conflict within our client groups. We might, for example, offer our program participants a handout saying something like, “Are there any conflicts associated with your department’s recent reorganization?” Within moments, the noise level in the room increases as the small groups we have structured start to explore the question, but their exploration typically avoids any real engagement with the conflicts that they know to exist. Their conversations are animated but, in certain important ways, superficial.

Then, after a few minutes, we offer another sheet . . . .

It says “Oh no! I forgot to define it! Please write your own working definition of conflict below.”

As I distribute the second sheet I feign embarrassment, sometimes commenting on the fact that I seem to have violated an extremely important principle of adult education in that I have failed to define the very important term “conflict.” (I should add here that when using this approach I have had participants literally say, “Hey wait . . . . You prepared that sheet in advance . . . ." as they found themselves caught in the joke.)

As our participants start to take in the meaning of the sheet, I explain that I knew that they each had a “working definition” of conflict because they were having an intelligent conversation about the topic for several minutes.

They write. They talk for a while in small groups. And then we start to explore their many definitions together.

Often, the definitions they generate are paragraphs long.

From these conversations, we can extract many important characteristics of conflict.

Do conflicts always occur between people? Well, no. I explain that I find that I often experience conflict when I am alone in my car and approach a local donut shop. They smile.

Is conflict between groups really the same as conflict between individuals? Well, no. There seem to be some conflicts built into the relationship between Finance and Engineering that somehow transcend the behavior of the individual members of those departments.

With each of these many brief discussions, important things start to happen. Of course, their knowledge increases a bit, but that is not my primary interest.
More importantly, they start to sense that their engagement with the very issue of conflict is starting to change. With each comment, their understanding deepens and they become a bit more capable and, with that, a bit more comfortable. Rather than being experienced as some sort of unapproachable whirlwind, their conflicts start to be *understandable*.

Eventually, I tell them that I will offer what I typically call “textbook definition” of the word “conflict.” When I do, I try to remember to mention it is not any better than theirs but is a bit “simpler.” I typically use Deutsch’s definition of conflict as “things in opposition.”

With that, I ask that they return to the original conversation about conflicts borne of their recent reorganization.

They do, but with greater depth, greater ease, greater creativity, and vastly increased energy.

My offering a definition of “conflict” is an act of *help*, but that quickly transitions to *support* as my program participants try to apply their new knowledge to their own work situation.

Some forms of conflict avoidance are organization-wide.

Those with whom I work often tend to believe that much of their behavior is biologically determined. In fact, in recent years, such a view seems to have swept many organizations I have come to know well.

Recently, I had the chance to work with a rather large group of people from a manufacturing firm. I spent several days with these folks but had responsibility for the program activities for only part of that time. At one point, a senior training manager spent a few hours with the group providing guidance for their understanding of a personality inventory that they had filled out perhaps a month before. It was the *third* such personality test they had taken since being hired by the company.

After a while, expressions of confusion started to arise because many in the group had come to notice that their personality characteristics seemed to differ depending on the particular test that was the object of their focus.

In response, the trainer thought it useful to explain the differences among the three tests.

She started with the test that these people had taken when the company first hired them. She characterized that test as revealing “their personality DNA,” that is, those characteristics of behavior that *could not change* . . . .

On the many occasions that I have asked representatives of my client organizations why they find these personality tests to be so useful, I have often been offered (essentially) the same response. I am usually told that the tests of personality are a very valuable *first step* in employees’ learning how to work productively with those who differ from themselves in fundamental ways.

Indeed, that would (initially) seem to be a most attractive prospect, particularly given my great interest in the productive resolution of interpersonal conflict.
Unfortunately, I have been waiting for many years for organizations that use this “first step” to get to the second step.

In fact, all too frequently, I hear employees of organizations that use these personality tests explain that meaningful interaction with particular others is all but impossible. They seem to have learned that because their behavior and the behavior of others is generated by (what they understand to be) immutable characteristics of personality, seeking common ground for the resolution of their conflicts is futile.

I have come to view this organizational tendency as a regrettable and systemic form of conflict avoidance, and, when I have the opportunity, I explore this issue with my clients.

Another form of conflict avoidance is seen in the tendency of some people to seek the role I sometimes call “conflict confidant.” These are folks who welcome conversations with any and all who come to them with descriptions of conflict about which their “clients” are concerned. Conflict confidants are usually skilled listeners and seem to take great pride in their ability to comfort those with whom they engage in exploration of these issues. Almost invariably, the person describing a conflict feels far better after such discussions: his or her tension is replaced by relaxation and comfort. Confusion is replaced by a sense of clarity. Animation is replaced by a sense of calm. And, in my view, the fact that they tend to welcome these changes is precisely the problem: that is because each such incremental decrease in energy decreases the probability that the actual parties to the conflict will engage one another in meaningful dialog. The discussion with the conflict confidant often becomes a substitute for the more productive (though admittedly more difficult) discussion that really should occur.

The role of the conflict confidant (and perhaps here I can reintroduce the now archaic but more descriptive terms “busybody” or “gossip”) is built upon the shared belief that conflict itself is something to be avoided. With that assumption, if, by “talking it through” one can sidestep the conflict, everyone involved is understood to be better off.

The difficulty I have described is exacerbated when the person in the role of conflict confidant is an organizational manager, and sadly many managers see the avoidance of conflict (particularly among their subordinates) as one of their primary responsibilities. In this regard, I try to support managers in understanding their responsibility as that of educating and encouraging their subordinates so that all of them can engage in, and extract benefit from, constructive conflict resolution more frequently.

In my view, people finding themselves in this role of conflict confidant (and we all will be in that situation frequently) must understand the individual, group, and organizational benefits that can be extracted from conflict and thus must encourage the productive resolution of conflict whenever possible. When they start listening to the conflicts that others experience, they
should respond with their own version of, “How can I assist you so that you can have a better conversation with the person with whom you have this issue?” With that posture, their helpful conflict avoidance can become supportive conflict encouragement.

AVOID THE CONSTRAINTS OF POLITESS

If one is to be successful as a third party or facilitator of conflict (whether in a formal or informal capacity) one must not be “polite.” That is most certainly not to suggest that a skilled third party should act in unkind ways.

In order to understand this (perhaps surprising) suggestion, we must first consider the social function of the rules of politeness to which we typically adhere.

Rules of politeness are essentially “lubricants” to our interactions. They render our superficial interactions more predictable and thus more familiar and comfortable. To understand this idea intuitively, suppose that in response to hearing a colleague say “How are you doing?” I were to detail the parts of my anatomy that were currently aching from the work I did in my garden this past weekend. As is quickly apparent, the phrase “How are you doing?” is not actually a question at all. Because it takes its meaning from the shared rules of politeness, it is a greeting, and, as such, it invites a response of a particular form. In order for an interaction thus initiated to flow smoothly, it is expected that I respond with something like “Fine, and how are you?”

These “lubricating” functions are important day to day, but it is these very functions that often cause problems in our attempts to be effective as facilitators of conflict or other forms of interaction.

Here are some examples.

For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that I am trying to assist two other people, Joe and Sue, who are experiencing a conflict.

One manifestation of politeness is that people tend to speak to those who speak to them. This may seem innocuous enough, but consider the pattern that might emerge as I work with Joe and Sue. Suppose, for example, I notice that Joe is responding to Sue exclusively from the perspective of his intellect. I might want to encourage him to convey more of his emotional perspective on the issues they are trying to explore.

If I say (some version of), “Joe, what are you feeling about the way you two are working on this issue?” The rules of politeness make it very likely that Joe will respond to me.

I then might ask a similar question of Sue, and she, again constrained by the rules of politeness, is likely to respond to me as well.
In moments of such dialog we have managed to exacerbate an aspect of the problem that we were hoping to resolve together: Joe and Sue were having some difficulty talking to each other productively, and because of my polite interventions, now they are not talking to each other at all. Instead, they are each talking to me, the third party.

What then might we do to support the ability of these two people to talk to one another?

One step forward is to frame my comment not as a question, but as a (gentle) suggestion or request. Instead of saying “Joe, what are you feeling about the way you two are working on this issue?” we are much more likely to ultimately contribute to a successful interaction by saying “Joe, please tell Sue how you are feeling about the way you two are working on this issue.” Again, by the familiar standards of day-to-day communication, this is impolite. We are not likely to talk to our friends at a dinner party in this way, but it can be of great potential benefit in this facilitated setting.

Though the approach I have just described represents a step in the right direction, it is still likely to fail because it alters only the verbal dimension of the interaction. If my behavior remains constrained by my desire to be polite (and because of the expectations of Joe and Sue that I am so constrained), Joe will almost certainly speak to me even though I have asked that he speak to Sue.

The failure I am describing is generated not by the words I have spoken in my “suggestion” or “request” to Joe, but rather by certain behaviors that most of us display making it very likely that Joe will respond to me even though I have asked that he say something to Sue: another rule of politeness is that people tend to speak to those who look at them.

If my goal is to get Joe to speak to Sue, I have to do something that most would consider wildly impolite:

As I make the request of Joe, I must break eye contact with him and look directly at Sue. As I look at Sue, so will Joe (partly as a function of my influence as a model, but also because, absent eye contact, it is most unlikely that he will continue to look at and speak to the back of my head). As he looks at her and hears my suggestion, he is vastly more likely to speak directly to her as I had hoped.

There is another aspect of the constraints imposed by expectations of politeness that is worthy of consideration here.

The constraints of politeness are often linked to control behaviors in any interaction. In our efforts to train facilitators, we describe control (informally) as “steering the bus.”

In most conflict situations, the third party or facilitator should be in control, that is, should productively manage the interaction.

That is simply because the pattern of communication that has been established by the parties to the conflict is likely to have become part of the problem.
Because the pattern of communication must be changed, at least initially, it is likely to be more productive if someone new “takes the wheel.”

On more occasions than I care to remember, facilitators find it nearly impossible to “take the wheel” if they are constrained by politeness.

We often demonstrate this idea in a brief role-play. We simply designate one of our program participants to be the facilitator of a conversation while I play the role of (what very quickly reveals itself to be) a “difficult” participant in a conflict.

As the facilitator starts to frame the discussion, I might say (in a very gentle tone), “Pardon my interruption, but how long are we scheduled to meet in this session?”

Almost invariably, the facilitator answers.

Moments later and in the same cooperative tone, I might ask of the facilitator, “And, will you be providing some guidance if we get stuck?”

Again, the facilitator responds.

Polite people respond to questions (most particularly when they are framed in the gentle and cooperative tone that I mentioned) and thus can be led ever further from the task at hand if they are constrained by the familiar rules of politeness I have described.

When I have used this sort of role-play as a teaching device, the facilitator-in-training frequently pretends to wring my neck at some point. They often shout their frustration. Of course the process is frustrating, but most people with whom I work are simply unaware of ways to avoid the constraints we are exploring here. Their frustration mounts as they sense that I (as the difficult participant) am “driving the bus” ever further from our conflict resolution task, but they have little experience extricating themselves from what they experience as my firm hold on the interaction. That is, they have little experience being impolite.

When teaching about these techniques, I have found it helpful to frame this issue initially as a matter of focus of the efforts of the facilitator. Typically, after such a role-play, I ask whether they sense that (in my role) I am more fully invested than the other party in exploring the conflict productively. Of course, most people are aware that my attempts to control the interaction through my manipulative questions are forms of conflict avoidance.

With that, I ask about the effect that they are having on the other parties to the conflict each time they are drawn away from a productive interaction by my behavior.

In a matter of moments, people begin to notice that if, as facilitators, they are drawn to be focused on me, they are denying their attention to others. From that awareness, it is a short step to see that (in the structure I have described) being polite to me often implies being impolite to others.

I often remind my facilitators that when they think of those they hope to assist, they must remind themselves that “They are not dating.” Typically, they
smile, but they understand that their behavior as conflict facilitators ought not
be driven by familiar rules that can be more productively applied to other forms
of interaction with which they have much more experience.

CREATE A “CONCERT”

A few months ago, I came upon an interview on television that attracted my
attention. There, sitting in his home with an interviewer, was Bruce Springsteen.

At some point in their relaxed discussion, the interviewer said something like,
“Bruce, what are some of the things that you believe contribute to your doing
your best performances?”

The “Boss” started his response by mentioning in (what appeared at the time
to be) a casual way, that his were not *performances*, but *concerts*.

Neither the interviewer nor I took his meaning.

As the conversation continued, the interviewer again asked something about
Bruce’s “performances.” I soon noticed that with each mention of that word,
tension between them increased, but I did not understand why.

On the third or fourth occasion (and with a firmness that commanded my
attention) Springsteen explained: “Look, a *performance* is something that we
on stage do for those in the audience. A *concert* is something that we all do
together.”

I must admit that I was surprised by the intensity of his comment, but
beyond that, I saw in it things that are very important to my work.

Successful facilitation (whether in situations of conflict or otherwise) must
be a *concert*. If it is to succeed, facilitation must be built upon an active part-
nership with those people we hope to assist. We must become skillful at observ-
ing the results of our efforts and modifying our approach (sometimes moment
by moment) as the work proceeds.

As I watch the efforts of those new to the process of enhancing their facili-
tation skills, all too often I see that they are *performing*. On occasion this
tendency to perform is best understood in the theatrical sense (that is, the sense I
used prior to listening to the Springsteen interview): Often, in a simulation in
a workshop, I might ask a program participant to “facilitate this discussion for a
few minutes.” In response to that request, the participant I have chosen is some-
times transformed totally. He or she speaks in an entirely new voice (both
literally and figuratively), and often there is a radical change in body posture.
They typically become much more formal in their style of communication. All of
these changes and others are indications that the *performance* has begun.

I suspect that this happens because, understandably, we all tend to emulate
what we have seen, and many of my program participants have seen more than
their share of performance-oriented facilitation.
In order to truly enhance the quality of our facilitation, we must move in the direction of working in _concert_. That can happen only when we build upon the relationship we already have (even if it has recently started). Rather than encouraging people to become someone else when they facilitate, we try to encourage people to _be themselves_ as they take on the new responsibilities of facilitation. Only then can they work in _concert_ and only then can they be truly _supportive_ of those they wish to assist.

**ASSERT AUTHORITY**

It is no accident that as a psychologist, my bias is to suggest that our behaviors are learned and, as such, are amenable (in varying degrees) to change. There may be one category of exception, however.

When I teach people about our responses to those in _authority_, I tend to offer the opinion that much of it is “hardwired.” I often ask my program participants to consider one of the remarkably few, truly universal, aspects of the human experience: because human infants are utterly dependent on others for their very survival, the adults with whom I work have all experienced that dependency as evidenced by their having survived.

When I want to teach about the power of authority, I sometimes focus on a participant in our group and, with a dramatic flourish, tell a brief story:

“Tom, suppose that right now, as we are starting this discussion about authority, you were to glance over to the refreshment table there in the corner. For a fleeting moment you might be tempted by the taste of the orange juice. But then, you recognize that the timing might not be appropriate, and so you wait.

“Then, as I continue to speak, you become aware of a sound coming from the ceiling. You glance up, and see that the tiles are _parting_. Then, a hand reaches down toward you, but it is not what any of us would describe as an _ordinary hand_. The hand is nearly four feet wide, and the person to whom the arm extends weighs over a thousand pounds!

“The hand reaches beneath you and in one gentle motion lifts you through the opening in the ceiling. Once up there, that huge person gently holds you and gives you a drink of the cool orange juice that had so tempted you just moments before.

“Then, as if you were as light as a feather, the hand returns you to your seat, satisfied, and happy.

“Tom, at very least, you’d have a story to tell!”

Of course most people find the story funny, but many acknowledge that their hearts are racing a bit (particularly if I do a good job dramatically).

That, I explain, is the _universal experience of authority_.

With the help of a few examples, it does not take long to convince my participants that the issue of authority is one of the very most important and potentially powerful in the tool kit of skilled facilitators.

How then do conflict facilitators typically invest the important resource of their own authority?

In my experience with many hundreds of talented people who wish to enhance their skills as facilitators, authority is most typically not used at all. I find that most of the people with whom I work abdicate their authority as conflict facilitators at every opportunity.

They usually describe to those whose interactions (whether in conflict or not) they hope to facilitate that they are all essentially equals. They often say, for example, “We are in this together.” They emphasize their peerlike status at every turn.

Having seen this tendency for years, I started to become intrigued (and concerned). I am well aware that people generally understand authority to be something of a two-edged sword, and I would often ask participants to list some of the problems and benefits associated with this powerful psychological reality.

Typically, the problem list was far longer and more detailed than were the lists of positive aspects of the use of authority. Most people were far more aware of abuses of authority than they were of any potential benefits. It was no wonder that they thought some form of abdication to be the best course.

My experience teaches me that when authority is conducted well, those of lesser authority feel safer. They become more secure. Their tolerance for ambiguity increases and with that they become much more creative. Certainly in any interactive setting the potential benefits of these changes can be significant.

In situations of facilitated conflict, such benefits can be crucial.

When the authority of conflict facilitators is used well, it is a profoundly valuable form of support.

**EXTRACT MODELING BENEFITS**

It is easy (and fun) for me to demonstrate the impact of modeling to the large groups with which I sometimes work.

When working with small groups, we usually try to provide handouts and other materials to our participants as we need them. That allows us to preserve a flexibility that we value. But, when working with large groups (sometimes in the hundreds), we have to prepare folders in advance and we often set those up so that the pages we have yet to explore are in the right-hand pocket face down. At the start of our sessions, we explain that we do that to discourage the
(completely) understandable tendency of our participants to want to “look ahead” to see what we might be working on later in the day.

At some point, the group comes upon what appears to be a blank yellow sheet in the right side pocket. By that point, our methods are familiar. Everyone in the room expects that I am about ask that they pull the yellow sheet out, look at it, and then listen to me for a few moments as I amplify the concept described on the sheet. Then, they anticipate, I will ask them to discuss in their small groups some aspect of their work life that is stimulated by their consideration of the concept.

With the familiarity of that procedure in mind, I do, indeed, ask that they pull the yellow sheet from their folders, but then I diverge slightly (but significantly) from the accustomed ritual.

I typically say something like this:

“Before we talk about the substance of this next sheet, I would like you to notice something about the sheet of paper itself.” Then, as I continue to speak and having drawn the attention of everyone in the room, I move the sheet to my face and say, “It has a citrus aroma.” With that, I take a deep sniff of the page. Then, I listen to hear the flutter of hundreds of other yellow sheets as they move “noseward.”

Next, I ask the group to look at the sheet and there, in a small font and printed in the center of the page, they see the word “Modeling.”

Typically, there is a roar of laughter. Yes, they have been “had,” but they know that through this experience they have learned more about the power of modeling in seconds than I could convey in a detailed presentation.

It is extremely important that facilitators of conflict (and other forms of interaction) understand the power of modeling. Any characteristic of their emotional state and much of their behavior are likely to “rub off” on those they intend to assist.

Of course, that simple reality can be used to great advantage. (I sometimes mention to my Facilitation Skills program participants that prior to their sessions I put on music. I explain that if they find that music comforting in some small way all the better but that I put it on to increase my own comfort. I have no way to know in advance their tastes in music, but I certainly know mine, and I understand the power of modeling.)

If, through modeling, I can contribute to an increase in the comfort of those I hope to assist, it is likely to increase the likelihood of the success of the interaction. The same would be true of their sense of optimism, their faith in the positive motivation of all involved, their sense of commitment to the process, and their curiosity. Even such seemingly modest aspects of the interaction as punctuality can be altered in a positive direction through modeling.

So, at the simplest level, it might be tempting to suggest to facilitators they should do whatever they can to become aware of the impact of their own
behavior so that they can model those aspects that they believe will contribute to the success of the interactions they are facilitating.

In my experience, such an approach would, indeed, be tempting, but it can lead to serious problems. There is a potentially serious downside to modeling, and, in my observation, it is often ignored. When we model certain productive behaviors, we do it in the hope that the frequency of such behaviors will increase (in those we hope to assist). Often, however, despite our best intent as facilitators, those we are assisting display these very behaviors less frequently.

I call this the “division of labor” problem.

Division of labor was the great strength of Henry Ford’s first assembly line for the manufacture of automobiles. He understood that his workers were likely to have certain strengths and limitations in their response to each aspect of the process of assembling these machines. He correctly reasoned that by having each person “specialize” in the aspect of construction that tapped his or her (probably “his” at the time) greatest strength, there would be enormous benefits of efficiency.

Such division of labor is a fine way to increase efficiency (at certain costs that we will not explore here) but it is completely inappropriate to the sorts of skill development we hope to achieve with high-quality facilitation.

Suppose that I, as facilitator, occasionally fractionate an aspect of the larger issue in discussion in the hope that those with whom I am working will start to do the same. That is, I fractionate, in the hope that through modeling their behavior will be modified in this useful direction.

Instead, I may find that I am viewed by those in conflict as the “specialist” in fractionating, and rather than doing it more frequently, those in conflict may tend to do it less. In effect, they may come to understand that it is somehow my role to do the fractionating.

Of course, the very same thing can happen with any behavior that I might wish to model.

As a result, I suggest to those interested in developing conflict facilitation skills that they carefully observe the results of their attempts to model productive conflict behavior. If they find that the modeling has been successful, all the better. But, if not, I encourage them to make the issue explicit. By using the fractionating example that I mentioned earlier, I would encourage facilitators to say (their version of), “Did you notice how I tried to break the issue you were discussing into smaller pieces? Well, that might be a useful technique, and I would ask that you give it a try with the issue that just came to our attention.”

Absent that sort of explicit request, it is likely that the most effective conflict participant will be the facilitator, and quite obviously, that will not have the lasting benefit we would hope to provide.
CONCLUSION

Many of the people with whom I work need to be reminded that “knowledge” and “skill” are not simply two different names for the same thing. “Knowledge” means knowing that something is true, and “skill” means knowing how to do something.

I am no opponent of knowledge acquisition but happen to be far more interested in exploring the many issues associated with skill development.

I have observed in many of the people with whom I work their belief that knowledge and skill are fungible. That is, they behave as if they believe that there is a threshold beyond which accumulated knowledge will somehow become skill. We hope that our program participants will come to see that this is false.

It appears to me that much of the motivation for the belief that knowledge can somehow be turned into skill is rooted in timidity. Many of our program participants are hesitant to “give it a try.” I am sure that some of that is generated by the anxiety we all might feel when we try a new skill, but there is something beyond that: many people new to the world of small-group conflict facilitation seem to feel that any modest misstep on their part will have explosive consequences. With that, they become overly cautious, and often avoid intervening in the hope of preventing catastrophe.

Of course, I certainly do not wish to suggest recklessness on the part of any conflict facilitator, but in my view, little that we might do in that capacity has the explosive potential that many try to avoid.

In fact, when our interventions are inappropriate, they do not explode; they merely “fizzle.” Typically, they pass virtually unnoticed. I will admit that this may be no small blow to the ego, but it is important to remember, that with time, even such a blow can be overcome.

In response to my observation of this tendency toward hesitation in my conflict facilitators-in-training, I occasionally offer the old joke about the tourists who find themselves lost in midtown Manhattan one misty evening. To their relief, they spot a man beneath a streetlamp on the next corner.

As they approach, they notice that the gentleman seems the ideal person to provide assistance because he is carrying a horn case, and one of the tourists says, “Excuse me, can you tell us how to get to Carnegie Hall?”

The horn player says simply: “Practice, practice, practice.”

And so do I.
PART EIGHT

LOOKING TO
THE FUTURE
CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

A Framework for Thinking About Research on Conflict Resolution Initiatives

Morton Deutsch
Jennifer S. Goldman

In this chapter, we sketch out a framework for thinking about research on conflict resolution initiatives (CRIs). We first consider types of research and for what kind of issue each is most suited. Second, we discuss briefly types of audience, or users of research, and what they want. Here, we describe some substantive issues or questions for research that practitioners consider to be important. Next, we consider some of the difficulties in doing research in this area as well as what kind of research strategies may be helpful in overcoming these difficulties. Finally, we offer a brief overview of existing research in this area.

TYPES OF RESEARCH

There are many kinds of research, all of which have merit. They have differing purposes and often require varying types of skill. There is a tendency among both researchers and practitioners to derogate research that does not satisfy their specific needs or that does not require their particular kind of expertise. Thus, “action research” is frequently considered to be second-class research by basic researchers and “basic research” is often thought of as impractical and wasteful by practitioners. Elsewhere Deutsch (1973) has termed such conflict, which is based on misunderstanding (rather than on a valid conflict of value, fact, or interest), a “false” conflict.
We now turn to a discussion of several types of research that are relevant to conflict resolution: basic research, developmental research, field research, consumer research, and action research. Some researchers work primarily in one type; others move back and forth among them. We start our list with a discussion of basic research, but we do not assume the natural flow is unidirectional from basic to developmental research, and so forth. The flow is (and should usually be) bidirectional: basic does not mean initial.

**Basic Research**

There are many unanswered questions basic to knowledge and practice in the field of conflict resolution. To illustrate just a few:

- What is the nature of the skills involved in constructive conflict resolution?
- What determines when a conflict is ripe for intervention or mediation? What gives rise to intractable conflict, and how can it be changed constructively?
- What are the basic dimensions along which different cultures vary in their response to and management of conflict?
- How can people learn to control transference and countertransference (to use psychoanalytic terms) so that their emotional vulnerability does not lead to counterproductive behavior during conflict?
- What are the important similarities and differences in conflict processes at the interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels?
- What are reliable, valid, and reasonably precise ways of measuring the knowledge, attitudes, and skills involved in constructive conflict resolution?
- What are the intervening psychological processes that lead to enduring and generalized change in managing conflict, and what are the psychological and social consequences of such change?
- What are the most effective ways of dealing with difficult conflict and difficult people?
- What type of value system is implicit in the current practice of conflict resolution?

These are only a few of the important questions that must be addressed if we are to have the kind of knowledge that is useful for those interested in making conflict constructive—whether it be in families, schools, industry, community, or across ethnic and international lines. Many other questions are implicit in the various chapters of this book.
Developmental Research

Much developmental research is concerned with helping to shape effective educational and training programs in this area. Such research is concerned with identifying the best ways of aiding people to acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills necessary for constructive conflict resolution by answering such questions as how should something be taught (for example, using what type of teaching methods or pedagogy)? What should be taught (using what curriculum)? For how long? Who should do the teaching? In what circumstances? With what teaching aids? These best ways are apt to vary as a function of the age, educational level, cultural group, and personality of the children and adults involved.

There is a bidirectional link between developmental and basic research. To assess and compare the changes resulting from various educational and training programs, it is necessary to know what changes these programs were seeking to induce and also to develop valid and reliable measuring instruments and procedures for measuring these changes. We are now at the point where such instruments and procedures are being created and tested. One example is the conceptual framework for comparative case analysis of interactive conflict resolution by D’Estree, Fast, Weiss, and Jakobsen (2001). This framework was devised as a tool that can be used to evaluate and compare the results of a diverse set of conflict resolution initiatives. The framework is described in the final section of this chapter. Another example is the action evaluation research initiative (Rothman, 1997, 2005; Rothman and Friedman, 2005; Rothman and Land, 2004; Ross, 2001), a process that has been developed (though still being tested and refined) to help CRIs identify the changes they seek to create, and to evaluate whether and how those changes have occurred. This project is also described at the end of this chapter. While these examples demonstrate the work currently being done to increase our ability to evaluate CRIs, there is still much work to do in order to empirically better understand what types of initiatives are most effective and most efficient.

Field Research

Much developmental research can be done in experimental classrooms or workshops. However, field research is needed to identify the features of political systems, cultures, and organizations that facilitate or hinder effective CRIs. What type of effects do CRIs have with populations living under conditions of intractable ethnic conflict? What kind of culture is most favorable to such initiatives, and what kind makes it unfeasible or ineffective? Which levels in an organizational hierarchy must be knowledgeable and supportive of a CRI for it to be effective? In schools, what type of CRI model should be employed: extracurricular activity, a specific course in CR, an infusion model in all school
courses, use of constructive controversy, or all of the above? Is cooperative learning a necessary precondition or a complement to a CRI? What criteria should be employed in selecting CR practitioners? And so forth.

Most of these questions have to be asked and answered in terms of the specific characteristics of an individual setting, taking into account the resources, organization, personnel, population, and social environment. While this type of research can be difficult and expensive (in both time and money) to conduct, examples of it can be found in the conflict literature. Such research has been conducted on conflict resolution encounters that have taken place over the past few decades between parties in ethnic conflict, including those between Israelis and Palestinians (see Abu-Nimer, 1999, 2004; Kelman, 1995, 1998; Maoz, 2004, 2005) and Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Angelica, 2005; Rothman, 1999), among others, both internationally and domestically.

**Consumer Research**

It would be valuable to have periodic surveys of where CRIs are taking place, who is participating, what kind of qualification the practitioners have, and so on. Also, it would be good to know how the CRIs are evaluated by recipients, immediately after the initiatives and one year later. In addition to studying those who have participated in CRIs, it would be useful to assess what the market is for CRIs among those who have not had it.

Most of the research on CRIs in organizations has been essentially study of “consumer satisfaction.” The research has usually involved studying the effects of CRIs in a particular classroom, workshop, or institution. Results are quite consistent in indicating a considerable degree of approval among those exposed to CRIs, whether in the role of practitioner or participant. This is indeed encouraging, but awareness of the Hawthorne effect suggests both caution in our conclusions and the need to go considerably beyond consumer satisfaction research. (The Hawthorne effect, of course, refers to research suggesting that almost every program that is introduced has beneficial effects on the people involved simply because of the increased attention they receive.)

**Action Research**

Action research is a term originally employed by Kurt Lewin (1946) to refer to research linked to social action. To be successful, it requires active collaboration between the action personnel—the practitioners and participants—and the research personnel. What the action personnel do can be guided by feedback from the research concerning the effectiveness of their actions. To study the processes involved in successfully producing a change (or failing to do so) in a well-controlled, systematic manner, the researchers depend on the action personnel being cooperative. Most research on CRIs in the field—no matter how it is otherwise labeled—is a form of action research.
There are two main ways in which successful collaboration with practitioners increases the likelihood that research findings are used. First, participation usually raises the practitioners’ interest in the research and its possible usefulness. Second, collaboration with practitioners helps to ensure that the research is relevant to problems as they appear in the actual work of the practitioners and the functioning of the organization in which their practice is embedded.

However, there are many potential sources of difficulty in this collaboration. It is time-consuming and hence often burdensome and expensive to both the practitioners and researchers. Also, friction may occur because of the disparate goals and standards of the two partners: one is concerned with improving existing services, the other with advancing knowledge of a given phenomenon. The practitioner may well become impatient with the researcher’s attempt to have well-controlled independent variables and the intrusiveness involved in extensive measuring of dependent variables. The researcher may become exasperated with the practitioner’s improvisation and reluctance to sacrifice time from other activities to achieve the research objectives. In addition, there is often much evaluation apprehension on both sides: the practitioners are concerned that, wittingly or unwittingly, they will be evaluated by the research findings; the researchers fear that their peers will view their research as not being sufficiently well controlled to have any merit.

**AUDIENCES FOR RESEARCH**

There are several audiences for research: foundations and government agencies, executives and administrators who decide whether a CRI takes place in their organization, CR practitioners, and researchers who do one or more of the types of research described earlier. The audiences rarely have identical interests.

**Funding Agencies**

Our sense is that most private foundations are less interested in supporting research than they are in supporting pilot programs, particularly if such programs focus on preventing violence. Their interest in research is mainly oriented to evaluation, to answering the question does it work? Many government agencies have interests that are similar to those of private foundations. However, some domestic agencies, such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health, are willing to support basic and developmental research if the research is clearly relevant to their mission.

Internationally, as humanitarian organizations integrate CRIs into their work, the need to evaluate CRIs for the purposes of reporting the results to funders of humanitarian organizations has become a significant and challenging aspect of
CR work (Church and Shouldice, 2002). For example, while funders may be accustomed to evaluations of humanitarian programs that use immediate, concrete measures such as the number of people who participated in an initiative, a more accurate indicator of success for CRIs may be the long-term impact on the larger community. Working with funding agencies to reconcile the methods used to evaluate the short-term outcomes and long-term impacts of humanitarian-related CRIs can prove a challenging, but worthy task.

With respect to the type of evaluation research needed, we suggest that there is enough credible evidence to indicate that CRIs can have positive effects. The appropriate question now is under what conditions such effects are most likely to occur—for example, who benefits, how, as a result of participating in what type of initiative, with what type of practitioner, under what kind of circumstance? That is, the field of conflict resolution has advanced beyond the need to answer the oversimplified question of does it work? It must address the more complicated questions discussed in the section on types of research—particularly the questions related to developmental research.

**Executives and Administrators**

The executive and administrative audience is also concerned with the question of does it work? But depending on their organizational setting, they may have different criteria in mind in assessing the value of CRIs. A school administrator may be interested in such criteria as the incidence of violence, disciplinary problems, academic achievement, social and psychological functioning of students, teacher burnout, and cooperative relations between teachers and administrators. A corporate executive may be concerned with manager effectiveness, ease and effectiveness of introducing technological change, employee turnover and absenteeism, organizational climate, productivity, and the like.

It is fair to say that, with rare exceptions, CRI researchers and practitioners have not developed the detailed causal models that would enable them to specify and measure the mediating organizational and psychological processes linking CRIs to specific organizational or individual changes. Most executives and administrators are not much interested in causal models. However, it is important for practitioners and researchers to be aware that the criteria of CRI effectiveness often used by administrators—incidence of violence, academic achievement, employee productivity—are affected by many factors other than CRIs. They may, for example, be successful in increasing the social skills of students, but a sharp increase in unemployment, significant decrease in the standard of living, or greater use of drugs in the students’ neighborhood may lead to deterioration of the students’ social environment rather than the improvement one can expect from increased social skills. The negative impact of such deterioration may counteract the positive impact of CRIs.
One would expect executives and administrators to be interested in knowing not only whether CRIs produce the outcomes they seek but also whether it is more cost-effective in doing so than alternative interventions. Some research has evaluated the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation (see Chapter Thirty-Two) compared to adjudication, but otherwise there is little research examining the cost-effectiveness of CRIs.

Practitioners

Conflict resolution practitioners often have questions about the degree to which their work successfully affects both individual and institutional change. With regard to each focus, practitioners have articulated a need to have measuring instruments that they can use to assess the effectiveness of their work. Such instruments could be of particular value to them in relation to funding agencies and policy makers. Practitioners often feel that the methods they use during their training and consulting, to check on the effects their work has, are more detailed and sensitive than the typical questionnaires used in evaluation. Their own methods may be more useful to them even if less persuasive to funding agencies. Our sense is that a lot of general value could be gained from a study of the implicit theoretical models underlying the work of practitioners, as well as a study of how practitioners go about assessing the impact of what they are doing.

Practitioners’ focus on individual change tends to be concerned with such issues as these:

- How much transfer of knowledge and skill is there from the conflict resolution training, workshop, or encounter to the participants’ other social contexts? How long do the effects of CRIs endure? What factors affect transfer and long-term outcomes?
- How can CRIs be responsive to individual differences among participants in personality, intelligence, age level, social class, ethnic group, gender, and religion?
- How important is similarity in social cultural background between practitioner and participant in promoting effective CRIs? Are well-trained junior or student practitioners particularly effective in training other participants or students?
- What models of training are being employed among trainers?
- Can levels of expertise be characterized? How long and pervasive does training have to be for these levels?
- What selection and training procedures should be employed with regard to participants? With regard to trainers of trainers?
- At what age are the effects of CRIs most likely to take hold?
The focus on institutional change is concerned with other questions:

- In schools and communities, what set of adults and other community members—for example, administrators, teachers, parents, staff, and guards—should participate in CRIs if students’ learning is to effectively take hold? Must other community institutions be involved, such as the church, the police, health providers, and other community agencies?
- What are the most effective models for institutionalizing CRIs in schools, universities, communities, and at the political level?
- What changes in a CRI’s structure, pedagogical approach, and culture are typically associated with a significant institutional change?
- What critical mass of community and/or political involvement is necessary for systemic change?

It is evident that the issues raised by the practitioners are important but complex and not readily answerable by a traditional research approach. In addition, the complexity suggests that each question contains a nest of others that have to be specified in greater detail before they are accessible to research.

**Researchers**

Psychologically, other researchers are usually the most important audience for one’s research. If your research does not meet the standards established for your field of research, you can expect it to be rejected as unfit for publication in a respected research journal. This may harm your reputation as a researcher—and may make tenure less likely if you are a young professor seeking it. This may be true even if funding agencies, administrators, and practitioners find the research to be very useful to them.

The research standard for psychology and many other social sciences is derived from the model of the experiment. If one designs and conducts an experiment ideally, one has created the best conditions for obtaining valid and reliable results. In research as in life, the ideal is rarely attainable. Researchers have developed various procedures to compensate for deviation from the ideal in their attempt to approximate it. However, there is a bias in the field toward assuming that research that looks like an experiment (for example, it has control groups, and before-and-after measures) but is not because it lacks randomization and has too few cases (more on this later) is inherently superior to other modes of approximation. We disagree. In our view, each mode has its merits and limitations and may be useful in investigating a certain type of research question but less so in another.
We suggest three key standards for research: (1) the mode of research should be appropriate to the problem being investigated, (2) it should be conducted as well as humanly possible given the available resources and circumstances, and (3) it should be knowledgeable and explicit about its limitations.

**RESEARCH STRATEGIES**

Many factors make it very difficult to do research on the questions outlined in the previous sections, particularly the kind of idealized research that most researchers would prefer to do. For example, it is rarely possible to assign students (or teachers, or administrators) randomly to be trained (or not trained) by randomly assigned expert trainers employing randomly assigned training procedures. Even if this were possible in a particular school district, one would face the possibility that the uniqueness of the district has a significant impact on the effectiveness of training; no single district can be considered an adequate sample of some or all other school districts. To employ an adequate sample (which is necessary for appropriate statistical analysis) is very costly and probably neither financially nor administratively feasible.

Given this reality, what kind of research can be done that is worth doing? Here we outline several mutually supportive research strategies of potential value.

**Experimental and Quasiexperimental Research**

Experimental research involves small-scale studies that can be conducted in research laboratories, experimental classrooms, or experimental workshops. It is most suitable for questions related to basic or developmental research, questions specific as to what is to be investigated. Thus, such approaches would be appropriate if one sought to test the hypothesis that role reversal does not facilitate constructive conflict resolution when the conflict is about values (such as euthanasia) but does when it centers on interests. Similarly, it would be appropriate if one wished to examine the relative effectiveness of two different methods of training in improving such conflict resolution skills as perspective taking and reframing.

This kind of research is most productive if the hypothesis or question being investigated is well-grounded in theory or in a systematic set of ideas rather than when it is ad hoc. If well-grounded, such research has implications for the set of ideas within which it is grounded and thus has more general implications than testing an ad hoc hypothesis does. One must, however, be aware that in this type (as well as in all other types) of hypothesis-driven research, a hypothesis may not be supported—even if it is valid—because implementation of the causal variables (such as the training methods), measurement of their effects, or the research design may be faulty. Generally, it is easier to
obtain nonsignificant results than to find support for a hypothesis. Thus, practitioners have good reason to be concerned about the possibility that such research may make their efforts appear insignificant even though their work is having important positive effects.

In good conscience, one other point must be made. It is very difficult and perhaps impossible to create a true or pure experiment involving human beings. The logic involved in true experiments assumes that complete randomization has occurred for all other variables except the causal variables being studied. But human beings have life histories, personalities, values, and attitudes prior to their participation in a conflict workshop or experiment. What they bring to the experiment from their prior experience may not only influence the effectiveness of the causal variables being studied but also be reflected directly in the measurement of the effects of these variables.

Thus, an authoritarian, antidemocratic, alienated member of the Aryan Nation Militia Group may not only be unresponsive to participation in a CRI but also, independently of this, score poorly on such measures of the effectiveness of the CRI as ethnocentrism, alienation, authoritarianism, and control of violence because of his or her initial attitudes. Such people are also less likely to participate in CRIs than democratic, nonviolent, and nonalienated people. The latter are apt to be responsive to CRIs and, independently of this, to have good scores on egalitarianism, nonviolence, lack of ethnocentrism, and the like, which also reflect their initial attitudes.

With appropriate “before” measures and correlational statistics, it is possible to control for much (but far from all) of the influence of initial differences in attitudes on the “after” measures. In other words, a quasiexperiment that has some resemblance to a true experiment can be created despite the prior histories of the people who are being studied.

Causal Modeling
Correlations, by themselves, do not readily permit causal inference. If you find a negative correlation between amount of exposure to CRIs and authoritarianism, as I have suggested, it may be that those who are authoritarian are less apt to expose themselves to CRIs, or those who have been exposed to CRIs become less authoritarian, or the causal arrow may point in both directions. It is impossible to tell from a simple correlation. However, methods of statistical analysis developed during the past several decades (and still being refined) enable one to appraise with considerable precision how well a pattern of correlations within a set of data fits an a priori causal model. Although causal modeling and experimental research are a mutually supportive combination, causal modeling can be employed even if an approximation to an experimental design cannot be achieved. This is likely to be the case in most field studies.
Consider, for example, a study we completed several years ago on the effects of training in cooperative learning and conflict resolution on students in an alternative high school (Deutsch, 1993; Zhang, 1994). Prior theoretical analysis (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; Johnson and Johnson, 1989) as well as much experimental and quasiexperimental research (see Johnson and Johnson, 1989, for a comprehensive review) suggested what effects such training could have and also suggested the causal process that might lead to these effects. Limitation of resources made it impossible to do the sort of extensive study of many schools required for an experimental or quasiexperimental study or to employ the statistical analysis appropriate to an experiment. So we constructed a causal model that, in essence, assumed training in cooperative learning and/or conflict resolution would improve the social skills of a student. This, in turn, would produce an improved social environment for the student (as reflected in greater social support as well as less victimization from others), which would lead to higher self-esteem and more sense of personal control over one’s fate. The increased sense of control would enhance academic achievement. It was also assumed that improvement in the student’s social environment and self-esteem would lead to increased positive sense of well-being as well as decreased anxiety and depression. The causal model indicated what we had to measure. Prudence suggested that we also measure many other things that potentially might affect the variables on which the causal model focused.

The results of the study were consistent with our causal model. Even though the study was quite limited in scope—having been conducted in only one alternative high school—the results have some general significance. They are consistent with prior theory and also with prior research conducted in very different and much more favorable social contexts. The set of ideas underlying the research appears to be applicable to students in the difficult, harsh environment of an inner-city school as well as to students in well-supported, upper-middle-class elementary and high schools.

Nonexperimental field research is either exploratory or testing of a causal model, or some combination of both. Exploratory research is directed at describing the relations and developing the set of ideas that underlie a causal model. Typically, it is inappropriate to test a causal model with the data collected to stimulate its development. Researchers are notoriously ingenious in developing ex post facto explanations of data they have obtained, no matter how their studies have turned out. A priori explanations are much more credible. This is why nonexploratory research has to be well grounded in prior theory and research, if it is to be designed to clearly bear on the general ideas embedded in the causal model. However, even if a study is mainly nonexploratory, exploratory data may be collected so as to refine one’s model for future studies.
Survey Research
This form of research is widely used in market research; pre-election polling; opinion research; research on the occurrence of crime; and collection of economic data on unemployment, inflation, sales of houses, and so on. A well-developed methodology exists concerning sampling, questionnaire construction, interviewing, and statistical analysis. Unfortunately, little survey research has taken place in the field of conflict resolution. Some of the questions that could be answered by survey research have been discussed earlier, under the heading of consumer research. It is, of course, important to know about the potential (as well as existing) consumers of CRIs. Similarly, it is important to know about current CR practitioners: their demographics, their qualifications to practice, the models and frameworks they employ, how long they have practiced, the nature of their clientele, the goals of their work, and their estimation of the degree of success.

Experience Surveys
Experience surveys are a special kind, involving intensive in-depth interviews with a sample of people, individually or in small focus groups, who are considered to be experts in their field. The purpose of such surveys may be to obtain insight into the important questions needing research through the experts' identification of important gaps in knowledge or through the opposing views among the experts on a particular topic. In addition, interviewing experts, prior to embarking on a research study generally improves the researcher's practical knowledge of the context within which her research is conducted and applied and thus helps her avoid the minefields and blunders into which naïveté may lead her.

More important, experts have a fund of knowledge, based on their deep immersion in the field, that may suggest useful, practical answers to questions that would be difficult or unfeasible to answer through other forms of research. Many of the questions mentioned earlier under the heading of field research are of this nature. Of course, one's confidence in the answers of the experts is eventually affected by how much they agree or disagree.

There are several steps involved in an experience survey. The first is to identify the type of expert you want to survey. For example, with respect to CRIs in schools, one might want to survey practitioners (the trainers of trainees), teachers who have been trained, students, or administrators of schools in which CRIs have occurred. The second step is to contact several experts of the type you wish to interview and have them nominate other experts, who in turn nominate other experts. After several rounds of such nominations, a group of nominees usually emerges as being widely viewed as experts. The third step is to develop an interview schedule. This typically entails formulating a preliminary one that is tried out and modified as a result of interviews with a half dozen or so of the
experts individually and also as a group. The revised schedule is formulated so as to ask all of the questions one wants to have answered by the experts, while leaving the expert the opportunity to raise issues and answer the questions in a way that was not anticipated by the researcher.

Many years ago, Deutsch and Collins (1951) conducted an experience survey of public housing officials prior to conducting a study of interracial housing. The objective was to identify the important issues that could be the focus of a future study. It led to a study of the effects of the occupancy patterns: whether the white and black tenants were housed in racially integrated or racially segregated buildings in a given housing project. Additionally, the survey created a valuable handbook of the various other factors that, in the officials’ experience, affected race relations in public housing. It was a useful guide to anyone seeking to improve race relations in public housing projects.

Although it is possible for the experts to be wrong—to have commonly held, mistaken, implicit assumptions—their articulated views are an important starting point either as constructive criticism or as a guide to informed practice.

Learning by Analogy

Not only can the conflict resolution field learn from its experienced practitioners, it can also learn from the work done in other closely related areas. Many of the issues involved in CRIs have been addressed in other areas: transfer of knowledge and skills is of considerable concern to learning theorists and to the field of education generally; communication skills have been the focus of much research in the fields of language and communication as well as social psychology; anger, aggression, and violence have been studied extensively by various specialties in psychology and psychiatry; and there is an extensive literature related to cooperation and competition. Similarly, creative problem solving and decision making have been the focus of much theoretical and applied activity. Terms such as attitude change, social change, culture change, psychodynamics, group dynamics, ethnocentrism, resistance, perspective taking, and the like are common to CRIs and older areas. Although the field of conflict resolution is relatively young, it has roots in many well-established areas and can learn much from the prior work in these areas. The purpose of this handbook is, of course, to provide knowledge of many of these relevant areas to those interested in conflict resolution.

As an educational and social innovation, CRIs in the form of training, workshops, and intergroup encounters are also relatively young. There is, however, a vast literature on innovation in education and the factors affecting the success or lack of success in institutionalizing an innovation in schools. In particular, by analogy cooperative learning could offer much useful experience for CR training in this regard. Cooperative learning, which is conceptually closely related to CR training, has accumulated a considerable body of experience that might
help CR practitioners understand what leads to success or failure in institutionalizing a school program of CR training.

RESEARCH EVALUATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION INITIATIVES

In 1995, Deutsch wrote “there is an appalling lack of research on the various aspects of training in the field of conflict resolution” (p. 128). The situation has been improving since then. For example, there is now much evidence from school systems of the positive effects of conflict resolution training on the students who were trained. Most of the evidence is based on evaluations by the students, teachers, parents, and administrators. In Lim and Deutsch’s international study (1997), almost all institutions surveyed reported positive evaluations by each of the populations filling out questionnaires. Similar results are reported in evaluations made for school programs in Minnesota, Ohio, Nevada, Chicago, New York City, New Mexico, Florida, and Texas (see Bodine and Crawford, 1998; Johnson and Johnson, 1995, 1996; Lam, 1989).

While research evaluating CRIs may have begun primarily with research conducted on conflict resolution training, in the last few years conflict resolution evaluation research has expanded to include the development of tools, methodologies, and research conducted on a range of initiatives including interactive conflict resolution workshops involving politically influential parties from both sides in international conflicts (see D’Estree, Fast, Weiss, and Jakobsen, 2001; Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 1995, 1998), interethnic encounter groups (see Abu-Nimer, 1999, 2004; Maoz, 2004, 2005), and peace-building activities (see Lederach, 1997), to name a few. In this section, we offer a brief overview of some of the methodologies and instruments developed and research conducted over the past few years. We begin with an example of an instrument created by D’Estree, Fast, Weiss, and Jakobsen (2001) to assess the short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of interactive conflict resolution and other similar initiatives.

A Framework for Comparative Case Analysis of Interactive Conflict Resolution

D’Estree, Fast, Weiss, and Jakobsen (2001) created a framework, grounded in theory and practice, designed to be used as a tool for evaluating CRIs. While the framework was developed to address interactive problem-solving workshops (see Kelman, 1995, 1998; Fisher, 1997), it can be modified to address the particular goals of other types of CRIs as well.

The framework has four categories, and each category contains a set of criteria for assessing CRIs. The first category, “Changes in Thinking,” includes
criteria regarding various types of new knowledge that participants may gain from involvement in a CRI, such as the degree to which participants are able to problem solve, frame problems and issues productively, and communicate effectively. The second category, “Changes in Relations,” includes various indicators that the relationship between the parties in conflict has changed, such as the extent to which parties are better able to engage in empathetic behavior, validate and reconceptualize their identities, and build and maintain trust with the other side. The third category, “Foundations for Transfer,” includes criteria for assessing how well a CRI establishes a platform for transferring the learning to participants’ home communities once the CRI has ended. The criteria in this category include the extent to which participants have created artifacts (such as documents describing agreements, plans for future negotiations, joint statements, etc.) and put in place structures for implementing new ideas, and the extent to which the CRI has helped create new leadership. The “Foundations for Outcome or Implementation” category includes criteria that assess the extent to which the CRI contributed to medium- and long-term achievements that occur between the parties. Such criteria include the degree to which relationship networks have been created; reforms in political structures have occurred; new political input and processes have been created; and increased capacity for jointly facing future challenges can be demonstrated. It is important to note that the categories and accompanying criteria are interrelated, not mutually exclusive, and are not meant to be used in a linear fashion.

The framework also includes a matrix that differentiates between temporal phases of impact and societal levels of intervention. The temporal phases of impact are the promotion phase, in which a CRI attempts to promote or catalyze certain effects (assessed during the CRI); the application phase in which the effects of the CRI are attempted to be applied or implemented in the parties’ home environments (assessed in the short term after the CRI takes place); and the sustainability phase, in which the medium- and long-term effects of the CRI are assessed. The societal levels of intervention enable evaluators to distinguish between effects that occur at the individual (micro) level, societal (macro) level, and the community (meso) level, in which the transfer of effects from the individual to the societal level often takes place. D’Estree, Fast, Weiss, and Jakobsen (2001) suggest using a variety of unobtrusive methods to collect data along the dimensions of their proposed frameworks, including interviews, surveys, observations, content analysis, and discourse analysis.

The Action Evaluation Research Initiative

Another methodology that has been developed to evaluate a wide range of CRIs is called action evaluation research (Ross, 2001; Rothman, 1997, 2005; Rothman and Friedman, 2005; Rothman and Land, 2004). Action evaluation research refers to a process of creating alignment and clarification about the
goals of a CRI with a variety of stakeholders as a way of monitoring and assessing the successful implementation of a CRI (Rothman, 1997, 2005; Rothman and Friedman, 2005). The action evaluation process centers on three main sets of questions: (1) What long- and short-term outcome goals do various stakeholders have for this initiative? (2) Why do the stakeholders care about the goals? What motivations drive them? For trainers or developers of the initiative, what are the theories and assumptions that guide their practice? (3) How will the goals be most effectively met? In other words, what processes should be used to meet the stated goals?

These questions form the baseline, formative, and summative stages of the research. At the baseline stage, the action evaluator engages project members in a cooperative goal-setting process. The action evaluator collects data from all members using online surveys and interviews and then feeds back the data to the group with the purpose of creating a baseline list of goals that all stakeholders can use to monitor and evaluate the success of the CRI over time.

As the CRI is implemented, the action evaluation process enters the formative stage in which participants reflect on the action that has been taken so far, refine their goals as needed, and identify obstacles that need to be overcome in order to achieve the goals. The formative stage is an ongoing process of refinement and learning rather than a discrete, one-time process. The methods used at the formative stage include an on-line project log in which members can communicate with one another about important events, problems, and ideas; an on-line diary in which participants communicate directly with the action evaluator about ideas and concerns; critical incident stories in which participants enter particularly positive or challenging events into a project database; and interviews conducted with participants. Once again, the action evaluator feeds back the data collected to the group members and works with them to continue to clarify the goals of the initiative, monitor progress toward the goals, and direct future work. At this stage, a progress report is created that compares the data collected so far with the baseline stage goals. The report addresses questions such as towards what goals has observable progress been made? What new goals have emerged over time? Where have problems and obstacles occurred? The action evaluator helps participants assess the obstacles and make changes to address them as needed.

The summative stage occurs as a CRI reaches its conclusion or another natural point at which it makes sense to more formally evaluate the results of the CRI. At this stage, participants use the goals created at the baseline and formative stages to establish criteria for retrospective assessment of the CRI. As participants review their goals and examine whether they have reached them, they identify what worked well and what they would do differently to improve other similar CRIs in the future.
We now look at several research studies conducted to evaluate a variety of CRIs in different types of environments.

**Comprehensive Peer Mediation Evaluation Project**

The Comprehensive Peer Mediation Evaluation Project (CPMEP), conducted by Jones and her colleagues, involved twenty-seven schools with a student population of about twenty-six thousand, a teacher population of approximately fifteen hundred, and a staff population of about seventeen hundred (Jones, 1997). They employed a three-by-three design: three levels of schools (elementary, middle, and high school); each level of school was exposed to either peer mediation only (a “cadre program”), peer mediation plus (a “whole school program”), or no training at all (“control groups”). The training and research occurred over a two-year period.

The following draws on the report’s summary of general conclusions:

- Peer mediation programs yield significant benefit in developing constructive social and conflict behavior in children at all educational levels. It is clear that exposure to peer mediation programs, whether cadre or whole school, has a significant and lasting impact on students’ conflict attitude and behavior. Students who are direct recipients of program training benefit the most; however, students without direct training also benefit. Exposure to peer mediation reduces personal conflict and increases the tendency to help others with conflict, increases prosocial values, decreases aggressiveness, and increases perspective taking and conflict competence. These effects are significant, cumulative, and sustained for long periods, especially for peer mediators. Students trained in mediation, at all educational levels, are able to enact and use the behavioral skills taught in training.

- Peer mediation programs significantly improve school climate. The programs had a significant and sustained favorable impact on teacher and staff perceptions of school climate for both cadre and whole school programs at all educational levels. The programs had a limited to moderately favorable effect on student perceptions of climate. There is no evidence that peer mediation programs affected overall violence or suspension rates.

- Peer mediation effectively handles peer disputes. When used, peer mediation is very effective at handling disputes. There is a very high rate of agreement at all educational levels on satisfaction by both the mediator and disputants.

- The results do not support the assumption that whole school programs are clearly superior to cadre programs. The latter have a strong effect
on students’ conflict attitudes and behaviors, and whole school programs have a strong impact in terms of school climate. Based on this evidence, schools that cannot afford a whole school approach may secure similar, or even superior, benefits with a cadre program that is well-implemented.

- Peer mediation programs are effective at all educational levels.

It is important to recognize that not only was this study well-designed from a research point of view but also the conflict resolution training was well-designed and systematic. The training for the peer mediation only and peer mediation plus (whole school program) conditions is outlined here.

For peer mediation only:

- Grades trained included fourth and fifth (elementary); sixth, seventh, and eighth (middle); and ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth (high school).
- Eighteen to twenty-four students were trained per school in year one, and a second group was trained in year two.
- A minimum of fifteen hours of training was given in elementary schools and twenty to thirty hours in middle and high schools. Training was completed in four weeks or less and took place at the beginning of the fall semester in each year.
- Each school had a site leadership team (SLT) of four or five adults, with at least one teacher, one nonteaching staff member, and (where possible) one administrator. The SLT was responsible for day-to-day implementation and oversight of the peer mediation program.
- Each training organization gave SLTs one day of front-end program implementation training and contacted SLTs biweekly to monitor program implementation, offer program activities, and debrief cases.

For peer mediation plus or whole school programs, in addition to the peer mediation training and activities, each whole school program received (1) curriculum infusion training and (2) conflict skills training for staff.

Regarding curriculum infusion:

- Six to eight hours of training were given, using a standardized curriculum.
- A select group of teachers were trained (voluntarily, although any teacher could attend the training), who committed to using at least one period (forty-five minutes) per week of class time to teach from the conflict curriculum.
• One or two teachers per grade in elementary schools and two teachers per grade in middle and high schools delivered the conflict training in curriculum infusion classes for at least one full semester following training.
• Participating teachers received ongoing contact and support from the training organization.

As for conflict skills training:

• It totaled six to eight hours of conflict skills training.
• It was offered to all adult staff of the school (teachers, nonteaching staff, and administrators).
• Curriculum infusion teachers and SLT members were required to attend.

**Negotiation Evaluation Survey**

The Negotiation Evaluation Survey (NES) is a time-delayed, multisource feedback approach to assessment and development of collaborative negotiation training and its effects on individuals and groups (Coleman and Lim, 2001). This approach uses a modified MACBE model (motivation, affect, cognition, behavior, environment) (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995) to assess change at the individual level in terms of conflict-related cognitions, attitudes toward the use of cooperative and competitive strategies, affect and behaviors, and at the group level in terms of conflict outcomes and work climate. In order to correct for self-report bias inherent in many evaluation tools, the NES was designed as a multisource feedback (MSF) tool, often referred to as a 360-degree feedback instrument (Church and Bracken, 1997). The MSF process elicits perceptions of a target person’s behavior from a variety of sources (in this study from questionnaires filled out by self, a close friend, a supervisor, and a subordinate).

The NES was used to evaluate the effects of the Coleman/Raider Collaborative Negotiation model, which was used in the twenty-hour Basic Practicum in Conflict Resolution course at Teachers College, Columbia University (see Chapter Thirty-One). In addition to using the modified MACBE model as an organizing construct for the survey, the authors identified the elements of the Coleman/Raider model and translated the elements into specific training objectives and then into measurable constructs that form the basis of the actual items used in the NES.

The study used a Solomon four-group experimental design with two treatment groups and two control groups. Both treatment groups received the training and a posttest survey, but only one took the pretest survey. Neither control group received the training and both took the posttest survey, but only one took the
pretest. No significant effects were found in any of the four groups from taking the pretest, and no interactions between pretesting and training were found.

Training was found to have a significant effect on participants’ collaborative negotiation behaviors, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, negotiation outcomes, and work climates. For example, as compared to participants who did not receive the training, those who received the training were found to have:

- More cooperative and less competitive attitudes toward conflict
- More use of opening, uniting, and informing behaviors (as opposed to attacking and evading behaviors)
- More constructive conflict outcomes and work climate one month after the training
- Fewer attacking and evading behaviors
- Fewer negative emotions

Regarding the multisource feedback approach, the study found that:

- Friends tended to be more candid evaluators of targets’ negotiation behavior, particularly as compared to subordinates and self-reports.
- Subordinates tended to be kinder in their ratings than friends and supervisors, perhaps resulting from power imbalances in their relationship to the target and the nonanonymous nature of the instrument.
- Supervisors tended to give more flattering evaluations than participants themselves, particularly in categories that might reflect equally on the supervisor’s skills (such as on conflict outcomes and work group climate).

In an extension of this evaluation research study, Lim (2004) conducted a study in which she had the participants engage in a two-party negotiation simulation three weeks after taking the posttest. Participants’ behavior and attitudes during the simulation were measured by blind raters (who coded tape-recorded verbal exchanges) as well as by participants’ self-reports regarding their own and their negotiating partner’s behaviors and attitudes during the negotiation simulation. She found that, compared to those who did not receive training, participants who received the training established a more cooperative climate in the simulated negotiation, did a better job probing for (as opposed to ignoring) the other party’s needs, demonstrated better active listening skills, and agreed to outcomes that better addressed both parties’ interests. Lim’s study also replicated the Coleman and Lim (2001) study and its findings were similar to the original study.
The Process Evaluation Approach

In extensive field research, Maoz (2004, 2005) used a process evaluation approach that assessed the extent to which CRIs promote relationships, behaviors, and interactions that fulfill the standards of social justice, equality, and fairness that they strive to achieve within the larger conflict setting. We describe here two separate but related evaluation research projects. The first project examined forty-seven CRIs that brought together Jews and Palestinians living in Israel in encounters supported by the Abraham Fund for Jewish-Arab coexistence. The project assessed the level of symmetry between the Jewish and Palestinian participants as well as facilitators in all forty-seven CRIs. Assessed symmetry was based on direct observations of each CRI by the evaluation research team who recorded interactions and verbal exchanges using a detailed coding sheet and instructions booklet. Each CRI was assessed on a scale ranging from one (maximum dominance of one side, in this case Jewish) to nine (maximum dominance of the other side, in this case Palestinian). A rating of five reflected symmetrical participation of Jews and Palestinians.

In addition, the CRIs were classified into two categories: CRIs that emphasize coexistence and similarities between the sides versus CRIs that emphasize the conflict and power relations between the sides. (The CRIs in the latter category generally emphasize the conflict and power relations in order to raise awareness about existing asymmetrical power relations and to modify participants’ construction of identity).

The process evaluation of the forty-seven CRIs found that:

- In the vast majority (89 percent) of CRIs both Jewish and Palestinian participants were equally active.
- With respect to participants, there was no significant difference in the degree of symmetry in initiatives that emphasized coexistence models versus those that emphasized the conflict and power relations.
- However, with regard to facilitators, only 45 percent of the CRIs had full or near symmetry between Jewish and Palestinian facilitators. In 45 percent of the CRIs, Jewish facilitators were rated as having medium to great dominance, while only a small percentage of Palestinian facilitators were rated as having medium to great dominance.
- With respect to symmetry between facilitators’ participation, there was a marked difference between CRIs that emphasized coexistence and similarities between the parties versus CRIs that emphasized the conflict and power relations. Approximately one-third of CRIs in the coexistence category were rated as symmetrical while approximately two-thirds of CRIs in the power relations category were rated as symmetrical.
CONCLUSION

This chapter was initially stimulated by the paucity of research on conflict resolution initiatives. While evaluation research on CRIs has expanded over the past few years, the continued lack of systematic research is due to a number of factors, including lack of adequate funding to support the kind of research that would be valuable to do. Another important factor is lack of appreciation of the large range of worthwhile questions that can be addressed by research and the research strategies that are available to address them. In response to this latter factor, we have sketched out a framework for thinking about the research possibilities related to CRIs and have provided examples of innovative methodologies that have been developed and projects that have been conducted in this realm.

Note

1. We use the term “conflict resolution initiatives” to refer to the diverse set of activities that fall within a broad set of conflict resolution programs such as training, mediation, dialogue groups, intergroup encounters, youth exchanges, and other programs that occur from the grassroots to the political levels.

References


It would be idle to assume that a single chapter can be a comprehensive guide to the gaps in the field of conflict studies. The thirty-six chapters preceding this one summarize the knowledge in this field, and the gaps undoubtedly greatly exceed the knowledge. In addition, future research is likely to follow unforeseen theoretical directions, leaving a chapter like this one in the dust. Nevertheless, I hope that this chapter will provide some guidance to those new to the field and some stimulation to seasoned scholars.

The chapter may seem quite one-sided to those who follow traditions other than my own. But there is no way around this. What I find most exciting and can think about most clearly are research issues that fit into my way of looking at the field.

I have divided the chapter into five sections: Origins of Conflict, Strategic Choice, Escalation, Third-Party Roles, and Readiness for Conflict Resolution. In addition to identifying questions that need attention, I will present some possible directions for answering these questions and some testable hypotheses, and I will discuss some of the research methods that are needed to move ahead.

**ORIGINS OF CONFLICT**

Conflict has its origins in either perceived divergence of interest with another party or annoyance from that party. In either case, the basic source of conflict lies in needs, which appear to be opposed to the other party’s needs (divergence...
of interest) or to be deprived or frustrated by the other party (annoyance). Needs can be superficial and individualized, as in the need for money, a new car, or fame. Or they can be basic and shared by all humans, as in the need for food, shelter, security, identity, dignity, and control over one’s life (Burton, 1990). Some writers have argued that severe, intractable conflicts can usually be traced to the last four needs in this list (Coleman, 2000).

Most conflict scholars recognize that need deprivation is not sufficient, in and of itself, to account for the origin of conflict, because parties (individuals or groups) often endure need deprivation for long periods of time without engaging in conflict. Hence, two bodies of theory have been developed to explain how need deprivation produces conflict: relative deprivation theory and group mobilization theory. Both bodies of theory are supported by case studies (for example, see Davies, 1971) and are widely accepted in the field. But they are in need of further theoretical development and solid empirical testing.

**Relative Deprivation**

Relative deprivation occurs when need achievement falls short of a “reasonable” standard, such as what one has achieved in the past, what comparison figures have achieved, what law or custom says one deserves, or what one expects to achieve. Sociologists and social psychologists know a lot about the sources of relative deprivation but not much about its impact on behavior, including conflict behavior. For example, we know from laboratory experiments that people tend to compare themselves with others who are proximate or salient or who are similar to themselves in group membership, attitudes, values, or social status (Major, 1994). But there is little if any research about the effect of social comparison on social conflict.

The social psychological laboratory is a possible site for studies of this effect. Such studies could build on prior research about the impact of relative deprivation on cognition. The beauty of laboratory experiments is that they allow creation of novel conditions, precise operationalization of variables, and unambiguous assessment of cause and effect (Pruitt, 2005b). The design of such studies might compare three conditions: no deprivation, deprivation in the absence of a standard, and deprivation in the presence of a standard. The dependent variables could be such conflict behaviors as requests for improved outcomes, threats, and retaliation.

In addition to discovering whether and how much conflict behavior is produced under each condition, such studies should explore the mechanisms underlying these effects, such as whether relative deprivation has its impact by encouraging a sense of injustice and anger. The impact of various moderating variables should also be examined, guided by what is already known about the conditions encouraging relative deprivation.
If relative deprivation is established as an important antecedent of conflict behavior, follow-up research should examine the effect of the passage of time during relative deprivation. Casual observation suggests that people usually get used to relative deprivation after a while; hence, conflict behavior should diminish over time. Yet there also is evidence that dysphoric rumination may sometimes set in, producing an ever increasing sense of grievance (Baron, 2004). Theory and research are needed to establish the conditions under which each of these effects takes place.

Group Mobilization

By “group” is meant any set of people with a common identity who can communicate in some way and can take organized action. Groups, in this meaning, run all the way from small face-to-face friendship groups and workgroups to departments, organizations, organized ethnic groups, and even nations. While some of the phenomena differ from level to level in this hierarchy, there is considerable continuity across levels, especially in the realm of conflict.

How do the origins of intergroup conflict differ from those of interpersonal conflict? For one thing, relative deprivation must be understood in somewhat different terms. Questionnaire studies have found that readiness to participate in social protest actions is more closely related to collective deprivation, a sense that one’s group is not doing as well as other groups, than to personal deprivation (Birt and Dion, 1987; Guimond and Dubé-Simard, 1983). In addition, group mobilization is usually a forerunner of intergroup conflict.

Group mobilization theory (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1996; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) identifies a series of stages on the way to group action. First, individuals must become strongly identified with their group—the group must be an important part of their self-definition. Then they must develop a sense of group deprivation—a perception that the group as a whole has been victimized, that their own suffering and that of their fellow group members are part of a larger pattern. For this perception to lead to actual conflict behavior, group members must also be willing and able to pool their actions in a joint endeavor. This requires some level of group organization and the emergence of leaders or an activist subgroup that is willing to carry the group’s grievances to the adversary. These three stages—identity, perceived deprivation, and organization—tend to recycle. For example, leaders, once they emerge, often encourage increased group identity and greater perceived group deprivation.

Group mobilization theory is powerful and helps to explain a lot. But it is not very well developed, in the sense of understanding the processes that occur at each stage and the conditions that produce these processes. The field needs more case studies to understand these processes and some large-sample studies to test hypotheses about these conditions. Among the hypotheses that could be tested are Dahrendorf’s (1959) proposal that group mobilization occurs under
three conditions: (1) ease of communication within the group, (2) the availability of leaders to organize for group action, and (3) the absence of outside suppression of such leadership efforts.

One hesitates to propose that such hypotheses be tested with laboratory groups because of the complexity of the phenomena under study and the corresponding difficulty of developing an adequate laboratory simulation. Yet, as mentioned earlier, laboratory studies require clear operationalization of concepts, making them a good place to sharpen hazy ideas, such as those now found in the theory of group mobilization. Laboratory settings also make it easy to observe stages in the development of groups because they occur right before the eyes of the investigator.

Studies should also be done of group humiliation, in the sense of reduced group prestige in comparison to other groups, which has been suggested as a motive for a current spate of terrorist attacks. Research is needed to determine whether humiliation is indeed a powerful group motivator and, if so, what conditions produce its current, highly virulent form.

STRATEGIC CHOICE

Strategic choice theory (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004) holds that parties in conflict must choose among four strategies: contending, problem solving, yielding, and inaction. The first two are the most interesting. Contending, which involves such tactics as threats and coalition building, is aimed at defeating the other party. Because contending tends to elicit a comparable response from the other party, it often leads to failure to settle a conflict or to an impoverished solution that satisfies neither parties’ needs. Furthermore, contending may produce a conflict spiral, leading to escalation that hurts both parties’ interests—what Deutsch (2000) calls a “destructive process.” Problem solving, which is aimed at finding a solution that satisfies both parties’ needs, is in sharp contrast to contending. Problem solving encourages lasting settlements and improved future relationships between the parties.

There are many research findings on the antecedents of contending and problem solving (see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993, pp. 60–61, 104–117; Pruitt and Kim, 2004, pp. 42–60), most from the subfield of negotiation research. But some of the field’s assumptions about this matter are based on theoretical reasoning or on inferences from research on related phenomena. For example, Pruitt and Kim hypothesize that problem solving is fostered by faith in one’s own problem-solving ability, positive-sum (as opposed to zero-sum) thinking, momentum from prior agreement with the other party, and a belief that both parties are to blame for the conflict. Hypotheses such as these need to be tested.
Social psychological research suggests opposing hypotheses with respect to the impact of positive mood on strategic choice. The finding that positive mood encourages helping behavior (Isen and Levin, 1972) implies that it should also encourage problem solving, but the finding that positive mood encourages blame of the adversary (Forgas, 1994) implies just the opposite. This contradiction needs to be sorted out empirically.

Many conflict theorists believe that heavy contentious behavior, such as violence, is encouraged by moral exclusion of the other party, that is, by viewing the other as “outside the community in which norms apply, and therefore as expendable (and) undeserving” (Opotow, 2000, p. 417). Moral exclusion removes some of the main inhibitions that protect other people from one’s aggression. This body of theory is challenging but quite underresearched. Data need to be gathered on the psychological nature of moral exclusion, its precise impact on behavior, the conditions that foster it, and the conditions that encourage expansion of one’s moral community to include one’s adversaries.

Strategic choice theory has been criticized as an oversimplification, in that combinations of the four basic strategies are often found (Van de Vliert, 1997). Combinations of problem solving and contending are particularly common and are often quite beneficial. This is because problem solving requires that one be firm about one’s basic needs (while flexible about the means for achieving them), and contentious tactics are sometimes required to underline this firmness (Druckman, 2003). Furthermore, a vigorous defense of one’s position on certain issues, in contrast to others, may help the other party understand one’s priorities and thus locate an acceptable exchange of concessions. The basic research question here is what sorts of contentious tactics, employed in what ways, complement a problem-solving approach without courting escalation?

In partial answer to this question, Pruitt and Kim (2004) have put forward some testable hypotheses about how to make threats that do not provoke escalation: (1) combine threats with promises, employing both the carrot and the stick; (2) employ legitimate threats, such as those from a judge; (3) employ deterrent, rather than compellent threats. “Deterrent threats request that Other not take a particular action, while compellent threats request that Other take a particular action (p. 75).” Two other hypotheses might also be tested: (4) if compellent threats must be employed, give the other party a choice of possible actions, so as to avoid the appearance of pushing the other around; (5) employ threats that do not humiliate the other party or challenge his or her personal adequacy.

**ESCALATION**

In its original sense, “escalation” means movement from less extreme to more extreme contentious tactics by one or both parties to a conflict. We can also speak of “level of escalation,” which means the severity of contentious tactics
that are being used in a conflict. By no means do all conflicts escalate. But those that do sometimes become severe and intractable, causing suffering by the conflicting parties and annoyance to the surrounding community.

Movement from less escalated to more escalated tactics often goes through a series of intermediate stages, in what can be called an “escalation sequence.” There are two types of escalation sequence, unilateral and bilateral (Pruitt, 2005a). In unilateral sequences, only one party escalates, whereas in bilateral sequences the parties escalate in tandem.

Unilateral Escalation

In a laboratory experiment on unilateral escalation sequences, my students and I (Mikolic, Parker, and Pruitt, 1997) studied reactions to persistent annoyance by having confederates of the experimenter withhold supplies needed by the participants to complete a project. The data were based on a content analysis of telephone messages to the confederates. Most participants tried to get the supplies by means of the following orderly progression of tactics: requests, demands, angry statements, threats, harassment, and abuse. Escalation stopped at different points in this progression. Some participants made only requests; others, requests and then demands; still others, requests, then demands, then angry statements, and so on. Groups, on the whole, escalated farther than individuals—following the same orderly progression of tactics.

This study raises several questions requiring further research. The most basic question concerns why persistent annoyance so often produces escalation. There are at least three possible answers to this question, which need empirical testing. One is that people may reason that if a less extreme tactic fails to stop the other party from being annoying, a more extreme tactic may do so. A second answer is that people may become more angry and aroused over time, which should make them more aggressive. A third answer is that moral exclusion may increase because the other party is seen as increasingly guilty of a transgression.

A second question concerns how to account for the orderly sequence of tactics seen in this study. Perhaps it reflects a widely shared escalation script. Or there may be increasing levels of inhibition associated with the tactics in this sequence, so that as moral exclusion develops, they are accessed in order. A third question concerns the generality of these findings. We know that severely escalated tactics are sometimes adopted without going through intermediate levels. At one moment, the Japanese are making demands in a negotiation; at the next moment, they are bombing Pearl Harbor. The challenge is to identify the conditions that promote a precipitous escalatory jump as opposed to an orderly escalative progression. A fourth question concerns the level at which parties stop escalating. Why did groups escalate farther than individuals in our study? And what conditions or personality traits caused some of individuals to stop escalating at the level of demands while others went all the way up to threats?
These questions are worth answering because unilateral escalation is a common phenomenon in social conflict. Research to answer them can probably use our laboratory paradigm for a while longer, but generality studies in other settings will eventually be needed.

**Processes Involved in Bilateral Escalation**

Bilateral escalation sequences usually develop through conflict spirals entailing repeated retaliation and counterretaliation, or defense and counterdefense. Thus, a frustrating management policy might produce criticism by an employee, provoking disciplinary action such as failure to grant a raise. The indignant employee might then talk to the press, being fired as a result.

It is possible for conflict spirals to go round and round without advancing in level of escalation. For example, I yell at you . . . you yell at me . . . I yell at you . . . you yell at me. Contentious tactics are being used, but they are not getting any heavier. This raises an important theoretical question: under what conditions and through what processes do conflict spirals produce bilateral escalation rather than simply going round and round?

One possible answer to this question is that bilateral escalation occurs if the participants in a conflict spiral see the situation as one of persistent annoyance. Escalation will then occur for one or more of the reasons suggested in the last section. For that to happen, each party must see the other as responsible for every new round of the conflict spiral, a phenomenon called *biased punctuation*. An objective observer would see the conflict spiral as $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow A \rightarrow B \rightarrow A$, where $A$ is party $A$'s contentious behavior, $B$ is party $B$'s contentious behavior, and the arrows denote perceived causation. But the parties punctuate the sequence differently, with each of them seeing the other's input as the driving force in every round. Party $A$ sees the sequence as $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow A$, and Party $B$ sees it as $A \rightarrow B$. In addition, bilateral escalation may sometimes occur if only one party engages in biased punctuation, provided that the other party matches the first party's level of escalation at each new round of the spiral.

Biased punctuation has often been discussed by conflict theorists (for example, Kramer, 2004), but research on this topic appears to be nonexistent. If this is indeed a source of bilateral escalation, we need to know the conditions under which it occurs and the processes by which it develops.

Another possible answer is that bilateral escalation occurs when each round of the spiral produces structural changes in one or both parties or in the community surrounding them. My colleagues and I (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994) have put together a theory about structural change, which is based on earlier speculative conflict literature and on social psychological research about related issues. This theory, which is now outlined, is very much in need of empirical test.
Some structural changes are in the psychological realm. Hostile attitudes and perceptions set in, trust takes a nose dive, and new, more competitive goals develop. It becomes important “to look better than, punish, discredit, defeat, or even destroy” the other party (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 109).

If groups are involved in a conflict spiral, changes may also occur in normative and social structures within the groups. Hostile attitudes, perceptions, and goals are accentuated by group discussion, through the process of group polarization. (See Isenberg, 1986.) And these psychological states often become group norms, which are perpetuated by the processes of norm enforcement. Furthermore, groups may become more mobilized as a reaction to continued conflict; and it is often hard to put the genie back into the bottle once strong group identities are formed, group grievances are crystallized, group leaders emerge, or activist subgroups are formed. Group mobilization is, first and foremost, a contributor to the development of intergroup conflict and, hence, may at times lead to problem solving rather than escalation. But it often leads to escalation, especially when militant leaders and subgroups emerge.

Structural changes may also occur in the community surrounding the parties. In continuing conflict, community members are often pulled into one side or the other of the controversy, a phenomenon known as “community polarization.” The resulting social support reinforces both sides’ sense of grievance and hostility toward the other side and can strengthen their capacity for aggressive action, encouraging escalation. Community polarization also erodes the ranks of neutrals who might otherwise try to dampen the two sides’ tactics and mediate the conflict. The Cold War division of the world into supporters of the Soviet Union and of the West is a good example of community polarization.

**Conditions That Encourage Bilateral Escalation**

An important question remains: under what conditions will the processes just described go forward and produce bilateral escalation? Other related questions concern determinants of the rate of escalation and how severe it will become.

Some testable answers to these questions can be derived from social psychological research on the antecedents of aggression. (See Berkowitz, 1993.) For example, people who have been annoyed become more aggressive when they have been recently angered, are autonomically aroused, are under the influence of alcohol, or are so rushed that they don’t have time to think. They become less aggressive when they are in a good mood or are engaged in competing activities. Impulsive individuals and those with high, unstable self-esteem are easily provoked, while people with strong needs for social approval are not. All of these conditions are potential contributors to, or detractors from, bilateral escalation, especially if found on both sides of the conflict.
Relationships between individuals are also important. Several studies (for example, Bradbury and Fincham, 1992) have shown that people in distressed marriages are prone to retaliate when annoyed. Since retaliation is at the base of conflict spirals, this suggests that bilateral escalation should be greater in distressed marriages and other hostile relationships, a testable hypothesis.

Positive relationships presumably have the opposite effect. An old study by Back (1951) adds an intriguing twist to this speculation. He found some evidence that more cohesive groups (involving more positive relations between the members) engage in more conflict but are less prone to escalation. This suggests that strong, positive interpersonal relationships provide enough security that people feel free to raise issues with one another but they inhibit the use of heavy contentious tactics. Back’s study needs to be replicated and extended with modern research methods.

Although our study (Mikolic, Parker, and Pruitt, 1997) showed that groups move to higher levels of unilateral escalation than do individuals, it is not clear that they are more prone to bilateral escalation. Groups tend to be more insightful about solving the problems they face, which suggests that they may be less prone than individuals to fall into the trap of biased punctuation. Clearly, research is needed on whether groups become more involved or less involved in bilateral escalation.

Pre-existing community structure may also be important in determining whether communities hold together or polarize in the face of conflict between subgroups. The issue is whether the bonds between community members are predominantly crosscutting or overlapping (Kriesberg, 1973). In a heavily crosscutting structure, important members of most subgroups are bonded (for example, are members of the same clubs or political parties) to members of most other subgroups. In a heavily overlapping structure, subgroup members are bonded only to other members of their own subgroup.

There has been some research on this issue. Comparative case studies by Coleman (1957) and Varshney (2002) suggest that communities with crosscutting structures are much less prone to escalation than those with overlapping structures. Laboratory research by Vanbeselaere (1991) shows that the effects of crosscutting are partly psychological—members of one group who are bonded to members of another group are reluctant to use harsh tactics in dealing with that other group. But Varshney’s study of conflict in Indian cities suggests a more dynamic account, that people with crosscutting ties often take actions designed to head off impending escalation, such as curbing the rise of militant leaders.

Again, there is room for research on this topic. Varshney’s discussion of these counterescalative actions is quite brief, suggesting the need for more case material on the processes by which crosscutting structures have their effect. Laboratory research on the conditions and processes underlying bilateral escalation
should also be done. What is needed is a laboratory simulation where we can examine the complex interaction of variables and make careful real-time measurements of escalation as it unfolds. Simple laboratory games like the prisoner’s dilemma were once thought to provide such a simulation, and some things were learned in these studies (Pruitt, 1998). But these games are too simplified to allow most of the complex processes just described to go forward. Clearly, the field is in need of a new laboratory paradigm.

MEDIATION

Mediation can be defined as third parties helping disputants resolve their differences. Mediation may be formal, in the sense of involving specially trained third parties who offer their services to the public, or emergent, in the sense of involving third parties who are drawn from the same social milieu as the disputants.

Multiple Mediators

Sometimes more than one mediator is involved with a dispute. For example, in formal comediation, two trained mediators are assigned to a case. These mediators often differ in characteristics that reflect differences between the disputants, for example, a black and an Hispanic mediator when one disputant is black and the other Hispanic. The pluses and minuses of comediation need theoretical analysis and empirical test.

In emergent mediation, two or more mediators may form a communication chain between the disputants; for example, in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s, a chain went from Sinn Fein (the political wing of the Irish Republic Army) to the SDLP (a moderate Catholic political party) to the government of Northern Ireland and thence to the government of Great Britain (Pruitt, forthcoming). It can be argued that such chains serve two functions: (1) there is greater understanding and trust between parties adjacent in the chain than between the parties at either end, and (2) chain length makes it hard for outside observers to detect that sworn opponents—the parties at either end—are communicating with each other. Research is needed to fully understand the functions of such chains, the conditions under which they form, the extent of their success, and how chain users cope with the inevitable distortions in messages that are transmitted through chains.

Sometimes disputants communicate with each other through several mediators or mediator chains simultaneously. For example, during part of the time in which the chain just described was operating, Sinn Fein and the British government were also communicating through a mysterious individual known as the “contact” (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996). Scholarly opinion differs on
whether such multiplicity contributes to (Pruitt, 2003) or detracts from (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999) successful conflict resolution. This dispute needs to be sorted out both theoretically and empirically.

Rival Approaches to Mediation

Until recently, there has been a single, standard approach to mediation. (For example, see Kressel, 2000.) Mediation has been viewed as assisted negotiation, the goal being to help the disputants reach a viable agreement. The favored method has been guided problem solving. The mediator helps the parties locate the interests (goals, values, needs) underlying their initial positions and their priorities among these interests. Then a search is made for options that satisfy these interests and priorities. If the parties are unable to devise such options, the mediator throws out suggestions, but the final decision must be by agreement between the parties.

This standard approach has recently been challenged from a number of directions. A friendly amendment comes from writers who stress the importance of perceived justice in both negotiation and mediation (Conlon, 2006; Tyler and Blader, 2004; Zartman, and others, 1996). The argument is that disputants are as concerned about justice as about satisfying their interests. Hence, if one or both parties feel that they are suffering an injustice, the standard approach to mediation may produce no agreement or an agreement that is not followed. There are at least three kinds of perceived justice to which the mediator must attend. One is distributive justice, a sense that the outcome is equally favorable to both parties or more favorable to the party with a more legitimate claim; the second is procedural justice, a belief that the mediation session was conducted fairly; and the third is interpersonal justice, a perception that the mediator was sensitive, polite, and respectful. Several studies, including one by Lind, Kulik, Amtrose, and de Vera Park (1993) have demonstrated the importance of procedural justice for success in mediation. But empirical work is still needed on the other two forms of justice and on the question of whether one form of justice can substitute for another.

The standard approach to mediation is more radically challenged by two other new schools of practice. One is narrative mediation, which sees the basic job of the mediator as flushing out and restructuring the parties’ narratives—the stories they tell about the history of the conflict and how they think, feel, and speak about it (Cobb, 2003; Winslade and Monk, 2001). Narrative mediators have little use for the traditional effort to discover the parties’ interests, because they view these interests as deriving from narratives and as likely to change when the narratives change. Agreements may be reached as a result of narrative restructuring, but that is not the basic goal of mediation, which is to improve the parties’ capacity to deal effectively with each other.
Contingent Mediation

The other dissenting voice comes from proponents of transformative mediation (Bush and Folger, 2005). Transformative mediators seek to improve the relationship between the parties and to give the parties a sense of empowerment rather than to find a viable agreement. Their technique is very nondirective. They provide little structure and no advice, instead encouraging the parties to make their own decisions and helping them to understand their own and the other party’s viewpoints.

There is considerable evidence favoring the claims of traditional mediation (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). By contrast, narrative mediation and transformative mediation have not yet been evaluated empirically. Laboratory research does not seem appropriate for this purpose unless one can bring experienced mediators and genuine disputes into the laboratory, which is likely to be very difficult. A more plausible setting would be a community mediation center that uses all three types of mediation, if such could be found. Otherwise, centers specializing in each kind of mediation would have to be used.

What is needed first is a careful study of how traditional, narrative, and transformative mediators actually behave, to pinpoint similarities and differences. Then a comparative study should be done, in which several mediators of each type handle several cases. This study will be stronger if the cases are randomly assigned to the mediators so that there are minimal differences between mediators in the types of cases handled. Mediation centers are not always happy about random assignment (Pruitt, 2005b), but my students and I were successful in one such study (McGillicuddy, Welton, and Pruitt, 1987).

Finding common measures of success for the three methods is likely to be a challenge, since the proponents of these methods have different goals. But one would certainly want to measure disputant satisfaction, adherence to any agreement reached, and long-term improvement in the relationship and the ability to cope with future conflict.

Contingent Mediation

Advocates of the three contrasting traditions just discussed usually assume that their method fits all cases. But this assumption is highly questionable, considering the variety of conflicts that go to mediation. Contingent mediation, involving diagnosis followed by a choice among treatments, makes more sense.

A contingent approach is taken by Gray (2006), who recommends discovering the frame with which disputants enter mediation and trying to change that frame if it is inappropriate. Possible frames include (a) a “sell my position” frame, in which the goal is to dominate the session; (b) a “power struggle” frame, in which the goal is to gain authority or win allies; (c) a “hierarchist frame,” which accepts top-down decision making as legitimate; (d) a “hopeless dialog” frame, which views the mediation as a waste of time; and (e) a “potentially
resolvable problem” frame, which is ideal for mediation. Gray’s diagnostic approach is plausible but needs evaluation.

Other advocates of a contingent approach challenge the notion that mediators should always try to improve the relationship between the parties—a major goal of narrative and transformative mediation. For example, Fisher and Keashly (1990, pp. 236–237), distinguish four levels of escalation that require different approaches to third-party intervention:

1. Discussion, in which the parties have a good relationship but are unable to solve a particular problem. Here, relationship building is unnecessary and traditional mediation is fully appropriate.
2. Polarization, in which “trust and respect are threatened, and distorted perceptions and simplified stereotypes emerge.” Here, relationship building should be attempted before moving to traditional mediation.
3. Segregation, in which the parties are competitive and hostile.
4. Destruction, “in which the main aim of the parties is to subjugate or even to destroy each other.”

At these last two levels of escalation, relationship building is not feasible, and the mediator should try to contain the conflict by taking firm steps to stop hostile action. If these steps are successful, it may be possible to work on relationships later. Firm action of this kind may require some element of mediator power.

Fisher and Keashly’s elegant model was developed in the context of international and ethnopolitical conflict, but it seems equally appropriate to conflict between individuals and between small groups. The model clearly needs empirical testing, preferably in several different settings. Taking firm steps to stop hostile action (which is also advocated by Saposnek [2006] for divorce mediation) is 180 degrees antithetical to the nondirective approach of transformative mediation, a discrepancy that needs to be sorted out empirically.

A contingent approach is also advocated by Dugan (2001), who suggests that the source of a conflict may lie at any of the following three levels: the issues under dispute, the relationship between the parties, and the broader social system. Many conflicts are initially presented as involving surface issues but on deeper probing are found to derive from a flaw in the social system. Thus a conflict between two brothers over an old piece of furniture may turn out to hinge on a cultural norm that the older son inherits his parents’ property—a norm that is accepted by the older brother and rejected by the younger brother (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Dugan argues that such conflicts cannot be solved by dealing with the presenting issue or trying to improve the parties’ relationship. Instead, the underlying structural problem must be addressed.
In a study of the mediation methods used by the National Institutes of Health Office of the Ombudsman, Kressel and Gadlin (2005) found evidence of a search for underlying structures similar to that prescribed by Dugan. In a series of case studies, they showed that the mediators began with a diagnostic phase in which they classified most of the controversies as deriving from one of three underlying difficulties: a dysfunctional communication pattern, a supervisor blocking the scientific autonomy of a rising new investigator, or weak program administration. In some cases, they were able to work on the underlying difficulty, while in others, the disputants insisted on a more superficial, issue-based approach. Similar diagnostic templates are sometimes used by family therapists, who classify cases as arising from such standard causes as parental blockage of adolescent efforts to break away or the husband retreats/wife pursues pattern of interaction.

It is possible that diagnostic templates are used by mediators in other settings as well. Conceivably, many professional mediators develop a typology of underlying causes in the realm of their practice and use this typology to diagnose new cases. If so, our field needs more in-depth comparative case studies like that done by Kressel and Gadlin and broader theoretical work once these case studies have been done.

**READINESS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

The basic question in this section is under what conditions does a heavily escalated, “intractable” conflict become ready for deescalation and, hence, for negotiation or mediation? A derivative question is what can third parties do to hasten this readiness?

A variety of answers have been given to these questions. Some authors advocate simple contact between the parties (Miller and Brewer, 1984). While this can be an effective remedy in mild conflicts, research suggests that it is counterproductive in highly escalated ones (Rubin, 1980). A second possibility is the development of superordinate (common) goals, which seem more important to both parties than the aims of the conflict. Case materials—the turnaround of U.S.-Soviet enmity when both countries began fighting the Nazis and Sherif’s boys’ camps (Sherif and Sherif, 1969)—suggest that this can be an effective solution. But compelling common goals are seldom available in intractable conflicts.

A third approach involves ordinary mediation or various kinds of problem-solving workshops. (For the latter topic, see Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 2002; Lederach, 1997.) Research suggests that formal mediators have great difficulty solving heavily escalated conflict (Kressel, 2000), and the problem would seem even larger for problem solving workshops, which usually do not include the main decision makers of the groups involved in the conflict. More research is
needed on the effectiveness of these methods but, as will be suggested for mediation, it seems likely that these methods are mainly useful in conjunction with other forces. A fourth approach, which was already mentioned, involves having powerful third parties (for example, United Nations peace keepers) pressure the disputants to stop fighting and start talking (Fisher and Keashly, 1990). This makes sense if such third parties are available and ready to serve, though much more research is needed on the details of how this works.

The present author (Pruitt, 1997, 2005c, forthcoming) has argued that a party’s readiness to deescalate and enter into negotiation or mediation (“readiness”) is a multiplicative function of its motivation to escape the conflict and its optimism about finding a mutually acceptable solution. This “readiness theory” is a restatement and extension of Zartman’s (2000) ripeness theory. Readiness theory focuses on the psychology of the individual actors (e.g., motivation to escape conflict) rather than the characteristics of the conflict system (for example, Zartman’s hurting stalemate). This focus and the assumption of a multiplicative function make readiness theory useful for building a set of testable hypotheses (Pruitt, 2005c), including the following:

1. Some level of readiness must be present on both sides for deescalation to go very far and for negotiation or mediation to start and be successful. The more severe the escalation, the greater must be the readiness.

2. Both motivation to escape conflict and optimism about finding a solution must be present for readiness to develop. However, greater motivation can compensate for lesser optimism and vice versa.

3. Motivation to escape conflict is a direct function of the perceived costs and risks associated with the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived likelihood of winning the conflict.

4. New leaders are more likely than old leaders to recognize that a conflict is producing unacceptable costs or risks or that it cannot be won. Hence, the likelihood of escaping an intractable conflict is greater at times of leadership change.

5. Optimism about finding a solution is greater when mediators are available. This hypothesis, in conjunction with hypothesis 2, implies that mediators are most useful for resolving intractable conflict when motivation to escape the conflict has developed on both sides.

These and the many other hypotheses in readiness theory (see Pruitt, 2005c) would best be tested in laboratory experiments, because of the need for careful control of independent variables and close monitoring of participant states of mind. Devising and running a laboratory simulation where they could be tested would be a major undertaking, especially if intergroup conflict was involved,
but it would be very worthwhile. Otherwise, a naturalistic setting would have to be found in which there were multiple conflicts of much the same kind and in which decision makers’ mind-sets could be measured. This would probably be more difficult to achieve than a laboratory simulation.

CONCLUSION

In the five sections of this chapter, I have identified a number of questions that need to be answered, outlined some possible theoretical directions for answering these questions, suggested some testable hypotheses, and proposed some research methods. In doing so, I am under no illusion that I have exhausted, or even made a significant dent in, the research program that is needed for our field. That would be impractical in a chapter of this length and probably impossible for any one scholar to achieve. Rather, I have talked about the issues and ideas I know best, presenting some of the directions I might take if I were embarking on another thirty years of research. (I am retired.) It is likely that another scholar would come up with a very different agenda. My only hope is that a few of you, my readers, will have found in this chapter an idea or two that will stimulate future research.

References


CONCLUDING OVERVIEW

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Eric C. Marcus

We begin the conclusion of this volume with a story of hope. For several years, our center, the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, cosponsored a course with our colleagues at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs on the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution at the United Nations. This was an innovative course, bringing eminent theorists and researchers from academia together with highly skilled international practitioners and encouraging lively dialogue among them. The students for the course were a mix of graduate students from Columbia and U.N. personnel.

In 1999, we began the course with a conceptual overview of Deutsch’s theory of cooperation and competition (see Chapter One) and discussion of its relevance for resolving international conflict. After providing a summary of the theory, we asked the students to work in small groups to apply the ideas from the theory to the emerging conflict in Kosovo (this was in January, prior to the NATO bombing campaign), with the objective of generating recommendations for the U.N. and for the international community.

At the conclusion of this exercise, one particularly articulate student, a military attaché to a U.N. ambassador, summarized his group’s discussion. He said they felt there were few feasible options to the crisis other than recommending that NATO threaten to bomb or use other force against the Serbians to stop the ethnic cleansing in the area. There was general consensus on this conclusion among the students in the class.
Three months later, at the final meeting of the course, Richard Holbrook (whose position as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. was at that time pending approval in Congress) spoke to the class about what was then current United States and NATO policy in Kosovo and Serbia. Holbrook spoke passionately for the need to continue the bombing campaign against the Serbs. His argument was detailed, articulate, and very convincing. After Holbrook concluded his statement, he left the room—but discussion of the situation in the former Yugoslavia continued.

It was at this point that the same young attaché who had advocated bombing earlier in the term spoke again. He began by saying that he had been struck by something during Holbrook’s remarks: the fact that the military initiatives that were typically employed in these situations, such as use of bombing missions or sending in ground troops, were rarely successful in achieving their political objectives. The objectives, he claimed, in many such situations were to inflict enough harm on the general population that either the leadership feels its pain and acquiesces, or the people organize and remove the leaders. The use of military force, he said, as we had seen in Vietnam, Iraq, and now in Kosovo, rarely achieved these objectives. I paraphrase him: “The notion of bombing a village in order to save it, as in Vietnam, is insane. The Serbs are bombing Kosovo in order to save it, and we are bombing Serbia in order to save it. It simply makes no sense. There has to be a better way!”

He continued, as best I recall: “Every day I look at a map of Africa hanging in my office, and I think that if these are the types of solutions we have to offer the many conflicts on that continent, there will never be peace.” Here was an accomplished U.S. Marine, someone who had risen in the ranks of the military to a position of substantial importance, stating emphatically, “There has to be a better way!” In subsequent discussion with this student, he thanked us for the course and said that learning about constructive approaches to conflict had challenged his thinking about conflict resolution and peacemaking in important ways.

For more than seventy years, scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution have been searching for a better way. As is evident in the many chapters of this handbook, a great deal of progress has been made toward understanding conflict and resolving it constructively. However, a great deal of work remains to be done.

We find this opening story hopeful because it illustrates how education in conflict resolution, particularly when presented in practical terms to individuals who are in influential positions, can begin to have an important impact on our world. The story also points out, however, that there are no simple answers to complex conflicts and that we all must keep striving to find a better way.
THE CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD

In the last section of the Introduction to this handbook, Morton Deutsch outlined a series of questions that the field of conflict resolution has been, or is currently, addressing. In this, the Concluding Overview, we outline some of the questions and challenges that theorists, researchers, and practitioners of conflict resolution will face in their work in the years ahead. Many of the issues outlined here are themes that run throughout the book but are summarized here for purposes of clarity and to begin to set out a new agenda for scholar-practitioner collaboration in the field.

Oppression and Conflict

The first question is how can a field that holds notions of neutrality and egalitarianism so dear work constructively and ethically in situations where intergroup dominance and oppression are the norm? In the spring of 2005, the National Urban League released a study that reported that today, 142 years after the issue of the Emancipation Proclamation, the equality gap between Blacks and Whites in the United States continues to be substantial and in some areas is increasing. Black unemployment remains stagnant at 10.8 percent, while White unemployment dropped to 4.7 percent; the health status of Black Americans is 76 percent that of Whites; teachers with less than three years’ experience are teaching in minority schools at twice the rate that they teach in White schools; and Blacks are three times more likely to become prisoners once arrested than Whites. These are just a few examples of the extraordinary disparities in equality between groups that are becoming more and more pronounced worldwide. In the 1990s, the *Minorities at Risk Project* documented a total of 275 minority groups at risk for ethnopolitical conflict in 116 nations. This constitutes 17.4 percent of the world’s population who belong to groups disadvantaged due to discriminatory practices or currently politically organized to defend their interests. The links between such inequities and protracted conflict and violence cannot be overstated. (See Chapter Two by Deutsch on social justice, Chapter Five on power, Chapter Twenty-Three on violence, and Chapter Twenty-Seven on human rights in this handbook.)

The substantial scholarship on oppression, particularly in the social sciences, does an excellent job of describing the intractability of systems of dominance and conflict (see, for example, Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), but offers little utility for interrupting patterns of injustice or for sustaining constructive changes in the balance of power when they do occur. Thus, it becomes paramount for conflict scholars and practitioners in the field to identify the processes and conditions that can undo the dynamics of oppression at individual and group levels,
and thus enable constructive conflict resolution processes to work in tandem with those that promote justice.

Since 2002, we have conducted a faculty seminar at our center to explore and develop comprehensive conceptual models for addressing oppression and conflict. The main focus of the seminar has been on strategies that can ameliorate the increasing gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” in institutions and societies worldwide. This investigation culminated in a two-day working conference at Teachers College, Columbia University in spring 2004, which brought together eighty invited participants from a wide variety of academic disciplines (for example, economics, psychology, politics, and education) and professional practice areas (scholars, activists, philanthropists, students), focused on generating strategies for interrupting oppression and sustaining justice. The work from this meeting resulted in the development of a new cross-sector network of individuals interested in supporting each other in their work in this area, a Web site of the proceedings (see http://www.tc.columbia.edu/icccr/iosj.htm), and in a special issue of *Social Justice Research*, published in 2006. It was our hope that the outcomes of this conference would evolve and shape, enrich, or transform future research agendas on justice and conflict spanning across disciplinary boundaries.

Adam Curle (1971) proposed a practical model for conceptualizing the complementarities between justice-related activities (such as advocacy and consciousness-raising campaigns) and constructive conflict resolution. (See Lederach, 1997 for more detail.) He suggested that sustainable peace can be achieved progressively through four stages in situations characterized by oppression. In the first stage, conflict is “hidden” to some of the parties because they are unaware of the imbalances of power and injustices that affect their lives. Here, activities or events resulting in *conscientization* (erasing ignorance and raising awareness of inequalities and inequities) can move the conflict forward. An increase in awareness of injustice leads to the second stage, *confrontation*, when demands for change from the weaker party bring the conflict to the surface. Under some conditions, these confrontations result in the stage of *negotiations*, which is aimed at achieving a rebalancing of power in the relationship in order for those in low power to increase their capacities to address their basic needs. Successful negotiations can move the conflict to the final stage of *sustainable peace*, if they lead to a restructuring of the relationship that addresses the substantive and procedural concerns of those involved. This model emphasizes the essential relationship between conflict and justice and the important complementarities of these different areas of practice.

Readiness

The second question is how can readiness to resolve conflict constructively be fostered in individuals, groups, and nations?
This raises many issues, several of which were touched on in the chapters on personality, intractable conflict, training, change, and large-group intervention in this volume. However, many questions remain. People and institutions are seldom ready to undertake significant change. Yet competitive and avoidant approaches to resolving conflict are ingrained in many people and institutions; collaborative, integrative approaches represent a new way of thinking and acting for them. The collaborative approach generally goes against the prevalent competitive style of resolving conflict modeled in families, by the media, and by many of our leaders in sports, business, and government.

The first task is, quite often, simply to broaden people’s awareness that there are options available to them when in conflict other than to fight or flee. This is largely what most preliminary training or coursework in conflict resolution attempts to achieve: to increase people’s understanding of their own competitive or avoidant tendencies in conflict and of the fact that they have a broader menu of available options. For these educational experiences to be successful, it is important that they effectively engage and inspire students sufficiently to motivate them to try something new and to strengthen their skills at resolving conflict constructively.

A separate but related concern with regard to readiness has to do with our ability as third parties to assess and engender a degree of authentic readiness for disputants involved in a conflict. Collaborative negotiation and mediation are voluntary processes. They work only when the disputants engage in them willingly, by choice, if they are to help to make real progress toward understanding each other’s needs and reaching agreement. At times, disputants may “act cooperative” during a negotiation process, while having no intention of following through once an agreement has been reached. This is related to the distinction between compliance and commitment. (See Chapter Twenty for further discussion.) This is thought to have occurred at the Cambodian Peace Accords in the mid-1990s, an exemplary collaborative peace process that fell apart upon implementation because the parties reneged on the agreement. Work needs to be done on developing better methods of assessing and fostering disputants’ genuine willingness to collaborate and make peace.

Systems must also be readied. Research has shown that unless schools and districts are sufficiently motivated to embrace a change initiative such as instituting a program of conflict resolution training, it is likely to fail. This readiness must exist for a majority of the system, including regents, board members, superintendents, principals, teachers, other professional staff, students, and parents. One method for assessing organizational readiness in schools was used in the Learning Communities Project, initiated by the New York City Resolving Conflict Creatively Program, or RCCP (Roderick, 1998; see also the last part of Chapter Thirty-Six). For a school to be included in the project, 70 percent or more of the faculty must vote in favor of its implementation. This approach
could be taken for entire school districts or even for statewide school initiatives. Administrators and conflict practitioners need to work to develop innovative methods of assessing and fostering readiness throughout these and other systems.

Finally, awareness of constructive responses to conflict needs to be widespread among the general population. One way of attaining this is for the field to attempt educating prestigious individuals in high-profile positions within a given society. In 1995, a campaign was initiated in Australia through the leadership of the nationwide Conflict Resolution Network (CRN), which sought to influence the campaign process of local, state, and federal elections in that country. Their basic objective was to ensure high-level political dialogue by encouraging the candidates to adopt an orientation to issues, not insults; dialogue, not debate; and collaboration, not confrontation. Immediate response to the campaign was very positive, with 32 percent of candidates for their House of Representatives committing to the CRN conflict-resolving principles. In the United States, the League of Women Voters has been doing important work in promoting its Code of Fair Campaign Practices, which requires candidates for public office to commit to uphold basic principles of decency, honesty, and fair play.

These efforts hope to foster a new type of political process, and a government that models respect, care, and common sense in addressing the issues, conflicts, and visions of the people it represents. A general shift in attitude and response to conflict could come about if those in influential positions of high visibility (political leaders; sports, entertainment, and media celebrities; and business leaders) were to model constructive strategies and skills.

**Change Agents**

Third, how can we help people in the field of conflict resolution understand and develop skills in their roles as change agents?

The field is increasingly aware of the fact that very often conflict professionals have to act as change agents within the systems in which they work. Whether intervening in a professional relationship, a family, an organization, a community, or a nation, you will find it useful to think about conflict resolution systemically. This has two implications, one practical and one political. The practical concerns the need to broaden understanding of what we do. Much of the emphasis of past work in the field has been on training conflict specialists in the skills of getting disputants to the table, facilitating a constructive process, and reaching an agreement. However, there is increasing recognition of the problems that occur in implementation, both in helping to ensure that disputants can effectively implement their agreements and in implementing effective mediation and training programs within larger systems.

In the case of disputes between individuals, it is not uncommon for good agreements to fall apart because of problems with implementation or changes
that occur after the agreement is made. Conflict specialists need to be better trained to help disputants anticipate future problems and to build in feedback mechanisms so that if problems occur with implementation, the disputants will attempt to resolve them collaboratively or return to the table to work them out.

Considerable challenges can also occur in implementing mediation or training programs within systems. There is increasing recognition of the difficulties of implementing any lasting change in systems with regard to dispute resolution mechanisms and the need to identify the processes and conditions that give rise to successful implementation. Introducing cooperation and conflict resolution concepts and practices into systems often involves, in a sense, a paradigm shift in how people see and approach differences. Fostering this type of fundamental change in the norms and practices of a system requires that conflict specialists have the necessary skills to motivate and persuade, organize, mobilize, and institutionalize the change. These skills need to be adequately integrated into the training of conflict specialists who work in systems, particularly complex ones.

The second implication of defining our work in terms of change concerns the conflict resolver’s level of awareness of the political repercussions of his or her work. Intervening in part of any system in some way affects the whole system. If one department in an organization undergoes a substantial change in how it functions, this is likely to have an impact on the entire organization. It is therefore important for the intervenor to be informed about the political context in which she or he works and to be aware that the intervention has a likely impact on the balance of power existing within the system.

This is both a moral and a practical obligation. In *The Promise of Mediation* (1994), Bush and Folger discussed this issue under the heading “The Oppression Story” of mediation. They argued that in some settings, mediation can serve to oppress those in low power by masking patterns of injustice within systems or by allowing those in high power to set the agenda and intimidate. Conflict specialists must be trained to think in terms of the social and political processes within organizations and to reflect critically on their own role in the power dynamics within institutions so that they can work fairly and effectively. Furthermore, the moral obligation of the conflict specialist extends beyond understanding his or her impact on power dynamics and toward undoing systemic injustices that may exist.

**The Importance of Cultural Differences**

The fourth challenging issue is how can our growing recognition of the importance of cultural differences be used to improve the practice of constructive conflict resolution and to help develop practical theories in this area that are universally valid?

Most scientific theories and models of practice have the laudable aim of being universally true. Theorists commonly assume that the basic ideas in the theories
related to cooperation and competition, equity theory, social judgment, communication, self-control, persuasion, and so on are applicable to, say, the aborigines in Kakadu as much as to Park Avenue sophisticates, to people living in caves as well as to astronauts. However, most theories are developed in particular societies with their particular cultures, gender roles, and other characteristics that are often invisible to the theoreticians.

Theorists often do not articulate their assumptions about the relations between the theory and the social context in which it is to be applied. Does a theory developed in the United States implicitly assume that the social context is one in which there is a market economy and individualistic values are strongly held? If so, it may be applicable only in social contexts similar to the ones in which it was developed. There is a strong need for the field of conflict resolution, and the social sciences generally, to develop explicit knowledge about the social context that is assumed in its relevant theories.

Even if the basic ideas of a theory are applicable in a variety of social contexts, specific implementation of its ideas always depends on the characteristics of the social context in which they are applied. Thus, effective implementation of many of the theoretical ideas in this book depends on whether a practitioner is working in a social context (such as the American one) that is predominantly individualistic, has low-power distances, is strongly task oriented, has low uncertainty avoidance, and is masculine and modern or in a social context that differs significantly on any of these dimensions.

In general, scholars and practitioners can respond to these concerns in several ways. First, it is important that both scholars and practitioners be aware of their own gendered, cultural, and societal mind-sets with regard to their work. (See Fisher, 1988.) Kimmel (Chapter Twenty-Eight) offers a useful stage model for self-examination in this area along a dimension from ethnocentricism to understanding. Some degree of mindfulness of our own biases and assumptions can help us examine our theories, models, and practices for similar biases and make them explicit.

Second, a significant amount of work has been conducted in the last two decades on identifying the psychological dimensions on which people differ due to variations in culture, ethnicity, religion, and gender. (See Hofstede, 1980; Kolb and Coolidge, 1991; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Segall, Lonner, and Berry, 1998.) Conflict specialists working cross-culturally need to be informed about these dimensions and be mindful of how they affect the way people make meaning in conflict situations.

Third, scholars and practitioners need to better distinguish those elements of conflict resolution that are universal and therefore applicable across cultures from those that are not. For example, Deutsch (in Chapter One) has suggested that specific values such as reciprocity and nonviolence universally occur in enduring, voluntary, and significant relations of cooperation and constructive
conflict resolution. The cross-cultural universality of the linkage between such values and constructive conflict resolution is different from the culturally specific usefulness of certain prescribed processes (such as recommendations to “separate the people from the problem,” to openly express one’s needs, or to take an analytical approach to understanding the issues); these are likely to vary considerably across cultures, gender, class, and so on.

Lederach (1995) has suggested practicing an “elicitive” approach when offering conflict resolution training across cultures. He argues that “prescriptive” approaches to training, which view the trainer as the expert and participants as passive recipients of predetermined knowledge, models, and skills, are often inappropriate in many cultures. Lederach advocates an approach in which the context expertise of the participants is emphasized and combined with the process and content expertise of the trainer, so that the trainer and the participants together create a new model of constructive conflict resolution that is specifically suited to the resources and constraints of the particular social context in which the participants are embedded.

Conflict Within the Field of Conflict Resolution
Fifth, given the existence of much conflict in the field of conflict resolution (as among the scholarly disciplines, among theorists, researchers, and practitioners; and among training programs and graduate studies for scarce resources—students, clients, grants, and so on), how can the field learn to better walk its talk and model how conflicts can be resolved constructively?

The field of conflict resolution has become, ironically, a fairly competitive arena. This competition and the resulting conflict between individuals, disciplines, programs, and institutions pose serious challenges to progress in our field.

For example, the various scholarly disciplines often approach conflict from contrasting perspectives. Take a dispute over water rights between two neighboring tribal groups. A social psychologist is first concerned with the characteristics of the parties, their prior relationship, the strategies and tactics they use in the dispute, their respective needs in the situation, escalatory dynamics, and so on. A legal scholar working in this area, however, is concerned with prior treaties or contracts, land rights, the existence of legal precedents, and so on. A scholar of international affairs may be oriented to contextual or structural factors such as the balance of power in the dispute or the national or regional sources and implications of the conflict. Scholars from anthropology, business, history, and economics may emphasize still other aspects of the situation.

At one level, these orientations are due simply to the varieties of educational training and task orientation. At a deeper level, however, beneath many of the disciplinary contrasts are ideological and value differences. If conflict is believed to exist within a unitary ideological frame (where society is seen as an
integrated whole in which the interests of the individual and society are one) as opposed to a radical frame (in which antagonistic class interests are seen as comprising society), it requires one kind of response and not another. Similarly, whether one’s primary orientation to conflict is competitive or cooperative dictates strategy.

These and other variations in how conflict is understood and approached typically come into conflict themselves when scholars or practitioners attempt to work together. These days, because many of the significant conflicts that societies face are rooted in political, economic, and social histories and are fueled by social psychological dynamics, we are finding that analysis and resolution cannot be adequately conducted from any one disciplinary perspective; a multidisciplinary framework is required. But the traditional reward systems and orientations of the disciplines lessen the chances for such an approach. Combining traditional disciplinary paradigms and methodologies with multidisciplinary ones is a daunting task, though an essential one if the field of conflict resolution is to offer effective solutions to some of the world’s most perplexing problems.

Second, there is growing concern in the field of conflict resolution over the substantial gap between theory and practice. As described by Deutsch in the Introduction, many practitioners of conflict resolution dismiss (or are simply unaware of) the contributions of theorists and researchers, particularly if the research challenges their own opinions or methods. At the same time, scholars often fail to use the expertise of highly skilled practitioners in their development of theory, and research designs often fail to take into account what practitioners and policy makers want or need to know. In fact, an evaluation of the eighteen, mostly university-based, Hewlett Theory Centers found that the work of most practitioners surveyed was largely unaffected by the important contributions generated by the various centers (theory, publications, and so forth). At the same time, much of the research conducted at these centers was found to be “removed from practice realities and constraints.” This lack of effective collaboration between scholars and practitioners hinders the development of the field and is a significant loss for both scholars and practitioners.

There exists an interesting problem when trying to enhance the connections between theory and practice. It is embodied in this handbook, which is geared more toward the scholarly, academic modes (learning through reading), rather than the practice mode (learning through doing). The issue is how can we foster the growth of knowledge in this field by using more practical modalities? We have made efforts on two fronts in this regard. One way we have done so in this handbook is by asking those trained in the knowledge aspects of conflict, but whose work lies primarily in its practice, to contribute chapters (see, for example, Burke; Sole; Bunker; Marcus; Raider, Coleman, and Gerson; and Bartoli and Psimopoulos). Though not an equal balance, we have strived for a greater contribution from
the practice side in this second edition of the book. A second way we have
strived to strengthen the linkage is that we have asked contributors to devote a
section of each chapter to the implications of their contributions to the arena of
practice.

A curious and related matter concerns the distinction between knowledge and
skill in the area of conflict resolution (a distinction written about by Sole in Chapter
Thirty-Five). Unlike other scholarly areas, in the field of conflict studies, we have
all experienced conflicts: within ourselves, with other people, within and
between groups we belong to, and so forth. That is, we have more skill prac-
tice than theoretical knowledge in both well and poorly resolved conflicts. So,
even the most scholarly oriented conflict student continues to have many oppor-
tunities to increase his skill by practicing with the very concepts he is studying.
This is less likely to be the case in other areas of scholarship (for example, the
study of comparative political systems). In other words, there is more of an inher-
ent connection between theory and practice in the conflict field.

The field will be well-served if we work harder at practicing what we preach
and learn to work together to resolve the conflicts that exist across orientations,
organizations, disciplines, and between theory and practice. There is much
strength in the diversity of our field, but we must come together to realize it.

Learning to Learn
The sixth challenge is how can we learn to learn about our methods and
practice?

The field of conflict resolution has been criticized for being broad, but not deep.
The issue is whether work in this area is both based on sound theoretical think-
ing and systematically studied and evaluated in a manner that allows the field to
grow. We believe this volume attests to the rich theoretical foundations of the field.
However, much of the practice of conflict resolution is not evaluated or poorly eval-
uated. This is a lost opportunity to learn from our collective work, to understand
the conditions under which certain tactics and strategies are more or less effective,
and to build on what is effective and discard what is not. This type of research is
still uncommon, despite its increase in the past ten years. (See Chapter Thirty-Six.)
Systematic evaluation of conflict resolution practices needs to be conceptualized
and implemented at the onset of intervention, not as an afterthought. Addition-
ally, there would be much benefit from longitudinal studies examining the long-
term effects of training and mediation programs.

Encouraging Innovation
Finally, how can we foster creative innovation in our thinking and our practice
of resolving conflict constructively?

Betty Reardon, a renowned peace educator, has stated that “the failure to
achieve peace is in essence a failure of the imagination.” In addition to studying
what we already do, it is essential that we develop new methods and ways of thinking about conflict that move beyond our current approaches. As the nature of the conflicts that we face changes, so must our thinking and our strategies for resolution. This often requires adopting a novel point of view. (See Chapter Seventeen.) We must continuously view our current understanding of conflict and conflict resolution as merely a beginning—the first few steps toward the much needed means for finding “a better way” of improving and enhancing human conflict interaction.

References


RECOMMENDED READING

CHAPTER ONE


CHAPTER TWO


**CHAPTER THREE**


**CHAPTER FOUR**


**CHAPTER FIVE**


**CHAPTER SIX**


**CHAPTER SEVEN**


**CHAPTER EIGHT**


884 RECOMMENDED READING


**CHAPTER NINE**


**CHAPTER TEN**


**CHAPTER ELEVEN**


CHAPTER TWELVE


CHAPTER THIRTEEN


CHAPTER FOURTEEN


CHAPTER SEVENTEEN


CHAPTER EIGHTEEN


CHAPTER NINETEEN


CHAPTER TWENTY


**CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE**


**CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO**


**CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE**


**CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR**


**CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE**


CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX


CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN


CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT


CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE


CHAPTER THIRTY


CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE


**CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO**


**CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE**


CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR


CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN


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known, but after postdoctoral training, Deutsch received a certificate in psychanalysis in 1958 and conducted a limited practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy for more than twenty-five years.

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An anthropologist from Rome, he completed his Italian laurea (B.A.–M.A. equivalent) at the University of Rome, Italy, and his dottorato di ricerca (Ph.D. equivalent) at the University of Milan, Italy. He has been actively involved in conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy since the early 1980s as a member of the Community of St. Egidio (which he joined in 1970 and of which he is the representative in New York), focusing on Mozambique, Algeria, Burundi, Kosovo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). More recently, he coordinated CICR conflict resolution initiatives in Colombia, East Timor, Myanmar (Burma), and Iraq.

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Shelly Chaiken received her Ph.D. in social psychology in 1978 from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. She is a visiting professor in the department of psychology at the University of Minnesota and has held previous professorial appointments at New York University, University of Toronto, and Vanderbilt University. Her research has centered on social cognition, persuasion, and attitudes.

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